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THE BRAHMASŪTRAS AND THEIR PRINCIPAL COMMENTARIES

(A CRITICAL EXPOSITION)

VOLUME I

By

Śāstranidhi Dvaitavedāntarasajña

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

We have great pleasure in placing before Sanskrit Scholars and Students "The Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries" by Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, an eminent Professor of Sanskrit.

The importance of the Brahmasūtras in the evolution of Indian Philosophy need hardly be emphasised. In the present work, Dr. B. N. K. Sharma has critically examined the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, the great exponents of Indian Philosophy. Besides, Dr. Sharma has also introduced the niceties of their exposition by other distinguished commentators like Vācaspati Miśra, Amalānanda, Sudarśana Sūri, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha and others. The present volume covers the whole of the *Samanvayādhyāya* and the first Pāda of the *Avirodhādhyāya*.

The author has emphasised the Madhva view that "Śāstra" in the *Samanvayādhyāya* should be interpreted in a very broad sense and that the purpose of such *samanvaya* of Śāstra in Brahman is, as pointed out by Madhva, to expound the *Guṇapūrṇatva* or infinitude of Brahman, its Bhūmatva, its immanence in the universe (*Viśvāntaryāmitva*) and transcendence (*Viśvātītatva*) in all its completeness.

We are confident that this study of the Brahmasūtras by Dr. B. N. K. Sharma will prove an enlightening tool to the *Tarkarasikas* of both Indian and Western Philosophy.

J. H. DAVE
Hon. Director.

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,
Bombay-7

FOREWORD

विज्ञेयं परमं ब्रह्म ज्ञापिका परमा श्रुतिः ।
अनादिनित्या सा तच्च विना तां न स गम्यते (कात्यायनश्रुतिः)

It may not be usual to use the concept of revelation for understanding the Vedanta systems as a phenomenon of the history of philosophy. By revelation (*srutiḥ*) we mean that word that is believed to have been addicted to man as the transmitter of saving and liberating knowledge, whereby man is basically the receiving, listening part only. If we speak of this revelation in terms of texts, we understand here the last stratum of Vedic literature, the *Vedāntaḥ*, corresponding more or less to the older Upanisads, though strictly speaking, the canon of revelation is an ideal reality not necessarily confined to a special number of Vedic texts. For our purpose, it is irrelevant if Vedic literature as a whole or in later times even statements of other authoritative traditions are considered to be revelation. It is this formal concept of revelation (*Śrutiḥ*) because of its historical prototype traditionally called *Vedāntaḥ* that unites the historical diversity of the different Vedānta schools within the "power-lines of one field" and that makes it reasonable to call the various and philosophically heterogeneous systems by the one name "Vedānta".

Essentially, all Vedānta-systems of thought appear as theological rationally reflected exegesis of those statements which, belonging to the traditions of revelation, are conceived of as transmitting the liberating knowledge and are after a long process conceptually structured and for the first time brought into a system in the Brahmasūtras. In the form of the dialectical unity of original statement of revelation *and* its conceptual explication within the system of the Brahmasūtras, revelation became the historical basis and canon of the formation of concepts within the Vedānta-schools. Is it not this dialectical correlation which is meant by the words of Jayatīrtha when he says:

द्विविधं शास्त्रम्–निर्णीतं, निर्णेतव्यं च । तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मसूत्रादिकम् ।
द्वितीयं वेदादिकम् ।

a correlation which occurs again on the secondary level of the formation of systems?

In the course of history it remains the intention of the Vedānta-theologians to interpret this dialectic whole of liberating knowledge of revelation and its first conceptual structurizing in the Brahmsūtras in continuous efforts. Whether it is Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja or Madhva—to mention but the oldest extant commentators—all of them have tried to understand from their philosophical and religious position the venerable text of the Sūtras against revelation (*Śrutiḥ*) as the prospectus of interpretation and to prove through the canon of revelation their own philosophical thoughts as true expressions of the liberating knowledge contained in it. This is attested by the fact that beside the commentaries on the Brahmasūtras we find commentaries on the most important Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā—the inclusion of the Gītā obviously being a testimony of Theistic Vaiṣṇava trends in the Vedānta-tradition, from very early times onwards. These texts—at least conceived as ideal prototype, form as *Prathānatrayam* the basis and source of the Vedānta-tradition of thought, which on account of the mutual influence of revelation, contemporary philosophy and individual position of the respective thinkers was bound to develop into that historical pluralismus of a religious world-interpretation that is represented by the different Vedānta-systems.

It is this "power field" of the many Vedantistic explanations of the Brahmasūtras on the one hand and the original meaning of this first conceptual structurizing of saving knowledge of revelation (*śrutiḥ*) on the other hand, where the present work of Dr. B.N.K. Sharma takes its stand by asking for the original, i.e. the statements of revelation authentically interpreting sense of the Brahmasūtras. This question is answered from within the tradition of Madhva and his school starting from the Sūtra-interpretation of the great Ācārya. Confronting it with those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Madhva's often widely differing opinion is made clear as to its motivation and argumentation. Advantageously, the broad background of interpretation at disposition of this learned Savant in the field of Dvaita Vedānta includes the vast literature of subcommentaries—e.g. the Bhāmatī and Kalpataru for the Advaita, Sudarśana's Śrutaprakāśikā for the Viśiṣṭādvaita and the works of Jayatīrtha and especially Vyāsatīrtha and Rāghavendratīrtha for the Madhva-school of thought, to mention just the most important ones—offering thus a large amount of material unexplored until today, as most of these works are not accessible in translations and the authors of the

Madhvasampradāya have begun to gain the attention they deserve only in more recent times.

Only one who knows the difficulty of these texts from his own experience will be able to estimate the merit of this new work of the renowned scholar and do justice to its objective of ascertaining in one big project the Sūtra-interpretation of Madhva and his school and the historical controversy with the commenting-traditions of its opponents, *filling thereby a deeply felt gap in the literature of Vedānta-research.*

These modest words of introduction would remain incomplete if they do not mention the meritorious share of the Publishers, the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, who by including the work in the Bhavan's Series have given the author the good opportunity of publishing the results of a long research truly devoted to Bharatīya Vidyā, *which without their help would have remained inaccessible to the world of Indology.*

May this work written with scholarly honesty be well received in India and abroad. May its awareness of the problem of tradition and the implicit affirmation of the value thereof be incitement and programme to others, so that the proud word of Dharmakīrti may not become true of the learned author whom I may now leave with his readers:

वहति न पुरः कश्चित् पश्चान्न कोऽप्यनुयाति मां
न च नवपदक्षुण्णो मार्गः कथं न्वहमेकतः ।
भवतु विदितं पूर्वंव्यूढोऽधुना खिलतां गतः
स खलु बहलो वामः पन्था मया स्फुटमूर्जितः ॥

GERHARD OBERHAMMER,
Professor of Indology,
University of Vienna (Austria).

Vienna,
31st August 1971.

PREFACE

This work on the Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries is intended to enlarge the scope and widen the area of our present-day study of them and give it a greater depth of thought-content. At least three principal traditions of interpretation of these Sūtras have come down to us from the cogitations of the past. But except the commentaries of the Ācāryas Śaṁkara Rāmānuja and Madhva who founded them very little is known to modern scholarship of the work done by their renowned commentators like Vācaspati Miśra, Amalānanda, Sudarśana Sūri, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha and Rāghavendra Tīrtha, by way of exposition and reinforcement of their respective traditions of interpretation. Their writings are not accessible to modern scholars as there are no English translations of them. In the circumstances, creative thinking and writing on the interpretation of the Sūtras drawing ideas and deriving inspiration from a first hand study and examination of the valuable materials contained in these source-books have not been able to make any notable progress at the hands of modern scholarship, so far. And there is little hope of their being able to do so until the study of these Sūtras in our Universities and elsewhere and the literature produced on the subject are freed from the excessive influence of Śaṁkara's Bhāṣya, great as it is in many respects. It must be realized without any kind of mental reservation that the other interpretational traditions are entitled to the same scholarly interest, intensive study and attention. The conscience of modern philosophical scholarship in Vedānta does not seem to have awakened as yet to this realization. It is time to awaken it.

By way of gently but firmly disengaging the study of the Sūtras from the excessive hold of the Śaṁkara-Bhāṣya, I have taken the lead in commencing this study of the Sūtras with Madhva's interpretation. This may help the reader to adapt himself to looking at the Sūtras in

a fresh light regardless of what he has been conditioned to expect to find in them. In most of the known works in English, written specially on the Brahmasūtras, Madhva's interpretations have generally been ignored or have been only perfunctorily "noticed"; or else dismissed in a few words as "a performance of little or no merit." This injustice to one of our principal commentators on the Sūtras has to be remedied by the new generation of scholars. It would help very much to bring about a fresh climate of opinion to lay aside chronological considerations and study the Sūtras with Madhva's interpretations in the first place and then turn to those of the other two and note the difference and compare notes.

Thanks to Thibaut's famous review of the divergences in interpretation of the Sūtras between Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja, in the introduction to his translation of the Śamkara-Bhāṣya (1890), seminal ideas have emerged as to why Rāmānuja chose to establish a new tradition or revive an older one of Sūtra-interpretation. The philosophical world has been waiting since then for similar light to be thrown on the wider diffierences in thought and interpretation which separate the third principal interpreter of the Sūtras: Madhva, from his two illustrious predecessors in the field. I have tried to fill this gap to the best of my ability, without waiting indefinitely for the appearance of the ideal person to do the work.

Without a complete study of these three principal traditions of interpretation of the Sūtras, in their relation to one another, it would be difficult to have a clear and firm background of ideas and sufficient data for entering upon a valid discussion of the problem of where the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are intended to lead us. I hope the present study, which gives the different interpretations in their own authentic milieu and views them in relation to one another in the light of accepted principles, will be in a position to provide the indispensable background and the corpus of materials necessary for investigating the problems connected with these Sūtras.

Tho' each of these traditions has endeavoured to establish its own complete harmony with the Sūtras, the march of the history of Vedānta in India has made it possible for the tradition sponsored by Madhva and his commentators to enter much more incisively and in greater detail than the others, upon a critical and comparative examination of its own and the other traditions of interpretation of the Sūtras, while endeavouring to establish the consonance of its position with that of the Sūtrakāra. The most impressive work in this direction, it will be seen, has been done by Vyāsatīrtha in his *Tātparya-Candrikā*. Besides going fully into the organic details of each adhikaraṇa according to the

different interpretations, he examines them in the light of the language and wording of the Sūtras, their syntactic arrangement in the different interpretations and the nature, extent and admissibility of the liberties taken by the different commentators in resorting to *anuvṛtti, āvṛtti, apakarṣa, adhyāhāra, lakṣaṇā* and other devices permitted in the interpretation of aphoristic texts. He has also applied the test of *agatārthatā*, Adhyāya and Pāda Saṅgatis and of self-consistency in interpretation.

This is indeed a rigorous method of investigation and it should more than satisfy the requirements of modern critical scholarship, even if we hold with Thibaut that the question of what the Sūtras really teach is a critical, not a philosophical one. It would be a decided advantage to modern critical scholarship if it incorporates the best part of this critical method with its own, in its further investigation of the problems connected with the interpretation of these Sūtras.

We all owe an intellectual debt to the original path-makers and their expositors who have devoted all their time and energies to making these Sūtras intelligible to posterity, in their wealth of thought. This debt is to be discharged by studying their works in the originals and subjecting such a study to a process of *manana*. Such critical reflection as the process of *manana* would impose is sure to be rewarding in its results. As Vyāsatīrtha has put it, so aptly, it is not by licking the outer surface of sugarcane that we can taste and enjoy its sweetness but by squeezing it between the teeth and slowly imbibing every particle of its juice. No disrespect to the sugarcane is intended thereby:

न हीक्षुलेहनेनैव ज्ञात इक्षुरसो भवेत् ।
न चेक्षुदण्डं निष्पीड्य लब्धो नेक्षुरसो भवेत् ।।

It has not been an easy task to bring the scholastic idiom, forms of thought and arguments of the great commentators within the norms of a modern language and a 'foreign' one at that. But the effort seemed to me to be worth making and I am glad I have made it. In a subject like the present one, it is difficult to avoid what Prof. Joad has so aptly called the 'expression of obscurity'. But I hope I have not been guilty of 'obscurity of expression'.

The present Volume covers the whole of the first or the Samanvaya-Adhyāya of the Sūtras and the first Pāda of the second (Avirodha)-Adhyāya known also as "Yukti-pāda". The remaining parts of the work are expected to be covered in one or two more volumes.

It is my very pleasant duty to record my most hearty thanks to Prof. Dr. Gerhard Oberhammer, Professor of Indology, University of Vienna, Austria, for his stimulating Foreword.

My son Dr. Sudhindra K. Bhavani has helped me with the preparation of the Indexes and has checked the references and read the proofs at the initial stages. I thank him for his assistance.

It would have been impossible for me to get this book published but for the princely donation of Rs. 5000/- towards the cost of its publication bestowed for the mere asking by the Trustees of "Sri Gangābai Charities Trust", Madras, founded by the high-souled late Dharmabhūṣaṇa Sri K. Seetharama Rao, Founder of the Dasaprakash Group of Hotels and Dharmaprakash Group of Institutions, in sacred memory of his parents: Bhakta Sri Govinda Dāsa and Mātuśśrī Gangabai. To such overwhelming generosity, extended for the propagation of Adhyātmavidyā, there is only one way of recording one's gratitude and that is in the words of the Adhyātmaśāstra itself viz., भूयिष्ठां ते नमउक्तिं विधेम. I express my thanks to the Trustees of the Sri Gangabai Charities.

I am also beholden to the Management of the Ruparel College, Bombay, for its appreciative gesture in coming forward with its publication grant and to the revered Head of the Sri Palimār and Bhandārkere Maṭhas, Udipi: Sri Vidyāmānya Tīrtha and to the Head of the Sri Rāghavendra Svāmi Mutt, Nanjangud and to my friends for their support.

सत्यध्यानगुरुं नत्वा विद्यामान्यगुरुं तथा ।
तयोश्चरणयोः सेयमर्प्यते गुरुदक्षिणा ॥
ॐ तत् सत् ब्रह्मार्पणमस्तु.

B. N. K. SHARMA.

Bombay,
September 1971.

KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

ā	आ	t	त्
ī	ई	th	थ्
ū	ऊ	d	द्
ṛ	ऋ	dh	ध्
ḷ	लृ	n	न्
k	क्	p	प्
kh	ख्	ph	फ्
g	ग्	b	ब्
gh	घ्	bh	भ्
ṅ	ङ्	m	म्
c	च्	y	य्
ch	छ्	r	र्
j	ज्	l	ल्
ñ	ञ्	v	व्
ṭ	ट्	ś	श्
ṭh	ठ्	ṣ	ष्
ḍ	ड्	s	स्
ḍh	ढ्	ḥ	ह्
ṇ	ण्	jña	ज्ञ

ABBREVIATIONS

A.Ā.	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
AC	Abhinavacandrikā (Satyanātha)
adhi.	adhikaraṇa
Ait. Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV	Anu-Vyākhyāna
B.	Brahman
BD	Bhāṣya-Dīpikā (Jagannātha Tīrtha)
B.G.	Bhagavad Gītā
Bhāg	Bhāgavata
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B.S.B.	Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
C.	Commentary
Chān. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
D.M.S.	Daivī Mīmāmsā Sūtras
G.B.	Gītā-Bhāṣya
G.T.	Gītā-Tātparya
HDSV	History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature
His. I. Phil.	History of Indian Philosophy
J.	Jayatīrtha
JNMV	Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara
Kauṣ. Up.	Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad
M	Madhva

Mbh.	Mahābhārata
Mbh. T.N.	Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya
Māṇḍ. Up.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Muṇḍ. Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
N.	Nimbārka
NS	Nyāya-Sudhā
NSP	Nyāyasudhā-Parimala (Rāghavendra Tīrtha)
NSG.	Nyāyasudhā Gurvarthadīpikā (Vādirāja)
Pāṇ.	Pāṇini
PP	Pañcapādikā
PV	Pañcapādikā-Vivarṇa
PMS	Pūrvamīmāṁsāsūtras
RV	Ṛg Veda
Raghu. TPB(h)	Raghūttama: Tattvaprakāśikā-Bhāvabodha
Rāgh. TPB	Rāghavendra: Tattvaprakāśikā-Bhāvadīpa
R	Rāmānuja
S	Śaṁkara
Śvet. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T.Ā	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TC	Tātparya Candrikā (Vyāsatīrtha)
TCG	Tātparyacandrikā-Gururājīya (Keśvācārya)
TCP	Tātparyacandrikā-Prakāśa (Rāghavendra)
TD (TPD)	Tattvapradīpa (Trivikrama Paṇḍita)
TM.	Tattvamañjarī (Rāghavendra)
TDP	Tantradīpikā (Rāghavendra)
TP	Tattvaprakāśikā (Jayatīrtha)
TPG	Tattvaprakāśikā-Gurvartha-Dīpikā (Vādirāja)
TS	Tattvasaṁkhyāna (Madhva)
TT	Tarkatāṇḍava (Vyāsatīrtha)
Up.	Upaniṣad
Up. Kh.	Upādhi-Khaṇḍana (Madhva)
V.	Vallabha
VP	Viṣṇu-Purāṇa
Y.	Yājñavalkya

To

My beloved Son

PURANDAR

श्रीमतां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तिस्रो व्याख्यानपद्धतीः ।
विवृणोमि यथाप्रज्ञमधीतस्य शुशुत्सया ।।
अनेन ज्ञानयज्ञेन यत्पुण्यमुपचीयते ।
स्वर्गे समेधतां तेन प्रियः पुत्रः पुरन्दरः ।।

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE COMMENTATORS

1. **Śamkara** (768-820) the grand-disciple of the famous Gauḍapāda was the first illustrious Māyāvāda commentator on the Brahmasūtras. His Bhāṣya is copious and is written in a very lucid and animated style. Among commentators, he is supremely eloquent and wields his logic with admirable effect and persuasiveness. He makes clever use of the doctrine of Adhyāsa, of the double-decker theory of Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahmans, of mithyābheda and pāramārthikābheda etc., in the interpretation of the Sūtras and of their philosophy. Śamkara came from Kerala in South India.

2. **Padmapāda** (C. 800) was Śamkara's favourite disciple. His *Pañcapādikā* is admittedly the earliest erudite c. on Śamkara's Sūtrabhāṣya. Its title suggests that it was designed to cover the entire first Adhyāya and the opening Pāda of the second. Unfortunately, only the portion relating to the first four Sūtras of the first Adhyāya is now extant. Tradition ascribes the loss of the other parts to the jealousy of some fellow disciples. Judging from the quality of the extant portion, it must be acknowledged that the loss, if true, is a serious one.

3. **Vācaspati Miśra** (C. 850) This great son of Mithilā stands unrivalled as the greatest expositor of the entire Śamkara-Bhāṣya on the Sūtras. His *Bhāmatī*, supposed to have been named after his wife, is a brilliant commentary and exposition of the master's philosophy. It is as luminous as it is voluminous. Vācaspati does not err on the side of moderation. He is fond of literary embellishment which perhaps comes to him unsought. His erudition in the Śāstras is well-known and authenticated by standard commentaries and works on Sāmkhya, Yoga, Mīmāmsā and Nyāya. The half-formed Vivarta interpretations in Śamkara's Sūtrabhāṣya receive their resplendent and full-throated

expression from Vācaspati. He upholds the position of Jīvāśrita-ajñānavāda as against the view of Sarvajñātman and others. The 'fluid' state in which Śamkara himself had left many of the concepts and categories of his system in his Bhāṣya gave room for sharp divergences in interpretation and elaboration to his commentators and paved the way for the emergence of distinctive schools of interpretation within the fold of Śamkara-Vedānta.

4. **Prakāśātman** (C. 1000) author of a very learned c. on Padmapāda's work goes beyond his original in his "*Vivaraṇa*" in giving new orientations to the Advaita doctrines, concepts and categories, their definitions and lay-out. The famous Vivaraṇānumāna in support of the provenness of positive ignorance (*bhāvarūpājñāna*) in Advaita philosophy is assailed by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*, while reviewing the edifice of the Pūrvapakṣa. The *Vivaraṇa* has also advanced a picturesque theory of Brahman's Jagad-upādānatva in association with Māyā, which has attained classical distinction.

5. **Amalānanda** (C. 1220-1280) was evidently from Mahārashtra. He flourished under the patronage of the Yādava Kings Krishna and Mahādeva (1260-71) of Devagiri.[1] His c. on the *Bhāmatī*, called *Kalpataru* is a very measured and scholarly one, paying special attention to organic details of the adhikaraṇas in exposition. It is of indispensable value to those who want to master the adhikaraṇa-prasthāna of the Śamkara-bhāṣya. The redoubtable Vyāsatīrtha of the Madhva school has paid it a deserved tribute by reviewing many of its additional explanations of the interpretations of the Advaita school, in his *TC*.

6. **Rāmānuja** (1017-1137) the great Bhāṣyakāra of Viśiṣṭādvaita school was born in Tamilnadu. Besides the *Śrībhāṣya* he wrote two abridged cc. on the Sūtras. He traces his tradition to the Vṛtti of Bodhāyana and some other predecessors like Ṭanka and Dramiḍa who preceded Śamkara. Early in his career, he had joined the fold of Yādavaprakāśa a Bhedābhedavādin following the tradition of Bhāskara and Brahmanandin. The discovery of the *Bodhāyana Vṛtti* and the influence of the literature of the Ālvārs and of Yāmunācārya made him revert to the old Theistic Vaiṣṇava tradition of the Bhāgavata school as expounded by Nammālvār in his *Tiruvāimozhi*. He developed the concept of Śarīraśarīribhāva relationship with its emphasis on *apṛthaksiddhi*, as reflected in the hymns of Nammālvār (cf. i, 1.7) and the Sanskrit sources and standardized "Viś ṣṭādvaita" with a

1. Cf. कीर्त्या यादववंशमुन्नमयति श्रीजैत्रदेवात्मजे
कृष्णे क्ष्माभृति भूतलं सह महादेवेन संबिभ्रति । (*Kalpataru* Introd. Ver. 13).

very extensive c. on the Brahmasūtras and two smaller ones. His *Vedārthasaṅgraha* appears to have been an earlier work. He contented himself with discussing the socalled 'monistic texts' of the Upaniṣads and giving them suitable reinterpretations. He did not however write cc. on the Ten Upaniṣads as Śamkara had done. His counter-criticism of the Adhyāsa-bhāṣya of Śamkara and foundations of Advaita metaphysics are given at the commencement of his *Śrībhāṣya*. His criticisms are directed largely against the logical and dialectical exposition of the Advaita doctrines as given by the early followers of Śamkara. His style is rather recondite and heavily loaded with compounds and clauses in keeping with the intense emotional impact they were intended to make.

7. **Sudarśana Sūri** (C. 1250-1310) is the able commentator on the *Śrībhāṣya* and the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Rāmānuja. He was the senior contemporary of the illustrious Vedānta Deśika to whom he is believed to have entrusted the manuscript of his *Śrutaprakāśa* during the time of the horrors of the invasion of the South by Malik Kafur and the attack of the Muhammadan army on Srirangam.

8. **Madhva** (Ānandatīrtha) is the third classical commentator on the Sūtras. He came a century after Rāmānuja. He was from Tuḷunāḍu in Karnatak. His date is 1238-1317. He appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the systems of Śamkara and Rāmānuja had been well-established. His study of them and of advanced classics of theirs like the *Iṣṭasiddhi* had left him unconvinced. He therefore went to the source-books themselves, reflected deeply and formed fresh ideas of his own. As a result of these cogitations, he decided finally to propound a fresh system of Vedānta and write new commentaries on the three Prasthānas.

We have in all four cc. from Madhva on the Sūtras. The first three are the most important—the *Sūtrabhāṣya*, the *Anu-Vyākhyāna* (in verse) and the *Nyāya-Vivaraṇa* dealing exclusively with the organic details of the adhikaraṇas. His first work was however the *Gītā-Bhāṣya* which contains many anticipations of his distinctive interpretations of the Brahmasūtras. The final touches to his Bhāṣya on the Sūtras seem to have been given during the course of his first North Indian tour which was concluded with a fairly long stay at Badarikāśrama in the Himalayan retreat. The publication of the Sūtrabhāṣya on his way back to Udipi thro' U.P., Bengal, Orissa and Maharashtra blazed a new trail of Vedāntic thought. His views commanded respect and gained for him considerable following in the country. Two of his

most notable conquests over the hearts of men were made in Orissa[2] and in the centres of thought along the course of the *Godavarī*.[3] In due course, he wrote other works—brief philosophical monographs on epistemology, ontology and critiques of monistic philosophy, Bhāṣyas on the Ten Upaniṣads, another c. on the *Gītā*, one on the *Bhāgavata* and an epitome of the *Mahābhārata*, a c. on a part of the *Ṛg Veda* and miscellaneous works.

Madhva had of necessity to choose a plain unadorned style, terse and trenchant. For he had so much to say in place of what had been said by others before him, set men thinking and lead them straight to the crux of problems. It was necessary therefore to concentrate on the essentials and let the trappings wait.[4] His style is thus an index of his purpose and the outcome of the historical and philosophical necessities in which he found himself placed.

9. **Trivikrama Paṇḍita** (C. 1258-1320) of Kāvu near Kāsargoḍ (now in Kerala) was the Court Pandit of the Ruler of Kumbla in S. Kanara. He was a distinguished scholar of Advaita and a good poet. He was converted by Madhva to his views after a disputation lasting for fifteen days, at the temple of Kūḍil near Kāsargoḍ. Trivikrama was commissioned by Madhva to write a commentary on his Sūtrabhāṣya. The c. *Tattvapradīpa* is written in a learned and forcible style with many literary graces natural to an accomplished poet. *Uṣāharaṇam* is his Kāvya in eight cantos written before he joined Madhva's school.

10. **Jayatīrtha** (C. 1335-85) is Madhva's "Ṭīkākāra" or commentator *par excellence*. He wrote cc. on most of the important works of Madhva and two independent works one on logic (*Pramāṇa-Paddhati*) and another on metaphysics (*Vādāvalī*). His c. on Madhva's Sūtrabhāṣya known as *Tattvaprakāśikā* is most illuminating. It is much more detailed and systematic than Trivikrama's and holds undisputed sway. His *magnum opus* is however his *Nyāya-Sudhā* on M's *Anu-Vyākhyāna*. It is a work of monumental erudition in philosophy.

2. The earliest inscription of Ānandatīrtha's first disciple Narahari Tirtha Śrīpāda in the Simhācalam temple, in Andhra Pradesh, is dated 1264 AD.
3. His other disciple is reported to have come from the Godavari region (यो गोदाय उपाययौ M. Vij. xv. 120). This was Padmanābha Tirtha who wrote a brief C. on M's, *Sūtrabhāṣya* and cc. on *Daśaprakaraṇas*.
4. Cf. न पुनरतिगहनार्थत्वावगाहसन्नाहिनो महदनुसेविन : प्रत्यधिकरणं प्रक्रियाप्रकथनरूपां बहिर्मुखसुखावहामनल्पजल्पमालामाद्रियेरन् । नहि मणिगणमार्गणपरा निपुणधियोऽनुपदं स्वपरगुप्तिपाटनपटवोऽधिजलधि लहरीपटलपरिवृत्तिपरिगणनकौतुकेन समयमतियापयन्ति ! (Trivikrama *TD.* i.3.1).

J. standardized M's thought and his interpretation of texts. He was a born stylist. His style is noted for its elegance and lucidity. His arguments are profound and penetrating and his dialectic superb. His writings are characterised by an extreme orderliness of thought and presentation. He has placed Madhva's doctrine and his interpretation of the Sūtras and other texts on an enduring self-sufficient basis in respect of both the adhikaraṇa and Vādaprasthānas.

11. **Vyāsatīrtha** (1460-1539) is the Prince of dialecticians of the Dvaita school. With Madhva and Jayatīrtha, he makes the "Munitrayam" of the school. He was the spiritual Guru of Emperor Krishnadevarāya of Vijayanagar[1] and was held in great esteem by the other Kings of the second dynasty. We have a full contemporary account of his life and career in the *Vyāsayogicaritacampū* of Poet Somanātha.

Vyāsatīrtha wrote nine works in all. The most famous of them are the *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Tarkatāṇḍava* and *Tātparyacandrikā*. Of these, the *Nyāyāmṛta* formed the starting point of the historic dialectical controversy between the Dvaita and the Ādvaita schools in which great champions of the latter like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī felt called upon to take part. Vyāsatīrtha's works attest his encyclopaedic knowledge of contemporary thought and philosophical literature and show an astonishingly brilliant intellect of great clarity and penetration rarely to be met with in one man. He has the ability to marshal a vast quantity of factual material and extraordinary ramifications of thought in half a dozen propositions couched in terse and telling terms. His works embody the highest achievements of Madhva's philosophy in the spheres of constructive exposition of Siddhānta and critical examination and assessment of others' views. Dasgupta has paid him the highest tribute in saying that "the logical skill and depth of acute dialectical thinking shown by Vyāsatīrtha stand almost unrivalled in the whole of Indian thought" (*His. I. Phil.* iv, p. vii). Tho' written as a c. on J.'s *TP.*, Vyāsatīrtha's *Tātparyacandrikā* is virtually an independent treatise on the interpretation of the Brahmasūtras in the light of the views of the commentaries of the three great Ācāryas.

Other Commentaries and Glosses

Of the eight other explanatory glosses of the Dvaita school utilized here, two are by **Vādirāja Tirtha** (1480-1600)—one on the *TP* and another on the *NS*. His fame as a thinker and philosophical writer rests on

1. Cf, उत्साहं मम वीक्ष्य मद्गुरुरथ श्रीव्यासतीर्थो मुनि :
विष्णुं कीर्तय सर्वथेत्युपदिशन् मह्यं मुदा दत्तवान् । (Ver. 12).
from the fragment of a work, giving autobiographical information, ascribed to Krishnadevarāya.

his *Yuktimallikā* in 5379 verses. He was also an accomplished poet and wrote a Mahākāvya: *Rukmiṇīśavijaya,* and a complete c. on the *Mahābhārata.*

Raghūttama Tīrtha's (1557-96) *TP-Bhāvabodha* pays particular attention to the details of "Tadarthacintā", constitution of "Peṭikās" and adhikaraṇaśarīras, following in the footsteps of the *TC.*

The most excellent c. on the *TC* is by **Rāghavendra Tīrtha (1624-71)** called *Candrikā-Prakāśa.* It brings out the depth of thought underlying the crisp and trenchant words of the *TC.* His gloss of the *TP* known as *Bhāvadīpa* is a copious c. throwing much useful light on several intricate points of the text. Equally important, if not more, is his most remarkable *Vṛtti* on the *Brahmasūtras* known as *Tantradīpikā.* It is a marvel of brevity, clarity and adequacy of explanation. His *Sudhā-Parimala* is an indispensable aid to the study of the *NS.*

Last but not the least valuable aid to our study of Madhva's *Sūtrabhāṣya* in itself is the direct, simple and unassuming and withal the most self-sufficient elucidation of the bare text of M.'s Bhaṣya given by **Jagannātha Tīrtha** (C. 1718-60) in his *Bhāṣyadīpikā.* The author was one of the Pontifical successors of Vyāsatīrtha himself.

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PĀDA I

CHAPTER I

IMPORTANCE AND SCOPE OF BRAHMASŪTRAS

The Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are the earliest aphoristic manual of the 'System' of Vedānta that has come down to us. Their internal evidence shows that there had been other attempts to codify the speculations of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts and systematize their teachings. Jaimini, Bādari, Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna are some of the authors quoted in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. But we do not know if any or all of them had covered the entire field of metaphysical system-building or had merely confined their attention to some aspects thereof. M. holds that Bādarāyaṇa's work is wider in range and that these authors were in fact his disciples who developed particular aspects of his thought and that his object in referring to their views was to give them publicity and that there is no conflict of views between him and these authors.[1]

Even a cursory examination of the Sūtras will show that they have collected their data from a wide range extending from the Vedic to the Post-Vedic sources, *not excluding* the Smṛtis, Itihāsas, and Purāṇas[2] and have discussed them under appropriate headings with the

1. "Other seers severally take up as their own views ideas present in the spacious mind of Vyāsa and utilize them like houses enclosing open space. Having imbibed a part of Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana's wisdom, these Sages expound views according to their comprehension. So there is no conflict between his views and theirs. The views of these Sages are the views of Vyāsa himself. But a part of his views as grasped by them has been introduced by Vyāsa himself under their names so as to give them his disciples the necessary publicity. There is no conflict in the views held by them as they are meant to apply to aspirants of different levels of fitness."—M. B.S.B. i, 2, 28; i, 4, 23; and J. *TP*. i, 4, 23; M, *AV*. i.4, Ver. 28.
2. *Vide* the ff. Sūtras as commented upon by S. 1, 2, 6; i, 3, 23; 28; 30; ii, 3, 43; iii, 1, 14; 15; 19; iii, 2, 17; iii, 3, 26; 32; iii, 4, 30; 37; 38; 43; iv, 2, 14; iv, 3, 11; iv, 4, 20.

help of well-known principles of interpretation derived partly from the Mīmāmsā Śāstra and partly with the aid of the critical apparatus evolved by themselves. They have tried to formulate and expound a full-fledged system of Vedānta which will be free from contradictions of thought and conflicts with evidence that may possibly be felt or raised from within the sacred literature itself. Thus they derive their first principles and special doctrines from these original sources which are studied from the critical and constructive points of view. They also examine the doctrines of other established schools of thought opposed to their findings and lay bare their limitations and inadequacies—thus demonstrating the soundness of their own conclusions, in the end, as the last word on the subject of philosophical systematization.

Such a definitive, critical and comprehensive exposition of the Vedānta system, which even the author of the *Gītā* felt worthy of honorable mention (*B.G.* xiii, 4), can hardly be denied the title of "Nirṇāyaka-Śāstra", at least so far as the followers of the Vedānta system are concerned. It is not surprising therefore that Dr. Radhakrishnan should have accepted this description of the Brahmasūtras as "Nirṇāyaka-Śāstra" from M.[3] and given currency to it, in his latest work on the *Brahmasūtra* (p. 21). Such a description would naturally raise the question of the scope of the Sūtras—whether it should be extended to the Vedic and Post-Vedic literature as well; or be confined to the ten or twelve Upaniṣads alone. S. has taken the latter view on the basis of which he has explained the Sūtras as a systematization of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads (*aupaniṣadam darśanam*). His influence has predisposed most of the other commentators who came after him to accept his view of restricting the Samanvaya of texts carried out in the Sūtras to the Upaniṣads alone. But the internal evidence of the Sūtras and certain admissions of S. himself in his c. go to show that their scope as originally conceived by their author was much wider than the ten or twelve Upaniṣads and included the earlier and later phases of the sacred literature.

S's c. on *Śāstrayonitvāt* (B.S. i.1.3) is itself against restricting the scope of the Sūtras. The term "Śāstra" as used in this Sūtra has been explained by him as "the *Ṛg Veda* and others" (*Śāstram Ṛgvedādiḥ*)—the "others" referring, according to his commentator Vācaspati, to the rest of the fourteen Vidyāsthānas. This meaning of "Śāstra" is also retained by S. in the second interpretation of the Sūtra given by him, according to which the aforesaid Śāstra, consisting of the *Ṛg Veda* and others is the only source thro' which B. can be known in its true nature.[4]

It follows from this that the whole of the Śāstra consisting of the *Ṛg Veda* and others and not *only* the Upaniṣads, when properly interpreted with the help of the principles formulated in the 'Samanvayādhyāya' and elsewhere in the Sūtras, is competent to give us the correct knowledge of B. This is precisely how M. understands the meaning of the Śāstrayoni-Sūtra; and that is why he is opposed, in principle, to imposing restrictions on the scope of the Sūtras and limit it to the ten or twelve Upaniṣads. The Ārṣa tradition, as preserved in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts, supports the wider view of M. that B. is as much the chief and central theme of the Vedas as it is of the Upaniṣads, Epics and Purāṇas.[5] S. himself may not seriously dispute the truth of this proposition; tho' he has not taken the trouble to demonstrate how such a thoroughgoing Samanvaya could be successfully worked out. He was probably deterred from going beyond the Upaniṣads for purposes of Brahma-Samanvaya, by his sense of loyalty to the Pūrva-Mīmāmsaka dictum that the end and aim of the Vedas is sacrifices (*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt*). R. too accepted this limited view. Hence, he too did not make any attempt to revive the philosophy of the Vedas and establish its integration with the rest of the sacred literature in his c. on the Sūtras.

However that may be, we have many scattered references to numerous Vedic Śākhās including Khila Śrutis and non-extant sources in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa even according to Ś's own showing.[6] These are sufficient to establish the fact that Viṣaya-vākyas (texts embodying the subject-matter of discussion) and other relevant particulars for building up certain *adhikaraṇas* have been drawn by the Sūtrakāra from Pre-Upaniṣadic sources also, on several occasions. Post-Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic sources including Smṛtis and Dharma-Śāstras are also found to be utilised by the Sūtrakāra, especially in Adhyāyas III and IV.[7] The Sūtrakāra reviews other Darśanas in Adhy. II by way of strengthening the conclusions established by him regarding the nature and attributes of B. in Adhy. I.

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१. सूत्रेषु येषु सर्वेषु निर्णयाः समुदीरिताः ।
शब्दजातस्य सर्वस्य यत्प्रमाणश्च निर्णयः ॥

(M. *BSB* i, 1.1),

4. अथवा, यथोक्तं ऋग्वेदादि शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणमस्य ब्रह्मणो यथावत्स्वरूपावगमे
5. See his C on BS. i, 1, 10 and J. thereon and TP. iii, 3, 1. See also:
वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा ।
आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णुः सर्वत्र गीयते ॥
(*Harivamśa* Q. by *M. BSB*).
6. ii, 3, 43; iii, 3, 55-56.
7. i, 3, 30; 36; ii, 3. 43; 47; iii, 1, 14; 15; 16, 19; iii, 2, 4; 38; iv, 2, 14.

These are facts borne out by the text of the Sūtras, as we have it and by S's own c. on the Sūtras in many places. We cannot, therefore, be guided by his assumption that the scope of the Sūtras was originally limited to the ten or twelve Upaniṣads, either for purposes of Samanvaya of Adhy. I or for systematization of doctrines carried out in the rest of the work. This is confirmed by what S. himself has to say in this context, in his c. on the '*Sarvavedāntapratyayādhikaraṇa*' (iii, 3, 1-4).

The point established in this adhikaraṇa according to Ś. is that the several Vidyās taught in the different Upaniṣads or in different parts of the same Upaniṣad have a fundamental unity in regard to the subject of their meditation viz. B. regardless of their variation in details and particulars of such Vidyās.

M. and following him Baladeva Vidyābhuṣaṇa of the Caitanya school have given a wider interpretation to the Sūtra: *Sarvavedāntapratyayam* . . . . (iii, 3, 1) that for purposes of meditation with a view to realising B. the seeker should equip himself with a fully coordinated knowledge of B. as the purport (*anta*) of the teachings of all the Vedas (*sarvaveda*) and Śāstras (including the Upaniṣads): *Sarvavedanirṇayotpādyajñānam brahma* (M.B.S.B.): B is to be understood as the purport of the entire Veda-Śāstra with the help of the principles of interpretation elaborated in the B.S.[8]

Tho' such is not Ś's interpretation of iii, 3, 1, he veers round to M's position that B is as much uniformly the central theme of the Vedas (including the Karmakāṇḍa thereof) as it is of the Upaniṣads. This confession comes out in his c. on B.S. iii, 3, 4 of the same adhikaraṇa: *Darśayati ca* where he says that "the Veda also establishes the unity of all the Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads thro' the oneness of their subject-matter and object of inquiry. In support of this interpretation, S. cites two Śruti texts one from *Kaṭha Up: Sarve vedā yatpadam āmananti* (ii, 15) and another from the Aitareya Āraṇyaka (iii, 2, 3):

Etam hyeva Bahvṛcā mahatyukthe mīmāmsante
etam agnāvadhvaryava etam Mahāvrate Chandogāḥ. . . . .

The passage quoted by S. from the *A.Ā.* clearly says that B is the direct object of meditation and quest of the followers of the Ṛg, Yajus and Sāma Vedas, even in the sacrificial rites performed by them such as the Mahāvrata,—even as it is in the case of the numerous Vidyās

8. सर्ववेदानां य अन्त उक्तन्यायैस्तात्पर्यनिर्णयस्तेन प्रत्येतव्यं ब्रह्म (*Śeṣacandrikā* iii.3.1). In other words, 'Sarvavedāntapratyayam' is to be explained as a 'Vyadhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi' compound: *Sarvavedānām antena pratyayo yasya tat.* (Raghu. *TP-Bh*, p. 400. Madras GOS, 1956).

taught in the Upaniṣads. Thus, B.S. iii, 3, 4, as explained by S. himself clinches the matter that B is the final theme of both the Vedas and the Upaniṣads *and not merely of the latter*. Consistent with this finding, to which we are led, there can be no valid objection to our agreeing with M. that the expression "Sarva-veda-anta" in the opening Sutra of the same *adhikaraṇa* has to be given a wider meaning that would be in keeping with the claims of the Mantra and Brāhmaṇa parts of the Vedic literature to reveal the true nature of B along with the Upaniṣads, and help the seeker to discover the fundamental unity of thought (*Gati-sāmānya*, i, 1, 10) running thro' all branches of the sacred literature.

The Vedic Seers who had proclaimed the truth: *Tasmād dhānyan na paraḥ kimca nāsa* (R.V. x, 129, 2 d) 'Beyond That there was no other' could hardly have disagreed with the Upaniṣadic seers who maintained: *Ekam eva advitīyam* (One only without an equal). The Vedas which the Upaniṣads claim to be the breath of Brahman could hardly be opposed to or unconcerned with the majesty of B. The Samanvaya posited by the Sūtrakāra in i, 1, 4, if it is to be a real Samanvaya of the entire "Śāstra"—as that term has been defined and understood in i, 1, 3 (by S. also) must, in principle, be capable of being applied and must have been applied to the Pre-Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic literature as well. Otherwise, the solemn declaration of the *A.Ā.*: *Etam hyeva Bahvṛcā mahatyukthe mīmāmsante*... will be reduced to nullity and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā dictum: *Āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād* would triumph as an absolute truth and the Samanvaya of Śāstra proposed by the Sūtrakāra would be inapplicable to a part of the Śāstra itself. It is for these reasons that M. has decided to invest the Samanvaya contemplated by the Sūtrakāra with a wider range and meaning and bring the whole of the Śāstra within its purview, for purposes of systematization.

A Samanvaya of such wide range and dimensions would require vast intellectual equipment and exegetical resources and would impose great strain on the patience and understanding of ordinary persons in following the intricacies of its detail, even when it is successfully made out. M is alive to this limitation on the part of the seeker. He recognizes that only Brahmadeva is competent to master the technique of Sarvaśāstra-Samanvaya in all its completeness of sweep.[9] Nevertheless, he has tried to show the broad outlines of working out such a Samanvaya to the best of our powers of reasoning. His work in this direction is therefore purely illustrative of the technique and is not intended to be exhaustive. Even so, he has achieved remarkable results in enabling us thro' such Samanvaya to capture the unspeakable majesty

9. Cf. *AV* iii, 3, Ver. 24-31; 35-36.

of God as it stands manifested in the Adhibhūta, Adhyātma, Adhidaiva and other cross-sections of cosmic life. The purpose of such Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. is, as pointed out by M., to expound the Guṇapūrṇatva or the infinitude of B., its *Bhūmatva*, its immanence in the Universe (*viśvāntaryāmitva*) and transcendence (*viśvātītatva*) in all its completeness. In showing the way to such a Mahāsamanvaya of Śāstra (as M. calls it), in B., he has undoubtedly blazed a new trail in the history of Brahma-Sūtra-interpretation. His approach to Samanvaya has therefore to be viewed as a seminal contribution to our understanding of Bādarāyaṇa's Philosophy of Theism.

CHAPTER II

BRAHMA-SŪTRAS AS PARA-VIDYĀ

As Nirṇāyaka-Śāstra with reference to the whole body of "Nirṇeya-Śāstra" comprising the Vedic, Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic literature, the B.S. may conceivably be regarded as the "Para-Vidyā" spoken of in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i, 1, 5):

Atha Parā yayā tad akṣaram adhigamyate.

M. is the first Vedāntin to recognize this possibility and give expression to it in his metrical C on the B.S. the *AV*:

** परविद्याख्यं चक्रे शास्त्रमनुत्तमम् ।

There are other interpretations too of this famous passage of the *Muṇḍ. Up.* which speaks for the first time of a two-fold distinction of Vidyā into "Parā" (superior) and "Aparā" (inferior). As understood by S. the passage means that the entire Vedic literature and its *aṅgas* are to be regarded as "Apara" and the *Upaniṣads* alone are to be accepted as "Para-Vidyā". This would seriously affect the prestige of the Mantras and make them incapable of producing any true knowledge of B. at any time, for any one in any stage of spiritual development. Such a position would be quite unfair to the Vedic Saṁhitās. The Upaniṣads themselves are mere attempts to preserve and understand an ancient tradition than a new illumination. This is shown, apart from other evidences, by the curious fact that the Brāhmic-experience of Vāmadeva, first recorded in the *Ṛg Veda* (iv, 27 1-2), is actually retold in a later passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* (i, 4, 10). It is now coming to be realised by modern Indian scholars of Vedic philosophy that the purely *adhiyajña* and *adhidaiva* approaches to the interpretation of Ṛg Vedic hymns do not represent the whole truth of the Vedas and that they have ignored a more important standpoint preserved and reflected

in the Vedic tradition and implicit in the Araṇyakas and the Upaniṣads themselves. The voice of the Ṛṣis haranguing posterity with the call of true philosophy—*'Ekam and viprā bahudhā vadanti'* (R.V. i, 164, 46) 'That One the sages call by various names as Agni, Yama and Mātariśvan', gives the lie to the facile assumption that Vedic philosophy was purely polytheistic. The famous statement from the *A.Ā.*, cited earlier, confirms the point that the Bahvṛcas, the Adhvaryus and the Chandogas were all bent upon the quest of the Supreme B. thro' their sacrifices and stotras. It cannot therefore be maintained that the Pre-Upaniṣadic sources are devoid of any philosophical content and that for that reason they are to be put down as "Aparā-Vidyā" and therefore fall outside the scope of Samanvaya in B. in the B.S. Even in the Upaniṣads there are large areas which deal with various forms of Upāsanās and Vidyās which have nothing to do with the Śuddha-Brahman of S's. conception. Where then *is* the justification to hold that the Upaniṣads (alone) in their entirety are to be recognised as "Parā-Vidyā" and deny the title to the pre-Upaniṣadic sources, wholly or in part? Since the text of the *Muṇḍaka* speaks of particular body of texts like Ṛg Veda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda etc., as "Aparā-Vidyā", the natural presumption is that the term "Para-Vidyā" also similarly is intended to refer to *another body of texts.* It is difficult to accept R's equation of Aparā and Parā Vidyās with Parokṣajnāna (knowledge indirectly acquired thro' texts) and direct knowledge (aparokṣajnāna) answering to Bhakti. It does not accord with the terms in which Paravidyā is described in the Upaniṣad as 'that *by which* the Imperishable Brahman comes to be known'

'Yayā tad akṣaram adhigamyate'.

This has reference to an *instrument of knowledge* (adhigati-*karaṇam)* rather than to knowledge or devotion as such. Not only does R's interpretation ignore the sense of the 'instrument' implied by the words 'yayā' and 'adhigamyate' but is obliged to set aside the usual sense of word *'adhigamyate'* (comes to be known) and take it in the sense of "prāpyate" (comes to be *attained*) to suit the equation of Para-Vidyā with direct knowledge or Bhakti. The term Vidyā derived from the root *vid* with the suffix *'kyac'* can denote a means of understanding (*vedana-karaṇa*) also, primarily (as much as knowledge itself). There is no grammatical impediment whatever in interpreting 'Vidyā' as applied to Para-Vidyā in the sense of 'an instrument of knowledge' or that body of texts by which the Imperishable Brahman comes to be understood.

M's suggestion is that the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are eminently fitted to be accepted as that body of texts by which B comes to be

known as the purport of the entire range of Śāstras comprising the Ṛg Veda, Yajurveda, etc. This seems to be a very pertinent suggestion; for the Brahmasūtras *do embody* the principles of interpretation by which the Samanvaya of Śāstra is established in B. It is the role for which they have been cast:

Brahmasūtrapadaiścaiva hetumadbhir viniścitaiḥ

(*BG.* XIII.4).

Without the help of the principles of interpretation embodied in the B.S., even the deliverances of the Upaniṣads (which alone are regarded as Para-Vidyā by S.) cannot be shown to be 'definitive and based on sound reasoning'. These Sūtras thus provide the key to the interpretation of Śāstra. By such interpretation alone can B. be shown to be "Śāstrayoni". As Śāstra includes the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the latter are to be regarded as "Nirṇeya-Granthas" (body of texts whose purport is *to be determined*) before they can be proclaimed as Para-vidyā. It is the B.S. which embody the critical apparatus by which the purport of the Nirṇeya-granthas is to be determined. Hence they richly deserve the honor of being recognized as the Para-Vidyā referred to in the Upaniṣad. Since the B.S. cannot stand isolated from the sources which it seeks to systematize, the distinction of Parā and Aparā Vidyās would be seen to be a distinction of approach and purport and *not* a drastic division cutting across a given body of sacred texts. In other words, Parā and Aparā Vidyās are the two faces of the same Śāstra or body of texts, looked at from different angles. Just as the same Karma comes to be designated as 'Pravṛtta' (binding) and 'Nivṛtta' (conducive to Mokṣa) according as it is practised with or without attachment to fruits as defined in the *Gītā* or just as the same food is rendered wholesome or unwholesome according to the ingredients mixed with it, even so the same body of texts comprising the Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, etc., comes to be recognized as Parā or Aparā Vidyā according as it is understood as referring to B. on the basis of the *nyāyas* set forth in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, or as confined to various gods (*adhidaiva*), material principles (*adhibhūta*) and such other matters, when taken in a purely literal or conventional sense. In other words, *Ṛg Veda, Yajus* etc., and all the rest of the sacred literature become Parā Vidyā when subjected to Brahma-Samanvaya and remain Aparā-Vidyā when *not, so oriented in the light of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.* This is precisely the conclusion arrived at by M.[1]

1. For further remarks on Para and Apara Vidyās see Chapter XXIX.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL PLAN OF THE SŪTRAS AND ARRANGEMENT OF THEIR SUBJECT MATTER

There are four well-knit Adhyāyas in the B.S., each with four sections (*Pādas*). Each *Pāda* is divided into topics (*adhikaraṇas*). An *adhi.* may consist of one or more Sūtras according to the exigencies of the subject of discussion. The treatment follows the method of discussion adopted in traditional philosophical disputation known as *Vāda-kathā*. Each topic is discussed in the light of five constituent elements (i) *Viṣaya* (subject for discussion), (ii) *Viśaya* (doubt), (iii) *Pūrva-pakṣa* (objector's view), (iv) *Siddhānta* (conclusion) and (v) *Prayojana* (advantage accruing to either party).

The opening Adhyāya is known as Samanvayādhyāya. It establishes the exegetical correlation of various texts and contexts from the scriptural literature with B. which is posited as the goal of all philosophical quest and the source of the Universe. According to S. the Samanvaya is confined to the main Upaniṣadic texts. It shows how a synthesis could be established by correlating divergent views representing B. as Saguṇa and Nirguṇa or representing various *adhidaiva, adhibhautika* and other principles as sources controlling the world-order or partial aspects thereof and showing how they all tend, directly or indirectly towards the establishment of the unity and identity of the individual self with the Universal principle of consciousness known as Nirguṇa-Brahman thro' what is known as *akhaṇḍārthavṛtti* (non-partitive judgment) of texts descriptive of reality and how the other descriptions of the Saguṇa-Brahman and discourses on various other principles and Vidyās set forth in the Upaniṣads lead ultimately to the realisation of the Nirguṇa Brahman[1] thro' an arrangement of their themes in an ascending scale of values based on the *modus operandi* of *Adhyāropa-Apavāda* (superimposition and consequent negation).

1. *Kalpataru*, p. 72.

So far as the Nirguṇa B. is concerned, the Samanvaya, according to S., is only indirect thro' Lakṣaṇā (secondary significatory power of words) as B. is in reality attributeless and, therefore, strictly speaking, inexpressible by words (*avācya*). All knowledge of B. is conveyed by Scripture, in the last analysis, only thro' non-relational judgments (*akhaṇ-ḍārthabodha*) alluding to pure consciousness.

M., on the other hand, understands by Samanvaya an exegetical method by which a direct and complete 'at-one-ment' of the whole body of Śāstra is established with B. thro' numerous descriptions and marks of import (*tātparyaliṅgas*) embodied in it. Such attunement however is necessarily in terms of the plenary sense of these descriptions and marks of import which are shown to be inapplicable to other deities and principles apparently referred to in those descriptions or marks of import.

Looking to the manner in which this exegetical interpretation of passages is carried out by the Sūtrakāra himself in a large number of *adhikaraṇas* such as Ānandamaya, Ākāśa, Prāṇa, Jyoti, Gāyatrī, Guhām-praviṣṭau, Antaryāmi, Vaiśvānara, Dyubhvādyāyatana, Bhūmā, Akṣara, Avyakta, Pañcajana and Prakṛti, in the first Adhyāya, M. seems to be nearer the mark in holding that the object of such Samanvaya is to secure maximum affiliation of Scripture in the most primary, intimate and plenary sense of the descriptions with B. in and thro' all the *adhi-daiva, adhibhautika, adhiyajna* and other cross-sections of reality whose descriptions are met with in the scriptural passages. These descriptions are examined in the light of the *Upakrama* (commencement), *Upasamhāra* (conclusion), *abhyāsa* (repetitive statements), *apūrvatā* (novelty), *phalam* (fruit), *arthavāda* (appreciative or deprecatory statements) and *upapatti* (reason)—the accepted criteria of determining the final import of passages. The key-words in the passages discussed are scrutinized from the morphological and semantic angles and shown to find their true significance only as referring to the Supreme B. in the fullest primary sense of the words in their most exhaustive range of application to which knowers of B. can rise (*vidvadrūḍhi* and *mahāyoga*).

Such a process of Samanvaya is postulated in the fourth Sūtra: *Tat tu samanvayāt.* [That (Brahman) alone is to be known (as the primary source of the Universe and) as the theme of Śāstras in their entirety by means of the exegetical method based on *Upakrama, Upasamhāra* and other *Tātparyaliṅgas.*] The actual working out of the details of

this grand symphony of Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. begins with the sixth adhikaraṇa.

Since the Samanvaya has B. for its subject, the opening Sūtra initiates the philosophical inquiry into B. It postulates its existence, makes clear the why and the wherefore of such inquiry and touches upon the pre-requisites (*adhikāra*) of such an inquiry. This is followed by the definition of B. in Sūtra 2. The next one adduces the proof of "Śāstra" in support of this definition and the fourth shows how this Śāstra is to be interpreted properly without the risk of internal inconsistency or external contradiction.

The fifth adhikaraṇa establishes the possibility of accomplishing such a *complete* and *direct* Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. by quashing the most crucial objection to it emerging from the theory of B. being absolutely beyond the reach of word and thought—derived from certain statements in the Śrutis which are likely to mislead the unwary. Thus, the first five *adhikaraṇas* lay the foundations of samanvaya in B.

Several commentators have followed S. in treating the fifth *adhi.* as a refutation of the claims of Sāmkhya-Prakṛti to be the source of the world. This does not seem to be well-founded in as much as the *adhi.* should then have been placed *immediately after the second adhi.* where B. has been defined and declared to be the source of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world—which automatically rules out Prakṛti. If the claims of Prakṛti are still to be refuted in express terms, it should be done *then and there,* before passing on to the next question of the proof of B. The position of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa *immediately after the Samanvaya Sūtra,* whence the regular demonstration of the theme of Samanvaya starts, shows that it must naturally be connected with some question affecting the vital interests of Samanvaya *per se.* As Samanvaya presupposes direct conno-denotative relationship of B. with scriptural passages, one may reasonably expect this *adhi.* to be designed to meet some pertinent objection to the feasibility of Samanvaya itself—instead of *reverting* to the question of Kāraṇatva of B. (as against that of Sāmkhya Prakṛti). A challenge to the very idea of Samanvaya posed by the theory of B.'s being beyond the pale of speech and thought can certainly claim *priority of attention* over the need for a refutation of the causality (*Kāraṇatva*) of Prakṛti of the Sāmkhyas in respect of the world. The latter is *not such an urgent issue* and can afford to wait its turn! As a matter of fact, the Sūtrakāra himself takes up the question of the claims of Prakṛti and refutes them in Adhyāya II.2. *at great length.* There is no need therefore to anticipate the issue here. Thus the first adhikaraṇa constitutes an introduction to the science of

Brahma-Mīmāmsā and the other four pave the way for going into the details of the main theme of its opening Adhyāya.[2] The grammar of Samanvaya is implicit in the dialectic of Samanvaya carried out in the rest of the first Adhyāya. Some basic principles of Samanvaya are elucidated according to M.'s interpretation in a few adhikaraṇas in the body of the first Adhyāya itself (i, 2, 28-32; i, 4, 1; 9; 11; 16-23).

Adhyāya II is in the nature of a reinforcement of the philosophical position of the Sūtrakāra regarding the nature and attributes of B. and its relation to the world of matter and souls as established by him in the first Adhyāya. This reinforcement is made by (i) answering certain purely logical objections that could possibly be brought against the soundness of the Sūtrakāra's views about the nature and attributes of B. and its relation to the world of matter and souls; and (ii) by a direct refutation of the doctrines and dogmas of other established schools of philosophy in the field which are likely to challenge the claims of the Sūtrakāra's Siddhānta to exclusive philosophical soundness and sufficiency. Dr. Radhakrishnan is *not, therefore, justified* in saying that the second Adhyāya "shows that the interpretation offered in the first chapter is *not inconsistent* with the writings of other sages *and the views of other systems*"[3] (*The Brahma Sūtra,* p. 24). The last two Pādas of Adhyāya II resolve certain apparent contradictions of doctrine and discrepancies of detail *within* the body of the Śāstra (the Vedāntic texts themselves) and thereby strengthen the Samanvaya of Śāstra established in the first Adhyāya. Thus, Adhyāya II removes four kinds of opposition to Samanvaya.[4]

The third Adhyāya known as Sādhana-Adhyāya deals with the means of God-realization, the *modus operandi* of Vidyās, Upāsanās and other forms of discipline taught in the Śāstra.

The closing Adhyāya, called Phala-Adhyāya, deals with the goal of Brahmajijnāsā viz. Mokṣa. It gives a detailed account of the successive stages of spiritual ascent such as Utkrānti (upward ascent of the Soul from the body), destruction of Karmas, sojourn in the world of Brahmā, destruction of the Liṅgadeha and complete realization of unalloyed spiritual bliss and of the status of released souls in relation to B.

2. *TC.* p. 414.
3. Contrast: इदानीं प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वं इत्यस्यार्थजातस्य प्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय: ।। (*Ś. BSB*).
4. Based on reasoning (*Yukti*), rival schools of philosophy (*Samaya*), mutual conflict of Śrutis (*Śruti*) and Śrutis supported by reasonings (*yuktisahita-Śruti*).

While commentators are, on the whole, agreed about the general drift of the Adhyāyas, there is substantial difference of opinion among them in regard to the directive principles upon which the division of Pādas in each Adhyāya is based. It will be seen that this crucial difference of opinion determines the divergent courses of their interpretations and the philosophical conclusions to which they lead. It is open to the critical student to examine these directive principles themselves accepted by the different commentators, from the point of view of their self-consistency and with reference to the natural trend of the language and thought of the Sūtras, and come to his own conclusions regarding the general outline of the Sūtrakāra's system and how far the different commentators have been able to capture and reflect the intentions of the Sūtrakāra, faithfully, in their interpretations.

There is also some difference of opinion among commentators over the readings of Sūtras[5] and the number of Sūtras to be treated as part of given adhikaraṇas.[6] Such differences are largely a matter of individual judgment. Some of them involve serious philosophical consequences or doctrinal differences. Such cases have to be considered on their merits.[7]

5. Cf. S and M on i, 2, 26; i, 3, 14; iv, 4, 1.
6. S and M read i, 2, 9-10 and i, 2, 11-12 as separate *adhi*, while R. treats them as one *adhi*. R. reads the first two words of i, 2, 20 as part of 1.2.19 as against S and M. Unlike S and R. M. reads i, 4, 16-23 as *one adhi*. (*Samākarṣādhi*). They read '*Samākarṣāt*' as part of *Kāraṇatvādhi* (i. 4, 14-15) and split M's *Samākarṣādhi* into a *Jagadvācithvādhi*. (i. 4, 16-18) and *Vākyānvayādhi* (i, 4, 19-22) R. reads i, 3, 22-23 as part of the Daharādhi. unlike S and M.
7. For example M. reads: *Jyotir upakramāt tu* (i, 4, 10) *Tathānyat pratiṣedhāt* (iii, 2, 37) *Aksaradhiyām tvavirodhah,* (iii, 3, 34) *Samanā ca.* (iv, 2, 7) as against S.

CHAPTER IV

PRE-MADHVA AND POST-MADHVA COMMENTATORS ON THE SŪTRAS

1. *Pre-Madhva Commentators*

There have been many commentators on the B.S. before and after M. The names of not less than twenty-one Pre-Madhva commentators have been recorded for us by Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, the biographer of M. in his gloss on his own *Madhvavijaya*.[1] Some more cc. came to be written after M. such as those of Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha, Vallabha and Baladeva. Among the Pre-Madhva commentaries only three have come down to us,—those of S. Bhāskara and R. The rest had either been eclipsed by the more brilliant ones in the field or had died a natural death for want of sufficient following. The salient features of a few more were probably absorbed into one or the other of the extant three as a result of which they lost currency and passed into oblivion.

Most of the early cc. on the Sūtras appear to have advocated certain forms of Pantheistic realism. The cc. of Vṛttikāra, Brahmadatta, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmanandin, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa stand out in this respect. It is clear from Bhāskara's c. on the Sūtras that he counted Ṭanka or Brahmanandin as a full-blooded Pariṇāmavādin (Pantheist), like himself who looked upon the world of matter as a direct transformation of B. and, therefore, quite real tho' not as perma-

1. These are (1) Bhāratīvajaya (2) Saccidānanda (3) Brahmaghoṣa (4) Śatānanda (5) Udvarta (6) Vijaya (7) Rudrabhaṭṭa (8) Vāmana (9) Yādavaprakāśa (10) Rāmānuja (11) Bhartṛprapañca (12) Dramiḍa (13) Brahmadatta (14) Bhāskara (15) Piśāca (16) Vṛttikāra (17) Vijayabhaṭṭa (18) Viṣṇukrānta (19) Vādīndra (20) Mādhavadāsa and (21) Śaṁkara. The list is *not* chronological. Not all of these cc were Bhāṣyas in the accepted sense. Some like Nos. 8, 17, 18, 19 and 20 were mere *ṭīkās* or *vṛttis*.

nent as B. These commentators accepted the relation of Bhedābheda (difference and non-difference) with varying shades of emphasis, as between B. and the world of matter and souls.

R. derives his philosophical tradition from the enigmatic Bodhāyana who is generally identified with the Vṛttikāra and from the Bhāṣya of Dramiḍa and perhaps also from the *ṭīkā* of Vāmana. It is doubtful if the Māyāvāda-interpretation of the B.S. could be traced to any such commentator before S.[2] It is significant that S.'s illustrious predecessor Gauḍapāda has *not* made any use of the B.S. or attempted to enlist their support to his views in his famous Kārikās. The terms in which S. himself concludes the preface to his B.S.B. "*Yathā ca ayam arthas sarveṣām Vedāntānām tathā vayam asyām Śārīrakamīmāṃsāyām pradarśayiṣyāmaḥ*" gives a broad hint that his was going to be the first systematic and brilliant Māyāvāda c. on the B.S. Yet, how difficult he himself found this task of making the Sūtras yield a monism of his conception is proved by the artificiality and parenthetical irrelevance of his comments on many an occasion when he seeks to go against the spirit and letter of the Sūtras and the natural drift of their argument and inner dialectics. That he was fighting with all his force and ingenuity against a long line of Realist commentators is not the only fact that makes his c. suspect. It is more the disharmony of his metaphysical views and presuppositions with the thought of the Sūtras, so far as it could be made out from their plan, spirit and letter and according to his own objective interpretations undistorted by his parenthetical notes, innuendoes, correctives, asseverations and remarks *ex cathedra* such as:

Idam tviha vaktavyam; Sūtrāṇi tvevam vyākhyeyāni
(*S.B.S.B.* i, 1, 19).

Cf. also his comments on i, 4, 10; ii, 1, 33; iv, 4; 6. It is interesting to note in this connection how Bhāskara flings (B.S.B. i, 4, 26) one of the early commentators, the Vākyakāra alias Brahmanandi alias Ṭaṅka in the teeth of S. saying that the Vivartavāda has no support in the ancient tradition of Sūtra-cc. It is with difficulty that the *Bhāmatī* and the *Kalpataru* try to defend S. on this point. Under B.S. iv, 3, 7-14, S. cuts himself adrift from the established commentators and the order of the Sūtras, turning Pūrvapakṣasūtras into Siddhānta-Sūtras and *vice versa* to avoid the admission of B. as a qualified being. He encounters equally serious difficulty in interpreting the Ānandamaya-adhikaraṇa which at the very ouset of the Samanvaya-Adhyāya projects the image

2. There is no evidence that even the unnamed author (identified by some with Ācārya Sundara Pāṇḍya) from whom S. cites four verses at the end of his Bhāṣya on the *Samanvayādhi*, had actually left any fullfledged C. on B.S.

of a Saguṇa Brahman. Elsewhere in his c. S. refers (i, 3, 19) to the existence of Vedāntins who, unlike himself, believed in the permanent or Pāramārthika reality of the individual soul as such:

Apare tu Vādinaḥ pāramārthikam eva Jaivam rūpam iti manyante. Asmadīyāś ca kecit.

The doctrines of the *Pariṇāma* (transformation) of B. into the world and of *Bhedābheda* (both difference and identity between Jiva and B.) seem to have been more or less widely held by the early realistic commentators on the Sūtras. The Sūtras themselves were apparently so worded as to render such an interpretation plausible. Indeed, so pronounced was the influence of Pariṇāmavāda that even R. who was no Brahma-Pariṇāmavādin, in point of *actual fact,* in as much as he accepts the existence of Prakṛti as a dependent material principle (under B.S. i, 4, 3), still considered it prudent to adopt its terminology, after a fashion, and put forward what is familiarly known as *his* "Abinnanimittopādāna" theory of B.'s causality. Two conclusions are possible from this (i) that he had not the courage of his conviction to give up the language of Brahmapariṇāma; or (ii) that he could not afford to define his exact position in respect of the actual and precise nature of 'transformation' (*upādānatva*) of B., even to himself, much more clearly and unambiguously, on account presumably of a conflict of loyalties in his mind between the demands of true Theism, in which he was an ardent believer and the influence of the Pantheistic interpretational traditions derived by him from the Vṛttikāra and Brahmanandin, as predecessors of his school of thought. S. in his c. on B.S. ii, 1, 14 represents the Vṛttikāra as a frank Pantheist Brahmapariṇāmavādin; and Ṭanka or Brahmanandi was also indubitably one, as has been shown by Bhāskara who quotes his words: *Pariṇāmastu syāt dadhyādivat.* The fact then that the same Ṭanka is claimed by both Bhāskara and R. as the precursor of their tradition confirms the suspicion that R. should have made up his mind to part company with the original unexpurgated Pantheism of his acknowledged precursors and opt for a pure Theism, tho' in the phrasing of it, he could not extricate himself completely from the misleading terminology of Brahmapariṇāma or bid good-bye to it, but continued to indulge in the language of Brahmopādānatva, however, far removed from the acceptance of actual pariṇāma of Brahmacaitanya or Brahmasvarūpa his position might be.

Considering all this bewildering diversity of interpretations put upon the Sūtras by the commentators who had gone before him, M. preferred to examine the Sūtras afresh and let them speak for themselves and unfold their meaning without allowing himself to be swayed

by the prestige or influence of any of the cc., before him. The opening words of his B.S.B. *Sūtrārtha ucyate* (I shall give the meaning of the Sūtras as they are) testify to his determination to be faithful to the Sūtras and be guided by them instead of by the commentators.[3]

2. *Madhva's Influence on Other Schools and Commentators*

Notwithstanding M.'s powerful attack on various shades of (Jīveśvara)—bhedābhedavāda and Brahmapariṇāmavāda, many of the Post-M. cc. on the Sūtras were still reluctant to shake off their fascination for the language and ideology of Brahmopādānavāda or B's material causality of the world, which had come down to them from the earlier line of Pantheistic commentators like Bhāskara and Brahmadatta and which had a semblance of support in the Sūtras like *Prakṛtiśca*...... (B.S. i, 4, 23) *Ātmakṛteh pariṇāmāt* (i, 4, 26). This is best illustrated in the case of Nimbārka who ostensibly holds that between Jīva and B. the relation of difference and identity are both *equally true and real*. This is opposed to M.'s view. But then, when Nimbārka defines what he means by identity and difference, we find that his view of difference and 'identity' is virtually and substantially the same as M.'s, tho' N.'s way of phrasing them is different. For, according to N. "difference" means dependence of Jiva on B. while "identity" stands for lack of independent existence and functioning on the part of Jiva.[4] Thus on N.'s view, the Jiva's difference from B. and his identity with It would point to the same fact of his 'dependence' on B.N.'s view that the description of the Jiva in the Upaniṣads as being identical with B. should be understood in the sense that the former is dependent for ever on B. for his existence and functioning is nothing new or unacceptable to M. and has been most tellingly emphasized by him in all his writings:

Yadadhīnā yasya sattā tat tadityeva bhaṇyate
Vidyamāne vibhedepi mitho nityam svarūpataḥ.
'Sarvam khalvidam Brahma' ityucyate Tadadhīnasattāpravṛttimattvāt. Na tu sarvasvarūpataḥ.
(M. *GB*, iv, 24).

Thus, the Bhedābheda-siddhānta of Nimbārka is nothing more than a high-sounding paraphrase of M.'s position and cannot, therefore, be treated as falling outside the scope of his influence.

There are also other evidences of the influence of M.'s works on Nimbārka and his commentator Śrīnivāsa. The untraceable Śruti *Atha kasmād ucyate Brahmeti bṛhanto hyasmin guṇāḥ* cited by M. in his *NV*

3. अथाविद्यापटलपिहितनयनैरन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यातानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि यथावत् व्याचिख्यासुर्भगवानाचार्यवर्यः ** (TP.)
4. Cf. V. S. Ghate *The Vedanta*, p. 29.

on B.S. i, 1, 1,—is found cited by N. (in a slightly different form *"Bṛhanto guṇā yasmin iti brahma"*, in his c. on B.S. ii, 3, 28. His interpretation of the Utpattyasambhava-adhikaraṇa (ii, 2, 42-45) in terms of the refutation of Śākta system follows M. Several untraceable Śrutis cited only by M. for the first time have been cited by N.'s commentator Śrīnivāsa. The idea that the second Pāda of Adhyāya III of B.S. is to be connected with the theme of Bhakti has been introduced by M. for the first time in the tradition of interpreting the B. S.

Bhaktir asmin pāda ucyate.
Bhaktyartham Bhagavanmahimoktiḥ (M. *BSB*. iii, 2, 1).

It appears from N.'s introductory remark to this Pāda that he was impressed by this point of view tho' in the actual interpretation of the various adhikaraṇas here, he has not been able to establish so close a structural relationship for *each of the adhikaraṇas* of this Pāda with the theme of Bhakti, as M. has been able to do. Nevertheless, N.'s statement: *Brahmaṇi Puruṣottame bhaktyudrekasiddhāye tadguṇāścocyante* recognises the force of M.'s stand: *Bhaktyartham bhagavanmahimoktiḥ* (The majesty of God is expounded in this Pāda in order to foster Bhakti in the heart of souls).

M.'s influence on Vallabha has not been less. The way in which V. has raised the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* to the position of a fourth Prasthāna and commented on it may be attributed to the example set by M.—the first known Vaiṣṇava Ācārya to have written a c. on the B.P. and drawn upon it a great deal in his interpretation of the *Sūtras* and the *Gītā*. The distinction accepted by V. between the fruits of Jnānamārga and Bhaktimārga in Mokṣa[5] rests squarely on the doctrine of Tāratamya of bliss in Mokṣa which is distinctive of M.'s philosophy and is not to be found in any other school of Vedānta. Lastly, V. has borrowed, without acknowledgement, the verse:

भ्रान्तिमूलतया सर्वसमयानामयुक्तितः ।
न तद्विरोधाद्वचनं वैदिकं शंक्यतां व्रजेत् ॥

from M.'s short metrical c. on the B.S. known as *Aṇu-Bhāsya* (ii, 4-5). V. incomporates it in his own *Aṇubhāsya* (ii, 7, 11). His son Viṭṭhaleśa has quoted from M.'s *B.S.B.* (i, 4, 29) in his *Vidvanmaṇḍana*.[6]

5. ज्ञानमार्गीयभक्तिमार्गीययोरनावृत्तौ तुल्यत्वेऽपि फलप्राप्तौ वैलक्षण्यात् (V. *BSB* iv, 4. 22).
V. holds that the fruits of Bhaktimārga are higher and sweeter than those of Jnānamārga. For Jnanis God's favor lasts up to the time of release. His grace and favor are showered on Bhaktas to a greater extent and all thro' Mokṣa. This distinguishes them from those who have attained release by mere Jnāna: ज्ञानादेः सकाशात् भक्तिमार्गे फलतोऽप्युत्कर्षमाह । ज्ञानादिसाधनवत्सु अनुग्रहो मुक्तिपर्यन्त एव भक्तिमार्गे तु, विशेषरूपो मुक्तादिभ्योऽपि भक्तानां व्यावर्तको भगवदनुग्रहः स्मर्यते ॥
Cf. M. on Gītā ii, 52 where he quotes from *BP* in support of *Ānandatāratamya* in Mokṣa.
6. *Op. Cit.* NS. Press Edn. Bombay. 1926, pp. 337-38.

The influence of M.'s philosophy has been most prominent and pronounced on the Caitanya school of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. The growth of this influence can be traced in the works of Rūpa, Sanātana and Jīva Gosvāmins. It reached its zenith in the writings of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa (c. 1720-80). His *Govinda-Bhāṣya* on the *B.S.* is heavily indebted to M.'s *B.S.B.* as I have shown elsewhere with details.[7] Baladeva's teacher Radhā Dāmodara's *Vedāntasyamantaka* also quotes from M.'s *BSB*. The doctrine of "Viśeṣa" has been bodily taken over from M.'s philosophy and from the writings of Vyāsatīrtha by Radhādāmodara from whom it was taken over by Baladeva. It thus makes no difference to argue as some scholars have done[8] that Baladeva borrowed the idea of Viśeṣa, if at all, from his teacher Radhādāmodara and not from M. The fact is that Radhādāmodara himself got it from the *Nyāyāmṛta* of Vyāsatīrtha. This is clear from the examples he has cited in support of the doctrine which are found verbatim in Vyāsatīrth's work.[9]

While noticing often Baladeva's divergences in interpretation from S. and R. in his Edn. of the *Brahma Sūtra* with translation and Notes, Dr. Radhakrishnan has failed to show[10] how a considerable part of Baladeva's divergences from them are, in reality, derived from M. This omission, combined with the most scanty attention he has paid to some of M.'s most crucial divergences from the interpretations of S. and R. which raise fresh problems about the philosophy of the Sūtrakāra, leaves in the minds of readers of Dr. Radhakrishnan's *Brahma Sutra* a regrettably negligible impression about M.'s performance as one of the three leading Bhāṣyakāras on the Sūtras. This is quite unfair to him. One wishes that as very little has been made known about the real merits of M.'s interpretation of the B.S. as compared with those of S. and R., his rights had been taken into account more commensurately with his position and standing in a work dealing exclusively with the B.S. and their interpretation and written by the most illustrious exponent of Indian philosophy, in our times.

7. See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature*. Vol. ii, pp 396-407.
8. Op.cit. p. 335 and *Caitanya: His Life and Doctrine* A.K. Majumdar, Bby, 1969. p. 271.
9. See my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta*, ii, p. 335.
10. See his references to Baladeva under B.S. i, 1, 5-11; ii, 3, 51-52; iii, 2, 1-5; 11-12; 27; 31; iii, 3, 25; 43-44; 51. ii, 1.21; 26.

CHAPTER V

SAMANVAYA

1. *Nature and Purpose of Samanvaya*

According to M. the purpose of Samanvaya of Śāstra carried out by the Sūtrakāra in the opening Adhyāya of his work is to give a typical demonstration of the thesis implicit in the very connotation of the term "Brahman" used in the first Sūtra that it is a Being of infinite perfections. The definition of B. in the second Sūtra as the source of the eightfold dispensations of the world of matter and souls is intended to give us confirmation of the possibility of the existence of such a Perfect Being which is the quest of philosophy. The purpose of Samanvaya is not to arrive at a systematization of the diversified contents of the Śrutis with a view to showing how much of it all has reference to a B. conceived as Nirguṇa and how much more to the Saguṇa and how much else to lesser deities and principles pertaining to the adhidaiva, adhibhūta and other realms. Its object is to formulate the principles of interpretation by which the whole body of scripture can be shown to have the Perfect B. as its subject-matter in virtue of the fullest and highest conno-denotative power of the words and phrases used in the Śruti passages.

This dual interpretation of scripture based on the primary and ultra-primary connotations of words and phrases (referring to things of ordinary experience and to the highest B. respectively) is the basic feature of the technique of Samanvaya adopted by M. in interpreting the opening Adhyāya of the Sūtras. He derives the idea as we have seen from the well-known passage of the *Muṇḍ. Up.* referring to the *two Vidyās* to be known by every one. Other evidences of the recognition and

acceptance of this two-fold approach to Scripture in the interests of Samanvaya have been cited by M.[1]

It is in keeping with this basic approach that the Samanvayas of texts pertaining to the *adhidaiva, adhyātma, adhibhūta* and other cross-sections of scripture have been taken up one by one in the course of the Samanvayādhyāya. The Samanvaya in B. proceeds on the basis of the primary plenary and maximum senses of the terms and descriptions. These are referred to B. in view of its immanence in each and every cross-section of finite reality comprising the *adhidaiva, adhibhūta,* etc. and the complete dependence, in consequence, of everything else on B. for every one of its characteristics, functions and dispositions. Such a higher attunement of texts in B. is carried out by the Sūtrakāra, according to M., without any prejudice to the commonly accepted connotations of the words, phrases and passages of these texts in respect of various things of the world, deities, material principles, rites, ceremonies and disciplines.[2]

M.'s thesis that the majesty of B. is the highest purport (*mahā-tātparya*) of Śrutis is the same as the principle enunciated by R. in his *Śrībhāṣya* that words denoting the body have the capacity to denote the possessor of the body.[3] As B. is the Antaryāmi (indwelling spirit) of the world of matter *and Souls* according to the Upaniṣad, and in M.'s philosophy also, it is not difficult to see how from this point of view the descriptions of various *adhidaiva, adhibhūta* and other principles in the Śrutis have the power to signify their Antaryāmi also in a deeper and more intensive sense, in so far as their own respective natures, powers and functions and their capacity to become objects of knowledge (*sattā, pratīti* and *pravṛtti*) are all derived from the Antaryāmi within.

2. *Scheme of Samanvaya*

The following is the scheme of Samanvaya adopted by M.:

(i) *Anyatraprasiddhaśabdānām Brahmaṇi Samanvayaḥ.*

The purportful correlation to B. of words and phrases met with in Scriptural passages which by worldly convention have come to denote

1. Cf. यो देवानां नामधा एक एव (*R.V.* xi, 82.3).
एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति (*R.V.* i, 164, 45).
वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम् (*Pravṛtta Samhitā*).
2. See the discussion on *B.S.* i, 4, 10-11; 16-17.
3. शरीरवाचिनां शब्दानां शरीरिपर्यवसानं न्याय्यम् (*Śrībhasya* i, 1, 13).
But M. feels that this cannot be made the sole criterion for Samanvaya as there is some difficulty in conceiving of the material principles of the world as the 'body' of B in any physical sense.

things and principles other than B. and which cannot therefore *prima facie* be taken to denote B. in their primary sense at the very outset.

(ii) *Ubhayatraprasiddhaśabdānām Brahmaṇi Samanvayaḥ* . . . .

The correlation of words and phrases used in scriptural texts which while being in a position, at the first reading, to denote other things and principles, are equally in a position to refer to B. The Samanvaya of such words and phrases in B. is impeded only to the extent that there is a possibility of an alternative denotation which, at the Siddhānta level, will be shown to be barred by weightier grounds.

(iii) *Anyatraivaprasiddhaśabdānām Brahmaṇi Samanvayaḥ*

The Samanvaya of words and phrases occurring in Scripture which by their established usage therein and characteristics connoted have come to be accepted as *solely* denoting principles and things *other than B.* and where such usage can also be supported by powerful Scriptural authority and sanction, or by other inviolable grounds. For this reason, the Samanvaya of such terms is likely to be doubly impeded by prevailing denotative reference elsewhere and absence of ready application to B. or by insurmountable obstacles to such application being attempted.

Each of the above-mentioned classes of words and phrases may be subdivided into proper names or non-significant terms (*nāmātmakaśabda*) and descriptive or significant terms (*liṅgātmaka*). A separate Pāda is devoted to each group in respect of the first class only. In the remaining classes, the *Nāmātmaka* and *Liṅgātmaka* terms are dealt with in the same Pāda as the total number of Pādas cannot exceed four. Pāda i deals with Nāmātmakaśabdas of the Anyatraprasiddha category and Pāda ii with Liṅgātmakaśabdas of the same category. The proper names have precedence over descriptive terms as the former are capable of referring directly to the person or thing and the latter can do so only thro' attributes. The order of Pādas is based on convenience of comprehension. As the correlation of words of the third class to B. is in the nature of an uphill task, it is held over to the last stage by the Sūtrakāra.[4] The Samanvaya of *Ubhayatraprasiddha* words would be comparatively easier than that of the Anyatra-prasiddha class; for all that one will have to do is to block the alternative connotation. Their Samanvaya in B. would then follow as a matter of course by the strength of supporting evidences. Thus the priority given to Anyatraprasiddha words is justified. M. has taken due note of the fact that the Devatādhikaraṇa and Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa have only an incidental bearing on the themes discussed in the course of the Adhyāya. They do not therefore affect the main outline of the scheme.

4. अन्यत्रैव प्रसिद्धशब्दसमन्वयस्य प्रथममबुद्धयारोहात् चतुर्थे तदुक्तिः ।।

CHAPTER VI

EXAMINATION OF SCHEME OF PĀDAS ADOPTED BY ŚAMKARA and RĀMĀNUJA

M. has expressed his disapproval of the basis of classification of Pādas of Adhy. I adopted by S. and others: *Nānyathā tadadṛṣṭeḥ*[1] (M. B.S.B. i, 1, 12). The grounds of his disapproval have been clarified to some extent by J. in his *TP*. These have been argumentatively elaborated by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC*.[2] They are entitled to serious consideration.

Śaṁkara's Scheme

S. has given the following arrangement of Pādas. Pāda i discusses texts from the Upaniṣads which contain clear and unmistakable indications of B. as their subject matter, (*Spaṣṭabrahmaliṅga*). Pada ii and iii deal with passages which contain only indefinite marks of B. (*aspaṣṭabrahmalinga*) with this difference between them that Pāda ii deals with passages referring to Saviśeṣa or Saguṇa-Brahman while Pāda iii discusses passages relating to Nirviśeṣa Brahman. The last Pāda has nothing do with Samanvaya and establishes that Prakṛti or Pradhāna of the Sāmkhyas is nowhere recognized in the Śāstras and is, therefore, "foreign" to them (*aśabdam*)—a conclusion which had been taken for granted in B.S. i, 1.5.

On closer examination, we find that the Pādavyavasthā as set forth above by S. suffers from serious overlapping of the bases of classification of Pādas (Pādopādhis) in the actual interpretation of several Sūtras and

1. Not otherwise; for such a thing is *not* seen to be the case:—a most laconic statement characteristic of M.
2. For a detailed summary of Vyāsatīrtha's arguments see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedānta*...Vol. II. pp. 63-68.

adhikaraṇas, as interpreted by himself. For e.g. in Pāda ii, the Sūtra *Sarvatra prasiddho*...(ii, 2) *Attā carā*...(ii, 9) Antaryāmī...(ii, 18), *Adrśya*... (ii, 21) show clear and decisive marks of B. (Spaṣṭabrahmalinga) tho' they have been treated as aspaṣṭabrahmalingakas by S. Similarly, in Pāda iii, we see clear and distinct attributes of B. (Spaṣṭabrahmalingas) in *Dyubhvādyā*...(iii, 1), *Bhūmā*...(iii, 8), *Akṣaram*...(iii, 10) *Īkṣatikarma* ..(iii, 13). The term Spaṣṭabrahmalinga should either mean (i) such marks as are clearly proved, in other texts, to pertain to B. or (ii) such as would not be compatible with the Jiva or other entities. It could not possibly mean (i) what is not even *prima facie* applicable to Jīvas or other things or (ii) what are well-established even in the Viṣayavākyas themselves as marks of B. or (iii) what is *entirely devoid* of marks suggestive of Jīvas or other things. For on any of the latter alternatives, no Pūrvapakṣa could possibly arise. In texts like '*Sarvam khalvidam brahma*' cited as Viṣayavākya in iii, 2.1, we do have marks of B. (viz. *Sarvātmya* etc.) which are quite distinctive. We should, accordingly, have to consider them under Pāda i instead of in Pāda ii, as has been done by S.

The distinction between Pādas ii and iii, attempted by S. on the basis of Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa B. cannot also be sustained. For in Pāda ii in Sarvatraprasiddho (i, 2.1), Attā (i, 2, 9), Antara (i, 2; 13) Antaryāmi (i, 2, 18) Adṛśyatvādi (i. 2, 21) we have marks like being the substratum of illusions (bhramādhiṣṭhānatva) transcending time (Kālatrayātītatva) infinite bliss (pūrṇasukhatva) oneness with Jīva (Jivatādātmya) invisibility (adṛśyatva) etc. which are incompatible with the Saguṇa and are unmistakable marks of Nirguṇa. Similarly, in Pāda iii, (which is allotted to Nirviśeṣa) there are such obvious marks of Saguṇa and Saviśeṣa as perceivability (dṛśyatva) and having form (rūpitva) in Dyubhvādyāyatanam (i. 3.1); being the object of a determinate form of knowledge (Saprakārakajnānaviṣayatvam) in Bhūmā Samprasādāt (i.3. 8-9) in the text 'Seeing like this...(*evem paśyam*)—marks like being able to see (draṣṭṛtva) hear (śrotṛtva) etc. in Akṣaram (i.3.13) and desire (Kāma) etc. in the text *Satyakāmas satyasaṁkalpaḥ* in the Sūtra: *Dahara*...(i.3, 13-14). These are incompatible with the Nirviśeṣa B. It is no use the Advaitin's pleading that the Nirviśeṣa B. is the Cinmātra only and that B. in its capacity as the substratum of world-illusion is practically Saviśeṣa and that therefore B. dealt with in Sarvatraprasiddho... (i, 2, 1) could be regarded as Saviśeṣa. On the same line of argument, even Dyubhvādyā...(i.3.1) could be viewed as compatible with Saguṇatva and the Sūtra would have to be placed in Pāda ii. If it is still persisted that the Viṣayavākya 'Yasmin dyauḥ (Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 2, 5) discussed under Dyubhvādy...(i.3.1) is *not* Saviśeṣa-Brahmapara but refers to Nirviśeṣa by Lakṣaṇāvṛtti then, by parity of reasoning, even texts

like *Sarvam khalvidam brahma* (under i.2.1) could be regarded as in-dicative of Cinmātra (pure consciousness) by Lakṣaṇā, in the interests of their validity and in that case, Sūtra i.2.1, also, would have to go to Pāda iii. If it is again argued by the Advaitin that the incompatibi-lity between the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa could be got over on the ground that the Saviśeṣa is in reality the same as the Nirviśeṣa thro' superim-posed determinations (*āropitaviśeṣas*) this would be equivalent to say-ing that both kinds of texts are actually found to be discussed in both the Pādas, indiscriminately. In that case, there is no point in distin-guishing between those Pādas or labelling them as dealing with Savi-śeṣa and Nirviśeṣa respectively. That would mean that there is a good case for abandoning so unsatisfactory a classification and going in for a more satisfactory basis of classification. Of course, one can under-stand and make allowances for stray deviations. But it would seem on S.'s classification and interpretation that the deviations are too many and too frequent to be maintainable within the accepted frame-work.

Coming to Pāda iv, there is no single comprehensive basis of distinction of Pāda (Pādopādhi), such as denial of Śāstric validity to Prakrti, as claimed by S.[3] *that is applicable to all the adhikaraṇas* in this Pāda. For, according to S. such refutation is confined to the first three adhikaraṇas of Pāda iv and the subsequent Sūtras and adhi-karaṇas discuss a number of disconnected topics like (i) the question of an internal conflict of Śrutis regarding the order of things created (ii) the exclusion of the texts *Yasya caitat karma* and *Ātmā vā are dra-ṣṭavyaḥ* from the Jīvas and so on. Of these, the fourth adhikarana should go to Adhy. II. pāda 3 or 4 and the other two to earlier Pādas. (iii) The refutation of the distinction between the efficient and the material cause of the world with reference to B. in the penultimate adhikaraṇa (of i.4) is out of place here and relevant to Adhy. II. (iv) The last *adhi* is a summary refutation of the atomic and other theories of causation. Thus, out of eight adhikaraṇas in Pāda IV, *only three* pertain to the disestablishment of the Saśabdatva of Prakṛti. Looked at from any point of view, the way in which the fourth Pāda of Adhya.I has been interpreted by S. could hardly be accepted as being faithful to his own classification or the intentions of the Sūtra-kāra.

We thus see that while there is sufficient logical propriety in the scheme and sequence of Pādas as described by M., it is sadly wanting in S.'s. If we are to be guided by toughness of subject-matter, Spaṣṭa-

3. तद्यावत्तेषां शब्दानामन्यपरत्वं न प्रतिपाद्यते, * * *
* * * * अतस्तेषामन्यपरत्वं दर्शयितुं परः सन्दर्भः प्रवर्तते ॥ (S. *BSB*. i.4.1).

brahmaliṅgas would not deserve precedence over Aspaṣṭalingas, as has actually been given. The discussion of Nirviśeṣa texts would not also have been relegated to the third Pāda. If, on the other hand, prece-dence is to be given to the easier subject, the discussion of Nirviśesa B. in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa (i.1.12-19) in Pāda I, would *not* have led the topic of Samanvaya.

Rāmānuja's Scheme of Pādas

According to the Rāmānuja tradition of interpretation, the Sūtra: *Janmādyasya yatcḥ* (i, 1, 2) is charged with a double emphasis (eva) viz., *Brahmaiva kāraṇam eva* and *Brahmaiva kāraṇam.* The first sense of *eva* is insistence on invariable presence (*ayogavyavaccheda*) of cau-sality. It rules out the improbability (*asambhava*) of the definition by showing in the rest of the adhikaraṇas of the first Pāda that B. is in-variably the cause of all. The other three Pādas refute the objection of *ativyāpti* or overpervasion of the definition by excluding the causa-lity of others (*anyayogavyavaccheda*). Of these, Pāda ii discusses "Aspaṣṭalingas" relating to Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc; Pāda iii "Spaṣṭa-lingas" of the same kind and Pāda iv texts which contain very clearly expressed grounds in favor of the Pūrvapakṣas in support of Prakrti, Jīvas etc.

This is also unsustainable. For, according to R. himself, the causa-lity of Pradhāna is refuted in the *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* and that of the Jīva in *Kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā* (i, 1, 18). These are clear instances of re-moval of overpervasion of the definition of B. which according to R. is the theme of Pādas ii, iii and iv. It may be argued on R's behalf that if in the *Īkṣatyadhi.* texts like *"Sad eva somya idamagra āsīt"* are held to refer to Prakrti as the cause of all, then as it would be a gov-erning text, all other texts pertaining to causality would have to be explained in consonance with it—which would make Prakrti the one Jagatkāraṇa. That would land us in a Pūrvapakṣa that B. is not the Jagatkāaraṇa and that would eventually lead up to an "asambhava-śaṅkā" in respect of the earlier definition of B. It is such an asam-bhavaśankā" that is elaborately refuted in Pāda i. On the same lines it can be argued that B. being established as the purport of the govern-ing text *"Sadeva somya idamagra āsīt"*, all other texts pertaining to Kāraṇatva will have to fall in line with it. That would show that Pra-dhāna is not and cannot be the Cause of the world. Such a conclusion would naturally lead up to the removal of the overpervasion of the definition of B. In this way, the first Pāda would fall within the ambit of removal of overpervasion of the definition and give rise to an over-lapping of theme between itself and the other three Pādas. It would

not be difficult either to stretch the Pūrvapakṣas of Pādas ii, iii and iv in such a way as to provoke an *asambhavasaṅkā* against the definition of B in respect of the adhikaraṇas there which would blur the distinction of themes between the first and the other three Pādas.

Another explanation of the basis of R.'s classification of the Pādas of Adhy. I has been suggested by his commentator. It is this. Brahman's establishment as the ultimate source of all depends on the removal of objections on the ground of *asambhava* of the definition. This is done in Pāda i. which thus ensures the nature of the ultimate cause of all as *Cidacidvilakṣaṇam* (distinct in essence from Cit and Acit). Once this has been successfully shown, the various other attributes of B. are elucidated in the remaining Pādas. There is thus no overlapping between the first and the remaining Pādas.

This explanation too is unsatisfactory. For, if the distinction of B. from Cit and Acit is by virtue of its being the cause of Cit and Acit, then, Sūtras like *Antastaddharmopadeśāt* (i, 1, 20) and *Jyotiścaraṇābhidhānāt* (i, 1, 24) where such attributes as "being present in the Sun" and "being the essence of light" which are *other than* "being the cause" are referred to could not have been included in Pāda i. If, on the other hand, the Cidacidvilakṣaṇatva of B. taught in Pāda i is from the point of view of other attributes as well; then, the subject-matter of Pādas ii, iii and iv would be indistinguishable from that of Pāda i (and would have to be brought under the first Pāda itself). The other explanation on R.'s behalf that Pāda ii contains texts which *prima facie* carry certain indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*) marks of Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc., cannot also stand scrutiny; for, there are clear and distinct marks of Jīvas, Prāṇa, Buddhi etc. in many of the texts cited by R. under Pāda ii, such as *Manomayaḥ prāṇaśarīro bhārūpaḥ* in the Viṣayavākya of *Sarvatra prasiddhopadeśāt* (i, 2, 1); of "attṛtva" of Jiva in "Attā" (i, 2, 9) and of enjoyership of the fruits of Karma in respect of Jīva, Buddhi or Prāṇa (along with B.) in the Vissayavākya of the same Sūtra. Similarly, in the Antaryāmyadhikaraṇa (i, 2, 18) Antaryāmitva together with embodiment referred to in '*Yasya prithivī śarīram*' is possible in Jīva also. These adhikaraṇas should more properly then be shifted to Pāda iii. Here, an explanation has been offered on behalf of R. that the characteristics of *Manomayatva, attṛtva, Karmaphalabhoktṛtva* and *Śarīritva* do not signify ordinary physical modifications of the mind-stuff, taking food to satisfy hunger, or actual enjoyments of the fruits of Karma, having a physical body etc., but altogether different ideas such as being comprehensible to a mind duly purified (*śuddhena manasā grāhyatvam*), all-destroying power, control of the enjoyment of the Karmaphala of Jīvas, controlling the Jīvas present in the bodies and

so forth; and that in these special and exalted senses these marks cannot be regarded as "spaṣṭa"-Jīvaliṅgas, as they are incompatible with Jīvahood. This explanation also cannot be accepted. For the question will have to be answered if these special senses given to these terms are acceptable to the Pūrvapakṣin; or are found to be their ordinarily accepted senses; or are those to be given to them from the Siddhānta point of view. Since the Pūrvapakṣin cannot be expected to accept these specialized senses of the Siddhāntin, at the Pūrvapakṣa stage, there is no harm in regarding the apparent senses as those current in normal usage and therefore quite clearly pointing to the Jīvatman, Prāna etc. That these special senses of these terms would not fit the Jivas, Buddhi etc., at the Siddhānta level goes without saying and proves nothing and constitutes no bar to their pointing to the Jivas, Buddhi etc., clearly when the Pūrvapakṣa is raised. It being thus impossible to treat them as "Aspaṣṭalingas" of Jiva etc. their discussion in Pāda ii would not be justified.

It may be argued that 'Manomaya' does not simply mean having contact with a mind and therefore insufficient to prove that the person referred to is the Jiva; but that it means "having the mind as a sensory organ". As this sense of the term is not evident in the passage in question, the mark of Manomayatva cannot be looked upon as a "Spaṣṭa-Jīvalinga" and that therefore it and the others cannot be looked upon as Spaṣṭa-Jīvalingas. They may therefore be deemed to be rightly discussed in Pāda ii. This explanation would be far-fetched. The sense of 'contact with the mind' (*manas-sambandha*) would be sufficient in this case to establish further that the mind is regarded as an instrument of knowledge possessed by the person referred to. It need not therefore require any special mention. When we use the term "Cakṣuṣ-mān", we do as a matter of course understand a person who possesses the visual organ. We do not understand by that term the sky which is (ever) in contact with the eye. If it is objected that the term 'Manomaya' is still not clearly expressive of the Jiva (aspaṣṭajīvalinga) because in another text: "*Manomayaḥ Prāṇaśarīranetā*" (Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 2, 7) it signifies Brahman, one may answer back that, for a similar reason, in the Viṣayavākya of "*Dyubhvādyāyatanam*" (i, 3, 1) the mark of 'dyubhvādyāyatanatva' being well-established as a Brahmalinga in other texts like '*Eko dādhāra bhuvanāni viśvā*' and therefore not specifically denotative of Jīva (i.e. being an "aspaṣṭjīvalinga") that adhikaraṇa involving a Pūrvapakṣa with reference to the Jīva, according to R. will have to be shifted to Pāda ii from R.'s point of view. If it is still contended that in 'Dyubhvādyā...' there is the clear Jīvalinga viz., of 'being subject to births' (Cf. *Ya eṣo 'antas carate bahudhā jāyamānaḥ*) and that therefore the discussion is pertinent to Pāda iii, and not to

Pāda ii, we have to point out that similarly in Pāda ii also, in the *adhi.* '*Arbhakaukastvād....*' (i, 2, 7) the Jīvalinga is *clear* in *Eṣa me ātmā antarhṛdayaḥ*' and so it should have been shifted to Pāda iii. Moreover, it is possible to argue that in Pāda iii, the mark of Dyubhvādyāyatana' is not as such clearly descriptive of Jīva and similarly the other mark mentioned along with it viz. '*Amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ*' is not also clearly descriptive of the Jīva because of the proximity to Brahmalinga. Similarly in i, 3, 8, "*bhūmatva*" by itself and in contiguity with '*Yatra nānyat paśyati*...and other marks of B. and 'Akṣaratva' mentioned in proximity with "*Akṣarasya praśāsane sūryācandramasau vidhṛtau*" which is a clear Brahmalinga, are not clearly and decisively indicative of Jīva (i.e. *aspaṣṭa*). So all these adhikaraṇas involving such Aspaṣṭajivalingas, should have been placed in Pāda ii, according to R.

Pāda iv according to R. discusses texts which share the nature of both 'Spaṣṭa' and 'Aspaṣṭalingas'.[4] But this is not a satisfactory ground for bringing them under this Pāda. For ultimately such texts should be reducible to one or the other of the two categories (of Spaṣṭa or Aspaṣṭalingas) and as such assignable to Pāda ii or iii as the case may be. But they cannot surely fall outside the scope of both those Pādas altogether.

R's commentator has also sought to explain the phrase "Pradhāna-Puruṣādipratipādanamukhena Pradhānakāraṇatvapratipādanachhāyānu-sāriṇi vākyāni" used by R. as meaning "Spaṣṭatarapūrvapakṣahetuka-tvam" i.e. texts wherein the reasons in support of the Pūrvapakṣa are far more clearly evident than those in favor of the Siddhānta. And such texts are reserved for discussion in Pāda iv. But this condition is hardly fulfilled in respect of the Ānumānikādhikaraṇa (i, 4, 1) Jyotirupakramā (i, 4, 9) and Na saṅkhyopasaṅgrahād...(i, 4, 11) where the respective Viṣayavākyas are *Mahataḥ param avyaktam, Ajām ekām*...and '*Yasmin pañca pañcajanāh*... In these *adhi-s*, the Pūrvapakṣa, according to R is *not merely that there is the category of Pradhāna etc.*, (for that much is admitted by the Siddhāntin himself; *but that the Pradhāna etc. exist independently of Brahman.* But there is no clear or express reason embodied in any of the Viṣayavākyas of these adhi-s holding the Pradhāna and other categories to be existing *independently* of B. Hence this interpretation of the phrase—"*Tattatpratipādanacchāyānusāritvam*" cannot be accepted.

It has been further argued on R's behalf that Pāda iii establishes B. as having the entire Universe for its body (*sarvaśarīram*) and that it is of the nature of all (*sarvātmakam*) and that Pāda iv, establishes that

4. तत्तत्प्रतिपादनच्छायानुसारीणि चतुर्थे

there is nothing else in the universe which is not the effect of B (*atatkāryābhāvaḥ*) or its body (*ataccharīratvābhāvaḥ*). This would be equivalent to saying that each of the Pādas ii, iii, and iv propound but one attribute of B. Such a result could be accomplished by any individual *adhi.*, in each of these Pādas (e.g. *Antaryāmyadhidaivādiṣu taddharmavypadeśāt* where in the texts *Yasya prithivī śarīram, Yasyātmā śarīram*" the truth has been established that everything in the Universe is controlled by B. and that everything constitutes Its body). Similarly, in Pāda ii, in *Dyubhvādyā*....(i, 3, 1,) by the Viṣayavākya "*Yasmin dyauḥ pṛthivī*..." the thesis of "*Sarvaprakāritva*" and "Sarvātmakatva" of B. has been established. That being so, the other adhi-s in Pādas ii and iii would all be rendered superfluous.

Moreover in some adhi-s in Pāda ii such as Adṛśyatvādiguṇako... (i, 2, 21) and in some others in Pāda iii, such as Bhumā samprasādāt... (i, 3, 8) the attributes of "Sarvaśarīritva" and "Sarvātmatva" are not apparent, as required by R's view. It would moreover be arbitrary and unreasonable to impose any artificial restrictions on the number of transcendental attributes of B. that should be dealt with in the Sūtras (for one who believes B. to be Nikhilaheyapratyanīka (free from all imperfections) and Samastakalyāṇaguṇātmaka (abode of all perfections), when the Śrutis and Sūtras refer to numerous attributes of divinity like Sarvagatva, Dyubhvādyāyatanatva, Pūrṇatva etc. and artificially confine the scope of each Pāda to the treatment of one particular attribute alone of B.

CHAPTER VII

THE SAMANVAYA EXPLAINED IS ONLY TYPICAL AND ILLUSTRATIVE

The conception of B. as Guṇapūrṇa becomes enriched and widened with each forward step taken in the direction of Samanvaya. The Samanvaya of the term 'Ānandamaya' in i.1.12., for example, includes the Samanvaya of other terms Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya and Vijñānamaya in the same context. If, as the Sūtrakāra has it, Ānandmaya is the blissful and not the modification of bliss (*vikāra*), by the same reasoning *annamaya* would be the source of all sustenance, *prāṇamaya* would be seen to be the source of universal energy and so on—the five forms thus pervading and controlling the respective planes of cosmic life. We gain, in this way, a new insight into the philosophy of the *Taitt. Up.* and the Sūtrakāra's vision of the attributes Divine by which life in our cosmos is sustained by B. entering into all aspects of creation (*Tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānupraviśat*). This is true Brahmadṛṣṭi which the Upaniṣads place before us. It thus goes without saying that the Samanvaya of a particular word or phrase selected from a particular text is not confined to it alone but applies with equal force to and includes the Samanvaya of several other terms on a par with it in the same context. The choice of a particular term is only illustrative. This is known as the principle of Upalakṣaṇa (inclusion by implication). In the same way, the selection of a particular text from a particular source does not mean that the adhikaraṇa is restricted to that particular Viṣayavākya alone from that particular source. Texts on a par with it from other similar sources from Vedic and Post-Vedic literature are also to be taken into account. The method followed by the Sūtrakāra is only illustrative and not exhaustive as the number of sources is unlimited. (*anantā vai Vedāḥ*) and the Sūtra by definition is *Viśvatomukha* (multifaced). This

explains the *rationale* of M.'s drawing his Viṣayavākyas from the widest possible range of Vedic and Post-Vedic sources and not *only* from the ten or twelve Upaniṣads. It is again by virtue of this principle of Upalakṣaṇa that he brings the Samanvaya of the other terms *annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya* and *vijñānamaya* under the Samanvaya of the term *ānandamaya* in B.S. i.1.12. It stands to reason that in raising a discussion over a particular passage with a suitable Pūrvapakṣa, arguments and Siddhānta, the Sūtrakāra intends that other terms or passages elsewhere satisfying similar criteria and coming under the governing principle of the adhikaraṇa in question (*adhikaraṇopādhi*) are also understood to have been taken into account. Otherwise, as the Śāstra is vast in extent, a good deal of it would be left out of consideration and as there are only seven separate adhikaraṇas devoted to Samanvaya in the first Pāda of Adhy I. only seven distinct terms would have been attuned to B. and only seven attributes would have been secured for B. At this rate, it would be a poor achievement for an author who claims to show by Samanvaya how the whole body of Śāstra is able to reveal B. (*Śāstrayonitvāt; Tattu samanvayāt*).

Thus, as there is parity of grounds in the group of terms *annamaya, prāṇamaya* etc. all the five terms have been brought within the focus of Samanvaya in B. by M., by way of Upalakṣaṇa. He has duly explained why the order of enumeration of the terms as given in the Upaniṣad, in this particular case, has been overlooked by the Sūtrakāra and priority accorded to "Ānandamaya"[1].

In the same way, the Samanvaya of a term like Ākāśa in adhi. 8 applies to other *adhibhauika* principles as well, such as *Prithvī, Āpaḥ. Tejaḥ.*[2] The Samanvaya of one Adhidaivaśabda like Indra in adhi. 7 includes that of all other *adhidaiva*-terms."[3] The same is the case with all *adhyātma, adhijyautiṣa, adhyarca*, terms in subsequent adhikaraṇas. As a 'Tantrayukti' the principle of Upalakṣaṇa plays a decisive role in M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras. For e.g. the Sūtra *Ānumānikam apyekeṣām* (i.4.1) includes the Samanvaya of words like Jīva and the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa includes that of other words: feminine terms like *aditi.*

1. See under Ānandamayādhikaraṇa.
2. तस्मादधिभौतिकसर्वशब्दोपलक्षकाकाशशब्दवाच्यो हरिरिति सिद्धम् (*TP.* i. 1.22).
3. तस्मादशेषाधिदैवततत्तच्छब्दवाच्यो हरिरेवान्तः प्रविष्ट इति सिद्धम (*TP.* i. 1.21).

CHAPTER VIII

SAMANVAYA ILLUMINES GUṆAPŪRṆATVA OF BRAHMAN

The purpose of Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. according to S. is to sift its contents in such a way as to show how its ultimate purport is seen to be the identity of the Pratyagātman (individual self) with the Nirviśeṣa B. This is proposed to be achieved by resorting to the method of Adhyāropāpavāda (superimposition and consequent negation)—by first positing the appearance of the world, its organisation, sustenance and absorption in B. and then curing the aspirant of his belief in the reality of that world and its values, of his individuality and of a God above him, by applying the shock treatment of Bādha or denial of everything except pure consciousness and making him fit for self-realization. The Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya, with which S. prefaces his interpretation of the B.S., is intended to show that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are also constructed on the same technique of Adhyāropa-apavāda.[1] S. emphasizes this governing thought behind his Samanvaya, in his prefatory remarks to the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa.[2]

M. holds that the spirit and letter of the Sūtras and the general nature and drift of their teachings point to a very different conclusion. The definition of B. given in Sūtra 2, as the source of the world of matter

1. Madhusūdana Sarasvati's c. on the *Sankṣepaśāriraka* gives clear expression to this objective of Brahma-Mīmāmsā Śāstra:
तत्र श्रीमच्छारीरकशास्त्रस्य तात्पर्यविषयभूते मुमुक्षुजिज्ञास्ये निर्विशेषे ब्रह्मणि बोधनीये. प्रासंगिकमुमुक्ष्वजिज्ञास्यसविशेषब्रह्मोपासनावाक्याद्यनेकविधविचारविक्षिप्ततया दुरवबोधतामाकलय्य, तद्विशेषपरित्यागेन मुमुक्षुजिज्ञास्यं निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म शास्त्रतात्पर्यविषयीभूतं अनायासेन मुमुक्षुबोधाय संक्षेपशारीरकाख्येन श्लोकग्रन्थेनाविश्चकार करुणया श्रीसर्वज्ञाचार्यः ।
अत एव, मुमुक्ष्वजिज्ञास्यसविशेषब्रह्मप्रासंगिकविचारपरित्यागरूपसंक्षेपविशिष्टं निर्विशेषब्रह्मविचारात्मकं शारीरकशास्त्रमेव एतदिति संक्षेपशारीरकमिति समाख्यास्य युक्तैव ॥ (Banaras Edn. 1924. p. 2).
2. द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते नामरूपविकारभेदोपाधिविशिष्टं तद्विपरीतं सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम्. *** (*BSB*. i.1.12)

and souls, its control, etc., is clearly opposed to the view that B. is devoid of all attributes and activity. The clear wording of many Sūtras such as:

नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः	(i.1.16)	अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः	(1,310)
शारीश्चोभये	(i.2.20)	सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन	(1.2.42)
द्युभ्वाद्यायतनम्	(i.3.1)	मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात्	(i.3.2)
भूमा	(i.3.8)	जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्	(iv.4.17)

makes it difficult for us to agree that the Sūtrakāra was in favor of a monistic philosophy.

R. has anticipated M. in establishing that there is no room for a Nirviśeṣa-B. and for identity of Jīva and B. in the Sūtrakāra's system. He has also shown that the souls remain different from B. even in Mokṣa. M. is, however, unable to accept that part of R.'s interpretation of the Sūtras in which he makes out that B. in its own being is both the material and the efficient cause of the world (*abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇam*). R.'s acceptance of *Acit-Prakṛti* as a distinctive principle in his metaphysics and its transformation into grosser forms such as Mahat, Ahamkāra, in the course of its evolution, weakens his case for B's being the material cause of the Universe. His attempt to define material causality (*Upādānatva*) of B. as liability to change in the sense of being qualified as their controller by subtle and gross matter and their two states[3] leaves us with two Upādānakāraṇas for the world in the end—viz. *Acit and B.*—the former as the actually transforming principle and the latter as the connecting link and controller of the two states of Prakṛti (subtle and gross). M., therefore, dissociates himself from the interpretational tradition of the R. school and defines his position in regard to the causality of Prakrti and B. much more precisely and unambiguously. He recognizes that Prakṛti alone is the actual material or transforming principle, while B. is the Supreme intelligent principle which brings about all such transformation in Prakrti by its immanent Will:

> 'Entering into Prakrti, making her transform and being present therein as the controlling principle of such transformation'.[4]...

3. *Prakrtim anupraviśya, tām pariṇāmya, tatpariṇāmaniyāmakatayā tatra sthitvā* ....(M. *BSB*. i, 4.27).
As for the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa which many commentators have interpreted in support of B. being the material cause of the Universe, M. has raised two principal objections against such an interpretation. One is the irrelevance of the precise nature of B.'s causality of the world to the question of Samanvaya. The other is the conflict of the thesis of a 'material-cause-and-effect relationship' with the illustrations used in the Upaniṣadic text (*Chān. Up*. vi, 1, 4-6) and the terms in which they are put. These points will be found discussed in detail in their proper place in M.'s *BSB*.
4. उभयप्रकारविशिष्टनियन्तृंशे तदवस्थातदुभयविशिष्टतारूपविकारवत्वम् । (*Śrībhāṣya*, ii, 3.18).

In this way, B. emerges in M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras as the one and only independent source that explains all the states and conditions pertaining to finite reality—be it in the sentient or the insentient sector. He has accordingly shown in his C. that the *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (B.S. i, 4, 24-28) and the *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa* (ii, 1, 15-21) the two important adhikaraṇas on which Pantheistic and semi-Pantheistic commentators have set so much store, have nothing to do with B.'s being the material cause of the world.

R. interprets the term 'Samanvaya' in Sūtra i, 1.4 in quite a different sense from S. and M.—as being 'connected with' the highest good of man (Mokṣa). But looking to the wholly exegetical nature of the contents of almost all the adhikaraṇas of the entire Adhyāya barring the *Devatā, Apaśūdra* (and of the *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* according to S. and R.), it does not seem proper to divest the expression Samanvaya of the sense of analysis of texts, words and phrases with a view to showing their application to B.[5]

According to R. the rest of the Adhyāya (after *adhi.* 4) is designed to establish that B. is the *sole cause* of the Universe and that no other principle like Prakrti or Jīvas can be regarded as the cause. This Adhyāya is also intended according to him to establish that B. has the whole world as its body (*sarvaśarīram*) and is their Soul or moving spirit (*sarvātmakam*) and that therefore there is nothing in the Universe which is not a product of B. or does not constitute its body. But the wording of the Sūtras in this Adhyāya taken as a whole is hardly in support of the position that each Pāda of the Samanvayādhyāya establishes only one or two attributes of B. as above. Since B. according to R. also is infinite in its perfections (*anantakalyāṇaguṇātmaka*), it would be proper to expect the Sūtras to address themselves to the task of establishing it in the opening Adhyāya. If R. would agree that B. which is the subject matter of inquiry in i. 1.1 is indeed the Being of infinite perfections, he should also agree that this deserves to be fully demonstrated by the Sūtrakāra. This cannot be done by restricting the scope of the Sūtras to the establishment of only a few attributes of B.; but by utilizing the Sūtras in such a way as would make each adhikaraṇa (of Adhyāya I) bring out *as many* of the cosmic attributes of B. as possible and the whole Adhyāya an illuminating commentary on the thesis that B. the subject of the inquiry is a Being endowed with *infinite perfections* (Sarvaguṇapūrṇam). Indications are not wanting in the

5. This is conceded by R. himself:
अतः परं द्वितीयतृतीयचतुर्थेषु पादेषु * * तत्तद्वाक्योदितकल्याणगुणाकरत्वं ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यते ।
तत्रास्पष्टजीवादिलिंगकानि वाक्यानि द्वितीये पादे विचार्यन्ते, स्पष्टलिंगानि तृतीये ॥
(*Śrībhāṣya* i, 2. Introd.).

Sūtras[6] that such is indeed the tenor of Adhy. I. M. seems thus to be clearly on the right track in holding that the purpose of the first Adhyāya is to establish B. as Sarvaguṇapūrṇam thro' the exegetical method of Sarvaśāstra (śabda)-Samanvaya in B.

6. Cf. विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेः (i, 2.2) सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेः (ii, 1.38) आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि (ii, 1.29) अतोऽनन्तेन (iii, 2.27) etc.

CHAPTER IX

RESTORATION OF PRAKṚTI TO ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE IN THE SŪTRAKĀRA'S PHILOSOPHY

M. stands alone in fighting for a rightful place and status for Prakṛti within the framework of Vedānta philosophy as systematized by Bādarāyaṇa. When one recalls the many clear and frank references to Prakṛti and her evolutes and the colorful allusions to her guṇas in the Upaniṣads and Purāṇas, one is at a loss to understand the revulsion of feeling against Prakṛti exhibited by many commentators on the B.S. which has emboldened them to make the preposterous allegation that Prakṛti is *"aśabdam"* i.e., *has no place in the Scriptures of Hinduism* and has nowhere been taught and recognized in them. This dogmatic allegation seems to have originated with the early Pantheistic commentators on the Sūtras whose system left no room for a material principle —other than B., which could provide the stuff of which the Universe is made. When the Vivarta or Māyāvāda interpretation of S. and his school entered the field, *this philosophical antipathy of Pantheism to Prakrti came to be perpetuated and further exploited to its own advantage.* Yet, how futile and fragile was this charge of 'Aśabatvam' against Prakṛti can be seen from the significant reference to Prakrti as an accepted category in some of the Siddhānta Sūtras in Bādarāyaṇa's own work (cf. *Viśeśaṇabhedavyapadeśābhyām ca netarau*: i, 2.22)[1] and the inevitability with which Prakrti comes into its own, even in the system of an avowed Abhinnanimottopādānavādin like R.[2]

As a critical student of the texts and traditions of Vedānta philosophy, M. therefore felt bound to protest against this philosophical in-

1. Which Ś. has tried to explain away.
2. Cf. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः अपि तु परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्मकत्वविरहेण । तयानभ्युपगमादेव तंत्रसिद्धप्रकियानिरसनमिति । (*Śrībhāṣya* i, 4.3).

justice to Prakrti and restore it to its right and rightful place in the philosophy of the Upaniṣads and the Sūtras, as a material principle operating under the control of the Supreme Being and providing the stuff of which the world is made. He has, therefore, taken the natural step of repudiating the interpretation put on the *Īkṣatydhikaraṇa* (i, 1, 5-11) of the B.S. by the 'Aśabdatvavādin, as completely misplaced and irrelevant to the context. He has shown in his Bhāṣya and AV. that the Sūtrakāra's objection to Prakṛti is not to its being and functions as such but to the independent status assigned to it by the Sānkhya Dualists. He has accordingly reinterpreted the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa, the Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa and such others and shown how B. is the sole *Nimittakāraṇa* of all cosmic life evolved from Prakrti and Puruṣas and never the material cause of anything and that Prakṛti under the eternal control and direction of B. is the material cause of all cosmic life. The *nimitta* and *upādāna-kāraṇas* are thus kept apart and M. finds no basis at all in the Sūtras for the 'Abhinnanimittopādānatva of B.,[3] ostensibly accepted by R. and with much more mental reservations by S.[4] These points will be dealt with, in detail, in their proper contexts.

3. The view that B. is both the material and the efficient cause of the Universe.
4. Cf. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेण, अपितु, यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम । (*Bhāmati* i.4.27).

CHAPTER X

MADHVA'S RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN VEDĀNTA AND VAIṢṆAVA THOUGHT

The Śaṁkara we know from the cc. on the Upaniṣads, the Sūtras and the *Gītā* has avoided theological affiliations and steered clear of controversies regarding the theological identification of B. with either of the two contenders for supremacy since the classial age of Hindu revival under the Guptas. The reason for this lay in his acceptance of a Nirguṇa Brahman as the highest and the only true reality which left no room for any theological predilections. Nevertheless, a tacit acquiescence in the supremacy of Viṣṇu as the nearest approximation to the metaphysical Absolute is to be met with in his c. on B.S. ii, 2.42 and elsewhere. R., who came a few centuries after, believed sincerely and wholeheartedly that Viṣṇu was the B. shining on the crown of the Vedas (Upaniṣads).[2]

The attempt made by him in his *Vedārthasaṅgraha* to establish the preeminence of Viṣṇu as the highest object of religious worship and philosophical quest on the basis of a rapid survey of later Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva Upaniṣads and Purāṇas threatened his popularity in his own native region. It may be partly for that reason that he did not choose to pursue the line in his c. on the Brahmasūtras, and try to give his Vaiṣṇavism an authentic basis in the Sūtras themselves. But the work done by him in his *Vedārthasaṅgraha* must have raised great expectations in that direction.

1. ईश्वर: सर्वज्ञो नारायणाख्य: ईशनशील: (S. *GB*. XV.17) नारायण: परोऽव्यक्तात्....... (*G.B.* Intro.) and S. on Kaṭha Up. 1.3.9.
2. श्रुतिशिरसि विदीप्ते ब्रह्मणि श्रीनिवासे । (*Śrībhāṣya*).

These were fulfilled by M. who addressed himself to that task also, *not* in a spirit of sectarian bias or animosity to other ways of worship but as part of his task of Śāstrārthasamanvaya, Śāstrārthapariśuddhi and Śāstrārthanirṇaya (ascertainment of the teaching of Śāstra).[3] The doctrine of Tāratamya implicit in the conception of One Svatantra Real could not be shelved for ever.

The social strains and religio-political pressures in M.'s times were such as necessitated a resurgence of Hinduism under the common banner of a Theism with a country-wide appeal. M. evidently believed that a robust Vaiṣṇavism offered the most satisfactory basis for a resurgence of Hinduism. The Kṛṣṇa-cult had already stirred the people of Tamilnadu under the Ālvārs. In Bengal, Jayadeva had preached it in the twelfth century. In the Deccan, Bhāgavata-Dharma was gathering momentum (under the Mahānubhāvās?). M. appeared on the scene at this juncture with a new commentary on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, harnessing the flaming ideal of Kṣātradharma to the service of Vaiṣṇavism. He also found that Vaiṣṇavism offered the most congenial basis for a comprehensive synthesis of the heritage of the Vedic and Upaniṣadic past of the country with the then living springs of the Epic and Purāṇic faith of the masses and the classes sustained by the doctrine of Avatāras, peculiar to Vaiṣṇavism.

The emergence of the *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa* into fame, at about this time, must have contributed a great deal to the prestige of Vaiṣṇavism as a philosophy of religion as it stood for a synthesis of the concepts of the Vedāntic Brahman and the Theistic "Bhagavān":—

Brahmeti Paramātmeti Bhagavān iti śabdyate (Bhāg. i, 2, 11.).

There is no doubt M. succeeded in creating a favorable environment for Vaiṣṇava thought around the Prasthānatrayī, which was not without its influence on the sponsors of fresh schools of Vedānta who came after him. The increasing measure of this influence is to be seen, as has already been pointed out, in the schools of Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya.

M.'s works embody the most powerful and systematic attempt at establishing an enduring integration *(Samanvaya)* of the Vedic and Purāṇic Viṣṇu with the Vedāntic Brahman on the basis of a comprehensive survey of the Vedic, Upaniṣadic, Purāṇic and Pañcarātra

3. Cf. वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा ।
आदावन्ते च मध्ये च हरि: सर्वत्र गीयते ।। (*Harivaṁśa*, iii, 323, 34).
4. नारायणद्विट्तदनुबन्धिनिग्रहं क्षत्रियाणां विशेषतोऽपि परमधर्मं
* * बोधयति भगवान् । (M. *GT* introd.).

sources and its harmonization with the Theism of the *Brahmasūtras*.[5] He is the first to draw upon the evidence furnished by the closing Sūtras of the *Daivī-Mīmāṁsā* hailing Viṣṇu as the Brahman of the Vedānta.[6]

His cc. on the first three adhyāyas of the *Ṛg Veda*, on the *A.Ā.* and Upaniṣad, the concluding chapter of his *VTN*, portions of his *GB* and *GT*, his expositions of the *Bhāgavata* and *Mbh.* and the corroborative materials he has so diligently collected from the numerous Saṁhitās of the Pañcarātra and from many Khila-Śrutis now lost to us, provide an adequate basis for holding that Vaiṣṇavism has been the prevailing keynote of the Hindu religious tradition at its best, from time immemorial and that a Vedāntic Theism built on its foundations would represent the greatest common measure of agreement of Vedic, Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic thought. There will be no need for us then to feel embarrassed by the 'pronouncedly Viṣṇuite tone' of M.'s interpretation of the B.S. also, if we bear in mind the historical and traditional background to the task which M. was called upon to accomplish in the interests of the integration of Hindu thought and society as a whole, at one of the most disquieting periods of socio-political and religio-philosophical unrest in the history of the country.

The call of Vaiṣṇava Theism in Vedānta given by M. to his countrymen in the 13th century paved the way for the rise of fresh schools of Vaiṣṇava interpretation of the Sūtras such as by N.V. and the followers of Caitanya and inspired powerful waves of Vaiṣṇava Bhakti-cults led by the Santas of Maharashtra, the Haridāsas of Karnātak and the devotional Panthas of Tulsidās, Sūrdās, Kabīr and Mīrābai. The impact of M.'s rehabilitation of Vedāntic Theism can be seen in the output of Bhakti-oriented Stotra literature and cc. on the *Viṣṇusahasranāma*, *Sanatsujātīya*, etc. from within the Advaita school itself —much of which has been freely attributed to Ādi-Śaṁkara himself; but which, in reality, belongs to a much later writer or writers of the school coming after M.

M. is also the first to try to find a place for the Śrītattva in the theosophy of the Sūtras. His most noteworthy contribution to Theism in the Sūtras is to be seen in the lead he has given to commentators in finding an appropriate place for Bhakti *within the body of the Sūtras* by interpreting the whole of the second Pāda of the Sādhana-Adhyāya (III) as a "*Bhakti-Pāda*".

5. ब्रह्मशब्दश्च विष्णावेव (*M BSB.* i.1.1.).
6. 'स विष्णुराह हि । तं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते तं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते (*DMS.* q. by M. (*AV*) and *TP.* i.1.1).

The conception of Abhimāni-Devatās in the cosmic order, foreshadowed by the Sūtrakāra, obliges M. to work out a comprehensive scheme of gradation of such divinities behind the *ādhibhautika* order. The introduction of such divinities gives rise to the problem of their gradation and questions relating to Vidyās and forms of Upāsanās. These call for a good deal of theological niceties and explanations in M.'s system. They do not find a place in the other Vaiṣṇava systems of Vedānta which have not incorporated the doctrines of Abhimāni-Devatās and Devatātāratamya into the body-politic of their systems.

CHAPTER XI

MADHVA'S IMPROVED TECHNIQUE AND NEW PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE IN INTERPRETING THE SŪTRAS

Notwithstanding the difference in philosophical standpoint between S. and R., there is a very large area of agreement between their cc. on the *BS.* in respect of the topics of discussion, the Viṣayavākyas of a large number of adhikaraṇas and the meaning and purport of the majority of the Sūtras and the general trend of the discussions pursued by the Sūtrakāra. If S.'s introductory and parenthetical comments on topics like Adhyāsa, Vivarta, Māyā, Nirviśesa and Saviśesa-Brahmans, and higher and lower knowledge are kept aside, the Sūtra-interpretations of S., Bhaskara and R. would be seen to coincide for the most part.

Such is not the case with M. He differs radically from the others, even in the scheme and pattern of his interpretations, over the nature of topics selected for discussion in various adhikaraṇas, the alignment of such adhikaraṇas, the choice of their Viṣayavākyas and the range of sources from which they are drawn, and above all, the complexion of the Pūrvapakṣas raised and the Siddhāntas established. His interpretation of the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa (i.1.5-11) Ānandamaya (i. 1.12-19) Tadananyatva (ii, 1.15) Ambuvat (iii.2.19) Pṛthagupadeśa (ii, 3.28-29) Tadvyāpāra (iii.1.17) and such other adhikaraṇas are examples of such refreshing originality.

In interpreting the Sūtras within their generally accepted framework of Samanvaya, Avirodha, Sādhana and Phala Adhyāyas, M. has taken the initiative of suggesting fresh titles to many of the Pādas. Notable among such fresh titles suggested by him are those for the

Pādas of the first Adhyāya, *Yuktipāda* for ii, 1; *Samaya-pāda*[1] for ii, 2; and *Bhaktipāda* for iii, 2. He believes that the titles adopted by him reflect more faithfully than those of other commentators the general tenor of the topics discussed in them so far as it could be made out from the language of the Sūtras, the relevance of the topics to the Adhyāyas and Pādas in which they are introduced and the interrelation of the topics in question to those preceding or following them in the earlier and subsequent Pādas and Adhyāyas. It is worthy of note that in strict conformity with the theme of Adhy.I he has interpreted the *whole of its last Pāda unlike all other commentators,* in terms of *direct Samanvaya* of texts and names etc. *in B.*[2] His interpretation of *Kāraṇatvena ca.* . . . (i. 4, 15) is an example of the advantage of observing strict contextual consistency with the theme of the Adhyāya and Pāda, in interpretation. Violation of this has led to S.'s very unsatisfactory explanation of this Sūtra as attempting to resolve a minor discrepancy of detail in the order of evolution of certain material principles from B—which, according to his own scheme, must go to Adhy. II Pāda 3 or 4.

M. has also taken similar initiative in reconstituting several adhikaraṇas, (as accepted by S. R. and others) in the different Pādas and in sponsoring fresh interpretations of several Sūtras and adhikaraṇas in order to provide for the discussion of fresh topics of intrinsic value and importance to religion and philosophy which one would naturally expect to be discussed in a consolidated and authoritative treatment of Vedānta philosophy, such as we have in the B.S.[3] This includes the occasional splitting up of what other commentators have treated as one single adhikaraṇa into two or more separate adhikaraṇas. For example, the Sāmkhya-adhikaraṇa of S. and R. (ii, 2.1-10) is reset into *four* separate adhikaraṇas dealing with *four distinctive shades of Sāṅkhya thought* such as *Kevala-acetanapravṛttivāda* (ii, 2, 1-4) *Seśvara-sāṅkhya* (ii, 2.5) *Puruṣopasarjana-Prakṛtikartṛtvavāda* (ii, 2.8-10). Sandwiched between these is one adhikaraṇa (ii, 2, 6) criticizing the atheistic-materialistic Cārvāka system which has no faith in the moral values. This way of interposing an adhikaraṇa refuting the Cārvāka system in between the different shades of Sāmkhya thought is intended

1. While reasonings and counter-reasonings play the leading part in this Pāda (see Sūtras 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 27) the 2nd pāda is entirely a refutation of various *Samayas* (Cf. S. *Nirastas Sugatasamayaḥ Vivasanasamanya idānīm nirasyate* (ii. 2.33). This clearly shows that the designation of the two Pādas as *Smṛti* and *Tarkapāda* adopted by Advaitins is *inappropriate.*
2. This has earned him a grudging tribute from an adverse critic like V.S. Ghate (p. 157) who finds his performance "of little or no merit"! (The *Vedānta* p. 156).
3. Cf. M.'s interpretation of the *Tadananyatva* (ii.1.15) *Pradānavat* (iii.3.44) *Ambuvat* (iii, 2.19) *Kāraṇatvena* (i, 4.15), *Akṣaradhiyam* (iii, 3, 34) and other *adhikaraṇas.*

to convey a subtle suggestion, says M.'s commentator, Trivikrama Paṇḍita, that so far as the Sūtrakāra is concerned, all these types of Sāmkhya are as repugnant to him[4] (as a believer in Vedic philosophy) as the Cārvāka philosophy itself! The refutation of Seśvara-Sāmkhya in ii, 2.5 (according to M.) just *before* the examination of Cārvāka in ii, 2.6. is similarly intended to give a broad hint that the Sūtrakāra looks upon the position assigned to God in the Seśvara-Sāṅkhya philosophy, of being only a favorable factor (anugrāhaka) like the rain which is only the common cause in the production of different types of crops,[5] as a left-handed compliment to Īśvara's sovereignty.[6] It deserves to be noted, in this connection, that an *examination of the Cārvāka system is far more appropriate in this Adhyāya and Pāda* (ii.2) where anti-Vedic schools are being refuted than elsewhere in the Guṇopasaṁhārapāda (of Adhy. III.3, 53-54) as we have in S.'s c.

M. has shown in his criticism of the Pantheistic theories of his predecessors like Bhāskara, Bhṛtrprapañca, Brahmadatta and others that they involve moral and metaphysical denigration of the Deity by exposing it to the sufferings of creatures and the imperfections of matter on the one hand and physical transformation and deterioration of status from consciousness and bliss to unconsciousness and materiality of being, on the other. Such a prospect could hardly be consistent with the independence of B. It is fraught with the disintegration of B. and loss of its authentic being.[7] It is for this reason that M. refuses to make B. the material cause of the world in any form or sense—direct or indirect.[8] At the same time, he goes far beyond the Nyāya and other schools of Theism in his conception of B. as purely Nimittakāraṇa. He has taken special care to emphasize that in describing B as Nimittakaraṇa of the world, he is *not* using that expression in the narrow sense in which it has been understood and applied by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or the Seśvara-Sāṅkhyas to *their* Īśvara.

In his c. on BS. ii, 2.5, he has drawn pointed attention to the *fact* that God or B. in his system and that of the Sūtrakāra is *very much more than* being one of the contributory causes in creation or just a mere "Anugrāhaka" (favoring factor) like the clouds in the produc-

4. निरीश्वनिरासप्रस्तावे, तदनतिविप्रकृष्टत्वाल्लोकायतिकपक्षो निराक्रियते (*TPD.* ii. 2, 6).
5. Cf. ईश्वरस्तु पर्जन्यवत् द्रष्टव्य: (यथाहि पर्जन्यो व्रीहियवादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति * * एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति (S.BSB.ii, 1.34).
6. सेश्वर: कश्चित् सांख्यत्वसामान्तादन्तरा तं चामुं च निराकृत:। न च तदीश्वरस्येश्वरत्वम्; अनुग्राहकमात्रशक्तिमत्वेनास्वातंत्र्यात् (*TPD*).
7. न चेतनविकार: स्यात् यत्र क्वापि ह्यचेतनम् (*AV.* i.4).
8. This includes the doctrine of Brahman's Śaktipariṇāma. See AV. i.4, Ver. 71-72. NS. p. 200. Also *my Philosophy of Madhvācārya*. pp. 171-72.

tion of crops.[9] He affirms that Matter, Time, space, nature, karma and Jīvas exist and function at the pleasure of God and *not in His despite*. The very existence of matter and its power to change and transform are due to the will of God.[10] Nothing exists and functions or can do so independently of Him and His impulsion.[11]

In this sense, B. is the only Independent Cause and Source of all finite existence. This point has been dealt with by M. in his c. on Sūtra ii, 1.15, where he discusses the question whether the creation of the world by B. is on a par with the production of a pot by a potter —that is, determined by the utilization of other means, materials and accessories which have an independent existence of their own and a capacity to function independently. The answer to this question is in the negative—such is *not* the case with B.'s creation. Its creation proceeds absolutely in virtue of its own intrinsic power.[12] He points out that this question is raised in *R.V.* x. 81, 2 which is regarded by him as the Viṣayavākya of BS. ii, 1.15. The text cited is:

किं स्विदासीदधिष्ठानमारम्भणं कतमस्स्वित् कथासीत् ।

'What place was possibly there, what means at all and in what form did they exist'? Here, the existence of means and materials *independently of B.* is challenged and negatived in respect of the causal activity of B. M. holds that the above is not a simple question followed by a suitable answer. There is no answer pointing to any particular means or accessories. The Śruti has, therefore, to be interpreted as a statement challenging (*ākṣepa*) the precence of any independent existing means or accessory in God's creation.[13]

This raises a crucial problem in the philosophy of Theism—whether God (or B) needs or works with the help of accessories in His creation. Are these accessories created by Him or do they co-exist with Him? Or are they equally independent; or else metaphysically dependent on Him? If these questions deserve attention in the philosophy of Theism, the onus is on commentators on the Sutras, ancient and modern, to say where they have been discussed by Bādarāyaṇa *if not in the present* context. It will be shown that B.S. ii, 1, 24-25 cannot do so.

Viewed in the light of ancient and modern thought alike, M.'s interpretation of this adhikarana acquires great philosophical signifi-

9. तृणादीनां पर्जन्यवत् नानुग्राहकत्वमात्रमीश्वरस्य (*M BSB*.ii, 2.5).
10. चशब्देन प्रकृतिसत्ताप्रदत्वं चाङ्गीकृतम् (*ibid*).
11. न तु यथा तृणादीनां पर्जन्योऽनुग्राहकस्तथानुग्राहकत्वमात्रम् । सर्वपदार्थानां सत्तादिप्रदानाय सर्वगतत्वोक्ते:, ईश्वरप्रेरणामन्तरेण कस्यापि वस्तुन: सत्वस्यैवाभावात् । नहि यदधीनं यस्य सत्तादि तत् तस्यानुग्राहकमात्रमिति भाव: । (*TP.* ii, 2.5).
12. स्वतन्त्रबहुसाधना सृष्टिर्लोके दृष्टा नैवं ब्रह्मण: । किं तु, स्वरूपसामर्थ्यादेव तत्सृष्टि: (M.*BSB*.ii.1.15).
13. किं स्विदासीत् * * इत्याक्षेप: । अधिष्ठानाद्यनुक्ते: (M.*BSB*.ii, 1.15).

cance. The wording of the Sūtra *Kāraṇatvena cākāśādiṣu yathāvyapadiṣṭokteḥ* (i, 4.15), presupposes the existence of a series of causes in the evolutionary chain. The texts: *Sa kāraṇam kāraṇādhipādhipaḥ* (*Śvet Up.* vi.9) and Yah kāraṇāni....(*op cit* i.3) recognise the existence of other causes besides B. Their status must be clearly defined at some stage or other in the *Vedānta Sūtras*. Christianity in Western thought looks on God as the *sole and only cause*,—everything else being deemed to be created *de novo* and *ex nihilo*, by God. In India, the Seśvara Sāṅkhya posited co-existent Prakṛti which *does not owe* its existence to Īśvara. This Prakṛti is thus metaphysically *independent* of God, in the Seśvara Sāṅkhya Dualism. The question is thus of abiding interest to Indian thought—whether the causes including B., Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla etc. are all merely co-existent principles acting independently of one another? or whether *one of them* (B) is *metaphysically independent* and all the others metaphysically dependent on it, for their very existence (*sattā*)) and functioning (*pravṛtti*). Since the acceptance of the hypothesis of a plurality of mutually independent co-existent 'causes' would be philosophically unsound, M. has done well to pose the problem here and press it to a solution in the Sūtras themselves. Every true philosopher would thus see in the interpretation of this adhikaraṇa by M. the discussion of a problem of perennial interest to philosophy in general and to Indian philosophy in particular. For, the Indian philosophical tradition recognizes a number of eternal substances.[14] But they should be held to be *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on one Supreme Being. That is precisely what M. has done in this adhikaraṇa. The dependence is *not*, as may be inadvertently assumed, *only from the time of the creation of these substances;* for these substances are uncreated in time: And yet they are dependent on B.[15] The how and the why of it belong to the realm of revealed religion or transcendent reason. Short of admitting *creation* of 'eternal substances' also *in time*, this is the best solution within the framework of the Vedāntic commitment to the dictum: *Nityo nityānām* (*Katha Up.* ii, 2, 13).

M. interprets the Sūtra *Tadananyatvam*...(ii, 1.15) as laying down that B. is the *One Independent cause* in creation,—all the other factors (like Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Kāla, etc.) being metaphysically dependent ac-

14. ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजौ (*Śvet.* Up. i, 9).
पाच्यांश्च सर्वान् परिणामयेत् यः (*Op. cit* v, 5).
तम आसित् (*RV.* X, 129.3).
द्रव्यं च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च । (*Bhāg.* ii, 10.12).
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया

15. When they are used by God in creation, they undergo *Parādhinaviśeṣāpti* which is tantamount to their creation. For the concept of *Parādhinaviśeṣāpti* see my "Philosophy of Madhvacharya" ch. XXVI.

cessories. The proposition is purposely put in a double negative form (*tad—an—anyatvam*): "The Independent (Cause) is *not different from* (or other than) B. because of the presence of the word *ārambbhaṇa* in the Ṛg Vedic text (*Kimsvid āsīt adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇam*) and the challenge to the existence of independent accessories implied by it and on other grounds." The double negative is to emphasize the point that B alone is the Independent cause and that the rest are all, by implication and by hypothesis, metaphysically dependent on It. M.'s fresh interpretation of this Sūtra is not only original and thought-provoking but has also the advantage of saving the Sūtrakāra from inexcusable redundancy, if this adhikaraṇa[16] also is interpreted on S.'s lines, in terms of establishing the material causality of B.

There is a common impression that with his doctrine of 'absolute duality' which will have *"nothing to do with identity of any kind"*, M. is unable to do justice to the highest reach of Upaniṣadic thought emphasising the goal of unity. Like all superficial ideas, this rests on inadequate knowledge and hasty estimation of facts. For M. is as much alive, as any other Vedāntin, to the problem of Vedānta,—the need to reconcile the conflict of views to be met with in the texts regarding identity and difference between Jīva and B., and between the oneness and the duality of the nature of ultimate truth. He has given full and earnest attention to these questions in several of his works including his cc. on the Sūtras. *He has been the first to show how these important issues have been raised, discussed and solved by the Sūtrakāra himself* in the *Pṛthagupadeśa* (ii, 3, 28-29) Upamā (iii, 2, 18) Amśa (ii, 3, 43-50) Adṛṣṭa (ii, 3.51 adhikaraṇas and the Śāstradṛṣṭi-sūtra (i.1.30). The details of the arguments and the significance of the conclusions established in these adhikaraṇas and their philosophical bearing on the present problem, as they have been understood by M. will be found in their relevant contexts. It would be enough to point out here that the Sūtra *Tadguṇasārattvāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ* (ii, 3, 29) gives eloquent support to M.'s particular way of interpreting the language of identity used in describing the relation between Jīva and B. in Śruti texts like *Tat tvam asi* from the point of view of the measure of resemblance in respect of his essential attributes of reality, knowledge and bliss, which the Jīvātman bears to the Supreme[17] in virtue of the indissoluble bond of Bimbapratibimba relation which, *unites him with the Supreme Reality.*[18] This relation of Bimbapratibimbhāva is *sui generis*

16. *Vis-a-vis* the *Navilakṣaṇatva* adhikaraṇa (ii, I, 4-11) and *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (i. 4, 23-27).
17. ज्ञानानन्दादिब्रह्मगुणा एवास्य यतः सारः स्वरूपमतोऽभेदव्यपदेशः (*M.BSB.* ii, 3.29).
18. नहि येनोपाधिना जीवः प्रतिबिंबः तस्यैवोत्पत्तिविनाशौ ब्रूमः (*TP.* ii, 3.30).

and expresses the ontological relation between the concepts of the Svatantra and the Paratantra, in the domain of reality, from which M.'s philosophy derives its name of Dvaita-Vāda.

The teleology of Samanvaya as expounded by M. gives a new dimension to the doctrine of a Pūrṇa-B. of unspeakable perfections posited by Theism as against colorless abstraction of the Nirviśeṣa B. of the Advaita school, on the one hand and the concept of a limited B. of the Logical Realists. M. conceives the re-enthronment of the Theistic Pūrṇa-Brahman (of infinite perfections) to be the mission of his life and the aim of his philosophical career.[19] His interpretation of the fourth pāda of the Samanvayādhyāya takes us to the dizzy heights of a *Mahāsamanvaya* based on specialized concepts of Mahāyoga, Mahāruḍhiyoga, etc. expounded by him in his *KN* and C. on the *Ṛg Veda* and other works.[20]

M. is aware, as much as his critics, that this aspect of higher Samanvaya is intended only for those higher orders of adhikārins who have risen high in the scale of mystic upāsanā of Śabdabrahman.[21] He has made it clear that that the purpose of Śāstra in expounding the numberless attributes of B. is not merely theoretical but intensely practical viz., that the human spirit shall learn to contemplate them in all humility, love and devotion.[22] These attributes are trans-empirical. Each one of them is infinite in range and content. Every Divine attribute is to be meditated upon in unison with the idea of its infinitude, says M.[23]

His doctrine of Upāsanā is typically orthodox and proof against the blandishments of 'Adhyāropāpavādavāda' of any kind. There can be no lowering of standards in Upāsanṇ.[24] We cannot worship what we know to be a mental fiction.

There is nothing empirical about the attributes of B. But we have to use human language to create appropriate images of the trans-empirical attributes of God for our understanding, contemplation and

19. *Mbh. TN.* XXXII, 173-74.
20. रूढो, रूढियोगो महायोगो महारूढियोगो, रूढोपचारो रूढलक्षणोपचारो लक्षणेति शब्दवृत्तिभेदात्, रूढिपूर्वकत्वेन महायोगवृत्या परमेश्वरे अखिलशब्दव्युत्पत्त्युपपत्तेः (*NV.* 1.4).
21. शब्दानामपि सर्वेषां नामवित्कृतकृत्यता (*AV.* 1.4).
22. आध्यानार्थं हि सर्वे गुणा उच्यन्ते, प्रयोजनान्तराभावात् (M.*BSB.* iii, 3, 15).
23. सर्वगुणेषु भूमगुणस्य ज्यायस्त्वं सहभावात् (M.*BSB.* iii, 3.59). सर्वगणेषु भूमगुणस्य प्राधान्यं सर्वत्र संबध्योपासनीयत्वेन । तमृत एकगुणस्याप्यनुपासनीयत्वात् (*TPD*).
24. नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत (*Chān. up.* vii, 1, 5) इत्यादिना शब्दभ्रान्त्या न प्रतीके ब्रह्मदृष्टिः कार्या; किन्तु **तत्स्थत्वेनैव** उपासनं कार्यम् (M. *BSB.* iv. 1.4).

realization. The words we use are therefore to be taken in their 'analogical senses'[25]—as another great Theistic philosopher of the West has also pointed out.

These are profound ideas of God, of which genuine Theists could always feel proud. There are many such thoughts and ideas regarding the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being on which M. has shed much new light in his C. on the B.S. These entitle him to a high place among the best thinkers of the world on the perennial problems of religion and philosophy.

25. अलौकिकोऽपि ज्ञानदिस्तच्छब्दैरेव भण्यते ।
ज्ञापनार्थाय लोकस्य यथा राजेव देवराट् ॥ (M. *BSB.* iii, 2, 34)
व्युत्पत्तिश्च सौवर्णघटे घटशब्दस्येव किंचित्सादृश्येनैवोपपद्यते (*TP*)

प्रथमाध्यायसूत्रपाठः

प्रथमः पादः

* अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा
* जन्माद्यस्य यतः
* शास्त्रयोनित्वात्
* तत्तु समन्वयात्
* ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्

गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात्
तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्
हेयत्वावचनाच्च
स्वाप्ययात्
गतिसामान्यात्
श्रुतत्वाच्च

* आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्

विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात्
तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च
मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते
नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः
भेदव्ययदेशाच्च
कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा
अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति

* अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्

भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः

* आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात्
* अत एव प्राणः
* ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्
* छन्दोऽभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथा चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात् तथाहि दर्शनम्

भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम्
उपदेशभेदान्नेति चेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात्

* प्राणस्तथानुगमात्

न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन्
शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्
जीवमुख्यप्राणलिगान्नेति चेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिह तद्योगात्

द्वितीयः पादः

* सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्

विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च
अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शारीरः
कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च
शब्दविशेषात्
स्मृतेश्च
अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च
सम्भोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात्

* अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्

प्रकरणाच्च

* गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात्

विशेषणाच्च

* अन्तर उपपत्तेः

स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च
सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च
श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच्च
अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च नेतरः

* अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्

न च स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिलापात्
शारीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते

* अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः

विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ
रूपोपन्यासाच्च

* वैश्वानरः साधारणशब्दविशेषात्

स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति
शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तः प्रतिष्ठानान्नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशादसंभवात् पुरुषविधमपि चैनमधीयते
अत एव न देवता भूतं च
साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः
अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः
अनुस्मृतेर्बादरिः
संपत्तेरिति जैमिनिस्तथा हि दर्शयति
आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन्

तृतीयः पादः

* द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात्

मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात्
नानुमानमतच्छब्दात्
प्राणभृच्च
भेदव्यपदेशात्
प्रकरणात्
स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च

* भूमा सम्प्रसादादध्युपदेशात्

धर्मोपपत्तेश्च

* अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः

सा च प्रशासनात्
अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च

* ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् सः
* दहर उत्तरेभ्यः

गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथा हि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च
धृतेश्च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः
प्रसिद्धेश्च

इतरपरामर्शात् स इति चेन्नासंभवात्
उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु
अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः
अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत् तदुक्तम्

* **अनुकृतेस्तस्य च**
अपि स्मर्यते

*   *   *

* **सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन**

*   *   *

चतुर्थः पादः

* **आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च**
सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात्
तदधीनत्वादर्थवत्
ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च
वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि
प्रकरणात्
त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः प्रश्नश्च
महद्वच्च
चमसवदविशेषात्

* **ज्योतिरुपक्रमात्तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके**
कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्वादिवदविरोधः

* **न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च**
प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात्
ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने

* **कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः**
* **समाकर्षात्**
जगद्वाचित्वात्
जीवमुख्यप्राणलिंगादिति चेत् तद्व्याख्यातम्
अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपि चैवमेके
वाक्यान्वयात्
प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः
उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडुलोमिः
अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः

* **प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात्**
अभिध्योपदेशाच्च
साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नानात्
आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्
योनिश्च हि गीयते

* **एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः**

SAMANVAYA-ADHYĀYA

PĀDA I

CHAPTER XII

INVESTIGATION OF BRAHMAN AS DISTINCT FROM THE JĪVĀTMAN

1. *Jijñāsādhikaraṇam* (i.1.1)

The opening Sūtra: *Athāto Brahmajijñāsā* (i.1.1) establishes that the study of the Science of Brahman, which embodies the principles of interpretation by applying which we have to arrive at a correct ascertainment of the teachings of the Scriptures about the nature and attributes of B., the means of attaining It and the fruits of such attainment, is worth entering upon. In order to do this, it has to be shown at the outset that the conditions necessary for pursuing such a study, known as *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* (the four preliminaries) viz., the existence of a fit and proper subject of investigation, the person qualified to make it, the purposiveness of such a study, are all duly fulfilled. If the subject of the inquiry viz., B. were to be identical with the self (of the inquirer himself), the inquiry could not be pursued meaningfully; for one's own self has necessarily to be admitted as a self-evident and self-shining principle of consciousness (*svaprakāśa*). Such a principle cannot be made an object of inquiry without forfeiting its self-luminosity. The proposed inquiry can thus be made meaningful only on the basis of a clear admission of the fact that B. which is the subject matter of this Śāstra and of this proposed inquiry is not and cannot be the same as the individual soul (Pratyagātman) but must be entirely different and distinct from it. This is precisely what the opening Sūtra : *Athāto Brahmajijñāsā* tends to show, according to M.

He therefore starts with a well-chosen Pūrvapakṣa that as there is no proof of the existence of a B. other than the pure consciousness of Ātman and as the latter is a self-evident and self-shining principle[1] which cannot, in the nature and fitness of things, be open to any doubt in respect of its own existence or attributes, there is no proper subject of inquiry at all. Hence, there is no need to commence the inquiry (*vicāra*) into B.

It will thus be seen that M. has disconcertingly raised his Pūrvapakṣa[2] on the very foundational thesis of Advaitism—the oneness of Jīva and Brahman: आत्मा च ब्रह्म (S. *BSB*. i, 1.1)[3]

The Siddhānta view refutes the Pūrvapakṣa without questioning the self-evident character of the Jīvātman. It is pointed out that the use of the term 'Brahman' to denote the subject of the inquiry, distinguishes it once for all from the individual self because "Brahman" denotes a Being of infinite perfections. (*anantaguṇapūrṇam*), whereas the Jīvātman is established (by *Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa*) as a limited and a finite being[4] whom the Sūtrakāra holds to be atomic in size (*B.S.* ii, 3. 20-26).

A finite limited being like the Jīvātman *can become exposed to ignorance* and misunderstanding about the lordly attributes of the Supreme Being and about his own true relationship with It.[5] In consequence, it may come to arrogate to itself independence of initiative in its dealings with its God-given environments and treat the gifts of body, senses, intellect, etc., as its own independent personal possessions. It thus becomes a slave to their attractions. This is known as bondage.[6]

1. J. has shown in his *TP* (i, 1, 1) with cogent arguments that the self-evidentiary character of Ātman must be accepted as an axiomatic truth. He has shown the inadequacies of the Nyāya and the Mīmāmsā way of interpreting the intuitive awareness of the Ātman in the experience of Suṣupti, implicit in the recalling of that experience immedately on coming to the waking state, as an act of mere *'mānasa-anubhava'* or as merely pointing to the Ātman as being th ground of a self-luminous consciousness (*samvid*).
2. जीवव्यतिरिक्तेश्वराभावात्, तस्य च स्वप्रकाशत्वान्न जिज्ञास्यता इति प्राप्ते...... (M. *NV*. i, 1.1).
3. युक्त्यसहमपि परैः सिद्धन्तितत्वादस्माभिः पूर्वपक्षितम् । नहि परेषां सिद्धान्तोऽस्मत्पूर्वपक्षतामपि नार्हतीति भावः (*TCG*. p. 33 b).
4. *TP*. i.1.1.
5. तस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि जीवस्य परमेश्वरेच्छया परमेश्वरे स्वधर्मेषु चाज्ञानं संभवत्येव [अज्ञानमपि सत्यमेव, नाज्ञानकल्पितम्......] J.*NS*. p. 64.
6. Read: एवं खल्वध्यात्मविदां दर्शनम्—क्रियाज्ञाने प्रति कारकान्तराप्रयोज्यत्वादिलक्षणं कर्तृत्वं, भोक्तृत्वं च परमेश्वरायत्तमात्मनि स्वतो विद्यत एव । तस्य अपरायत्तत्वावभासोऽविद्यानिमित्तको भ्रमः । अविद्यादिकं च स्वरूपेणात्मसंबन्धित्वेन च सदेव । एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियशरीरविषयाः स्वरूपसन्त एव, ईश्वरवशा अप्यविद्यादिवशादात्मीयतयाध्यस्यन्ते । परायत्तात्मीयता अप्यस्त्येव । तांश्चात्मनो विविक्तानपि विस्पष्टतयानुपलभमानः तद्धर्मान् दुःखादीन् सत्यानेव आत्मीयत्वेन पश्यन्, तत्कृतेन नीचोच्चत्वलक्षणे विकृती सत्ये एव प्रतिपद्यते । ततो रागद्वेषाभ्यां प्रयुक्तः तद्विनिवृत्तये यत्करोति तदप्येतादृगेवातनोतीत्यनेकयोनिषु बंभ्रमीति । न क्वाप्यात्यान्तिकं तदुपशमं लभते—विना परमपुरुषाराधनात् इति (*NS*. p. 26).
   Dasgupta has unhappily misread and misconstrued the import of J's phrase "अपरायत्तत्वावभासः" in the above, in his *His. of I. Phl.* iv, p. 113 and f.n. 1.

Only the Supreme grace of God can free the soul from this beginningless bondage.[7] Right knowledge of God (Brahman) as the Supreme Being of all perfections and as the redeemer of souls from bondage can alone enable the soul to earn His Grace. Such knowledge leading to grace is to be secured thro' the arduous process of Jijñāsā consisting of *Vairāgya, Bhakti, Niṣkāmakarma, Śravaṇa, Manana* and contemplation and ripe devotion (*Pakvabhakti*) included in the scheme of Śadhanas. All these facts have been touched upon by the words *atha, ataḥ* and *Brahmajijnāsā* (*kartavyā*) of the opening Śutra.[9]

Sūtrārtha[10]

The term *'atha'* (then) is used *for the sake* of auspiciousness (*maṅgalārthaḥ*).[11] Its expressed sense is immediate sequence (*ānantarya*) to eligibility (*adhikāra*).[12] The *Bhāgavata Tantra*[13] refers to two kinds of eligibility—one based on the intrinsic classification of souls into Devas Ṛṣis and men and another based on merits acquired by effort. The Devas are the highest eligibles (*uttamādhikāriṇaḥ*) being capable of meditating on B. in its all-pervasive aspect (*Sarvaprakāśāḥ*); the Ṛṣis are middlings (*madhyama*) because they are fit to meditate on B. within their own selves (*antaḥprakāśāḥ*). Men of the highest calibre belong to the lowest cadre of Adhikārins as they are fit to meditate on and realize B. thro' external forms and symbols (*bahiḥprakāśāḥ*).

In the classification of Adhikārins based on earned merit, the virtues to be cultivated are Vedic study, tranquillity, self-control, contentment, concentration etc. (*śamādi*) and realization of the impermanence of everything in the Universe except God and the world's absolute dependence on the Supreme Being, freedom from attachment and complete devotional self-surrender of one's being to God. Tho' all the three classes are expected to possess all the virtues, there will be no over-

7. मोक्षस्य नारायणात्यर्थप्रसादमन्तरेणासंभवात्; अत्यर्थप्रसादस्य च तदपरोक्षज्ञानमन्तरेणालाभात् (*TP*. i.1.1).
8. अपरोक्षज्ञानस्य च ब्रह्मजिज्ञासां विनानुदयात्, अत्यर्थप्रसादद्वारा, मोक्षसाधनापरोक्षज्ञानोत्पादिका ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येत्यर्थः (*TP*. i.1.1).
9. अथशब्देनाधिकारमत इत्यमुना फलम् ।
   ब्रह्मशब्देन विषयं सूचयामास सूत्रकृत् । (*TC*. i, 1.1).
10. In M.'s tradition of Sūtra-interpretation, the syllable *Om* is read at the beginning and end of each Sūtra. The *Om* at the beginning of the first Sūtra as stated in the *AV* carries the sense of *guṇapūrṇa*, a being of infinite attributes ओतत्वंवाची ह्योंकारो वक्त्यसौ तद्गुणोततताम्. In all other Sūtras, the two *omkāras* are read for unseen merit (*adṛṣṭārtha*).
11. Dr. Radhakrishnan (*Brahma Sutra* p. 28) is not correct in saying that M. takes *'atha'* to indicate the beginning of the subject. He has evidently misunderstood M.'s words अधिकारानन्तर्यार्थश्च to mean 'beginning' *and* sequence.
12. अत्राप्यानन्तर्यमेव साक्षादर्थः अधिकारस्तु योग्यतया लभ्यते । (*TP*. *G*. p. 8).
13. A work of the Pañcarātra school cited by M. in his *BSB*. It is not now extant.

lapping in the classification, owing to the admitted variation in terms of comparative abundance and intensity among the respective sets of qualifications of the three classes in an ascending order: *Na ca sāṅkaryam. Uttaroktāprācuryeṇāsaṅkaryāt.* (*TP.* i.1.1). The relative position of merits has been clearly explained in the *TC.*[14]

The *Vyomasaṁhitā* has it that those outside the pale of Cāturvarṇya are eligible to practise *nāmajapa* (meditation by chanting the names of the Lord). Women, Śūdras and fallen Brahmins not entitled to study the Vedas are to acquire knowledge of God thro' the Purāṇas and Pañcarātras. Certain high-souled women like Maitreyī, Yamī and Śacī have been recognized in the Śāstras as having had the right to Vedic study.

The term 'ataḥ' in the Sūtra points to the purposiveness of Jijñāsā by showing how and why inquiry into B. is deemed to be indispensable for attaining release. The bondage of souls due to the cycle of births and deaths is a grim fact of life. It is not possible to get rid of it without the fullest measure of Divine grace. The grace of God is vouchsafed only unto those who attain His direct vision (*aparokṣajnāna*) and realize His glory. The glory of God can be realized only thro' the arduous process of Jijñāsā consisting of Śravaṇa (study), manana (reflection), nididhyāsana (meditation), Bhakti, Niṣkāmakarma, etc. The general statement of scripture that bondage is terminated by knowledge, being otherwise incompatible, presupposes the need for Divine grace for its termination.

Some other thinkers have held that bondage is merely due to beginningless ignorance of the identity of Atman and B.; it is not a reality and is, therefore, capable of being sublated by right knowledge. So Divine grace has no direct, intimate and significant part to play in the termination of such bondage. This view is unsustainable. For, then, we would have to end up with attributing an original ignorance to B. itself. (*Brahmājnānavāda*) which would create more problems for philosophy.

M. has, therefore, held that the theory of Jīvājñānavāda or what may be called Svabhāvājñānavāda has to be accepted as the right explanation of the fact of bondage. According to it, finite selves are, in the last analysis, subject to the bondage of Prakrti by the Will of God from time immemorial. This bondage is a reality and is by no means imaginary (*avidyākalpita*). It exists by the Will of God and is terminable by His Will. He alone is, therefore, competent to release the souls from it and manifest to them the full measure of their own bliss-

14. *TC.* p. 78.

ful nature and of His own glory to them.[15] He must therefore be moved to do so by extending His grace to them. It is here that God-vision or Aparokṣajñāna comes into the picture. It helps to move Him.[16] As Jijnāsā is the means of achieving Aparokṣajnāna, the opening Sūtra enjoins it on the seeker as the first step in the attainment of Mokṣa thro' grace. 'Ataḥ' stresses the indispensability of Divine grace for the termination of bondage in the context of its irrefragable reality and the impossibility of terminating it thro' any other means like Karma or by the sheer power of knowledge. M. puts the whole argument of the Jijñāsāsūtra in a nutshell when he says in his *AV*:

अतो यथार्थबन्धस्य विना विष्णुप्रसादतः ।
अनिवृत्तेरतदर्थं हि जिज्ञासात्र विधीयते ॥

The same idea is put in equally significant words in his *BSB.*—

यतो नारायणप्रसादमृते न मोक्षः, न च ज्ञानं विना अत्यर्थप्रसादः, अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या ॥
(As there is no Mokṣa without the grace of God and no fulness of grace without a direct vision of God, inquiry into B. has to be made, to achieve it).

In his *AV*, M. has argued a strong case for holding Divine grace to be the ultimate factor in the attainment of Mokṣa. All other means including Jnāna, however valuable and necessary, are but steps leading to Divine grace and qualifying for it; for God's grace is not arbitrary. It takes into account the efforts and deserts of seekers. Adhering to the spirit of the Śrutis and Smṛtis, M. affirms his deepest conviction as a Theistic philosopher that without the grace of God there can be no Mokṣa for any one in the world even with all the power and potency of Jñāna: ********

इत्यादेर्न हरिं विना ।
ज्ञानस्वभावतोऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्यापि हि क्वचित् ॥

This profound tribute to the unique role of Divine grace in the achievement of Mokṣa by the transmigrating selves is the direct corollary of his realistic theory of the origin and nature of bondage and of its termination. It carries an implicit criticism of Śaṁkara's monistic theory that the bondage of selves is unreal and illusory,—it being a product of beginningless Ajñāna (ignorance) and therefore terminable (thro' sublation) by the intrinsic power of realisation of the truth:

ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ॥

(Brahman alone is real—the world is false. The Jiva is the same as B. and not different from it).

15. *Kaṭha Up.* i, 2, 23.
अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णुर्ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः
आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां स एवैको जनार्दनः ॥ (AV. i.1.1).

16. सिद्धं च साधनं भगवानिति मुमुक्षुणा सव्यापारीकरणीयः, व्यापारश्च प्रसन्नतैव । (*NS.* p. 17).

This theory has been outlined by S. in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* with which he has prefaced his C. on the B.S. He and his commentators have taken the theory of the unreality of bondage to be implicit in the Sūtrakāra's making the knowledge of B. the means of eradicating bondage; for the real is not eradicable by knowledge. Only the unreal is.[17]

M. has naturally criticized the doctrines of *Adhyāsa* (superimposition), *mithyātva* (illusoriness of the world), degrees of reality (*sattā-traividhya*) and Nirviśeṣabrahmājñānavāda, in his AV., while expounding the significance of the term 'Ataḥ', in conformity with the unmistakable Theistic and realistic spirit of the Sūtrakāra's work as a whole.[18] He has argued with much force, for instance, that on the Monistic hypothesis of Ātman (or Brahman) being 'Nirviśeṣa' (aspectless), it would be impossible to make out even a tentative case for undertaking the proposed inquiry (Jijnāsā), in as much as pure being which is *ex-hypothesi* self-evident, self-shining and without absolutely any kind of internal distinction of aspects whatsoever can never be conceived to become obscured by Ajñāna or Avidyā in respet of any particular *part* or *aspect* of its nature: निर्विशेषे स्वयंभाते किमज्ञानावृतं भवेत् ? (*AV*)
(In a reality which is by hypothesis utterly void of all characteristics and is self-shining, what is it that can possibly become obscured by Ignorance?)

It will not do to set up 'imaginary aspects' (mithyāviśeṣas) in Ātman (or B.) to account for the possibility of ignorance. For, such imaginary aspects (*Kalpita-viśeṣas*) could not be conceived of in Ātman (or B.), without the intrusion of Ajnāna.[19] That would hardly be compatible with the nature of a self-luminous being. Thus the Advaita philosopher's atempt to make out a case for undertaking Jijnāsā into 'Ātman-Brahman' within the framework of his 'nirviśeṣavāda' remains and must for ever remain unsuccsesful and unconvincing. Students of Vedānta are familiar with R.'s trenchant seven-point attack on S.'s *Brahmājñānavāda* in his *Śrībhāṣya*. M.'s *Māyāvādakhaṇḍana* has an equally powerful criticism of this theory showing how there is no justification for any Jijnāsā of B. or Ātman from the Advaitic standpoint. The most systematic and comprehensive examination of the B.S. interpretations of the Advaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita schools was carried out from the standpoint of M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras by the cele-

17. ब्रह्मज्ञानं सूचयन्सूत्रकारो बन्धोत्पत्तेर्हेतुविध्वंसनाय ।
एतत्सर्वं सूचयामास तस्मादेतत्सर्वं भाष्यते भाष्यकारैः ॥ (*Samkṣepaśārīraka* i, 56).
अतो, ज्ञानेन बन्धनिवृत्तिं सूचयता तस्य मिथ्यात्वमपि सोपपत्तिकं सूचितं भवतीति गम्यते (C. Rāmatirtha).
18. See M's AV. i. 1 Verses 16-33. These points of critism have been very *exhaustively expounded* by J. in his *NS.* i, pp. 22-64, to which attention is invited.
19. मिथ्याविशेषोऽप्यज्ञानसिद्धिमेव ह्यपेक्षते । (*AV*).

brated commentator and dialectician of the Madhva-school, Vyāsarāya (1478-1539), in his *Tātparya-Candrikā*. This covers the first two Adhyāyas of the B.S. It was completed by one of his successors Raghunātha Tīrtha (c. 1695-1742) in his *Śeṣa-Tātparyacandrikā*. I shall be utilizing materials from these two works also, wherever necessary, in the following pages to elucidate the inherent strength of M.'s line of interpretation of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

S. has sought to justify Jijnāsā on the ground that tho' Ātman is revealed in all our ego-awareness in a general way (*Sāmānyataḥ*) it still remains partly open to doubt on account of divergent views held by followers of different schools regarding its true nature.[20] Some thinkers like the Cārvākas hold that the ego is the body itself developing consciousness from within. Others identify the soul with the sense-organs, mind, Śūnya. Brahman and so forth. Hence the need for an investigation.[21]

The TC points out that this is irrelevant (*vyadhikaraṇa*). The subject of inquiry as given in the Sūtra is B. not Ātman. In order to justify Brahmajijnāsā then, the proper thing to do far a commentator would be to indicate the divergence of views, if any, pertaining to B. and not to Ātman. Even supposing with S. that Ātman is ultimately the same as B. the irrelevance of the *Vipratipatti* (statement of divergence of views) regarding the nature of Ātman, to the subject on hand cannot be got over. For, in presuming Ātman and B. to be one (*Ātmā ca Brahma*) and seeking to justify Brahmajijnāsā on that basis, S is evidently thinking of them in terms of Bimbapratibimbabhāva relation (resting on Upādhis). Even then, divergence of views touching the nature of the Pratibimba alone would not be competent to call for an inquiry into the nature of the *Bimba*. If the purpose of the proposed Jijnāsā is to establish the identity of B. with Ātman, it would be necessary to show how B. is open to a general awareness while *its* specific nature and attributes are open to divergence of views. This has *not* been done by S. or his commentators.[22]

It cannot be argued that the inner self itself (*Pratyagartha*) as Pratibimba of B. is the subject of Jijnāsā owing to the misconception prevailing about its true nature and that to know this *Pratyagartha* (inner-self) as B. is what is meant by 'Brahmajijnāsā'. Unless otherwise stated, an inquiry has reference to a subject that is directly given in the context

20. तस्मात्, सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि विशेषतो विप्रतिपत्तौ युक्तस्तद्विशेषेषु संशयः । (*Bhāmatī*).
21. *S.BSB,* i.1.1.
22. तथापि न तावत् बिम्बं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासाधर्मि प्रतिबिम्बे तु सामान्यप्रतिपत्त्यादीति युक्तम्। प्रतिबिम्बमात्रे विप्रतिपत्त्या बिम्बे जिज्ञासादर्शनेन ब्रह्मोद्दिश्य प्रत्यगर्थाभेदविधानाय ब्रह्मण्येव तयोर्वक्तव्यत्वात् ॥ (*TC.* p. 106 b).

and not to an uncertain relation in which the given subject is supposed to stand to another subject *not* given in the context. Such an interpretation would involve an emendation of the Sūtra from Brahmajijnāsā to *Pratyak-Jijnāsa* or *Practīco Brahmatvajijñāsā*!

Commentators like Sarvajñātman have argued a case for the bare identity of pure consciousness between Jīva and B. (*tvam* and *tat*). If the Jijnāsā in the opening Sūtra contemplates such a bare identity of essence by the denudation of the respective attributes of B. and the empirical self, then, in so far as no identity is intended to be established between two qualified beings as such (*viśiṣṭaikya*), there would be no point in referring to the divergent views held by different thinkers regarding the nature of the conditioned self which is *not* the subject of Jijnāsā, according to this particular view.

If the purpose of Jijnāsā is to establish the true nature of the self, liquidating the characteristics of egohood which have been superimposed on the pure self, then we should expect to find the definition of the subject of inquiry embodied in the next Sūtra to be consistent with such a purpose. But it is *not*. For, the second Sūtra gives a definition of B. as the author of the Universe which is certainly not applicable either to the individual self or the pure self (*cinmātra*). Some Advaitic commentators have put forward an ingenious explanation that there is no incongruity in the Pratyagātman being the subject of Jijnāsā and the definition of the subject of inquiry being in relation to B. as the author of the Universe. Their plea is that the inner self being the same as B. the definition, such as it is, in the second Sūtra is to enable the seeker to shake off the cobwebs of false identifications of the self with the body, organs and outward possessions in which the self has lost its hold upon itself. The definition in the next Sūtra sends a pleasant shock of surprise thro' the seeker and awakens him to the reality and dissipates the entanglements of Dehātma-adhyāsa. The only weakpoint in this argument, which is, otherwise, ingenuity itself, is this. The seeker cannot shake off the false identifications (*atadāropa*) and awaken to his identity with B. unless he has the certainty of knowledge and conviction that the inner self is itself B. Without this prior knowledge and conviction, the coming across with a definition of B. as author of the Universe could do nothing to rid him of the Dehātmaikya-adhyāsa.[23] The position cannot be improved by making another reckless suggestion that the purpose of the definition of B. (as author of the Universe!) is exactly to convey to the seeker the truth about the identity of the self with

23. किंच, धर्मिण्यतदारोपनिवृत्यर्थत्वाल्लक्षणस्योत्तरसूत्रे प्रत्यगर्थ एव ब्रह्मत्वेन लक्षणीयं स्यात् । न च जिज्ञासुना प्रतीचो ब्रह्मत्वं निश्चितम्; येन ब्रह्मणि लक्षिते प्रतीचि ब्रह्मलक्षणविरोध्याकारो मिथ्येति ज्ञायेत ।। (*TC.* p. 107 b).

B. Here again the futility of the argument lies in this that the seeker has not assured himself that authorship of the Universe is the distinctive characteristic of the Pratyagātman and without such a self-assurance he can be none the wiser for hearing the B. defined as the author of the Universe! The very preposterousness of the idea that the Jīva or Pratyagātman *is* or *can* be the Author of the Universe is sufficient to condemn it. S. himself has repudiated the idea with the contempt it deserves in his C. on several Sūtras such as *B.S.* i, 2, 20; i, 3, 4; and ii, 1, 22.

The *Bhāmatī* has tried to justify the need for Jijnāsā on the ground that the pure self (*Suddhacit*), tho' by nature self-evident and self-shining, is not revealed in our empirical consciousness of ego,—*as it is in reality*, according to the teaching of Vedāntic texts.[24] Reviewing this, the *TC* asks, "What exactly is meant by this contention? Does it mean (i) that Ātmic essence does not at all shine forth in our ego-consciousness; or (ii) that some of it does, while the rest of it does not; or (iii) that something else besides Ātmic essence *also* shines in it; or (iv) something totally different from Ātmic essence shines forth in it? The first view is not maintainable because of the self-shining nature of Ātman admitted as an axiomatic truth. It would be impossible to conceive of *some* of Ātmic essence being revealed and the *rest of it* remaining obscured and *unrevealed*, as Ātmic essence is by hypothesis Nirviśeṣa (aspectless) to the Advaitin.[25] Thus, *either Ātmic essence shines in its entirety or it does not shine at all*. In the former case, there can be no doubt about its essence and character and so no need for a Jijnāsā. The second alternative would be impossible if Ātman were really self-luminous. In the third case, we are entitled to ask: What precisely is that element which does not (or is not supposed to) shine when Ātmic essence is shining? Is it the Ātman's distinction from the body and other appurtenances only; or the Ātman's freedom from doership and enjoyment (*kartṛtvabhoktṛtvābhāvaḥ*); or non-difference of the individual spirit from the Universal spirit; or the negation of the merest idea of an "other"? It would also be necessary to say if *this 'aspect'* which is held to be "not shining" in ego-consciousness and *which is evidently to be brought into realisation thro' Jijnāsā* is to be treated as a reality or an unreality. If it is to be a reality, the principle of monism would suffer. If, unreal, it cannot be made the subject of any serious inquiry. Even supposing that the reality of these 'negative' elements (not shining) may not upset *positive monism* (bhāvādvaita) the Jijñāsā, if it

24. भवेदेतदेवं यद्यहमित्यनुभवे आत्मतत्वं प्रकाशेत; नत्वेतदस्ति तथाहि–समस्तोपाध्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तानन्दचैतन्यैकरसमुदासीनमेकमद्वितीयमात्मतत्वं श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणादिषु गीयते. . . . . . . (*Bhamati* i. 1.1).
25. ज्ञातं सामान्यतोऽज्ञातं विशेषेण विचार्यते ।
ज्ञाताज्ञातविभागस्तु निर्विशेषे न युज्यते ।। (*TC.* p. 108).

should manifest these hitherto unmanifested aspects in the Ātman, will have to be a Jijnāsā not of the pure self (which is already known and revealed) but of those aspects remaining unmanifested. In that case, we should expect the opening Sūtra to be worded: *Athāto dvitīyā-bhāvādi*jijñāsā (Then therefore the inquiry into the negation of the merest duality etc.)!

It cannot also be contended, says the *TC*. that tho' identical with Ātmic essence, these aspects come to be regarded as different from it on account of superimposition of difference. For, where the substratum is truly realised, there can be no room for any superimposition to step in. Nor can we hold that tho' self-luminous, Ātmic consciousness is prevented from shining forth on account of the adverse influence of Avidyā. In that case, Avidyā itself—as Bhāvarūpājñāna—and its effects of pain and sorrow would remain unperceived; for their experience is possible only because they are intuited by the pure self (according to Advaita theory). If the pure consciousness of the self is opposed to Ajnāna not by itself but only when it acts thro' the mental states (Vṛtti), the experiences of pleasure and pain will (have to) forfeit their character of having no existence except as and when they are felt (intuited)[26]—since pleasure and pain exist only as perceived or felt states, it would not be possible to conceive of their preexistence in order that they may be revealed by Vṛtti. Hence they have to be taken to be revealed without the help of Vṛtti—i.e. to say directly to pure consciousness. If then, pure consciousness were not opposed to Ajnāna, pleasure and pain which are directly known by the pure intelligence of Sākṣī would remain for ever covered by Ajñāna.

The third view that something besides the pure self *also* shines forth in Ātmic consciousness would not compel an inquiry so long as the shining forth of Ātmic consciousness remains unaffected. The *Bhāmatī* argues that Ātmic essence is both *shining and not shining* at the same time. It shines by virtue of intrinsic self-luminosity. Being concealed by Avidyā, it may be said to be *not shining as well.* Such a position need not be regarded as self-contradictory. For the shining forth is true; its not *shining* is an unreal superimposition! This is far from convincing. It would be utterly impossible to superimpose 'non-shining' on Ātmic essence which is admitted to be self-shining. Vācaspati contends further that just as thro' the sense of hearing aided by the impressions gained by seasoned knowledge of the science of music one experiences directly the different notes of Ṣaḍja etc. in all the niceties of their cadence and rhythm, even so the pure self manifested as Cit

26. *TCP.* p. 20 b.

comes to be fully realised by Vedāntic study[27] The *TC* rejects the analogy as misplaced. The untrained ear grasps the notes of music in a general way without technical interpretation of the Svaras. Expert knowledge enables it to have a more detailed and well-differentiated appreciation of the notes and their nuances. But according to Advaitic theory, Ātman (or B.) is a simple, homogeneous, absolutely differenceless and undifferentiated essence. It will not admit of first being known in a general way to be followed by deeper, more detailed and exhaustive knowledge, involving fresh aspects, later. The Advaitic case for Jijñāsā cannot, therefore, stand examination.

The *Śaṁkarabhāṣya* considers the possession of the fourfold virtues of discrimination of the eternal and non-eternal, non-attachment to the enjoyment of fruits here and in the hereafter, abundance of calmness, equanimity, etc. and desire for release as the conditions precedent to the desire to know B. (Jijnāsā). The *TC* points out that tho' estimable in themselves, some of these requisites would be inconsistent with Monistic tenets. Some others, if admitted to be present in the seeker before the opening of Jijnāsā, would make it needless. For example, if Nityānityavastuviveka means a clear discernment that B. alone is eternal and all the rest are non-eternal, it would make Jijnāsā or Vicāra itself unnecessary. If such a discernment is reached prior to Jijnāsā, the latter would cease to be purposeful. Discrimination (Viveka) in the phrase Nityaānitya-vastuviveka used by S. is knowledge of difference or what is concomitant with difference. If such discriminating knowledge is valid knowledge, 'difference' would become a reality which is not a welcome prospect to the Advaitin. If it is invalid, the inquiry into B. would have no permanent value.

The *Kalpataru* has argued that Vicāra (inquiry) is not for the purpose of bringing about Nityānityavastuviveka. It is rather to evaluate the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa texts in the Śāstras, harmonize them towards a single differenceless reality as the purport *(akhaṇḍārtha)* and eradicate the illusory perception of difference in the world. But then, following the *Bhāmatī's* interpretation of 'Nitya' and 'Anitya' as what is true and false respectively, the conclusion that B alone is real being already well-established at the time *of Nityānityavastuviveka,* it would seem purposeless to go thro' a discussion of Saguṇa texts or their Samanvaya in Akhaṇḍāartha, in order to reach the same conclusion. The point is that the ascertainment of the purport of texts is not an end in itself. It is only for arriving at the nature of the truth to be known. The truth to be known is that B. alone is real and all else is false. As

27. *Bhāmatī* p. 58.

this knowledge has already been attained prior to Vicāra, where will be the need to initiate a Vicāra to ascertain the purport of Nirguṇa-Saguṇa texts and so on and arrive, at the end of it all, at the very same result that B. alone is real and all else is false? The same objection applies to the realization of the identity of Jīva and B. or the falsity of their difference, by Vicāra. As identity of Jīva and B. is the very essence of B. and as their difference is necessarily false, the reality of the former and the unreality of the latter will be borne out by the very nature of *Nityānityavastuviveka*. How then could there be need for Vicāra still?

To overcome this difficulty, the *Kalpataru* following the *Bhāmatī* suggests another interpretation that *Nityānityavastuviveka* signifies only a broad conclusion that in this world of self and not-self there exist two main predicates of eternality and non-eternality and that these must have their corresponding subjects *(dharmi)*.[28] But this does not involve a definite ascertainment as to which of them (the self or the not-self) possesses the predicate of eternity and which has non-eternity.[29] That is to be settled by Vicāra.

It will be seen that such a general knowledge can hardly help the seeker to give up the pursuit of not-self and turn to the inquiry of the self which is the purpose of Nityānityavastuviveka as explained in the *Bhāmatī*.[30] The pursuit of the self to the exclusion of the not-self is not possible unless the Adhikārin is quite certain as to which of them is eternal and worth pursuing and which is not. Without such a clear understanding of their relative value, no true distaste for worldly enjoyments can be promoted.

The *Kalpataru* puts forward one more explanation. Nityānityavastuviveka denotes only the knowledge that the world of appearances has its basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) in a reality, without however specifically locating that basis in B.[31]. This will not improve matters. For even tho' the root-meaning of the word B. involving its properties may not be included in this Viveka, still it does comprehend the essential element of B. being the substratum of phenomenal appearance of the not-self. This is all the truth to be learnt from Śāstra-vicāra. Hence, the superfluity of Jijñāsā cannot be avoided. As the c. of Rāghavendra Yati points out, from the point of view of pure Advaita, the knowledge produced

28. आत्मानात्मसमुदाये नित्यत्वमनित्यत्वं च स्तो धर्मौ तयोश्च धर्मिभ्यां भाव्यमित्येतावन्मात्रं निश्चितम् (*Kalpataru* p. 71).

29. इदं नित्यमिदमनित्यमित्यनिश्चयात् ।। (ibid).

30. नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकलक्षणात् प्रसंख्यानादिहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः ।। (*Bhāmatī* p. 73).

31. अनित्यस्य संसारस्य किंचिदधिष्ठानमस्ति इतीयान् विवेको, न तु ब्रह्मेति ।। (*Kalpataru* p. 73).

by the Vicāraśāstra (i.e. Brahma-Mīmāṁsā) that B. is the real substratum of an unreal world-appearance is *not* in the nature of a synthetic judgment involving a subject-predicate relationship. True knowledge of B. according to Advaita is in the nature of a purely non-relational judgement *(akhaṇḍārthabodha)*. It is knowledge only of the bare substratum and not of *"B" as the substratum (Brahmatvaprakārakādhiṣṭhānajñānam)*. As this knowledge that the world of appearances has a substratum has already been obtained by Nityānityavastuviveka, the Vicāraśāstra can certainly be dispensed with, as it cannot add anything to what has already been attained by the above interpretation of Nityānityavastuviveka.

Commenting on the last of the four Sādhanas mentioned by S. the *TC* argues that desire for release *(mumukṣutva)* would not be compatible with the purely Advaitic view of Mokṣa as being identical with the self-essence of Ātman and hence "ever-ready" *(nityasiddha)* and therefore not something to be brought into being *(akārya)*. The Ātmic essence being the same, at all times, it would make no difference to it whether it is qualified *per accidens* by the final Vṛtti of Akhaṇḍārtha or not. Apart from this, it would be difficult to define in precise terms what is meant by the expression 'desire for release'. Would it take the form *Let* "me" be released; or "Let pure consciousness be released"? The Advaita does not allow the ego or the 'I—principle' *(ahamartha)* to survive in Mokṣa. So no such desire on the part of the ego would have any chance of fulfilment. Nor can the ego entertain such a desire on behalf of 'pure consciousness'. For pure consciousness *(cinmātram)* does not subserve any interest of the ego. The *latter* cannot therefore be expected to entertain any wish that the *former* should become released, on the analogy of a father performing the Jāteṣṭi to enable his male child to acquire the merit of purity, even tho' it is the father and not the child that entertains the wish, while the fruit of the iṣṭi accrues to the child. The analogy is not pertinent. The father expects the child to subserve his interest; hence the purity attained by the child gives him satisfaction. In the present case, however, pure consciousness would be absolutely indifferent to the ego. There is no reason why the ego should trouble to entertain a desire that pure consciousness should become released.

The immediate antecedents of Brahmajijñāsā as made out by S. and his commentators are thus open to objection in important respects from the point of view of Advaita philosophy itself, apart from their own mutual inconsistencies and discrepancies. It may be noted for instance that *Uparati* (feeling of satiation) with regard to worldly enjoyments included under *Śamādi* is practically the same as non-attach

ment to the enjoyment of fruits here or hereafter (*ihāmutrārthaphala-bhogavirāga)* which has been separately mentioned by S. In the same way, Nityānityavastuviveka could be brought under *Samāhitatva* included in the series of *Śamādi*. It is for these reasons that M. has given the qualifications of Adhikārins and antecedents of Jijnāsā in a different order and setting as leading to Bhakti and Vairāgya and thro' them and not directly to Vicāra.

It deserves to be noted that it is only in M.'s interpretation that '*ataḥ*' receives an independent and weighty sense commensurate with its position as a '*hetu*' in its own right, as drawing attention to the purposiveness of Jijñāsā in helping the seeker to earn the grace of God. In S.'s interpretation '*ataḥ*' has no independent status. Its function is taken to be merely to reaffirm the indispensability of the four antecedents to Jijnāsā by drawing attention to the ephemeral nature of the rewards of Karma and the permanence of the fruits of Brahmajñāna with the help of a fresh text like *Tad yatheha karmajito lokaḥ kṣīyate evamevāmutra puṇyajito lokaḥ kṣīyate* (*Chān. Up.* vii.1.6) called up by the other sense of B. as "Veda" suggested by the thought of the source of knowledge by which B. to be investigated is established.[32]

The *TC* objects to this devious way in which *ataḥ* is sought to be connected with the same preliminary requisites of Jijnāsā already conveyed by the term '*atha*' instead of its being interpreted in a pragmatic purposeful and independent way with the predicate of the proposition *Brahmajijnāsā* as embodying the purpose for which Jijnāsā is to be undertaken. It is natural for us to expect the Sūtrakāra to tell us, after he has referred to the prerequisites of Jijnāsā by the term '*atha*', as to what benefit the Jijnāsā is expected to confer on the seeker in furtherance of the attainment of his goal *and how*. It is this purposiveness (*prayojanavattvam*) of Jijnāsā that must receive attention after '*atha*' and not a reversion to the importance of the prerequisites. By making Jijnāsā the means of earning Divine grace, which is the ultimate cause of the termination of bondage of souls, M. has given us the most pertinent and thoughtful explanation of '*ataḥ*' in its own right, in the Sūtra.

The *Vivaraṇa* (C. of S.'s school) takes it that '*ataḥ*' disposes of exceptions to the attainment of permanent reward by Brahma-Vicāra alone, likely to be presented by texts like: *Akṣayyam vai Cāturmāsyayājinas sukṛtam* which promise equally eternal rewards to per-

32. अत्र च, ब्रह्मपदेन तत्प्रमाणं वेद उपस्थापित: । स च योग्यत्वात् 'तद्यथेह कर्मजित' इत्यादिरत इति सर्वनाम्ना परामृश्य हेतुपंचम्या निर्दिश्यते ॥ *(Bhāmatī)*.

formers of sacrifice. The fourfold requisites of Brahmavicāra have therefore to be stabilized and *reaffirmed* to prevent an unwary seeker from being lured away by any of these Karmic texts. This stabilization is done by '*ataḥ*'. This explanation also is not satisfactory. We do not find '*ataḥ*' adding anything more to what has been said by "*atha*" in order to stabilize it against the inroads of exceptions (apavāda-śaṁka).[33] The reiteration of the same reason (*atha*) thro' another word (*ataḥ*) cannot achieve anything substantial.[34]

R.'s interpretation of *ataḥ* is not also free from redundancy. According to him *atha* practically means that an Adhikārin should turn to Brahmavicāra after he has successfully completed Karmavicāra and has as a result of it become imbued with the understanding of the transitory nature of Karmic rewards and of the permanent and inexhaustible nature of the rewards of Brahmavicāra. Since so much has been expressed by *atha* there is nothing more for *ataḥ* to add to it by way of a fresh reason to enjoin Brahmajijnāsā. Its role is thus reduced to repeating and endorsing what has been said by *atha*.

There is another crucial point to be considered in connection with R.'s interpretation of *atha*, that it prescribes immediate sequence to Karmavicāra. From such Vicāra one comes to know the impermanence of Karmic fruits and the permanance of the fruits of Brahmajñāna and turns to the latter. The Pūrvapakṣa in this Sūtra according to R. starts by challenging what is known as *Siddhe Vyutpatti*. According to this view, scripture has its purport only in Kārya (things to be done) and not in an infinite and permanent reality or a *being* such as B. Hence inquiry into such a being cannot be the aim of Śāstra. Consistent with such a Pūrvapakṣa, one would expect R. to establish as his Siddhānta only this point that Brahmavicāra has to be undertaken. He is not justified in interlocking it with an immediate sequence to Karmavicāra also. It cannot be argued that the Pūrvapakṣa challenges the Vicāra of B. together with its immediate sequence to Karmavicāra. (*viśiṣṭakartavyatā*). Such a contention is not tenable. For unless the thesis of *Siddhe-Vyutpattiḥ* is first established, the question of entering upon Brahmavicāra whether before or after Karmavicāra cannot arise. The proper course for the Sūtrakāra would be to establish *Siddhe-Vyutpatti* at the outset and then take up the question whether Karmavicāra should precede Brahmavicāra or not.

33. अत्र विवरणचार्या अथशब्दपरिगृहीतस्य हेतुत्वस्य हेत्वन्तरेणापवादशंकायां तन्निरसनेन हेतुत्वव्यवस्थापनार्थमत:शब्द: (Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri Edn. *S*. *BSB* Bombay p. 73.

34. हेतुत्वसाधकहेतो: कथनमेवापवादशंकानिरास:, न तूक्तस्यैव पदान्तरेण कथन इति दिक् । (*TC*. p. 87 b).

To sum up, M. has attempted to show by his interpretation of the opening Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa that the science of B. is worth undertaking as its fourfold requisities viz. *adhikāri, viṣaya, prayojana* and *sambandha* are fulfilled without any difficulty in a sound Theistic philosophy such as his. For here we have in the finite self, caught up from time immemorial in the cycle of births and deaths and struggling for freedom from the bondage of Prakṛti, ignorant of the true nature of the Supreme Being and of his own relation to Him, and wanting to be enlightened and saved, the right type of *adhikārin*. The Supreme Being of infinite perfections is the subject (*viṣaya*) of investigation. It transcends all, is immanent in the whole Universe and is present in the heart of the Jīvātman himself. His grace is the final means of deliverance from bondage. The consummation of His grace releases the soul from immemorial bondage and enables it to realize the felicity of unalloyed bliss of Mokṣa. By implication, it is shown that none of these requisites is fulfilled in the other approaches to the Sūtra.

It is the Supreme Being of infinite perfections defined in the second Sūtra as the author of the Universe and the deliverer of the Souls from bondage that is the true and worthy object of Jijñāsā. Many ideas prevail about the true nature and attributes of the Supreme Being. Divergent views of philosophers on the subject are another source of confusion. Some have come to regard it as essentially Nirguṇa (attributeless). To others it is a ocean of auspicious attributes. Some have dared to limit its attributes to six or eight[36] or a few more. Some believe it to be not one but many. To some it is purely transcendent; to others entirely immanent in the Universe; and to yet others, it is both. Some would believe that it is the stuff of which the Universe is made. Others would have none of it and make it a secondary or a common cause.[37] Others with a deeper insight into Its nature would recognize it to be the source of all being, consciousness and activity of finite reality (*Sarvasattāpratītipravṛttinimittam*) and the One Transcendental Principle behind all. Such divergent views regarding the nature and attributes of the Supreme Being are sufficient justification for undertaking a systematic inquiry into the subject of Brahman.[38]

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35. पूर्ववृत्तादल्पास्थिरफलकेवलकर्माधिगमानन्तरं तत एव हेतोरनन्तस्थिरफलब्रह्माधिगमः कर्तव्यः ॥ (R. *Vedāntadīpa*. i.1.1).
36. Cf. *Yeṇguṇattān tāḷai vaṇaṅgāt talai* (*Kuraḷ*). Also: NS. ii. p. 283b.
37. S. *BSB*. ii, 1.34.
38. तस्माद्वेदान्तादिना आपातप्रतीते ब्रह्मणि सगुणनिर्गुणाल्पगुणत्वादिना विप्रतिपत्तेर्जिज्ञास्यत्वमिति ॥ (*TC*. p. 119 b).

CHAPTER XIII

BRAHMAN DEFINED AS THE SOURCE OF ALL COSMIC LIFE

2. *Janmādyadhikaraṇam* (i.1.2)

This adhikaraṇa defines B. as the author of the creation, sustenance, dissolution *etc.*, of the world of matter *and souls*.[1] The purpose of such a definition is to bring out vividly B.'s distinction from all the Jīvas and from all material principles so that it may be understood to be the highest reality which, while transcending all, is also the immanent principle underlying all possibilities of change and development in the life of matter and souls.[2] This will be clear from M.'s conception of 'Creation' as a process of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti (dependent acquisition of new characters, names and forms), by all finite reals. As everything in the life of souls and matter flows from B., its perfection is infinite. The vastness and glory of the cosmos is not even a tittle of the immeasurable perfection of the All-source. The definition of B. as the source of the Universe is a pointer to the illimitable perfection (*Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva*) of B.; for our cosmos is but a speck in the plethora of cosmic systems that radiate the power and glory of B. Thus while perfection of attributes (*Guṇapūrṇatva*) is the essential nature of B. the definition embodied in the second Sūtra explains and paraphrases the infinite perfection of B. and makes it intelligible to us. Understood in this way, there is no need for philosophers to look upon "*Satyam jñānam anantam*" (Taitt. Up. ii, 1) alone as con-

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1. सर्वस्य चिदचिदाख्यविश्वस्य सर्वस्य जन्माद्यष्टकस्य यथायोगं कर्ता विष्णुरेव, न रुद्रो जीवः (Rāgh. TM. i.1.1). प्रमितस्य चिदचिदात्मकस्य विश्वस्य जन्मादि यतः ॥ (*TDP*).
2. द्वितीयसूत्रे सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनेन, सर्वोत्कृष्टं सर्वस्माद्व्यावृत्तं चेति प्रतिपादितम् । सजातीयविजातीयासंभवितधर्मस्य लक्षणत्वात् । सकलेतरव्यावृत्तेश्च तत्प्रयोजनत्वात् ॥ (*NS*. p. 306).

stituting the intrinsic definition (*Svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of B. and '*Janmādyasya yataḥ*' (*B.S.* i.1.2) as a mere non-intimate definition (*taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*). M. has shown in his C. on the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa in his *AV.*, how the latter definition of being Jagatkāraṇa is implicit in the terms of the former, which is only a succint formulation of what is elaborated in the fuller definition.[3] 'Satyam' is what confers (*yāpayati*) reality (*Sat*) on the Universe. Derived from the root *Sad* in its well-known senses of goal (*gati*) and dissolution (*avasādana*), 'Satyam' stands for the ideas of being the author of the dissolution of the world and the deliverance of souls. 'Jñānam' applied to B. shows that B. confers knowledge on struggling souls and is, by implication, the author of their ignorance and bondage. "Satyam" (reality) implies 'existence' and 'living' under Divine control. "Anantam" (infinite) refers to B. as the source of infinite bliss of Mokṣa. Thus the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos are implicit in the concise definition of the Upaniṣad—*Satyam jñānaman antam brahma.*

S., R. and others have held that creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world *exhaust* the definition of B. embodied in the second Sūtra.[4] M. holds that it should be extended to include other equally important dispensations in the life of matter and souls, such as *niyamana* (control) *jñāna* (enlightenment) *ajñāna* (obscuration) *bandha* (bondage) and *mokṣa* (release). He attaches *special importance* to these as they have an intimate bearing on the career of the *souls* from the beginning of their Prākṛtic bondage and a direct relevance to their final release. The definition represented by these eight factors not only raises B. above the level of a purely material-cause-and-effect relation with the world but also shows how such a purely physical relation would be totally incompatible with the spiritual essence of B. as the Antaryāmi of the cosmos.[5] The acts of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world and the acts of controlling, obscuring, enlightening and releasing the souls from bondage point conspicuously to a benevolent Theism[6] as the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa. It would be pointless to hold with Pantheism that B. *becomes* the world of matter and/or souls and in the process, itself goes thro' bondage and attains release. The emphasis on order,[7] cosmic control,[8] obscuration by nescience, enlightenment and conferment of Mokṣa on deserving souls places Vivartavāda and Māyāvāda out of court with the Sūtrakāra's position.

3. *AV.* i.1, *adhi* 6. **Verses 36-44.**
4. जन्मस्थितिभङ्गं समासार्थः (Ś) जन्मादीति सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयम् (R).
5. *BS.* i.2.28.
6. पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः (*BS.* i.3.43).
7. रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम् (ii. 2.1).
8. सा च प्रशासनात् (i, 3.11).

M. quotes several Vedic texts under BS i.1.2 to support his enlarged interpretation of '*Janmādi*' as above. The *TC* discusses how far M. is justified in giving special place to five more items under "*ādi*" in '*Janmādi*'. Before going into these points, we may as well note the internal evidence of the Sūtras on the question of the scope of *ādi* in i, 1.2. The Sūtra *Parābhidhyānāt tu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau* (iii, 2.5) ascribes obscuration of Jīvasvarūpa (*tirodhāna*), bondage (*bandha*) and its termination: of Mokṣa (*-viprayaya*) to the Will (*abhidhyāna*) of the Supreme. Order, control and energization of cosmic life have been repeatedly ascribed to B. in the Sūtras (i.3.10; 11; 16; i.2, 18). These evidences cannot be seriously disputed by anyone. The passage from the *Taitt. Up.* (iii.1) which has been cited by the commentators as Viṣayavākya (basic text) of the adhikaraṇa in i.1.2, actually speaks of *four* and not merely of *three* distinctive determinations of the cosmos viz. origination, sustenance, dissolution and full communion of beings (*abhisamveśa*)[9] with B. Communion is not dissolution of being. We have, therefore, to distinguish it from Pralaya and Suṣupti states which are not everlasting.[10] The acceptance of *Taitt. Up.* iii, 1 as Viṣayavākya does not, therefore, preclude us from taking into account other cosmic functions of the Supreme, referred to in the same Śākhā or elsewhere. The Sūtras are *Viśvatomukha*. They collect their data from many Śākhās. M. has not, therefore, done anything out of the way in referring to several other texts besides the *Taitt. Up.* (iii, 1) as Viṣayavākyas here and basing his interpretation of '*ādi*' (in 1, 1.2) on them. These texts, as the *TD* points out, make specific mention of *niyamana, jñāna, ajñāna, bandha* and *mokṣa* as dispensations of the Supreme Being.[11]

The *TC* has shown with much force that unlike the inclusion of the six *bhāvavikāras* of Yāska under *sṛṣṭi, sthiti* and *pralaya* as suggested by S. it will not be possible to subsume any of the five dispensations of *niyamana, jñāna, ajñāna*, etc., under those three. Each one of the latter has a distinctive character. Niyamana is *impulsion* of things and beings towards fulfilment of particular ends. It is *not* the same as the production or generation of things; tho' it has a begin-

9. यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्ति, अभिसंविशन्ति, तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तत् ब्रह्म । (*Taitt. Up.* iii, 1).
10. Cf. "********** मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च ॥ (*BG.* xiv, 2).
11. *RV.* i, 154, 5; 155, 6; vii. 99, 12. x, 82.3. यस्मिन्निदं सं च विचैधि सर्वं यस्मिन्देवा अधि विश्वे निषेदुः (T.Ā. x.1.1) इति **स्थितिः** । वेनस्तत्पश्यन् (*TĀ.* x.1.3). इति **ज्ञानं, संहारश्च** । 'विवेश भूतानि (*TĀ.* x.1.1) इत्यर्था**न्नियमनम्** । येनादित्यस्तपति तेजसा (*T.Ā.* x.1.1) इति स्पष्टम् । ऋतस्य तन्तुम् (TA. x.1.4) **इत्यज्ञानम् बन्धश्च** । य एनं विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति (*T.Ā.* x.1.3). इति **मोक्ष**; (*TD.* i.1.2).

ning. Obscuration of knowledge and enlightenment of souls stand out in their distinctiveness from creation and destruction. Bondage is the experience of happiness and misery in the world. Mokṣa is the experience of everlasting bliss. It would be preposterous to treat Mokṣa as nothing more than the destruction or negation of bondage and thus try to reduce the number. One may argue then that 'creation' is but the cessation of antecedent non-existence of a thing and that it does not deserve separate mention. If it is contended that production destroys the antecedent non-existence only, but not the thing to be produced, and that, therefore, *utpatti* (production) and *prāgabhāvanivṛtti* (cessation of antecedent non-existence of the thing) should be recognized as distinctive in their natures, it can be said with the same force that Mokṣa is not the destruction of the bound spirit but of bondage only. Bondage and Mokṣa ought, therefore, to be kept distinct. So also the rest of the dispensations. There is profound truth in the contention of the TC that as Mokṣa is the highest Puruṣārtha, it will *have to be given due recognition and special status* as the be-all and end-all of the inquiry into B.,—the fruit which the Jijnāsya-Brahman bestows on the seeker (cf. BS. iv. 4.1). It does not stand to reason that the Sūtrakāra, who has referred to bondage and release as falling under the dispensation of the Supreme (iii, 2.5), and has also referred to the released souls approaching B. in their released state (i, 3.2) would be averse to recognizing that deliverance of souls is the most important prerogative of B. fit to be incorporated in the definition of B. *given by himself*. It is surely the responsibility of his commentators to do full justice to his intentions in the light of the internal evidence of his own work by explaining what he really means by *ādi* in '*Janmādi*',—having regard to the brevity of expression (*alpākṣaratva*) of the Sūtra style.

There is thus good reason to welcome the revised and enlarged interpretation of Sūtra i.1, 2 given by M. Tho' the definition of B. as the author of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the Universe may be deemed to be enow to establish its difference from and transcendence over the world of matter and souls and thereby its infinite perfection of attributes, so as to justify the inquiry into such a Being enjoined in i.1.1, still *a special reference has to be made to its being the source of deliverance of souls from bondage* in order to show that the Jijnāsā enjoined in i, 1.1 is well worth the endeavor in view of the fruit of Mokṣa which it carries with it.[12] This would require B. to be recognized as the ultimate source of bondage also in as much as

12. विषयोपपादकगुणपूर्तिप्रसिद्धये जीवात् भेदके प्रसिद्धे जन्मादित्रितयहेतुत्वेऽभिहितेऽपि प्रयोजनसिद्धये मोक्षदत्त्वस्यापि वक्तव्यत्वात् । (*TC.* p. 134-*b*).

the obscuration of the self-luminous nature of souls by a purely dependent and insentient principle like Ignorance will *not* stand to reason. Obscuration of the nature of souls and removal of such obscuration by knowledge have thus, in the last analysis, to be ascribed to B.[13] In this way, all the eight principal determinations in the life of matter and souls fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Being and have the right to be taken into account in formulating a *meaningful definition* of the B. to be investigated.

The definition of the Jijñāsya-Brahman as the author of the Universe, its creation, sustenance etc. puts Advaita philosophers in an awkward position. For, according to them B. (to be investigated) is Nirviśesa, Nirguṇa, Niṣkriya and devoid of all characteristics. It cannot, therefore, be the source of the world, its creation, sustenance, etc., in any *active sense* of these terms. There is also another difficulty. Production, subsistence and dissolution are properties of the world (*Prapañcadharma*). They are not the properties of B. and do not exist in B. In these circumstances the definition given by the Sūtra can only be treated as an *Upalakṣaṇa* (an accidental property) or a *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* (a qualification *per accidens*) like the crow sitting on the top of a house for a time, serving as a mark of identification or like the moon in the distant sky being said to be located between the two branches of a tree (*Śākhācandranyāya*).[14] The constitutive definition of B. can only be *Satyam jñānam anantam* understood in a non-relational sense (*akhaṇḍārtha*). The definition given in the Sūtra is, therefore, applicable only to the Personal God or Īśvara known as Saguṇa Brahman associated with Māyā and not to the Śuddha-Brahman.[15] The reason for resorting to *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* is that the Śāstra proceeds by the method of *Adhyāropāpavāda*.[16]

S.'s c. on i, 1.2 does not enter into this question explicitly. The *Pañcapādikā*, *Vivaraṇa*, *Samkṣepaśārīraka* and other works of his followers have taken advantage of certain hints[17] thrown out by S. in his C. and have worked out the theories of *Svarūpa* and *Taṭastha*

13. पुनश्च दीपस्तम इव, ज्ञानं बन्धकाज्ञानं स्वभावादेव हन्ति किमीश्वरेणेति शंकायां, दीपज्ञानादिस्वभावोऽपि भगवन्नियत इति वाच्यत्वात् प्रकृतोपयोगितयाष्टकोक्तिः । (*TC.* p. 134).
14. द्विविधं हि लक्षणमुपलक्षणं विशेषलक्षणं च । तत्रेदं लक्षणं प्रपंचधर्मत्वात्, पृथक्भूतमेव कारणमुपलक्षयति, न विशेषणत्वेन । अतः पृथक् स्वलक्षणकथनम् । (*PP.* p. 296).
15. त्रैविध्यमत्र संभवति–रज्वाः संयुक्तसूत्रद्वयवत् मायाविशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा; मायाशक्तिमत् ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा; जगदुपादानमायाश्रयतया ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा । (*PV.* Madras G.O.L. p. 652).
16. प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धप्रपंचस्य ब्रह्मण्येवोत्पत्तिविनाशवत्तया अन्यत्राभावमुपवर्ण्य, तत्रापि प्रतिषिध्य, मिथ्यात्वोपपादनेन प्रमाणान्तराविरुद्धतया अद्वितीयब्रह्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः प्रयोजनम् । (*PP.* Ed. Madras G.O.L. p. 637).
17. तत् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेष इति....उपलक्षितब्रह्मस्वरूपं लक्षणं च दर्शयति । (*PP.* 298).

lakṣaṇas in relation to the doctrine of Akhaṇḍārthavāda and Śabala-Brahmavāda.

As M. does not subscribe to S.'s theory of Nirguṇa, Nirviśeṣa and Niṣkriya Brahman, he sees no reason to deny that the definition given by the Sūtrakāra is anything but a constitutive definition (Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa) of B. He, therefore, affirms in his *AV.* that it is as much an intrinsic definition (*Svalakṣaṇam*) as the other one of *Satyam Jñānam anantam.* He refers to a passage from the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*[18] (x, 78.5) in support of his contention:—

यत्तत्परंज्योतिरनन्यमद्वयं स्वसंस्थया नित्यनिरस्तकिल्विषम् ।
ब्रह्माख्यमस्योद्भवनादिहेतुभि: **स्वलक्षणै**र्लक्षितभावनिर्वृतिम् ॥

As many as eight alternative definitions of Svarūpa and Taṭastha-lakṣaṇas including one or two put forward by the *Vivaraṇa* have been reviewed by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC.* He has attempted to show that it will not profit the Advaitin in any way to go into the question of Svarūpa and Taṭasthalakṣaṇas, so long as the fact remains that both of them operate as distinguishing characteristics of the thing defined.[19] In the present case, the causality of B. in regard to the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world of matter and souls is certainly an intrinsic and constitutive definition of B. which utterly distinguishes it from all other principles like Jīvas and Prakṛti. The distinction between Svarūpa and Taṭasthalakṣaṇas on the ground that in the former the distinguishing characteristic partakes of the nature of the thing defined, while in the Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa the characteristic is only an external or a temporary mark of identification is also irrelevant to the present question. In arguing that birth, subsistence, and dissolution are but properties of the world (*prapañcadharma*),[20] the Advaitin misses the point that the power of creating the world, sustaining it, ruling over it and affecting it in various ways can very well be deemed to be an essential defining characteristic of B. even as the power of illumination is an essential characteristic of the Sun capable of revealing objects without having to *depend on them* for such a possession.[21] It is possible to hold that the powers of creation, dissolution etc. can exist in B. in a potential state and become active as occasions demand, without ceasing to be its essential attributes all the

18. जन्माद्यस्येति तेनैतद्विष्णोरेव **स्वलक्षणम्** ।
अस्योद्भवादिहेतुत्वं साक्षादेव स्वलक्षणम् ।
कृष्णध्यानच्छलेनैव स्वयं भागवतेऽब्रवीत् ॥ (*AV.* i. 1.2).

19. तस्मात्सत्यज्ञानादिवत् कारणत्वमपि स्वेतरव्यावर्तकमिति ॥ (*TC* p. 144).

20. *PP.* p. 296.

21. जगज्जननादिसामर्थ्यस्यैव स्वरूपलक्षणत्वोपपत्तेश्च । (*TC* p. 141 b).

while.[22] Vyāsatīrtha also points out that the definition of Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa as a characteristic that partakes of the nature of the thing would go against the interests of Akhaṇḍārtha or the non-partitive judgment arising from the proposition *Satyam jñānam anantam brahma.* If the 'characteristics' are to be viewed as being *identical* in essence with the thing, the element of *abundance* (*prakṛṣṭatva*) and luminosity (*prakāśatva*) which are accepted as the Svarūpalakṣaṇa of the moon would cease to be so; for the Advaitic theory of Akhaṇḍārtha holds in the interests of the non-partitive judgment arising from the proposition that the characteristics of abundance and luminosity stand *outside* the bare substantive sense of '*moon*' which is *all that is conveyed* by the proposition: Prakṛṣṭaprakāśaś candraḥ, and do not enter into syntactic relation with the substantive-sense. Moreover, in any definition, a known characteristic, which is distinctive of the thing in question, is put forward as the definition of an unknown or insufficiently known subject which happens to be the thing defined (*lakṣya*). In these circumstances, the expression Svarūpalakṣaṇa cannot make any sense. A definition to be meaningful must express some specific content of the thing over and above its *mere being.* Every svarūpa-lakṣaṇa then must embody certain definite and distinctive characteristics possessed by the thing defined, in order that it may serve the purpose of a definition viz., its differentiation from others of the same and of different class. Since 'Jagajjanmādikāraṇatvam' (being the author of the world) fulfils this condition, there is no reason why it should not be deemed to be a Svarūpalakṣaṇa.

Vyāsarāya examines another contention of the *Vivaraṇa* that whereas knowledge, bliss, etc., can be accepted as the defining essence of B. in virtue of their being regarded as properties unconditioned by relation to anything "other" than themselves (*nirupādhika*), the property of kāraṇatva (causality) cannot be so regarded as, by its very nature, it stands related to the 'world' which falls outside the essence of B. and cannot, therefore, be regarded as anything more than a Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa. Vyāsarāya rejoins that the Advaita-Brahman cannot be regarded as having bliss as its defining essence as in the 'pure being' that is B. there can be no bliss as a class-essence. Or, *ānanda* may be viewed as 'something in the nature of what is desirable or is dearest to one's heart or whose nature is opposed to all sorrow. All

22. Cf. 'शक्तय: सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचरा:
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तय:' (*V.P.* i, 3, 2).
इति वचनसिद्धं 'यतो,' 'येन,' इत्यादिकारकशक्तिवाचिपंचम्याद्युक्तजगज्जन्मादिसामर्थ्यस्यापि परमानन्दादिवत् यावलक्ष्यभाविरूपस्वरूपलक्षणत्वमेव । वह्नेर्दाहशक्तिवत् । एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4.23). स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च (*Śvet. Up.* vi, 8 cd). इत्यादिश्रुते: (*TC* p. 142-43 b).

these ways of defining *ānanda* presuppose a reference or a relation to something outside its being. The same is the case with the property of "Jñāna", viewed as a Svarūpalakṣaṇa. It is the nature of knowledge to illumine an object. In this sense, it is also connected with an "other" (*sopādhika*). It cannot be argued, says Vyāatīrtha, that—like the Sun's effulgence being its defining essence, knowledge in the sense of an inherent power which is all-illuminating and which is not in any way conditioned by being dependent on or being inseparably connected with an object, is the constitutive definition of B.[23] For the capacity to illumine or reveal anything implies the possession of a power to do so and this power is necessarily connected with some object with reference to which it is effective. At any rate, like the power of knowledge and illumination, the power to create, sustain, control and dissolve a world of matter and souls can also be considered to be an essential definition, characteristic of B.—the exercising of that power at different times being left to the will of B. Even in the proposition *Prakṛṣṭaprakāśaś candraḥ* constituents of the svarūpalakṣaṇa are not, strictly speaking, free from being conditioned by dependence on an "other". The sense of 'abundance of luminosity' conveyed by the sentence has to be contrasted with the effulgence of other luminaries of lesser light. In this way, this proposition: 'The moon is that heavenly body which has abundance of luminosity' would *not* be an example of Svarūpalakṣaṇa but of Taṭasthalakṣaṇa instead.

Another definition of Svarūpa and Taṭasthalakṣaṇa is also considered by Vyāsarāya. Svarūpalakṣaṇa is an attribute intimately connected with a purposeful end and what is not so is a Taṭasthalakṣaṇa.[24] The causality of the world (according to the Advaitin) does not serve any purposive end. So it is not to be regarded as B.'s Svarūpalakṣaṇa. The reply to this is as follows. Just as *ānanda* and other attributes of B. are to be known by the seeker thro' Jijñāsā in order that B. may be realized as being distinct from what is not-blissful, etc., It is equally to be known as the author of the world (*Jagatkāraṇam*) in contra-distinction from what is not-cause (viz., Prakṛti, Jīva, etc.). Hence 'Kāraṇatva' (causality) also is an attribute which is connected with a purposeful end (*jijñāsārūpakāryānvayi*). Hence, it cannot be denied the honor of a Svarūpalakṣaṇa.

The purpose of a definition be it Svarūpa or Taṭastha would be to distinguish the thing defined from others of the same class or of a different one. The Advaita-Brahman being differenceless, there will be no

23. विषयानवच्छिन्नमादित्यादिप्रकाशवत् अर्थप्रकाशनसमर्थं ज्ञानं स्वरूपलक्षणम् । (*Vivarana*).
24. कार्यान्वयिरूपं विशेषणं स्वरूपलक्षणम् । तदनन्वयिरूपोपलक्षणं तटस्थम् । आनन्दादिकं हि जिज्ञासारूपकार्यान्वयि; तस्य मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्वात् । न तु कारणता (*Vivaraṇa*).

point in trying to differentiate it from Jīva or Prakṛti by means of Taṭasthalakṣaṇa.[25] It cannot be that the Sūtrakāra is giving an unreal definition to establish an unreal distinction between B. and the Jīvas and Prakṛti by representing the former to be the cause of the Universe and denying such causality to the Jīvas and Prakṛti.[26] The Śāstra is meant to help seekers of truth and not to mislead them which unreal distinctions. It cannot be contended that the aim and purport of of Śāstra does not lie in wanting to represent B. as the cause or source of the world's comming into existence, its sustenance etc.,[27] Such a contention would be against the laborious efforts which have been made in adhikaraṇa after adhikaraṇa of Adhayāya I of the B.S. to establish that B. alone is to be accepted as the source and first cause of the Universe and not Prakṛti or Jīvas.[28]

M.'s enlarged interpretation of the Lakṣaṇasūtra thus brings into relief two important issues of utmost significance to the philosophy of Theism. The first one is that the law of causation in Vedānta is not confined to the world of matter, as it appears from the earlier interpretations of the Sūtras. The world of sentient beings had been only remotely and in any case very inadequately brought under the purview of B.'s causation by earlier commentators on the Sūtras. The position has been very much altered and significantly improved in M.'s interpretation which brings the world of sentient beings also *prominently* under the Law of Causation (Kāraṇatva) of Brahman, in terms of the eightfold dispensation applicable to all finite realities sentiment as well as insentient, according to the nature and fitness of each case (in the light of the doctrine of Parādhīna-Viśeṣāpti)—as elucidated in M.'s. *Tattvasaṅkhyāna*,[29] *Tattvaviveka* and other works. The second is connected with the ultimate effect of this enlarged interpretation of the Lakṣaṇasūtra viz. that it saves the Supreme Brahman from distintegration and loss of its authentic being by the inroads of Pantheism (*Pariṇāmavāda*) and Illusionism (*Vivartavāda*).

25. स्वरूपं वा तटस्थं वा लक्षणं भेदकं मतम् ।
सजातीयाद्विजातीयात् तच्चाद्वैतिमते कथम् ? (*TC*. p. 143 b).
26. सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति विहाय, नान्यतः परपरिकल्पितात् प्रधानादेरचेतनात्, चेतनादपि परिच्छिन्नज्ञानक्रियाशक्तेः संसारिणो हिरण्यगर्भादुत्पत्त्यादिर्नसंभावयितुमपि शक्यम् । (*PP*. p. 302).
27. भवेदपि कार्यस्य विगीतत्वमप्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । न ह्ययं सृष्ट्यादिप्रपंचः प्रतिपिपादयिषितः । न हि तत्प्रतिबद्धः कश्चित्पुरुषार्थो दृश्यते श्रूयते वा । (S.*BSB*. i, 4.14).
28. न च कारणत्वे श्रुतेरतात्पर्यान्नाप्रामाण्यम् । तात्पर्यनिर्णायकैः सूत्रैः प्रत्यधिकरणं सदेवेत्यादिवाक्यं न प्रधानादिकारणत्वपरं किंतु, ब्रह्मकारणत्वपरं इत्युक्तेरिति । (*TC*. p. 143).
29. Cf. *TS*. 10-11 and J. thereon. See also my *Philosophy of Śrī Madhvācārya*, pp. 156-58.

CHAPTER XIV

BRAHMAN'S AUTHORSHIP OF THE UNIVERSE AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES ARE KNOWABLE ONLY THRO' ŚĀSTRA

3. *Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇam* (i.1.3)

This adhikaraṇa establishes that the definition of B. as Jagajjanmādikāraṇam is not adversely affected by counter-claims made by systems of philosophy like the Sāṅkhya and Nyāya on behalf of Prakṛti, atoms etc. on the basis of pure reasoning or by religious schools upholding the supremacy of gods like Brahmā and Rudra on the authority of their own respective Āgamas, whose validity is inferentially established. This intention of the Sūtra is borne out by the clear statement following the definition of B. in i.1.2 that the said causality of B. rests on the authority of Śāstra *alone*.[1] This implies that the nature and identity of B. to be accepted as the sole independent source of the world is not determinable by any other source of knowledge than "Śāstra". It is out of the question to suppose that the nature of the first cause can be determined by reasonings advanced by philosophers like the Sāṅkhyas or the Naiyāyikas or by followers of religious schools like those of the Pāśupatas.

M. explains the term Śāstra as the Vedas, Upaniṣads, Purāṇas, Epics, Mūlarāmāyaṇa, Pañcarātras and *whatever else is in conformity with their teachings*. This liberalizes the connotation of "Śāstra". The inclusion of the Pancarātras in this definition is significant. M. has specially excluded the Pañcarātras or Vaiṣṇava philosophy from the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here and has tried to establish the validity of Pañcarātra on the authority of certain passages from the Mokṣadharmaparva of the *Mahābhārata* (xii, 359.1-64), where in the dialogue

1. The *BD.* points out that the word *eka* (only) is to be understood after *'Śāstra'*.

between Bhīṣma and Yudhiṣṭhira the question of the validity of Sāmkhya, Yoga, Pāśupata and Vedāraṇyaka is raised. In answering the question about Vedāraṇyaka, the Pañcarātra is lauded as being the most authoritative. This apparent irrelevance of the answer to the question is used by M. as an argument in support of the Pañcarātra being based on the Vedas and Āraṇyakas[2] and thus deriving its validity as being in conformity with their teachings.[3]

Taken with "Śāstra", 'Yoni' which means 'source' suggests that it is the prerogative of Śāstra to give true knowledge about the nature and identity of the Jagatkāraṇa.[4] How Śāstra is able to do so is made known in the next Sūtra which refers to Samanvaya or the exegetical method by which the purport of the Śāstra is to be determined.[5]

S.'s bhāṣya gives two interpretations of *Śāstrayoni*. The first one takes the compound as a Tatpuruṣa and makes B. the author of Scripture. The second takes it as a Bahuvrīhi and makes Scripture the only source of knowledge by which B. can be known (to be the source of the world). M. has criticized the first interpretation of S. in his *GB* (iii.15).[6] His point is that B.'s being the originating source of Śāstra has no relevance to its being the cause of the world. Authorship of Śāstra is not a sufficient proof of B.'s authorship of the universe. The latter includes the former.[7] S. has tried to show some relevance in raising the question of the authorship of Śāstra here, by saying that Sūtra i.1.2 has hinted at the omniscience of B. by making it the originating cause of the Universe. This omniscience is reinforced in the present Sūtra by showing that B. is the author of the Vedas—a store-house of all knowledge.[8] M. feels this is not a proper argument. Śāstra is only a small portion of the Universe created by

2. It should be noted that M.'s reading of the line is different from what is found in most of the mss. of the southern and northern recensions of the Epic. A Viśiṣṭādvaita Edn. of the Epic in Grantha script (1900) and Vādirāja's *Lakṣālamkāra* c. read *'Vedāraṇyakam'* in the opening line. For further details see my *Catussūtrī Bhāṣya* of M. Ed. 1934. Notes pp. 120 21.
3. 'सांख्यं योगः पाशुपतं **वेदारण्यकमेव** च' इत्यारभ्य **वेदपंचरात्रयोरैक्याभिप्रायेण** पंचरात्रस्यैव प्रामाण्यमुक्तं इतरेषां भिन्नमतत्वं प्रदर्श्य मोक्षधर्मेष्वपि । (*M.BSB.* 1.1.3).
4. मानत्वादिति वक्तव्ये योनित्वादित्युक्तिः मानतोपपादनाय । शास्त्रपदलभ्यभ्रान्त्यहेतुताकस्य ज्ञप्तिहेतोर्मानताध्रौव्यात् । (*Rāgh. TDP.*).
5. शास्त्रयोनीति पूर्वसूत्रादनुवृत्तिरिति योजना । (Raghu. *TPB.* i.1.40).
6. This criticism has been elaborated by J. in his *TP* and *NS* and by Vyāsarāya in his *TC*. The sequence of ideas between Sūtras i.1, 2 and 3 would require only the statement of the nature of the proof or authority by which the fact of B.'s being the cause of the world is to be known.
7. जन्माद्यस्येत्युक्ते प्रमाणं हि तत्रापेक्षितम् । न तु, तस्य जातत्वं वेदकारणत्वं वा । नहि वेदकारणत्वं जगत्कारणत्वे हेतुः । नहि विचित्रजगत्सृष्टेर्वेदसृष्टिरशक्या सृज्यत्वे । यदि वेदस्रष्टा सर्वज्ञः, किमिति जगत्स्रष्टा न सर्वज्ञः ? (*MGB.* iii.15).
8. सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मेत्युपक्षिप्तं, तदेव द्रढयन्नाह–'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' इति (*S.BSB.* 1.1.3). अयमपरः प्रपंचकारणस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्वे हेतुः । (*PP.*).

B. How then can B.'s omniscience, if it is incapable of being made known by the creation of a whole universe of such stupendous range and variety, be made clear by the production of the Vedas which form but a small part of the universe (चेतनाचेतनजगत्) created by B.? J. says it cannot be argued on S.'s behalf that in Sūtra i.1.2 omniscience has been made the implicit ground for maintaining that B. is the sole cause of the Universe and for excluding Prakṛti from being admitted as the cause of the Universe and that in i.1.3 this omniscience of B. is sought to be established on the basis of B's being declared to be the originating source of Śāstra. Such an argument would be futile. For no Sāṅkhya or other philosopher who is not disposed to recognize B. as Jagatkāraṇa is ever likely to concede the point that B. is the author of the Śāstra. If B.'s omniscience is to be proved to the satisfaction of these philosophers by reference to Scriptural authority, one may directly prove it to be the cause of the Universe on the same authority, instead of thro' such a devious course[9] It is difficult to see *from the Advaita point of view,* how authorship of the Vedas can prove the omniscience of their author. S. has tried to illustrate his point by an argument from analogy. A person like Pāṇini who has composed a great work throwing light on a science must be presumed to know more than what he has actually written. So too in the case of Īśvara.[10] The argument is not only unsatisfactory but creates fresh difficulties. For S. will have to define what exactly is meant by the statement that B. is the author of the Vedas. If it means that B. first acquires necessary information from other sources, takes thought and composes the Vedas with special effort, they would cease to be 'apauruṣeya'.[11] If authorship of Vedas simply means that B. *utters* them, that would not necessarily prove its omniscience. If Vedas are to be taken to issue out of B. like the breath of a man, their 'creation' would be but an involuntary act which cannot establish omniscience. If, as the *Pañcapādikā* holds, Śāstra is superinmposed on B., as the snake is superimposed on the rope,[12] the illustration of Pāṇini given by the Bhāṣyakāra would be out of place.[13] Superimposition of Śāstra on B. could hardly prove omniscience of B. The *PP.* explains that Śāstra is the illusory manifestation of the cognitive power of B. By means of this power B. comes to appear as the Śāstra. Since the superimposed Veda has this power of illumination, the substratum of this appearance viz. B. must indeed have the attribute of knowledge in reality. J. says this need not necessarily be true. A property or power pertaining to the superimposed object need not necessarily be existing in reality in the substratum. It is the 'snake' that has the power of frightening the perceiver—and *not* the rope, the substratum of the illusory perception. Nor is the power of an *adhiṣṭhāna* (substratum) necessarily passed on to the *āropya* (superimposed object). Otherwise, Avidyā and Ākāśa as illusory appearances of B. (like Śāstra) should have the power of illumination. If they are supposed to be the *Vivarta* of Sacchakti of B. and not of Cit-Śakti, the possession of two different *Śaktis* by a Nirviśeṣa-B. would be a curious proposition.!

9. श्रुत्या शास्त्रयोनित्वं, तेन सार्वज्ञं प्रसाध्य, तेन प्रधानस्य कारणतानिषेधात् वरं श्रुत्यैव तन्निषेधः। (*TC.* p. 159 b).

10. यद्विस्तरार्थं शास्त्रं यस्मात्पुरुषविशेषात्संभवति यथा व्याकरणादि पाणिन्यादेः। (S. *BSB.* i.1.3).

11. किं चेदं शास्त्रस्येश्वरनिर्मितत्वं, अर्थमुपलभ्य रचितत्वं वा, निःसृतत्वमात्रं वा? नाद्यः कणादचरणानुसरणप्रसंगात्। श्रुत्यादिविरोधाच्च। न द्वितीयः। शास्त्रयोनित्वस्य सार्वज्ञसाधकत्वाभावप्रसंगात्। (*TP.* i.1.3).

12. कथं पुनस्ततो जन्म ? तत्परतंत्रत्वात्; रज्जुसर्पवत्। (*PP.* p. 316).

13. रज्जौ भुजंगवत् ब्रह्मण्यारोपितो वेद इति चेत्; तर्हि कथं पाणिन्यादिदृष्टान्तः? नहि पाणिनावारोपितं व्याकरणम्। कथं चैवं सति, सार्वज्ञसिद्धिः ? तस्यैव विज्ञानशक्तिविवर्तत्वाच्छास्त्रस्येति चेन्न। वियदादीनामपि प्रकाशक्तिप्रसंगात् अविद्यागतावरणादिशक्तेरपि ब्रह्मणि तात्त्विकत्वप्रसंगाच्च। कुत्र चेदमुपलब्धं आरोप्यगता शक्तिरारोपाधिष्ठाने वास्तवीति ? (*NS.* p. 112 b)

Vyāsarāja raises another objection. If, as the Advaitin must hold, the Veda teaches the truth of the existence of one pure consciousness alone and not the multiplicity of phenomena, B. could not be said to know anything but pure consciousness. The Sūtrakāra cannot possibly be thinking of omniscience *in this sense* when he hails B. as the Sole Creator, preserver and controller of a vast and mighty Universe whose inner variety and multiplicity are such as to stagger the imagination—to quote S.'s own words. The first Varṇaka of the Sūtra *Śāstrayonitvāt* offered by S. thus turns out to be out of place and unsustainable.

M. holds that the Sūtra carries with it an implied refutation of anti-Theistic rationalism,[14] Svabhāvavāda (naturalism) and other views regarding the genesis of the Universe. In *AV* he has argued at some length that the Sūtra also carries with it an implicit refutation of the adequacy of pure reason unaided by Scripture, to establish the true nature and attributes of B. He has drawn attention to the limitations of the cosmological and the teleological arguments[15] which are generally cited in support of natural theology as an ascent to the knowledge of God by the natural light of human reason unaided by intimations of revealed theology.[16] The *Tarkatāṇḍava* of Vyāsarāja examines Udayana's Theistic proofs at great length *from this point of view.*

14. 'रेतो धातुर्वटकणिका घृतधूमधिवासनम्।
जातिस्मृतिरयस्कान्तः सूर्यकान्तोऽम्बुभक्षणम्।
प्रेत्य भूताप्ययश्चैव देवताभ्युपयाचनम्।
मृते कर्मनिवृत्तिश्च प्रमाणमिति निश्चयः॥' (*Mbh.* xii, 220, 30-31).
इति मोक्षधर्मवचनान्न नास्तिक्यवादो युज्यते। दर्शनाच्च तपआदिफलस्य। (M. *BSB.* 1.1.3).

15. * * *
इत्याद्यनुमया स्पर्धि नानुमानं परेशितुः।
शक्तं विज्ञापने चातिप्रसंगोऽनुमयेदृशा॥ (*AV.* 1.1.3).

16. आगमानुग्रहे हि सर्वाण्येतान्यनुमानान्येव। पक्षधर्मतादीनामंगानामपौरुषेयतया स्वतः प्रमाणेन शास्त्रेण सिद्धेः। प्रतिपक्षादीनां च तद्विरोधेन बाधादिति॥ (*NS.* p. 111).

CHAPTER XV

HOW TO INTERPRET AND INTEGRATE ŚĀSTRA

4. *Tat tu Samanvayāt* (i.1.4)

This adhikaraṇa lays down the *modus operandi* whereby the Jijñāsya-B. is to be established thro' Śāstra as the Supreme Source of the eightfold dispensation of the world of matter and souls and as the Being of infinite perfections (Sarvaguṇapūrṇam). This consists in Samanvaya or proper exegesis (*samyaganvaya*) of Śāstra with the help of principles of interpretation laid down in the Mīmāmsā Śāstra, including the Tātparyaliṅgas or marks which determine the purport of texts, such as *Upakrama* (commencement of the text), *Upasamhāra* (conclusion), *abhyāsa* (repetition), *apūrvatā* (novelty), *phalam* (fruitfulness), *arthavāda* (eulogistic or deprecatory references) and *upapatti* (logical justification). According to M. the preposition '*sam*' in '*Samanvaya*' signifies two things: (i) that this exegesis of Śāstra is to be based on the highest and fullest denotative power of words (*paramamukhyavṛtti*), (ii) in such a comprehensive way as would embrace the entire range and extent of Śāstra known, unknown and to be known, without any statutory exceptions whatsoever in respect of the so-called Karmakāṇḍa and other parts. The particle *sam* implies that in applying the Tātparya-liṅgas to determine the purport of texts, due regard must be paid to the question of their relative strength and superiority (*balābalacintā*) in cases of conflict.[1] The Tātparyaliṅgas include the others accepted by Pūrvamīmāmsakas[2]—such as *Śruti*, *liṅga*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇa*, *sthāna* and *samākhyā*.

1. उपक्रमादिभिः (तात्पर्यलिगैः) सम्यङ्ग निरूप्यमाणे तदेव शास्त्रगम्यम् (*M.BSB.*) संश्चासौ बलाबलत्वादिना विचिन्तितश्चासावन्यश्च । तस्मादुपक्रमादिलिंगसमुदायात् । (*TDP*).
2. अत्र श्रुत्यादिषट्कं च ग्राह्यम् । (*TP*. i.1.4).

In M.'s view, the Tātparyaliṅgas have an ascending order of strength. The reason for this principle has been briefly explained by J. The concluding statement is in the nature of an explanation or a commentary. It is therefore to be admitted that the initial statement if it is (or appears to be) in conflict with it should be considered invalid and re-interpreted so as to be in agreement with the conclusion. A repetitive statement is comparatively weightier than both the initial and the concluding statements which are made out once and so on in regard to the rest of the Tātparyaliṅgas.[3] This is implied by the way in which M. has placed *upapatti* at the head of them, in his terse statement: *anvaya upapattyādi liṅgam*. A clear statement to the same effect is found in his *AV*.[4] The thesis of the ascending order of strength of the Tātparyaliṅgas does not find favor with Advaita schoolmen. Vyāsarāja's *TC* has tried to show that it is acceptable to the Mīmāmsakas. He has discussed the question with special reference to several adhikaraṇas of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā, in his *TT*.[5] The *Upasamhāravijaya* of his disciple Vijayīndra Tīrtha is an independent manual devoted solely to the discussion of this question,[6] in reply to the adverse criticisms of Appayya Dīkṣita's *Upakramaparākrama*.

When the purport of the whole body of Śāstra thus comes to be patiently investigated and arrived at in terms of B.'s being the Supreme Reality of infinite perfections and the primary source of the eightfold dispensations of the cosmos, we have the fulfilment of Śāstra-samanvaya.[7]

It is this kind of exhaustive affiliation of the entire body of Śāstra with B. in the highest primary denotation of words with the help of these principles of interpretation that has been worked out in the four Pādas of the Samanvayādhyāya, with typical illustrative examples chosen from a wide range of sources.[6] The outline of the Scheme of Samanvaya as set forth by M. and followed by him has already been explained in detail in the Introduction.

3. उपसंहारस्य व्याख्यानरूपत्वेन तद्विरोध्युपक्रमाप्रामाण्योपपत्तेस्तस्य ततोऽपि प्राबल्यम् । एकत्रोक्तादपि बहुलोक्तेः प्राबल्यादभ्यासस्योपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां प्राबल्यम्। एकत्र बहुवारोक्तादपि मुख्यस्य प्राबल्यादपूर्वताया उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यासेभ्यः प्राबल्यम् । फलस्योद्देश्यत्वादुपक्रमादिभ्यः प्राबल्यम् । करणाकरणयोरिष्टानिष्टकथनादिरूपार्थवादस्य फलमात्राधिक्यादुपक्रमादिभ्यः प्राबल्यम् । उपपत्तेः सर्वमूलत्वेन सर्वतः प्राबल्यमिति । (*TP*. i.1.4).
4. उपक्रमादिलिंगानां बलीयो ह्युत्तरोत्तरम् ।
   श्रुत्यादौ पूर्वपूर्वं तु ब्रह्मतर्कविनिर्णयात् ॥ (*AV*. i, 1.4).
5. For details see my *HDSV*. ii. pp. 53-56.
6. For summary of his arguments see my Introd. to the Edn. of the work (Parimala Press. Nanjangud 1956).
7. उपक्रमादितात्पर्यलिगैः सम्यङ्ग निरूप्यमाणे, तदेव शास्त्रगम्यम् । (*M.BSB*. i, 1.4).
8. तमेव समन्वयं प्रकटयाति– 'आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्' इत्यादिना समस्तेनाध्यायेन प्रायेण । (*M.BSB*. i.1.12).

CHAPTER XVI

BRAHMAN IS NEITHER UNKNOWABLE NOR INEXPRESSIBLE

5. *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇam* (i, 1.5-11)

Before getting down to the task of the actual working out of the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. it would be natural to expect the Sūtrakāra to dispose of possible objections against the feasibility of Samanvaya as such. One such objection may be raised on the basis of certain texts to be met with in the Scriptures themselves which (seem to) represent B. as being essentially inexpressible and beyond the sphere of thought and speech and conno-denotative reference.[1] If this be true, there can be no meaningful Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. as envisaged in Sūtras i, 1.3-4. That such an objection cannot be ruled out as being fanciful or far-fetched is seen by the way in which the Advaita school of philosophy has actually taken its stand on texts such as *Yato vāco nivartante;*[2] *Yad vācā 'nabhyuditam;*[3] *Avacanenaiva provāca*[4] and maintained that B. is Nirviśeṣa (without any attributes or characteristics, aspects or the like) and that it cannot, therefore, be brought within the scope of any Scriptural description; for no description is possible of a being that is devoid of a name, a class-essence or a specific property, activity or relation to others.[5] Such a being cannot possibly be made the subject of a conno-denotative exegesis in any fruitful sense. It is, therefore, only in a vague nebulous sense of non-relational judgments called *Akhaṇḍārtha-Vṛtti* that B. can be said to

1. अव्यवहार्यमव्यपदेश्यम् । (*Māṇḍ.* Up. vii).
2. *Taitt. Up.* (ii.4).
3. *Kena Up.* i.4.7.
4. Q. by S.*BSB.* iii, 2.17.
5. Cf. यस्मिन् न कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति, नाम वा, रूपं वा, जातिर्वा, गुणो वा, तद्द्वारेणैव हि शब्दवृत्तिर्भवति । न चैषां-कश्चिद्विशेषो ब्रह्मण्यस्ति । अतो न निर्देष्टुं शक्यते इदं तदिति । (S. *Bṛh. Up.* c. ii, 3.6).

be described by Scripture, without any positive, definitive content to such judgments.

But a meaningful Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. as the source of all cosmic evolution and its sustenance and as a being possessed of infinite perfections worthy of philosophical quest could not put up with such a conception of B. It would be a misuse of language to call such a loose way of bringing Śāstra into relation with B. as has been proposed by thinkers like the Advaitins by the name of *Sam-anvaya* (complete and primary integration). We have every right then to expect the Sūtrakāra to come to grips with this problem and clear the way for the smooth working out of the details of the Samanvaya proposed to be undertaken by him, by overthrowing the chief objection to Samanvaya, which the doctrine of Avācyatva of B. and its corollary of Akhaṇḍārthavāda interpose.

It would thus appear that M. is on the right track in interpreting this adhikaraṇa as argumentatively establishing the fundamental presupposition of Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. that B. *is described* in Scripture in the highest and fullest primary sense of words as having infinite perfections, and refuting, by implication, the thesis of monism that it is essentially inexpressible and indescribable because it is Nirguṇa and Nirviśeṣa and that therefore the Samanvaya envisaged by the Sūtrakāra is more apparent than real, robust and full-blooded. Dasgupta has thought it fit to acknowledge that this way of interpreting the adhikaraṇa is "surely not less cogent"[6] than (the one followed by other commentators) of treating it as a refutation of the causality of Prakṛti.

M. and his commentators have, however, held that the interpretations of S., R. and others following them are unsustainable, for more than one reason. This will be made clear, in due course.

The Sūtrakāra's purpose in establishing the expressibility of B. thro' primary denotation of words and applying this principle to the whole body of scripture (i.1.10) is to convincingly demonstrate the position that B. is the Being possessed of infinite perfections[7] (गुणपूर्णम्). Such a Samanvaya has naturally to be established in the two senses of the prefix *sam*—viz. in the full primary sense of words and with reference to the entirety of Śāstra. As these two senses are closely related and as the sense of entirety (*kārtsnya*) comes after the acceptance of the primary sense, both the issues have been mooted in

6. *History of I. Phil.* Vol. iv. p. 130 f.n. 1.
7. नहि ब्रह्मशब्दः कतिपयगुणाभिधायकः । जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वगुणग्रहणं तु, तस्याखिलगुणसाधकत्वेनान्योपलक्षणाभिप्रायेणैव । (*TP.* i.4.1).

the same adhikaraṇa[8]—the larger question of direct and primary denotation of words being discussed in all its bearings in several Sūtras and the other one dealt with in one Sūtra (i.1.10).

The opening Sūtra is deliberately worded with a double negative (*na a-śabdam*) to emphasize that (the highest) B. is verily *not inexpressible* by words.[9]

Since the term *īkṣati* in its radical sense of "to see" from √ īkṣ cannot be meaningfully connected with the predicate of the proposition, commentators have been obliged to take it in a modified sense suitable to their interpretation. According to S. and R. the sense intended by "*īkṣateḥ*" is the act of seeing and willing—(*īkṣaṇam*) in the active i.e. the omniscience of the creative principle (B). They have accordingly quoted *Tad aikṣata....* (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.3) as the Viṣaya-vākya of this Sūtra. But, then, the use of the masculine form '*gauṇaḥ*' referring to the same idea, in the next Sūtra throws considerable doubt on the correctness of their understanding of the drift of the argument of the Sūtras.

Apart from this consideration, their interpretation of the adhikaraṇa as the refutation of the (*Sānkhyan*) view that unintelligent Pradhāna is the cause of the world is open to several objections. Such an interpretation is first of all *not relevant* to the theme of the Samanvayadhyāya. This has to be squarely admitted. The Sūtrakāra is refuting the claims of Prakrti to be the cause of the world in Adhy. ii.2. in as many as ten Sūtras (ii, 2, 1-10) according to S., R. and others. Where then is the need to anticipate the issue in i, 1, 5-11?

Secondly, it involves violent twisting of evidence to suit a preconceived notion, much special pleading and a good deal of liberty taken with the wording of the Sūtra i, 1.5 *as it stands*, in trying to construe it with additions and importations (*adhyāhāra*).

S. and R. have rendered *aśabdam* in i.1.5 in the sense of "being foreign to the Vedas". Such a stricture on Prakṛti is clearly unsustainable. There are clear enough texts in the Upaniṣads and Purāṇas accepting Prakṛti as the material principle from which the Universe has been evolved. These cannot be ignored or explained away.[10] The question of the *status* of Prakṛti—whether it is operating independently of B. or as a dependent principle would be an *altogether different*

8. संशब्दाक्षेपसमाधानरूपत्वज्ञापनार्थमेव वाच्यत्वसमर्थनपरसूत्रमध्येऽस्य सूत्रस्य निवेशः कृतः। (*TPBb* p. 34).
9. अशब्दं इत्यादेः शब्दादिगुणशून्यं तदविषयश्चेत्यर्थः । (*TP*).
10. Cf. *Śvet up.* 1, 9; iv.5; *Cūlikā Up.* 3.5; *Gītā* xiii. 19; *Mbh.* xii. 347 31; *Bhāgavata* iii, 26, 10-11; *Viṣṇu. Pur.* i, 2.29; B.S. i, 2.22.

one which would not affect the provenness of Prakṛti (*Śrautatvam*) in any way. No modern scholar feels happy over S.'s *tour de force* in seeking to banish Prakṛti from the domain of Upaniṣadic thought.

It would be obvious that an objection based on the inexpressibility of B. would have priority over any other topic *vis a vis* the immediate and main thesis of the chapter viz. Samanvaya of names and marks. The fact also that there are subsequent adhikaraṇas refuting the causality of Prakṛti (i, 4, 23-27 and ii, 2.1-10 according to S. himself) considerably weakens the case for S. and others in i.1.5. There is *greater cogency and fitness* in refuting the objection to Samanvaya based on the ground of the Avācyatva-dogma immediately after the enunciation of Samanvaya (*Samanvayapratijñā*) in i.1.4 *than* in criticizing the Jagatkāraṇatva of Prakṛti.[11a]. There is no immediate contextual urgency or propriety in raising the issue about Prakrti *at this stage*. As a matter of fact, it has been rightly reserved for Adhy. II. If any passing refutation of Prakrti-kāraṇatva were, however, called for at this stage, it should have been made immediately after the second Sūtra where B. (alone) was defined as the author of the Universe. It is too much to make the Sūtrakāra digress into that question in one full adhikaraṇa of as many as *seven* sutras instead of making a passing reference to it in a Guṇasūtra, tagged on to i, 1.2, *if* he could not really have waited till Adhy. II, where he is attacking the causality of Prakrti in a full-dress debate. All this shows that the true interpretation of the adhikaraṇa has been missed by the oldest extant commentary of S., which has turned the issue into a groundless attack on the Sānkhya Prakrti, which has no legs to stand upon. Perhaps it was a shrewd move on S.'s part to avoid a frontal attack on one of the most cherished dogmas of monism—the Avācyatva of B. This wrong lead has been tamely accepted and followed by all those who came after him regardless of consistency with evidence or even with their own views. For instance R. adopts the same line of interpretation. But while it is possible for S. to repudiate the category of Prakrti by reducing it to his Māyā, it would be impossible for R. to do away with Prakrti as such, in as much as it is one of the three categories of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The question of the metaphysical dependence of Prakrti (*Acit*) is really irrelevant to the discussion here about its Śrautatva (as a category of his and the Sūtrakāra's Siddhānta). *Accepting then the category of Prakriti or Acit as he does,*[11b] R. has the

11a तथापि शब्दगोचरतैव प्रथमप्रतिपाद्या स्यात् हि यस्मात्तस्मात् सैवात्र प्रतिपाद्यते; न सांख्यनिराकरणम् । अवाच्यत्वे हि ब्रह्मणि शब्दसंबन्ध एवानुपपन्नः जगत्कारणत्वादिवाक्यविचारस्तु दूरे । सांख्यनिराकरणाभावे तु सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यानामेव समन्वयानुपपत्तिः। अतः प्रथमं वाच्यत्वसमर्थनेन समन्वयसंभावनायां सत्यां, वाक्यविशेषनिष्ठस्य पश्चादवसर इति (*NS.* p. 120).
11b. Cf. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषांश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छमः । (*Śrībhāṣya* i.4.3).

least justification to dub Prakrti "aśabdam", following S. This would be sufficient to show that a grave historical blunder has been committed over the interpretation of the fifth adhikaraṇa by almost all the Pre-M. commentators. M. has really opened our eyes by giving the correct lead in the matter—which Vallabha and Baladeva have followed.

Turning to the syntactic arrangement of the words in Sutra i.1.5, as interpreted by S. we find that he proposes to treat *aśabdam* as embodying one reason (*hetu*)[12] why Prakrti cannot be accepted as the cause of the world. But then there is no ablative case-termination after the word *aśabdam* to justify such an interpretation. This shows it is a farfetched construction. The simplest and the most natural way of construing the Sūtra *as it stands worded* would be to take **(na)** *aśabdam* as the predicate of the Sautra proposition: *Ikṣater na aśabdam*—the subject of the proposition being very naturally supplied by the word *tat* standing for B. from the *preceding sūtra*, by *anuvṛtti*. There is no reason to abandon this simple and most natural construction of the Sūtra and seek to *introduce a fresh subject* for the proposition in *the form of the Sāmkhya Prakrti* whose foreignness to scripture (*aśabdatvam*) is *yet to be proved*, even according to S. and others, in the fourth Pāda! But it is doubtful if, in spite of all the ingenious efforts of S. and others to do so, the Prakrti could really be banished from the portals of the Hindu Scriptures as "not recognized by the Śrutis", by any impartial student of the sacred texts.

S.'s interpretation of the fifth Sūtra is very cumbersome in that he has to introduce a new predicate (*Kāraṇam*) and *repeat* this word after changing the nominative-form into the genitive to square with the second proposition which he is obliged to introduce, and give it a suitable probans (*hetu*) of its own to reject the causality of Prakrti and by implication ascribe such causality to B. We are thus presented by S. with *two distinctive propositions* with the bracketed words having to be *imported*:—

(i) **(प्रधानं)** न **(जगत्कारणं)** अशब्द–**(त्वात्)**

(ii) **(कारणस्य)** ईक्षते: (= ईक्षितृत्वात्)

This involves the defect of Vākyabheda, not to speak of unauthorized importations (*adhyāhāras*).

R. does not treat *aśabdam* as a probans. According to him, it signifies Pradhāna (Prakrti). It is the subject (*Pakṣa*) of the proposition and the predicate (*sādhya*) viz. *'cause of the world'* (Jagatkāraṇam) is to be supplied as in S.'s case. This does not accord with the

12. न सांख्यपरिकल्पितमचेतनं प्रधानं जगत्कारणं शक्यं वेदान्तेष्वाश्रयितुम्; अशब्दं हि तत् (*Ś.BSB*. i. 1, 5).

normal practice of the Sūtrakāra. R. too cannot escape resorting to the introduction of a second proposition (involving Vākyabheda) with *'īkṣateh'* as its probans. As against these farfetched constructions, M.'s straight and simple way of construing the Sūtra:—

(तत् or ब्रह्म) नाशब्दं, ईक्षते: ।

"B. is not inexpressible as It is an object of knowledge" has much to commend it to our acceptance. The ablative *ikṣateh* of the probans is understood by M. in the passive sense of the root (*īkṣ*); on account of its being an object of knowledge (*īkṣaṇīyatvāt*):[13] ईक्षणीयत्वात् वाच्यमेव (M.*BSB* i.1.5).

B. is the subject of the proposition in the Sūtra. It is given in the preceding Sūtra from which it could be taken over without any violation of accepted principles of Sūtra-interpretation. Thus Sūtra 5 affirms that B. is not inexpressible by words as it is open to knowledge only thro, scriptural descriptions. Consistent with this interpretation M. chooses the following Śruti texts as his Viṣayavākyas.[14]

"He (the seeker) perceives the Supreme One thro' initiation by the exalted Brahmā."

"He should perceive the Supreme in his own self."

"Receiving clear ideas from Scripture, he shall endeavor to obtain direct vision".

"All the Śrutis speak primarily of Him".

"The One chiefly denoted by words (of Scripture)."

These texts clearly establish that B. is perceived thro' knowledge and vision obtained from the Śrutis.

Thus, Sūtra i.1.5 comes to mean, according to M.:

It (B) is *not inexpressible by words*, because it is *an object of knowledge*. The point underlying this argument has been clarified by M. as follows. B. being *Śāstrayoni* (i.1.3) i.e. knowable only thro'

13. Cf. सूत्रे ईक्षतेरिति धातुनिर्देशमात्रत्वेन, तदर्थलक्षणाया ईक्षणादिति लाभात् तस्यचासंबद्धस्य हेतुत्वायोगात् योग्यतया पुरुषमीक्षत इति श्रुत्यानुगुण्याच्च क्रियाकर्मभाव इति मत्वेक्षणीयत्वादित्युक्तं भाष्ये । (*Rāgh*. TPB. p. 34b).

14. स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशयं **पुरुषमीक्षते** (*Praśna* Up. v.5).
आत्मन्येवात्मानं **पश्येत्** । (*Bṛh. Up*. iv, 4.23).
विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत । (*Bṛh. Up*. iv, 4, 21).
सर्वे वेदा यत्पद**मामनन्ति** । *Kaṭha Up*. 1, 2.15).
एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा **वदन्ति** । (*R.V*. i. 164, 46).
वचसां **वाच्यमुत्तमम्** । (*Pravṛtta Saṁhitā*).

Śāstra[15] (*aupaniṣada*) and as Śāstra comprises a body of texts, it follows that Śāstra is competent to describe the nature and attributes of B. and produce correct knowledge about it thro' direct denotative power of its words and descriptions. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that B. is utterly inexpressible by words or absolutely beyond the reach of conno-denotation. Advaita philosophers have no doubt tried to take up the position that tho' B. is essentially inexpressible and therefore not open to denotation, Scripture can still give us some knowledge of it thro' a process of secondary signification of words known as *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti*. The type of *Lakṣaṇā* resorted to here is known as *Akhaṇḍārtha* or *Cinmātralakṣaṇā* whereby Scriptural texts descriptive of B. are interpreted as conveying the bare essence or pure being (*svarūpamātram*) of B., shorn of all attributes and determinants.[16] In the last analysis, scriptural passages describing B. yield, according to the Advaita, nothing more than a non-relational judgment. The talk of fulness of attributes in B. does not, therefore, arise in these circumstances.

Apart from the question whether the concept of an absolutely character-less (Nirviśeṣa) B. is maintainable or not, M. has raised a very pertinent objection here to the principle of Lakṣaṇā being invoked with reference to a being that is by hypothesis utterly and absolutely incapable of being expressed or denoted by any word or expression in the entire repertoire of Language. Such an entity must for ever remain equally beyond the purview of Lakṣaṇāvṛtti as well,—says M.[17]

The full force and the logical niceties of this trenchant criticism of '*Avācye-Lakṣaṇāvāda*' as it has been attempted to be applied to Scriptural interpretation by Advaitins have been brought out by J. thro' a syllogistic argument of remarkable agility:

Vipratipannam na lakṣyam
Kenāpi padena avācyatvāt
Vaidharmyeṇa tīravat.

[The subject under dispute cannot be indicated by the secondary power of words as it is incapable of being expressed by any word whatsoever in language—unlike the 'bank' in the sentence 'the hamlet is in (on) the Gaṅgā' (*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*)].

15. औपनिषदत्वाम्नावचनेनेक्षणम् । (*Op. cit.*).
16. For M.'s refutation of Akhaṇḍārthavāda see his *Tattvodyota*.
17. सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्तेः ॥ (*BSB*. i.1.11).

In the above counter-example, the bank (*tīra*) is indicated by the word 'Gaṅgā' by secondary signification, so as to convey the ideas of the coolness and sanctity of the hamlet—which may not be comprehended if one were merely to make a plain statement that the hamlet is on the bank of the Ganga (*Gaṅgātīre ghoṣaḥ*).

But then, it should be borne in mind that we are in a position to use the word 'Gaṅgā' in this case *indirectly* (i.e. by Lakṣaṇā) to convey the sense of 'the bank of the Gaṅgā', *only because* there is *another word* which is capable of directly denoting the bank, in its own right—viz. the word *'tīra'*. If the thing indicated were to have *no word* capable of *expressing it* (outside the given case of Lakṣaṇā) it could not at all be brought under the scope of Lakṣaṇā by some other word. In the final analysis, then, all Lakṣaṇāvrtti derives its sustenance from and goes back upon a direct expressibility by some specific word or words (*abhidhāvṛtti*). 'Pure' *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti* in the utter absence of any corresponding direct denotation would thus be unthinkable, impossible. Such is the law of thought and language.[18]

If then, B. were essentially inexpressible by Scripture, the whole programme of Śāstrasamanvaya in B. projected by the Sūtrakāra in i.1.4, would have to come to a standstill. The entire Samanvayādhyāya will thus have to be *written off*.

We have, therefore, to accept that statements in Scripture proclaiming B. to be beyond the range of thought, language and description are not to be taken in their absolute sense of utter inexpressibility and inconceivability but only as emphasizing the illimitable majesty of B. which cannot be fully comprehended and expressed by limited powers of human thought and speech.[19] This does not, however, preclude the possibility of our knowing B. and realizing its majesty and describing it according to the measure of our understanding and capacity. It is only a humble admission of the limitations of human understanding and not a sweeping denial of actual content in B. M. has illumined this profound truth with a picturesque analogy from the Purāṇas:

18. अवाच्यस्य लक्ष्यत्वाप्रसिद्धेः नाप्रसिद्धमवाच्यस्य लक्ष्यत्वं कल्प्यमित्यर्थः। ननु,गंगापदावाच्यस्यापि तीरस्य तल्लक्ष्यत्वं प्रसिद्धमिति, वेदावाच्यस्यापि ब्रह्मणस्तल्लक्ष्यत्वं किं न स्यादित्यत आह–सर्वेति । भवेदेवं तीरादेर्गंगादिपदावाच्यस्यापि लक्ष्यत्वं, पदान्तरवाच्यत्वात्; नतु ब्रह्मणः। तस्य सर्वशब्दावाच्यत्वात्। सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्यापि लक्षणायां 'विप्रतिपन्नं न लक्ष्यं केनापि पदेनावाच्यत्वात् वैधर्म्येण तीरादिवत् इति युक्तिविरुद्धत्वादित्यर्थः। (*TP*. i.1, 11). See also *HDSV*. Vol. 1, p. 165.
19. अवाच्यत्वादिकं तु, अप्रसिद्धत्वात् –
'अप्रसिद्धेरवाच्यं तत् वाच्यं सर्वागमोक्तितः ।
अतर्क्यं तर्क्यमज्ञेयं ज्ञेयमेवं परं स्मृतम्' ॥ (*M.BSB*. i.1.5).

"The wise ones tho' perceiving the expanse of the Meru mountain, (still) perceive it not, in its entirety as this much."[20]

The remaining Sūtras of this adhikaraṇa have also been explained by M. and his commentators in keeping with the spirit of the main Sūtra. The Sūtra *Gauṇaścennātmaśabdāt* (i.1.6), for example, is taken to rebut an explanation that while the Nirguṇa-B. remains truly inexpressible (*aśabdam*), it is the Saguṇa-B. or else the individual self of introspection that is actually referred to in the Śrutis as open to knowledge and, therefore, open to description. This view is characteristic of Advaita thinking. Hence its refutation in i.1.6 by the pointed use of the term *ātman* in the highest contexts of Brahmic vision. And the term *ātman,* in the Sūtrakāra's view, *primarily* denotes the Supreme Being alone (i.3.1).[21] The next two Sūtras refute possible objections that the Ātman referred to could nevertheless be the *Gauṇa ātman* or one associated with the three guṇas, by showing that there are scriptural statements to the effect that one who knows the Ātman attains Mokṣa.[22] It is accepted by all thinkers that Mokṣa is attained by the knowledge and realisation of the very highest B. and *not* by knowing 'the Lower Brahman' or the Jīvātman. Thus, it stands to reason that the Supreme B. alone can be the One to be sought by the seeker, eschewing all other values (*Heyatva-avacanācca*).[23] This means that it is *only* the "AGAUṆA-ĀTMAN" (the Supreme Being other than Jīvātman or the Saguṇa-B. of Advaita) that can be the ultimate object of knowledge (*īkṣaṇīya*), description and realization by the individual souls (*prāpya*)—according to the Śrutis. The ninth Sūtra refers to one other characteristic of the Supreme Agauṇa-Ātmā, who is revealed by the Śāstras viz., that He is the One who emerges from and merges in Himself (*Svāpyayāt*).[24]

Thus, the entire exposition of the adhikaraṇa according to M.'s line of interpretation, shows remarkable inner consistency of thought be-

20. न तदीदृगिति ज्ञेयं न वाच्यं न च तर्क्यते ।
पश्यन्तोऽपि न पश्यन्ति मेरो रूपं विपश्चितः ॥
इतिवत् (M.*BSB.* i.1.6).
ईदृगिति साकल्येन न पश्यन्ति । (*BD*).
21. This is accepted by S. also in his c. on the same Sūtra.
22. *Brh. Up.* iv, 4.13.
23. 'तमेवैकं' जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथ अमृतस्यैष सेतुः इत्यन्येषां हेयत्ववचनादस्य च अहेयत्ववचनान्न गौण आत्मा । (*BSB.* i.1.8).
24. पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते ।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ॥ *Brh. Up.* v. 1, 1.).
'स आत्मन आत्मानमुद्धृत्यात्मन्येव विलापयति अथात्मैव भवति' । M.*BSB.* i.1.9.

sides being free from contextual and other objections. This cannot be said of the interpretations given by S. and R.—as we have seen. It is not a little surprising, therefore, that V. S. Ghate should have found M.'s interpretation of this adhikaraṇa "unsatisfactory and *groundless*" (*The Vedanta,* p. 168).

CHAPTER XVII

BRAHMAN IS THE INFINITELY BLISSFUL THE INFINITE SOURCE OF ENERGY ETC

6. *Ānandamayādhikaraṇam* (i, 1, 12-19)

The working out of Samanvaya proper begins with what is known as the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa. It is based on Vallis 2 and 3 of the *Taitt. Up.* They deal with the same topic of the evolution of cosmic life in its varied forms, from B—the immanent source of all. Valli 2 opens with the declaration that the knower of B. attains it. B. is defined as *Satyam jñānam anantam.* This is explained by what follows—the evolution of the elements and life. This gives us the clue to the proper interpretation of the three terms *satyam jñānam anantam.* B. is *satyam* in that it gives birth to the world, sustains it, impels it and dissolves it in the end.[1] It is *jnānam*, the source of all consciousness here. It is *anantam* as its powers and attributes are unlimited and it transcends time and space.

Enlarging on this meaning of 'Satyam', the Upaniṣad traces the evolution of the five elements, food and man from the Supreme Being by Its immanent impulsion at each stage.[2] For purposes of such evolution, it is pointed out that B. presents itself in the different elements, their presiding deities and their bodies.[3] In this way, the fourfold evolutionary series is traced down to the 'birth' of the embodied self. When the Puruṣa or the embodied self is born from *annam*, the Sup-

1. सत् सद्भावं यापयतीति सत्यम् सत्त्वं जीवनं प्रवर्तनं च षद्लृ विशरण इत्यस्मान्नाशं यापयतीति च ।
2. तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशात् वायुः वायोरग्निः अग्नेरापः, अद्भ्यः पृथिवी पृथिव्या ओषधयः, ओषधीभ्योऽन्नम्, अन्नात्पुरुषः । स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमयः ॥ (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 3).
3. तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् (ii.6.) See *Brh. Up.* iii, 7.3 -23.

reme B. presents itself in the self and in its body,[4] and is also (primarily) denoted by the term Puruṣa. The individual self is nourished by the essence of food in the ordinary sense of the word. The same term *annarasamayaḥ* while referring to the Supreme B. present in the Jīvātman and his body has to be understood in the spiritual sense of the word *annam* which is defined by the Upaniṣad itself in its cosmic aspect as:

adyate atti ca bhūtāni tasmād annam tad ucyata iti (ii, 2.)

It is called annam as the universe depends upon it *(upajīvya)* and it eats it up in the end. In keeping with this higher sense of the word *annam,* as applied to B., the term *rasa* has the meaning of spiritual essence[5] and *maya* of abundance, when the term *annarasamaya* refers to B. The use of the word *rasa* at the outset and at the end again (*Raso vai saḥ*) after *ānandamaya* suggests its being understood with reference to the others in between. Thus, the five forms of the Supreme are to be understood as being designated here as *annamaya, prāṇamaya,* etc. in the purely spiritual sense of those terms.[6]

The five Kośas in which the embodied self is manifested have their own constituent parts. In each of these Kośas is present a corresponding form of B. which is likewise designated by its name but in the specialized sense of the terms *as explained above.* The Kośas are only modifications of food, energy and so on. But the forms of the Supreme present in them (for purposes of their origination, sustenance, control etc.[7]), are of the purest essence of spirit without any touch of material defilement. Thus, Prāṇamaya possesses abundant spiritual energy. Manomaya abounds in spiritual thought-essence, and so on. The hands and feet, head and limbs of the immanent forms of B. are similarly of pure spiritual essence in each case. Tho' invisible, they are referred to by the demonstrative pronoun *'this'* or *'that'* in virtue of their inner proximity to the limbs of the physical body of man.[8]

After describing in this way the varied aspects of Divine majesty, the second *Valli* speaks of the Supreme felicity of Mokṣa and the intrinsic gradation of *ānanda* enjoyed by released souls. The next *Valli*

4. चतुर्विधान्नात् पुरुषशब्दितो देहस्तदभिमानी जीवः, तदुभयान्तर्गतो हरिश्चेति त्रितयं संभूतमिति ज्ञेयम् । (Rāgh. *Taitt. Up.* gloss).
5. 'रस'शब्देन विशेषणात् तत्तत्सारभूतं चिन्मात्रमेवोच्यते । (M. *BSB.* 1.1.15).
6. अयं भावः— 'अन्नरसमयः' 'रसो वै सः' इत्यादावन्ते च विशेषणात्, मध्ये च 'प्राणरसमय' इत्याद्युपपत्तेः । रस-शब्दस्य सारवाचित्वात् प्रचुरान्नादिसारं चैतन्यमात्रदेहं ब्रह्म अन्नरसादिशब्दार्थः, न भौतिकान्नादिः । (*TPD.* i.1.15).
7. हरेस्तत्स्थितयान्तर्गतिश्च तत्सत्ताशक्त्यादिप्रदत्वेनेति ज्ञेयम् । (Rāgh. *Taitt. Up.* gloss).
8. दृश्यमानजीवदेहशिरोऽन्तःस्थत्वेन तदावृततया स्थितत्वात् हरेः शिरसो वस्त्रप्रावृतजानुनि 'इदं जानु' इति निर्देशवदुपचारेणायं निर्देशः । (*Op. cit.*).

elucidates the same theme with the aid of the discourse of Varuṇa to his son Bhṛgu.[9] The definition of B. given in the second *Valli* in terms of *Satyam jñānam anantam* is here elaborated in more familiar phraselogy: *Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*...... (iii, 1). The five forms of the Supreme indwelling in the Kośas are here referred to by their shorter titles as *annam, prāṇah,* etc. (iii, 2-6).

In his preface to this adhikaraṇa, S. tries to find room for his double-decker theory of B. within the framework of the philosophy of the Sūtras and the pattern of Samanvaya adopted by the Sūtrakāra. Much of the actual Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. attempted by the Sūtrakāra comes to be relegated, in his view, to the sphere of Saviśeṣa-B, Upāsanās and Vidyās and thus treated as incidental (*prāsaṅgikavicāra*) —having little to do with the Nirviśeṣa or the *'Jijñāsya-B'* as such. This has been clarified by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the introductory remarks to his c. on the *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka,*[10] that the aim of Samanvaya, as conceived in S.'s line of interpretation, is to make clear *how little* of the entire Śāstra is connected with the *B. to be known and realised* and *how much more of it* is connected with *'incidental matters'* relating to Saviśeṣa-B., different forms of 'Upāsanās', Vidyās, etc., which are *not to be investigated by the seeker of the highest truth of salvation.*

S. sets himself to prove that the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa is meant to establish the position that the highest B. of Vedānta is Nirviśeṣa. This conclusion is reached by first interpreting the Sūtras, as they stand, in a Theistic and dualistic sense and then rejecting it outright as being hostile to the spirit of the Śruti and substituting in its place a new interpretation of some of the Sūtras—notably the opening one—by interpolating fresh words and phrases into the Sūtras (*adhyāhāra*) and having recourse to Lakṣaṇā in construing the Sūtras as they stand worded, to suit the new interpretation.[11] In doing so, S. has been forced to openly rebuff the Sūtrakāra[12] and his commentator Vācaspati justifies the liberty S. has chosen to take with the wording of the Sūtras on the ground that the Sūtras have to be overruled and otherwise interpreted if they conflict with the Śrutis.[13] This admission of

9. ब्रह्मवल्ल्युक्तार्थे संवादितया कांचनाख्यायिकां प्रागुक्तशांतिपठनपूर्वकमाह । (*Op. cit.*).
10. The relevant passage from his c. has already been quoted earlier. See P. 34. fn. 1.
11. एवमिहापि * * सूत्राण्यध्याहारादिभिर्नेयानि (*Kalpataru*).
आदिशब्देन लक्षणानुषंगो योगवृत्तिश्च गृह्यते । तत्र सौत्रान्दमयशब्दस्य आनन्दमयपर्यायाम्नाते पुच्छब्रह्मणि लक्षणा स्वप्रधानत्वेन प्रतिपाद्यं इत्यध्याहारः । (*Parimala*).
12. इदंत्विह वक्तव्यम्—सूत्राणि त्वेवं व्याख्येयानि । (S.*BSB*. i, 1.19).
13. वेदसूत्रयोर्विरोधे 'गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पना' इति सूत्राण्यन्यथा नेतव्यानि । (*Bhāmati*).

conflict of views between the Śruti and the Sūtras is itself a confession of the commentator's *'not being faithful' to the Sūtras.*

S.'s revised interpretation of the adhikaraṇa is known as *Pucchabrahmavāda.* It has made his commentators feel quite uncomfortable and modern scholars find it impossible to endorse it as a faithful interpretation of the topic. Thibaut has been the most outspoken in his criticism of S.'s stand. Deussen sought to hide his discomfiture by making a desparate suggestion that the Pucchabrahmavāda in S.'s Bhāṣya was probably an interpolation by some later writer. V.S. Ghate could not go beyond Vallabha to prove its genuineness. But the fact remains that S. himself refers to this interpretation in his C.[14] on *B S.* iii 3.12, and the *Bhāmatī* is the earliest to defend it. R. does not discuss S.'s Pucchabrahmavāda. The *AV.* of M.,[15] the *TDP* of Trivikrama, and the *TP* and *NS* of J. are the earliest to refute it. The *TC* of Vyāsatīrtha contains the most exhaustive and powerful criticism of it.

The adhikaraṇa is based on the ii (*Brahma*)—*vallī* of the *Taitt. Up.* M. has made a special point of it that as the next (*Bhṛgu*)-vallī also shows a close affinity of thought with it, the two chapters deserve to be taken together for a comprehensive and coordinated discussion of the whole topic.[16] S. himself in his Bhāṣya on *BS.* i.1.12 cites *Ānando brahmeti vyajānāt* (*Taitt.* iii, 6) as evidence of *abhyāsa* along with other texts from the *Taitt. Up.* ii. There is also the fact that both the chapters deal with the topic of B.[17] The terms *anna* (*rasa*)*-maya, prāṇamaya,* etc. occur in both the vallis (ii, 1-5 and iii, 10, 5) in the same order of enumeration. Both the vallis (ii.8 and iii.10) refer to the knower of B. reaching the *annamaya* etc. *after departing from this world.*[18] As the *kośas* are already abandoned with the surrender of the body at the time of death and departure from *this world* (*asmāt lokāt pretya*) there can be no question of reaching (or reaching beyond) the *annamayakośa* etc., again *afterwards.*[19] This uniform reference in both the *vallis* to the *attainment of annamaya* etc. *after departing from this life,* by the knower of B., is sufficient not only to establish the unity of theme between the two Vallis but also that, in both, the subject matter is the

14. न चैते प्रियशिरस्त्वादयो ब्रह्मधर्माः । कोशधर्मास्त्वेते इति उपदिष्टमस्माभिः 'आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्' । इत्यत्र । (*BSB.* iii, 3.12).
15. ************ऽप्यतः कोशा इत्यतिसाहसम् । (*AV*).
16. योगमन्नमयाद्यैर्यत् फलत्वेनास्य शंसति
स्यानद्वयेऽपि * * * (*AV*).
7. ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् तदेषाभ्युक्ता, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म (iii.1) अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति । (ii.1)
18. To escape the difficulty the Advaitic commentator will have to interpret *Upasamkramya* (attaining) as *atisankramya* (reaching beyond) which is an unwarranted liberty.
19. *NS.* p. 140-141 b.

same: Brahman. There is no justification, therefore, for holding that Valli 2 treats of *kośavidyā* and Valli 3 (Bhārgavī-Vāruṇī-Vidyā) alone is concerned with the highest B.—as S. would have it.[20] These considerations point to the fact that the terms '*anna, prāṇa, manaḥ,* etc., in Valli 3 stand for their corresponding equivalents *annamaya, prāṇamaya* in Valli 2. It is a case of the part being put for the whole.[21]

There are three distinctive interpretations of this adhikaraṇa offered by S., R. and M. respectively. S.'s first interpretation of the adhikaraṇa is in agreement with that of the Vṛttikāra and the apparent drift of the Sūtras, that out of the five forms referred to in the *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 2-5), the last one Ānandamaya alone is B. while the rest are sheaths (*kośas*). It is this interpretation which S. goes back upon in his Bhāṣya *by dismissing all the five as kośas* and proclaiming only that which has been spoken as the "Puccha" (tail) of Ānandamaya[22] to be the Nirviśeṣa-B. R. follows the Vṛttikāra's view that *Ānandamaya alone is B.* Among the others, he regards *Vijñānamaya* as Jīvātman and the rest as *Kośas.* M.'s view is different from both these. His is an enlarged interpretation of the Sūtra: *Ānandamayo 'abhyāsāt* having regard to its brevity of expression (*alpākṣaratva*) and the unity of theme between the Vallis and the other reasons to be set forth. According to him the adhikaraṇa establishes all the five forms referred to in the second and the third Vallis of the *Taitt. Up.*, in allied terminology, as *anna<annamaya, Prāṇa<Prāṇamaya,* and so on to be identical with B. They are in fact the names of the five forms of B. present in the five *kośas* of those names[23] and as such designated by their names[24]—as *annamaya, prāṇamaya,* etc. They are to be progressively realized by the seeker.[25] If the aim of Brahmavidyā taught in the Upaniṣad is to enable man to realize the immanence of B. in the cosmos, and in every cross-section of finite reality, in the adhyātma and other planes of psycho-physical life, represented by the five kośas etc., the Bhārgavī-Vāruṇī Vidyā and

20. या तु भार्गवी वारुणी विद्या तस्यां मयडश्रवणात् युक्तमानन्दस्य ब्रह्मत्वम् । (S.*BSB.*).
21. अन्नाप्यन्नप्राणाद्येकदेशोत्कीर्तनेन अन्नमयादिशब्दलक्षणया अन्नादिशब्दानामन्नमयादिशब्दानां चैक्यमंगीकृत्य,– तन्निमित्ताभिधेयैक्यमंगीक्रियते; प्राप्यतयोक्तिस्थाने मयट्प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् । न ह्यन्यविषयान्यप्राप्तिर्युक्तेति भाव: (*NS.* p. 132).
22. अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमय: ** तस्य प्रियमेव शिर: ** आनन्द आत्मा, ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा । (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 5).
23. अत्र तु, कोशान्तर्गतभगवन्मूर्तिविशेषा: । (*TC.* p. 284).
24. अन्नमयादिकोशगता: तत्तच्छब्दवाच्या इत्यर्थ: (*TCP*)
यद्यपि, परमते पंचानां कोशत्वं, पूर्वपक्षे तु चतुर्मुखादित्वं, तथाप्यब्रह्मतासाम्यात् कोशत्वस्याप्यभिमतत्वाद्वा एवमुक्तम् । (*TCP.* 262-3).
25. अन्नादीनां ब्रह्मत्वेऽपि 'तद्विज्ञाय पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति', पुनरुपसत्तिस्तु–एकं रूपं निदिध्यासनेन साक्षात्कृत्य, रूपान्तरस्य गुणान्तरविशिष्टतया निदिध्यासनार्थमनुज्ञामादातुम् । तन्नानुजानीहि इति वक्तव्ये, यदधीहि इत्याह, तत् विनयातिशयात्, इत्यादिकमुत्तरप्रस्थानादवगन्तव्यम् । (*TC.* p. 284 b).

its earlier counterpart in the Upaniṣad in terms of the forms of B. present in the five planes of food, life, mind, understanding and bliss, propounded by M., would be seen to reflect the true spirit of *Brahmadṛṣṭi* as applied to the interpretation of the various Vidyās taught in the Upaniṣads. Seen in this light, neither S. nor R. nor any other believer in the truth of B.'s presence everywhere in the cosmos[26] can have any valid reason to refuse to concede the justice of M.'s interpretation, which enables us to achieve the greatest measure of Samanvaya of *all the five contexts in B.*

There are, however, two difficulties which have to be got over in M.'s interpretation. One is the non-mention or non-inclusion of *annamaya* and the other three in the text of the Sūtra: *Ānandamayo'-bhyāsāt* (i.1.12) and the other is the *preference* given in Sūtra i.1.12 to Ānandamaya which happens to be the last in the series of Annamaya etc. Both these objections have been anticipated and answered by M. and his commentators. By extension of significance (*Upalakṣaṇa*), the term *Ānandamaya* in the opening Sūtra is taken to stand for *the other four terms also* in addition to itself.[27] The reasons adduced by the Sūtrakāra for holding Ānandamaya to be B. (and not the Jīva or any other principle) viz., that there is the repeated use of the expression *brahma* in the given context and that the suffix *maya* should be understood to convey the sense of superabundance and *not* the sense of modification or liability to change, as well as the other grounds hold true in respect of the other terms also.[28] As J. points out, if the suffix *maya* is incapable of bearing the sense of superabundance in respect of *annamaya, prāṇamaya* etc. it could not, by parity of reasoning, be taken in the sense of abundance in respect of Ānandamaya *alone.*[29] We cannot make an invidious distinction in favor of only one of the terms in a given series. All the five *annamaya, prāṇamaya* etc. are to be accepted as B. This bold stand taken by M. takes the wind out of the sails of S.'s interpretation. It completely disarms his main objection that if *ānandamaya* were to be treated as B. by investing the suffix *maya* with the higher sense of superabundance (of bliss), there will be a gross violation of the uniform use of *maya* in the sense of change or modification (*vikārārtha*) in the other four instances of *annamaya*

26. तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6).
27. उपलक्षणत्वं शब्दानामानन्दमयपूर्विणाम् । (*AV.* i.1. adhi. 6).
28. अत एव 'विकारशब्दात्' इत्याद्याक्षेपाणां तत्परिहाराणां स्वतन्त्रयुक्तीनां चोपलक्षणत्वं द्रष्टव्यम् । (*NS.* p. 126).
29. कथं चान्नमयादिषु स्थितो मयट्शब्द: प्राचुर्यार्थतामलभमान: आनन्दमये श्रुतौ लभेत ? (न चास्ति बाधकविशेषो येन द्वैविध्यं कल्प्येत) (*TP.* 1.1.13).

etc.[30] By adhering throughout to the same sense of 'abundance' (*prācurya*) for 'mayaṭ'-suffix, M.'s interpretation of the Upaniṣad and the adhikaraṇa based on it, achieves the *maximum degree of Samanvaya of the entire series beginning with annamaya and ending with ānandamaya.*

While S.'s Siddhānta-interpretation flouts the very wording of the Sūtra, R.'s position is just content with the literal sense of Sūtra i, 1.12, and restricts the sense of abundance to the suffix *maya* in *'ānandamaya'* without giving due weight to the spirit of the Sūtras and the teaching of the Upaniṣad. His interpretation is consequently exposed to S.'s criticism of *Prāyapāṭhavirodha*. R. does not also explain satisfactorily the anomaly of B. being regarded as the limb (*puccha*) of Ānandamaya or the attribution of *hands and feet to* B. as Ānandamaya. Such attribution cannot be treated as a superimposition; for that would make the 'Śruti' invalid. It cannot be explained as a figurative reference based on resemblance of form; for the nature of B. cannot possibly have any resemblance to the hands and feet or other limbs of man.[31] M. would explain that by reason of the proximity of the limbs of the indwelling form of the Ānnarasamaya-Brahman to those of the human form, it is said of Him "*This* is His head, this the right side (hand) this the left, this is the body and this the lower part" (ii.1).[32]

R.'s Pūrvapakṣa is that Ānandamaya is Jīvātman because the text says 'Of that (Ānandamaya) this Śārīra (embodied self) is the self. The term "Śārīra" denotes Jīvātman.[33] This is too slender a basis for a valid Pūrvapakṣa. For we find the same mode of reference in the case of the Prāṇamaya and Manomaya also of whom the Śārīra is said to be the self.[34] But R. has not, on that account, thought it fit to equate Prāṇamaya and Manomaya also with Jīvātman. The reason (of Śārīratva) is thus inconclusive. His further contention that "Vijnānamaya" is the Jīvātman is considerably weakened by the manner in which the Śruti describes 'Vijñāna': "All the gods worship Vijñāna as the highest

30. इदं त्विह वक्तव्यम्–** इति च विकारार्थे मयट्प्रवाहे सति, आनन्दमय एवाकस्मा**दर्धजरतीयन्यायेन** कथमिव मयटः प्राचुर्यार्थत्वं, ब्रह्मविषयत्वं चाश्रीयेत इति । मांत्रवर्णिकब्रह्मविद्याधिकारादिति चेन्न । **अन्नमयादीनामपि तर्हि ब्रह्मत्वप्रसंगः** ।। (S.*BSB*. 1.1.19).
31. आनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मत्वे ब्रह्मणः पुच्छत्वाद्यनुपपत्तीनामपरिहारात् । ब्रह्मस्वरूपमेव शिरः पक्षपुच्छादिना रूप्यत इति चेत्; रूपणं यद्यध्यासः श्रुतेरप्रामाण्यमतिप्रसंगश्च । यदि सादृश्योक्तिः तदा मुख्यार्थत्यागः, सादृश्याभावाच्च । नहि ब्रह्मस्वरूपं शिरआदिसदृशम् ।
32. इदमिति च दृश्यमानसन्निहितत्वात् (*M.BSB*. i, 1, 15). —यथा अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि वस्त्रप्रावृते प्रत्यक्षवस्त्रसन्निधानादिदं इति निर्देशः तथा प्रकृतेऽपि । (*NS*. p. 138 b).
33. किं युक्तम् ? प्रत्यगात्मेति । कुतः ? 'तस्यैष एव शरीर आत्मा' इत्यानन्दमयस्य शारीरत्वश्रवणात् शारीरो हि जीवात्मा (*Śrībhāṣya*).
34. प्राणो हि भूतानामायुः * * तस्यैष एव **शारीर** आत्मा (ii.3).
तस्यैष एव **शारीर** आत्मा * तस्माद्वा एतस्मान्मनोमयात् (ii.4).

Brahman. Whoever kows Vijñāna to be B. attains fulfilment of desires after leaving the mortal body."[35]

M. explains that tho' Ānandamaya is mentioned last in the series, the Sūtrakāra has given it precedence over Annamaya and others *for a very important reason connected with the way in which the Supreme B. has been set down in the context of the Ānandamaya as just a limb (puccha) of the latter.* This gives rise to a doubly powerful Pūrvapakṣa with particular reference to the Ānandamaya,[36] apart from the common difficulty created by the presence of the suffix *mayaṭ* in all the five contexts.[37]

The Pūrvapakṣa takes the following form. The opening Sūtra has enjoined inquiry into B. This B. is however found referred to as a 'limb' of 'Ānandamaya' in *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 5.): "B. is the (Ānandamaya's) tail—its support". The objection naturally arises that an investigation of the part (of a thing or being) would be fruitless without an investigation of the whole.[38] As Ānandamaya appears to be the whole and B. merely a limb of it, and as the part and the whole must be *different*, it would seem that inquiry into Ānandamaya would be more in order than the inquiry into B.[39] At the same time the inquiry into B. being prominently enjoined in the 'Śruti' (*Tad vijijñāsasva tad Brahma*) could not be given up.[40] But if Ānandamaya' were to be *other than B.* and different from it, the investigation into B. initiated in Sūtra i.1.1 would be ruled out.

To get over this difficulty and to vindicate the Jijñāsā into B. the Sūtrakāra has to show that the Ānandamaya of whom B. has been presented as a limb (*avayava*) is *not* some one other than and *different from B.* but *the same as B.* itself. Hence there is no impediment to the pursuit of the Jijñāsā of B.[41] initiated in Sūtra i.1.1. This is done by the Sūtra *Ānandamayo' bhyāsāt*: Ānandamaya is Brahman itself in view of the repetition of the term 'Brahman' 'with reference to it.

35. ii.5.
36. आनन्दमयरूपे तु ब्रह्मणः पुच्छतोक्तितः ।
समस्ताब्रह्मताप्राप्तेरानन्दमय नाम हि ।। (*AV*).
37. तत्रानन्दमये आनन्दम**यासाधारणपूर्वपक्षहेतोरधिकस्य सत्वात्** इत्यर्थः । आदिशब्दात् मयडादेः **साधारणस्य** ग्रहः (*TCP*. p. 263).
38. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येत्युक्तम् । तच्च ब्रह्म, 'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' इत्यानन्दमयावयवरूपं प्रतीयते । न ह्यवयविनं विनावयवमात्रस्य ज्ञेयतेत्यत आह—आनंदमयोऽभ्यासादिति । (*M.BSB*. 1.1.12).
39. यद्यानन्दमयो ब्रह्मणोऽन्यः स्यात्तदा न ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा संभवति, अवयविन एवानन्दमयस्य जिज्ञास्यत्वापत्तेः । (*TP*. 1.1.12).
40. ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा च श्रुत्युक्ता न हातुं शक्या । (*TP*. 1.1.12).
41. तस्माद्यस्यावयवो ब्रह्म, स आनन्दमयो विचार्यःस्यादित्यत आनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मत्वं प्रथमतः साधनीयम् । तत्साधयति–आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् । (*TPD*. i.1.12).

The manner in which B. has been referred to in the context of the *Taitt. Up.* pertaining to the Ānandamaya is thus compromising to the dignity and the primacy of B. The only honorable and effective way of solving the difficulty would be to recognize without any reservation that *there is no internal distinction of part and whole in B.—that both the Ānandamaya and its so-called limb are equally B. in essence and in fact.*[42] Strange as is may seem, it is all the same in B. to be the whole and the part: *Tad eva avayavi avayavaśca iti yujyate.*[43] It is precisely the truth of such a proposition as applied to B. that is sought to be denied by S.'s open rejection of the Sūtrakāra's categorical assertion that Ānandamaya is B.[44] And it is precisely the same proposition that M. seeks to uphold in vindication of the Sūtrakāra's finding—*Ānandamayo brahma,* with the help of his concept of Viśeṣas.

In doing so, M. has shown how deeply he values the Sūtrakāra's judgment in exhibiting the perfect harmony between the Śruti and the Sūtra. It is a pity that S. and his commentators should try to dismiss the very first Sūtra with which Bādarāyaṇa seeks to illustrate his thesis of Śāstra-Samanvaya in B. with such scant courtesy as being antagonistic to the spirit of the Śruti and, therefore, fit to be found fault with.

In treating *annamaya* and the others as forms of B. present in the different kośas, M. is loyal to the spirit of the Upaniṣadic teaching and its intention that the suffix *maya* should be understood in all cases of its use in this context, in the sense of superabundance of the respective properties named.[45] This is clearly borne out, says M, by the deliberate definition of *annam* in the Upaniṣadic text as *that which is eaten* and which devours beings (*adyate atti ca bhūtāni tasmād annam tad ucyata iti* (Taitt. Up. ii, 2). As he explains in his Bhāṣya, "being eaten" stands for dependence of beings on B. (*upajīvyatvam eva adyatvam*) and "eating all beings" signifies dissolution of the world in the end.[46] These two are unmistakable cosmic attributes of B. and not of the ordinary food (*annam*) or *annamayakośa.* Another significant detail to which M. has drawn attention in his c. is that the Upaniṣad

42. ब्रह्मतावयवेऽपि स्यात्तथावयविनि स्वत: ।
यथैव कृष्णकेशस्य कृष्णस्य ब्रह्मताखिला
दर्शिता चैव पार्थाय नि:सीमा: शक्तयोऽस्य हि ॥ (*AV.* i.1.12).

43. न चावयवत्वविरोध: । नेह नानास्ति किंचन
इति श्रुतेरवयवाद्यभेदात् । (*NV*).

44. नन्वान्दमयावयवत्वेनापि ब्रह्मणि विज्ञायमाने न प्रकृतत्वं हीयते, आनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मत्वादिति, अत्रोच्यते—तथा सति, **तदेव ब्रह्म** आनन्दमयस्यात्मा **अवयवी, तदेव च ब्रह्म** पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा**वयव इत्यसामंजस्यं स्यात्** । (S.*BSB.* 1.1.19).

45. अन्नादीनां च प्राचुर्यमेव । (*M.BSB.* 1.1.13).

46. अद्यतेऽत्ति च भूतानि इति व्याख्यनात् । तत्प्राचुर्यं च युज्यते । उपजीव्यत्वमेवाद्यत्वम् । *M.BSB.* 1.1.13.

qualifies the annamaya by another adjunct *rasa* (*sāra*) as *annarasamayaḥ.* This, when read along with the sense of superabundance (*prācurya*) bestowed on *mayaṭ,* will elevate *annamaya* into *annarasamaya* i.e. *sārānnamaya.* The reference to *ānandamaya* as *'Raso vai saḥ'* establishes the same point with regard to *ānanda.*[47] In the same way, the other terms in the series *Prāṇamaya, manomaya* etc. are also to be referred to B. as the greatest source of abundant energy, greatest source of thought, intelligence and son on.[48] The unity of theme between Vallis 2 and 3 is borne out by the reference to the knower of B. reaching the *annamaya, prāṇamaya* etc. after departing from this life, *in both the chapters.* The Upaniṣad itself speaks of the Bhārgavī-Vāruṇī Vidyā as rooted in the highest B. (*parame vyoman pratiṣṭhitā*). The instructions about *anna, prāṇa, manaḥ* etc. have been introduced by way of answers to the request: Teach me B. (*adhīhi bhagavo brahma*). The repeated assertions: By meditating deeply, he (Bhṛgu) *realized annam* as B. show that each instruction had been realized thro' deep meditation (*tapas*). The application of the definition of B. given in *Taitt. Up.* iii.1 (*Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante....*) to the description of *annam* in ii.2 and to all the five in iii, 2-6, deserves special attention, as establishing their identity with B. The use of the term *"ātman"* in describing the *annamaya* etc. in the concluding section (iii, 10.5) points to the same fact that the Supreme B. is meant by all those terms.[49] It would hardly be proper to describe a *kośa* such as *annamaya* by the exalted epithet of *'ātman'.* The incongruity of the Upaniṣadic statement that "after departing from this world the knower of B. (*evamvid*) reaches the *annamaya* (reaches the Prāṇamaya etc.)" precludes the possibility of these being mere *kośas.* S. has argued that *annamaya* and others are *not* B. as the Upaniṣad is giving a progressive definition of B. as consisting of food, life, mind, understanding and bliss. But

47. रसशब्देन विषेषणात् तत्तत्सारभूतं चिन्मात्रमेवोच्यते । (M.*BSB.* i, 1.15).

48. भोग्यत्वमन्नचाद्यत्वमुपजीव्यतया हरे: ।
महाभोगो महाभोक्ता इत्यर्थोऽन्नमये भवेत् ।
महाप्राणो महाबोधो महाविज्ञान इत्यपि
विशेषसामान्यतया विज्ञानं मन इत्यपि
एकस्य ज्ञानरूपस्य हरेरुक्तिविभागत:
अभेदेऽपि विशेषेणैवान्य इत्युदितो हरि: ॥ (*AV*).

49. तस्मात्–
ब्रह्मशब्दात्समस्तात्त्वलिंगाच्च वाक्यत: ।
पूर्वोत्तरस्मान्मंत्रस्थब्रह्मप्रकरणादपि ।
भृगुवल्लीसमाख्यानान्मुक्तगीतावसानकात्
स्थानप्रमाणतश्चैव पंचानां ब्रह्मता स्थिता
तथा–ब्रह्मप्रश्नोत्तरात् ब्रह्मलक्षणात् ब्रह्मशब्दत:
विज्ञातत्वाच्च तपसा मुक्तगम्यत्वतस्तथा
वाधूलीयसमाख्यानादनुव्याख्यानिरूपितात्
भृगुवल्युदितस्यान्नप्राणादेर्ब्रह्मता स्थिता ॥ (*TC.* pp. 290-291).

such a progressive realization is equally compatible with each preceding stage or aspect of the teaching being as much a teaching about the Supreme Brahman with particular reference to one aspect of its being and majesty—as the succeeding one,—without the further commitment to the view that all of them or all but the last of them refer to non-Brahman (*A-brahma*)—being intended merely to serve as empirical foot-holds to reach out to the true B. The vastness of the subject of Divine majesty may also necessitate its exposition in successive stages—as we find in the discourse of Āruṇi to his son Śvetaketu in *Chān. Up.* (vi, 8-16) where the latter approaches the former *nine times* praying to be instructed in B. once more every time after the first.[50] And S. himself has *not* suggested that any of these is *not* an instruction about the true B. but of *"a-brahman"* leading to the true B. by progressive stages. It has been suggested by S. that the pupil Bhṛgu after listening to the first discourse that *annam* or matter is the explanation of the Universe approaches the teacher Varuṇa because he feels that the first finding is *not satisfactory* and finding the *inadequacy* of the principle of mind, intelligence, etc. similarly again approaches for higher instruction. This is also the view of modern interpreters of the Upaniṣad, like Deussen, Radhakrishnan[52] and others who are generally content to follow S.'s lead in interpreting the Upaniṣads. It is, therefore, pertinent to ask if, in requesting to be initiated into the next stage, the disciple had actually felt or realized that the previous finding was 'inadequate and unsatisfactory'—that matter (*annam*) and life (*prāṇa*), etc. were *not* B. and, therefore, wanted to be initiated into the true explanation. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, we should expect to find the Upaniṣad introducing each succeeding instruction with some such words as—"He understood that *annam* was *not* B. *Not* from *annam* are beings born. . . ." and so forth. Instead, we find the Upaniṣad affirming: He *realized* that *annam was B.*, that mind *was Brahman,* and so on. This cuts the ground from under the feet of S.'s and the modern scholars' approach to the sublime teaching of Brahmavidyā from a distorted perspective.

In keeping with the best traditions of Upaniṣadic teaching, it is possible to hold that after initiating his pupil into the subject of B. and placing before him the definition of B., the teacher here impresses on him the need for reflection and meditation (*tapasā brahma vijijñāsasva*) in order to have direct vision of B. As it is beyond the power of the disciple to meditate upon and realise at one stretch all the eight aspects of B. taught by the Guru, in terms of *anna, prāṇa, cakṣuh*. . . .he starts

50. Cf. स य एषोऽणिमा ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति **भूय एव मा भगवान् विज्ञापयत्विति** ॥ (*Chān.* Up. vi, 8-15).
52. *The Principal Upanisads*, 1935. pp. 554-556.

with the first one and after successfully realising it, comes back to his Guru to report his success so far and solicit his blessings for similar success in regard to the remaining aspects. The Upaniṣad reflects the pupil's humility of approach to the Guru in asking to be further *instructed* by him instead of asking him to permit him *to take up the next aspect.*[53] Thus understood, there will be no difficulty in interpreting every aspect of the teaching: '*annam brahma, prāṇo brahma*' etc. as referring *directly* to B., instead of thro' limping empirical substitutes to be knocked down as we go on. Moreover, the text '*He* desired: let me become many; let me create (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6) has for its antecedent the Ānandamaya (mentioned in the masculine gender) and *not* Puchha-Brahman said to be the limb of Ānandamaya and referred to in the neuter gender. As creation of the world is one of the accepted characteristics of B. the Ānandamaya to whom such creation has been ascribed must indeed be B. and cannot be dismissed as a Kośa, as S. has done.

S. has raised certain objections against taking Ānandamaya to be B. One of them is that if Ānandamaya is accepted as B. along with its Puccha which has been expressly referred to as B. it would involve an absurdity and a contradiction that B. is both the whole and the part (of Ānandamaya). We have already disposed of this objection.[54] Another objection brought up by S. is this. Since B. is Nirviśeṣa and as Ānandamaya has been described as having joy for his head, happiness for right arm, supreme delight for his left arm, and so forth, the latter cannot be B. Assuming that the suffix *maya* in Ānandamaya signifies 'abundance' it would still imply the co-existence of a certain measure of the contrary element of sorrow and pain with abundant bliss in the Ānandamaya, even as a statement like "this village has plenty of Brahmins (*brāhmaṇapracuro grāmaḥ*)" presupposes that there are a few non-Brahmins also living there. But as sorrow and other imperfections cannot be in B. we have to give up the identification of Ānandamaya with B. Anandamaya has, therefore, to be dismissed as a *kośa.*[55]

These and other objections of S. in his Bhāṣya have been answered by M., J. and Vyāsatīrtha. There is no question of internal distinction or difference of part and whole in B. By the play of Viśeṣas, we can speak of B. as the limb of Ānandamaya, without detriment to its perfection. It is only a distinction of reference and not of essence. The Śruti says: "This is full (infinite) that is infinite. From the infinite

53. *NS.* p. 143.
54. See Page 101 fn. 44 *ante.*
55. अपि चानन्दप्रचुर इत्युक्ते दुःखास्तित्वमपि गम्यते प्राचुर्यस्य लोके प्रतियोग्यल्पत्वापेक्षत्वात् । (S.*BSB.* i.1.19).

emerges the infinite and merges into it". As the terms *annamaya, prāṇamaya* etc. refer (as has already been made clear) to the forms of B. present in the corresponding kośas of those names by which the human being is constituted, the joys and delights of human beings are also controlled by the forms of B. present in the respective kośas and in that sense they are ascribed to the forms of B. by virtue of sovereign control (*svātantrya*[56]). The infinitude of the part (puccha) is equally true of the infinitude of the whole (*ānandamaya*). *The Viṣṇu Purāṇa* refers[57] to the black hair of the Lord Viṣṇu incarnating itself as Sri Kṛṣṇa whose Viśvarūpa form has been described in the *Gītā* (xi, 13-20) as all-pervading. What may *not* be true of the part in relation to its whole in empirical logic may well be true of the trans-empirical. The Advaitin himself admits in his own system that pure consciousness which is impartible and unlimited comes to be enveloped by Ajnāna which is a limited principle. But there is no parallel in empirical logic to an infinite being becoming enveloped by a finite principle. In ordinary experience, we have only instances of finites becoming conditioned by other finites. It is *not inconceivable* then that Ānandamaya and "its limb" may both be Brahman and infinite joy without offence to transcendental logic. S.'s objection[58] that only one of the two can be B. or that B. cannot be described as the ' part' of Ānandamaya is thus unsustainable.

His other objection that it would lead to the co-existence of sorrow in B. (*qua* Ānandamaya) if *maya* is interpreted in the sense of abundance (of joy) is a rhetorical stunt without logical force. Tho' abundance of a particular property in a given thing is generally conceived in relation to a modicum of its opposite existing elsewhere, it is *not always true* that such a rival element must also be conceived to be present in the same locus.[59] That will depend on evidence.[60] In the present case, Ānandamaya-Brahman being by hypothesis absolutely blissful and of the very essence of bliss, the possibility of a little sorrow being present in it along with an abundance of bliss stands completely ruled out. The illustration of *Brāhmaṇapracuro grāmaḥ* can be easily countered by another, given by M.—'The Sun has abundant luminosity (*Pracuroprakāśo raviḥ*). This cannot possibly imply that there is some

56. श्रवणोत्थं प्रियम् । दर्शनोत्थो मोदः । भोगोत्थः प्रमोदः । स्वरूपभूत आनन्दः । **तत्तत्प्रवर्तकतया तत्तद्व्यपदेशः** (*TP.* i, 1.12).
57. उद्बबर्हात्मनःकेशौ सितकृष्णौ महामुने ।
उवाच च सुरानेतौ मत्केशौ वसुधातले ।
अवतीर्य भुवो भारक्लेशहानिं करिष्यतः । (*V.P.* V, 1, 59-60).
58. See p. 101 f.no 44.
59. प्राचुर्यस्य प्रतियोग्यल्पत्वापेक्षत्वेऽपि न प्रतियोगिनः सामानाधिकरण्यनियमः । (*TC.* p. 275 b).
60. विरुद्धार्थप्राप्तेरशाब्दत्वात्, तत्प्रचुरशब्दो हि तस्य तस्मिन् महत्वमात्रमाह विरुद्धसद्भावस्तु प्रमाणान्तरगम्यः । (*NS.* p. 131 b).

measure of utter darkness in the Sun.[61] In such cases, the opposite element is deemed to exist elsewhere in some *other* object of the same or of a different class or kind.[62] Accordingly, abundance of bliss in Ānandamaya-Brahman may be contradistinguished from the measure of suffering and sorrow present in the Jīvātman.[63] The Sun's abundance of light is distinguished from the lesser light of other luminaries. The TC gives three clear instances from Upaniṣadic sources, of epithets carrying the suffix *maya* which, according to Advaitic interpretation also, are admitted to refer to the Supreme Ātman-Brahman.

(i) The self within the body of the nature of right and pure[64].... (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii, 1.5).

(ii) This space that is within the heart, therein is the Person consisting of mind, immortal and resplendent.[65] (*Taitt. Up.* 1.6).

(iii) The third quarter is Prājna, whose sphere is the stage of deep sleep, who has become one who is verily a mass of cognition, who is full of bliss.[66] (*Māṇḍ. Up.* 5).

There is no suggestion of the co-existence of even the smallest fraction of the opposite quality in the Ātman-Brahman in these instances.

The same thing will hold true in respect of the Ānandamaya and the others in that series.

S.'s view that the text *Yato vāco nivartante* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 4) posits a Nirviśeṣa-Brahman beyond thought and speech and that, therefore, such a B. cannot be equated with Ānandamaya is also open to question. This is not the only way in which this Sruti can be interpreted. Nor is the conclusion of Nirviśeṣatva consistent with other facts set forth in this Upaniṣad, regarding the nature of B. S. himself concedes that the text, "He desired, Let Me become many. May I grow forth" (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6) found in the proximity of Ānandamaya, is in reality connected with the Supreme B.[67] But as this text ascribes "willing" and "growing forth" to the Supreme B. it can hardly be "Nirviśeṣa" in S. 's sense. Another

61. प्रचुरप्रकाशः सविता' इत्युक्तेऽपि तस्मिन्नन्धकारलेशाप्रतीतेः । (*TC.* p. 275).
62. प्राचुर्यस्य विजातीयसामानाधिकरण्यं यथा, तथा सजातीयभिन्नाधिकरणाल्पं निरूपकम् ।
63. प्रकृते च, 'सैषानन्दस्य मीमांसा' इति श्रुत्यैव व्यधिकरणस्य, सजातीयस्य, जीवानन्दाल्पत्वमुक्त्वा ब्रह्मानन्दस्य 'यतो वाच' इति महत्त्वमुक्तम् । (*TC.* p. 275).
64. अन्तःशरीरे **ज्योतिर्मयो** हि शुभ्रः । (*Mund. Up.*).
65. य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः तस्मिन्नयं पुरुषो **मनोमयः** । (*Taitt. Up.*).
66. सुषुप्तस्थानः ** प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयः (*Mānd. Up.* 5).
नचात्र प्राचुर्यार्थत्वसंभवे वैयर्थ्यापादकस्वार्थिकत्वं युक्तम् । (*TC.* p. 276 b).
67. आनन्दमयाधिकारे च 'सोऽकामयत' इति कामयितृत्वनिर्देशात्, नानुमानादिकमपि सांख्यपरिकल्पितमचेतनं प्रधानमानन्दमयत्वेन कारणत्वेन वापेक्षितम् (S. *BSB.* i.1.18).

text cited by him under *Taddhetuvyapadeśāt* (B.S. i.1.14) is "He verily is it who bestows bliss" (ii. 7). There is above all the famous text *Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* (*Taitt. Up.* iii, 1) which defines B. as the creator, sustainer and dissolver of the world. These do not bear out S.'s contention that the Upaniṣad is thinking of a Nirviśeṣa-B. The text: *Yato vāco nivartante* has, therefore, to be understood to say that as the attributes of B. are countless they cannot be compassed in human thought and speech:

Avāṅmanasagocarānantaviśeṣavat (TC).

Thus by rejecting S.'s interpretation of the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa *entirely* and *improving* on R.'s interpretation of it *considerably,* M. has most vividly brought out the full significance of the great thesis of Upaniṣadic philosophy that the Supreme Brahman is verily present in each and every phase of cosmic evolution and expression of life in both the ascending and the descending scale of values without exception. As the goal of all spiritual realization is supreme bliss, the Sūtrakāra most appropriately commences the grand Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. with its transcendent attributes of infinite bliss (*pūrṇānanda* or *ānandamaya*) infinite energy, etc. so that constant meditation on it after Samanvaya may enable the seeker to realize his own inner blissful nature, thro' the grace of Ānandamaya-Brahman, as its *Pratibimba.* This is the philosophical *raison d'etre,* according to M., for the place of honor given to the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa, in the Samanvayādhyāya.[68]

68. तत्र ** सर्वापेक्षितानन्दप्रदोपासनाविषयपूर्णानन्दत्वरूपमहागुणस्य प्रथमं वक्तव्यत्वाच्चानन्तरसंगतिः । (*TC.* p. 260b).

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ONE WITHIN

7. *Antaḥsthatvādhikaraṇam* (i, 1.20-21)

Tho' coming under Nāmpāda where, as a general rule, only proper or non-significant names are intended to be taken for Samanvaya, as conceived by M., this adhikaraṇa attempts the Samanvaya of a descriptive epithet *"antaḥ-sthaḥ"* (the being within). In the Viṣayavākya of this adhi. cited by M. from *T.Ā.* (iii, 11, 24-25), this characteristic is found connected with various presiding deities (adhidevas) like Indra, Sūrya and Varuṇa. By construing the mark of *antaḥsthatva* here so as to refer to the Supreme Being, the Sūtrakāra is able to show with ease that the names of other deities which happen to be associated with this mark in the same text or elsewhere in allied passages, are all of them to be referred to B. in their highest connotation. This simple device has been resorted to here in view of economy of thought and expression (*alpākṣaratva*) in the Sūtra.[1] In the normal course, as in the previous adhikaraṇa, the attunement of one proper name may achieve the Samanvaya of others of the same class by *Upalakṣaṇa.* But the attunement of definite marks associated with those names in the illustrative passage could not be achieved by resort to Upalakṣaṇa thro' a bare *nāmapada.* It is for this reason that the Samanvaya of 'adhidaiva' names like Indra is sought to be established here, in B. thro' the *samanvaya* of the mark of "being within" (*antaḥsthatvaliṅga*). There is a decisive advantage in establishing the Samanvaya of several proper names of deities in B. thro' the Samanvaya of *one mark.*

1. अल्पाक्षरे सूत्रे एकलिंगसमन्वयोक्त्यानेकनामसमन्वस्यार्थिकसिद्धेरेव संगतत्वात्, । एकनामसमन्वयोक्त्या चोदाहरणवाक्यस्थसजातीयनामसमन्याक्षेपस्य, विजातीयलिंगसमन्वयाक्षेपस्य च सति गत्यन्तरे गौरवापादकतया क्लिष्टत्वेनासंगतत्वात्, सजातीयस्योपलक्षणं विजातीयस्याक्षेप इत्यस्यापि वैरूप्येणासंभावितत्वात् इत्यर्थः (*TC.* p. 315-16b).

M. connects the present adhikaraṇa with the immediately preceding Ānandamayādhikaraṇa by way of raising an objection to one of the points made out therein (*ākṣepasaṅgati*). In the previous adhikaraṇa, the attributes of incomprehensibility (*adṛśyatva*) and all-ruler-ship (*anātmya*) had been referred to the Ānandamaya-B.[2] The present adhikaraṇa starts with the objection that in the well-known passage of the *T.Ā.* this attribute of incomprehensibility is found applied to some of the Adhidaiva deities like Indra, Sūrya and Varuṇa. This is clear from the text:—

"The Maker who has entered within, who by His own free will dwells in the moon, whom the gods do not know well enough, tho' He is present along with them"[3] and its concluding portion in which there is mention of the gods Indra, Sūrya and Varuṇa.[4] This makes it almost certain that the Ānandamaya to whom the attribute of incomprehensibility had been applied in *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 7) quoted in the context of Ānandamaya must be the one or the other of these gods and *not* the Ānandamaya-Brahman.

Such, according to M., is the Pūrvapakṣa of this *adhi.* refuted in the Sūtra: *Antastaddharmopadeśāt.* It is shown in the Siddhānta that 'The Being within' must be identified with the Supreme B. as the text clearly embodies the exclusive attributes (*taddharma*) of B. such as dwelling in the primeval waters, being the ultimate support of the souls etc. The next Sūtra *Bhedavyapadesāccānyaḥ* (i, 1.21) points out that the text of the *T.Ā.* clearly distinguishes the minor *adhideva* deities from the Supreme Being.[5]

As the Sūtras are '*Viśvatomukha*' in the sense of being decisive of the import of all *śākhās* (*sarvaśākhānirṇāyaka*) the ruling given in the present *adhi.* is capable of being extended to the entire domain of Adhidaiva hymns in Vedic literature whereby they can be interpreted in their highest sense (*paramamukhyavṛtti*) in terms of One Supreme Being. This is indeed the truth emphasized by the famous Ṛg Vedic text:

इन्द्र मित्रं वरुणमग्निमाहु-
रथो दिव्यः स सुपर्णो गरुत्मान्
एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ।। (i, 164,46)

2. * * * * * * * अदृश्येऽनात्म्येऽनिलयनेंऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते । (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 7).
3. अन्तः प्रविष्टं कर्तारमेतमन्तश्चन्द्रमसि मनसा चरन्तम् । सहैव सन्तं न विजानन्ति देवाः (*T.Ā.* iii, 11).
4. अपां नेतारं भुवनस्य गोपाम् । (*TĀ.* iii, 11, 9).
5. इन्द्रस्यात्मा निहितः पंचहोता
वायोरात्मानं कवयो निचिक्युः ।
अन्तरादित्ये मनसा चरन्तं
देवानां हृदयं ब्रह्मान्वविन्दत् ।। (*TĀ.* iii, 11).

This Śruti also establishes that the Supreme Being is denoted by the terms Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, etc., in the highest sense of those words because the attributes of highest sovereignty (*paramaiśvarya*) etc. which are the basis of application of those names (*pravṛttinimitta*) to those deities are found in their fullest measure in the Supreme Being alone. Their application to the lesser divinities is traced to the presence of the Supreme *in them* as the source of such reference.

In this way, M.'s interpretation of the Samanvayādhyāya, throws light on how each *adhi.* there plays its own part in elucidating the central thesis of Samanvaya of B.'s perfection of attributes (*Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva*) from a fresh angle of Guṇasamanvaya.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. have, however, chosen an entirely different Viṣayavākya from the *Chān.* Up. (i, 6, 7-8; i, 7, 1-5) for this *adhi.* and have sought to discuss the identity of "The golden Person seen in the Sun and the Person seen in the eye"[6] with B. This is open to the following objections. (i) The subject-matter of the present *adhi.* as has been given by them does not arise out of any point made out in the previous adhikaraṇas or texts discussed therein. Such a connection is normally to be expected between adhikaraṇas of a given Pāda. (ii) The keyword of the second sūtra of this *adhi.* "on account of the declaration of difference" does not refer, as interpreted by S. and R. to any difference that is *embodied* in the Viṣayavākya in question *in its own context.* It is referred by them to a difference taught in *some other passage occurring in a different Upaniṣad*[7] altogether. A topic for discussion and a viṣayavākya which are able to fulfil the two requirements of *adhikaraṇa and Śruti-saṅgati* have, therefore, better claims to represent the correct subject-matter of the present *adhi.* M.'s choice of Viṣayavākya and topic of discussion do satisfy these criteria. Hence his interpretation of the *adhi.* seems to be more appropriate.[8]

Rebutting the Pūrvapakṣa that the person seen in the Sun to whom the attributes of golden hue and sinlessness have been ascribed cannot be regarded as the Supreme Being, S. argues that tho' B. is in reality formless and without attributes, the Śrutis ascribe attributes to it, for purposes of Upāsanā only. This argument can cut both ways. For, the qualities of sinlessness (*pāpmabhya uditaḥ*) etc., referred to in

6. अथ य एषोऽन्तरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दृश्यते (i, 6, 7.8).
अथ य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते ****** (i, 7.1-5).
7. य आदित्यमन्तरो यमयति (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 7.9). इति श्रुत्यन्तरे भेदव्यपदेशात् (S. *BSB.* 1.1.21).
8. अस्मद्रीत्या, आनन्दमयाधिकरणाक्षेपायादृश्यत्वादिगुणयुक्तस्य स्वप्रकरणस्थभेदव्यपदेशवतश्च वाक्यस्योदाहरणत्वसंभवे, तद्रहितस्य तदयोगात् । (*TC.* p. 309).

this context can as well be referred to the individual self (in the Pūrvapakṣa) for purposes of Upāsanā, instead of to the Supreme. In that case, the Person in the Sun and in the eye can well be identified with the self as contended by the Pūrvapakṣin. It is hardly necessary, in S.'s theory of Upāsanā, to hold that attributes suggested for Upāsanā should be *real ones pertaining to the object of meditation.*[9] It is accepted by him that in texts like *Nāma brahma ityupāste* (*Chān.* Up. vii, 1.5) brahmanhood superimposed on 'name' etc. for purposes of Upāsanā is purely *prātibhāsika* (unreal). The Upāsanāvākyas according to Advaita theory are just meant to show that such Upāsanās are to be carried out. They do not involve the further commitment that such qualities as have been ascribed to the object for purposes of Upāsanā should really be present there or be possessed by it.[10]

Nothing prevents the Pūrvapakṣin then, from holding that the Person in the Sun is some individual self of high eminence to whom the quality of freedom from sins has been ascribed purely for purposes of meditation. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣa is not effectively repulsed in this interpretation.

There is also overlapping of the topic of discourse between the present *adhi.* and the *Antarādhikaraṇa* (i, 2, 13-17) where too, according S. and R. the Person seen within the eye (*Chān. Up.* iv, 15.1) is established as B. The only difference is that these passages are from different chapters of the same Upaniṣad. That is not, however, enough to justify a fresh *adhi.* The marks of B. such as immortality (*amrtatva*) are found in both the contexts. In both, the person in the eye has been referred to as being *directly perceived* (*eṣa Puruso drśyate*) which gives room for the *Pūrvapakṣa.* There is thus a good case for choosing a different Viṣayavākya for the present *adhi.* as M. has done.[11]

The attempt made by S. and his commentators to find room for a Nirviśeṣa-B *ultimately* in this *adhi.*,[12] is also in conflict with the studied use of expressions like *dharmopadeśa* (attributes being taught) and *bhedavyapadeśa* (difference being taught) in the first and the second sūtras here. It would be well to remember that S. does not accept B.

9. त्वन्मते उपास्यस्य नामादौ ब्रह्मत्वादेः प्रातिभासिकत्वनियमेन, अत्रापि तथैव युक्तत्वात् ।
10. उपासनावाक्यस्य तत्कर्तव्यतामात्रपरत्वेनार्थपरत्वाभावात्, कर्तव्यतायां च व्यावहारिकप्रातिभासिकविभागाभावात् (*TC.* p. 310b).
11. See *NS* p. 147.
12. निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः ।
ये मन्दास्ते ऽनुकम्प्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः ।

* *

वशीकृते मनस्येषां सगुणब्रह्मशीलनात् ।
तदेवाविर्भवेत् साक्षादपेतोपाधिवर्जितम् ॥ *Kalpataru* i.2.20.

as direct material cause. Yet in explaining statements such as "having a beard as bright as gold, etc.," here, he speaks of B. possessing some of the attributes of its effects. This can only be in the sense of B. being the Vivartopādāna or substratum of the world thro' Māyā. It is not the Saviśeṣa B. that is the Vivartopādāna according to S. but the Nirviśeṣa. There is thus frequent shifting of ground from Nirviśeṣa to Saviśeṣa backward and forward in these explanations. The criticism of S.'s interpretation on the basis of Nirviśeṣa, in the *TC* is to be understood as being made from this ultimate position of S.

Such significant details relating to the organic side of the *adhikaraṇaśarīras* in the interpretations of S. and R. have seldom been taken note of by modern scholars like Thibaut, Ghate and Radhakrishnan in their attempts at comparative study and estimate of the B.S. interpretations of the various commentators.

CHAPTER XIX

BRAHMAN IS UNLIMITED

8. *Ākāśādhikaraṇam* (i, 1, 22).

This adhi. establishes the Samanvaya of names of all adhibhūta entities like Ākāśa, Tejas, Vāyu, etc., in B. Ākāśa, being the chief of the elements, has been mentioned in the Sūtra by name. The rest are left to be understood by *Upalakṣaṇa* (implication of the analogous). The Viṣayavākya chosen by all the commentators is from *Chān. Up.* (i.9.1).

M. starts the Pūrvapakṣa with an *abhyadhikāśaṅkā* (further objection) directed against the conclusion reached in the previous *adhi.* that the names of adhidaiva deities like Indra referred to in the *TĀ.* text discussed there are to be referred to the Supreme B. because these adhidaiva deities derive their powers and limited sovereignity from the Supreme Being who is their inner Ruler. Such a principle of interpretation based on being the independent source of the basis of denotative capacity of words applied to other objects (*anyagataśabdapravṛttinimittam prati svātantryam*) cannot, however, be extended to the sphere of inanimate principles like Ākāśa (space). The distinctive characteristic of providing room for things to exist, which is the basis of applying the name (*pravṛttinimitta*) "Ākāśa" to space cannot be regarded as something dependent on or derived by Ākāśa from B. In the first place this characteristic is intrinsic (*svābhāvika*) to Ākāśa. It will cease to be so if it were to depend on something else.[2] Secondly, Ākāśa being

1. What is the goal of this world? He replied—'Ākāśa'. For, all these creatures are produced from Ākāśa. They return to Ākāśa. For Ākāśa is greater than these. It is the final goal. It is the Udgītha—the highest and the best, the endless".
2. अन्याधीनत्वे स्वभावत्वहानेः । (TC. p. 324b).

an insentient principle, its specific property of emptiness and providing room for others[3] cannot be intelligibly attributed to the grace of God as in the case of the powers enjoyed by the adhidaiva deities.[4] For these reasons, the Samanvaya of names of insentient principles, like Ākāśa, in B. is not feasible. Hence the adhi. need not be begun.

Such a Pūrvapakṣa based on the foregoing *adhi.* is refuted here: *Ākāśastalliṅgāt* (i.1.22). The refutation brings out one of the profound truths regarding Divine Majesty in the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa as M. conceives it—that even the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of all things in finite reality, be they sentient or other than sentient, is dependent on (and derived from) the Supreme Will[5]

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति, न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ।।

(*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12) q. by M.

The TC emphasises the same idea with words of deep religious insight:

"It is because of the Divine Will that Ākāśa should be hollow that it is so—so as to provide room for things to be. Otherwise, it would have been impervious. In the practical world, we do find that the specific configuration of a pot along with the pot itself depends on the person who makes the pot. A potter whose efforts at pot-making result in a cup is no potter. He can make a pot or a cup out of the clay at his disposal. Sometimes, the pot he intends to make may exhibit certain features not at all contemplated by him. But in God's creation, nothing that has not been contemplated by Him can come into existence. It is possible for the Deity to undo the vacuity of space and make it impervious. That He has not done so is due to His not having had such a wish and not because of want of capacity to do so. We see in the world that copper is turned into gold by process of alchemy. How then can one have the temerity to assert that God is incapable of changing the roomy into the impervious? We have to agree that God can constitute the world as He pleases because of His unrestricted freedom of will and action. The Śrutis and Smṛtis also clearly teach that even the nature and constitution of things is entirely

3. अवकाशप्रदत्व or विवरत्वम् ।
4. चेष्टा हि चेतनानां या सा भवेत्तत्प्रसादतः
अचेतनस्वभावस्तु विवरादिः कथं ततः । (AV)
5. स्वभावमात्रस्येशाधीनता आकाशाधिकरण उक्ता । (*TC.* p. 380b).

subject to Divine Will. It is by His ordinance that rivers flow, the wind blows and space provides room for things to extend themselves in".[6]

It may be noted in passing that the manner in which the present discourse has been carried on between the three interlocutors in the *Chān. Up.* (i, 9, 1-2) puts S.'s philosophy of B. in an awkward position. If B. emerging from the discourse of Śilaka-Śālāvatya, Caikitāyana-Dālbhya and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali were Saviśeṣa, the attribute of *anantatva* ascribed to it in the Up. would be incompatible. If it were Nirviśeṣa the attribute of *Jyāyastva* (being greater) would be inapplicable to it. If there is really no difference between the two conceptions of B. as Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa, the division of Pādas 2 and 3 of the Samanvayadhyāya on the basis of such a distinction would be uncalled for.

The next three adhikaraṇas deal with the Samanvaya of *ādhyātmika*, *adhiyajna* and *adhiveda* names in B.

6. अस्तु खं छिद्रमिति या हरीच्छा तद्वशत्वत: ।
छिद्रात्मकं हि संजातमन्यथा निविडं भवत् ॥
लोके हि —
कुंभस्वभाव: कुंभत्वं पुंतन्त्वं धर्मिणा सह ।
न शरावार्थंयत्नेन कुंभकारो भविष्यति
यथैव हि मृदा कुंभ: कुंभकारेण निर्मित:
तथैव च मृदा कर्तुं शरावाद्यपि शक्यते
किन्तु कुंभादौ कुलालाद्यसंकल्पितमपि खलु जायते । ईश्वरासंकल्पितं तु, नाणुमात्रमपि जायत इति विशेष: । किंच, उत्पत्त्यनन्तरमपि आकाशस्य विवरत्वं निन्हूयाविवरत्वं संपादयितुं शक्त ईश्वर: । तथेच्छाभावान्तु न संपादयति—
औषधादिवशाल्लोके ताम्रादेरप्यताम्रताम् ।
कुर्वन्तीशस्तु नेष्टे किं छिद्रस्याच्छिद्रताकृते: ?
तस्मादन्यथाकरणाभावेऽप्यन्यथाकर्तुं शक्तत्वाद्यथेष्टविनियोगार्हतास्त्येव । बोधयन्ति च श्रुतिस्मृतय: स्वभावस्यापीश्वराधीनत्वम् –
स्यन्दन्ते शासनान्नद्य: भीषास्मात्पवतेऽनिल: ।
नभो ददाति श्वसतां मार्गमित्यादिकाश्च ता: ॥ (*TC.* p. 332-33).

CHAPTER XX

BRAHMAN THE PRIME MOVER

9. *Prāṇādhikaraṇam* (i.1.23)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya of names of adhyātma principles[1] like Prāṇa occurring in texts like:—

"You are that breath which confers on the four-faced Brahmā various blessings. So you are blessed. You are breath. You impel the nine gods—the senses, to action[2] (*T.Ā.* iii, 14)."

S. bases this *adhi* on *Chān. Up.* (i, 11, 4-5): "Prastotr,—the deity which belongs to the Prastāva which then is the deity? He said "Prāṇa". The Pūrvapakṣa according to S. is that Breath (Praṇā) here must be held to denote the fivefold vital breath because in sleep the mind, speech and other organs and the elements are all merged in breath and are reproduced again in the waking state. This is set aside in favor of the Siddhānta view that Prāṇa referred to in this connection is the Supreme B.

But the difficulty here is that the Pūrvapakṣa as set out by S. lacks substance and does not merit any consideration. This is the rea-

1. Adhyātma is that which exists with reference to the soul, as the means of its enjoyment—viz., the body. The higher powers (divinities) which control and regulate the functioning of life, breath, senses etc. are known as ādhyātmikas: आत्मानमधिकृत्य तस्य भोगायतनत्वेन वर्तत इत्यध्यात्मं शरीरम् । तस्मिन् प्राणनं जीवनं चेष्टादिकं च ॥ (*NS.* p. 149).
2. तद्वै त्वं प्राणोऽभव:, महान्भोग: प्रजापते: ।
भुज: करिष्यमाणो यद्देवान् प्राणयो नव ॥ (*TĀ*, iii.14)

son for M.'s discarding this Viṣayavākya and choosing a different one.[3] If S.'s pūrvapakṣa is made on the assumption that Prāṇa stands for the physical principle (Jaḍa-Vāyu) the question asked in the Up. "which is that deity" and the answer given to it—"Prāṇa is that divinity" become incongruous. On the other hand, if the objector assumes that Prāṇa represents the presiding deity of fivefold vital air (*abhimānidevatā*), S.'s own statement while concluding the Pūrvapakṣa—"Here the Pūrvapakṣin says the word Prāṇa must be held to denote the fivefold vital breath which is a peculiar modification of wind",[4] belies it.

S.'s Pūrvapakṣa has to assume that in deep sleep the elements the senses etc., are all merged, in the sense of becoming disintegrated in Breath. It is on this ground that the Pūrvapakṣa is taken to be a threat to the definition of B. embodied in i.1.2, which is, therefore, to be overcome here.[5]

But then, there is no corroborative evidence (*mānāntarānugraha*) as contended by the *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru*—from Pratyakṣa, inference or Āgama that there is any disintegration of the elements, the senses etc. in Prāṇa, viewed either as a physical principle or as a deity. On the other hand, the continued existence of the Mahābhūtas (elements) is open to our own perception in respect of other persons who are asleep when *we* are not asleep. This in its turn can be extended to our own case, in sleep. Secondly, the "senses" being 'supersensuous' (*atīndriya*) their merger cannot be open to perception. Nor can it be known by inference conclusively beause there is no law that that which is inactive when another is active must necessarily be merged in it. Our recollective judgment establishes conclusively that the very same senses with which we had been carrying on our activities before going to sleep resume their activities when we wake up. This cannot be if these senses had been disintegrated in Prāṇa. In the light of this recollective judgment, any statement in the Śruti referring to such 'merger' will have to be taken in the sense that they were in a state

3. Dasgupta misses this point when he says "M. has, however, come to the same conclusion with reference to the use of the word Prāṇa in another passage of the TĀ". (*His. of I. Phil.* iv. p. 131). It is not just a matter of personal preference for a particular text as against another. In all such cases M. has good reasons to discard the Vṣayavākyas of his predecessors and choose a now one. The *TC* invariably explains the reasons which M. has in mind in the selection of his Viṣayavākyas, discarding those of others. I have tried to indicate some of those reasons on important occasions. See under i, 1, 28.31; i, 2, 1-8; etc.

4. वायुविकारस्य पंचवृत्तेः प्राणस्योपादानत्वं युक्तम् । (S. *BSB*. i.1.23).

5. ब्रह्मणो वा सर्वभूतकारणत्वं, आकाशस्य वा, वाय्वादिभूतकारणत्वं प्रति नागमादृते मानान्तरं प्रभवति * * इह तु, संवेशनोद्गमने भूतानां प्राणं प्रत्युच्यमाने, किं ब्रह्म प्रत्युच्येते आहो वायुविकारं प्रतीति । (*Bhāmatī*).

of suspended activity during sleep.[6] As for Scriptural evidence, there is the following text from the *Praśna Up.* (iv.7) "Even as birds resort to a tree for a resting place, so does everything here resort to the Supreme Self",[7] which clearly shows that the senses are *not* disintegrated in sleep. In this way, the Pūrvapakṣa as made out by S. and his commentators is not well-founded. So it does not deserve refutation in a separate adhikaraṇa.

6 प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रबलत्वेन श्रुतिगताप्ययशब्दस्य निर्व्यापारत्वार्थान्तरपरत्वेन सावकाशत्वात् । (Rāgh. *TCP*. p. 353b).

7. 'यथा वयांसि वासोवृक्षं सप्रतिष्ठन्ते, एवं ह वै तत्सर्वं पर आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते'। संप्रतिष्ठतिशब्दस्यापि लयार्थत्वे, पक्षिणामावासवृक्षाश्रयत्वदृष्टान्तानुपपत्तिः । (Rāgh. *TCP*. p. 353b).

CHAPTER XXI

THE LIGHT WITHIN

10. *Jyotiradhikaraṇam* (i.1.24)

M. chooses for the Viṣayavākya of the next *adhi.* a beautiful verse from RV. vi, 9.6:

> "My ears turn away; so too my eyes from the Light that is placed in the heart. The mind too strays far away. Poor soul that I am, what shall I say or think of that Light".[1]

This brings the entire Mantra literature within the scope of Brahmasamanvaya.[2] It deserves to be noted that the expression *caraṇa* without the preposition *"vi"* in the Sūtra is most appropriate to Vedic construction which more often than not separates the preposition from the verb. On the other hand, the way in which the term Caraṇa in i.1.24 has been understood by S. and others to stand for 'foot' (*pāda*) mentioned in *Pādo asyā sarvā bhūtāni* (*Chān. Up.* iii, 12, 6) renders the use of '*pāda*' again in Sūtra 26 of the same *adhi.* redundant[3] in as much as *caraṇa* in Sūtra 24 and pāda in 26, have the same meaning according to S.

1. 'वि मे कर्णा पतयतो वि चक्षु
   र्वीदं ज्योतिर्हृदय अहितं यत् ।
   वि मे मनश्चरति दूर आधीः
   किं स्विद् वक्ष्यामि किमु नू मनिष्ये ।।
2. अग्निसूक्तमुदाहृत्य मंत्रगोचरं विचारं सूचयता परमवैदिकेनाचार्येण निखिलोऽपि वेदसमन्वयो विचारितो भवतीति भूयानयं लाभः । (*TPD* i.1.24).
3. पौनरुक्त्यं परमते ज्योतिर्भूतादिसूत्रयोः ।
   पादोपदेशादन्या हि नैवास्ति चरणाभिधा । (*TC.* p. 382b).

CHAPTER XXII

BEARER OF ADHIVEDIC NAMES

11. *Chandobhidhānādhikaraṇam* (i.1.25-27)

The next *adhi.* attempts the samanvaya of *adhivedic* terms like Gāyatrī in B. The Viṣayavākya is from *Chān. Up.* (iii, 13.7): which refers to "the Light which shines beyond the heavens, above all, and above everything in the highest worlds, beyond which there are no higher ones. That is the same as this Light here in the Puruṣa." The same Light is, however, found to be referred to earlier (in *Chān. Up.* iii, 12.1), as Gāyatrī in the text: "Gāyatrī is indeed all this". Since the terms in which the Light has been spoken of are incompatible with the metre Gāyatrī, the name Gāyatrī has to signify the Supreme B.

This would at once accord with the further description of Gāyatrī in *Chān. Up.* (ii, 12, 5-6) as having four feet and being sixfold. .That this is a description of the Supreme B. is seen from *Chān. Up.* iii, 12, 6, which speaks of "all the beings as constituting one fourth of the Supreme".[4]

The *TC* points out how the *adhi.* is intended to meet a further objection (*adhikāśaṅkā*) raised against the conclusion of the previous *adhi.* in respect of Ākāśa. Ākāśa, Jyoti and others being non-eternal principles, the basis of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) of their respective names to the Supreme Being in the fullest and highest sense of the terms can be easily secured as B. is the source of all created substances. But Gāyatrī being the name of a Vedic metre and as Vedic hymns are eternal and beginningless according to orthodox tradition, a very valid objection

4. पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि । (*Chān. Up.* iii, 12.6).

can be raised that the *Pravṛttinimitta* of names of such eternal and uncreated things as Vedic hymns and the metres in which they are cast cannot be traced to B. The present *adhi.* is designed to meet such an objection and show that the Supreme B. has the power of controlling and determining the essential natures and properties of eternal and uncreated substances as well. This brings into prominence one very significant aspect of Divine majesty—viz. *anādisvabhāva-niyāmakatvam* (control of beginningless nature of eternal things) in the grand concept of Sarvaśāstrasamanvaya in B. which the Sūtrakāra has placed before us in the opening Adhyāya of his Brahmamīmāmsā-Śāstra.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE COSMIC ANTARYĀMI

12. *Antaryāmi-Prāṇādhikaraṇam* (i.1, 28-31)

This adhi. is the life-breath of the entire Samanvayādhyāya. Besides providing the key to the Samanvaya of all kinds of Anyatraprasiddha, Ubhayatraprasiddha and Anyatraivaprasiddha words in B., it holds the master-key to the solution of the conflict between the 'Mahāvākyas' of Advaitavāda and the Mahāvākyas of Dualistic metaphysics or Dvaitavāda. It introduces us to the 'Advaitic experience' of one of the greatest seers of the Vedic age—the celebrated Vāmadeva, and gives it an authentic mystic reorientation which embodies the most practical and the best theoretical concord between the essence of *true* 'Advaitism' and of genuine Theistic experience—between *Tattvam asi* and *Tava smasi*;[1] between '*So*' ham and '*Tavāham*'.

This is the last *adhi.* of the first Pāda. It establishes the correlation to B. of many names like Prāṇa commonly denoting other principles and which tho' names, stand more or less in the position of distinctive marks of reference, which to all intents and purposes are irreconcilable with B.[2] These are here applied to B. from the standpoint of its being the *Antaryāmi* in all beings and as such entitled to be denoted by all their distinctive names and attributes in their fullest sense.[3] Tho' this principle has, in a way, been pressed into service in the interpretation of certain passages in the earlier adhikaraṇas, it is here that

1. We are Yours (*A.Ā.* ii, 1.4).
2. Such as being mentioned in the company of minor deities of sense organs (*AĀ.* ii, 1.4) as involved in a contest for supremacy among them: अस्मिन्नधिकरणे विष्णावत्यन्तानुपपद्यमानलिंगस्थानीयप्राणादिशब्दानामपि समन्वय: साधनीय: । (Vādirāja, *TPG* p. 29).
3. अन्यगतत्वेन प्रसिद्धलिंगानामन्तर्यामिगतत्वनिर्णयोऽत्रत्यन्यायसाध्य: । (*TPC* i.1.28).

the Sūtrakāra has made a systematic attempt at actually expounding how this exegetical principle of *Antaryāmivyapadeśa* has been operative in the Śāstra. This he has done, according to M., with special reference to (three) significant contexts pertaining respectively to the Jīva, (Mukhya)-Prāṇa and Indra. The Viṣayavākyas chosen for the *adhi.* according to M. are passages from the *A.Ā.* beginning with the words: "They are Śriyah, the eye, ear, mind, speech have their place in the head[4]........" (ii.1.4) and ending with O Sage, I am verily Prāṇa, you are Prāṇa, Prāṇa is all these beings.[5] (ii.2.3).

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the name Prāṇa mentioned in several places in the above contexts must be the Chief Breath or some other being but not the Supreme B. because in the opening passage (ii.1.4) it has been placed in the company of a group of sense organs (and their deities. There are similar evidences of reference to Indra[6] and the Jīvātman[7] also in the general context. They too may, therefore, be regarded as the subject matter of this text. These objections are set aside in the first, second and fourth sūtra of this *adhi.* The third sūtra formulates the principle of "Śāstra-dṛṣṭi" based on the standpoint of the "Antaryāmi" to show how these are comprehended by it.[8]

The first Sūtra: *Prāṇas tathānugamāt* (i.1.28) as interpreted by M. establishes that the name "Prāṇa" used in several places in the above contexts refers to B. as the characteristics of the Supreme are found mentioned *right thro'*. Thus, we read here: "The gods brought the knowledge of the Supreme (to their pupils).[9] He is the Supreme Asu, who overthrows the enemies. He is Prāṇa, the blissful".[10] "One should understand that all the Ṛks refer to Him."[11] "Prāṇa has taken his seat in the body which is His car" (*AĀ*. ii, 3, 8).[12] There is also the reference to B. many times in this context.[13]

4. ता वा एताः शीर्षन् श्रियः श्रिताः चक्षुः श्रोत्रम् *** । (ii, 1.4).
5. प्राणो वा अहमस्मृषे; प्राणस्त्वम्; प्राणः सर्वाणि भूतानि । (ii, 2.3).
6. प्राणो वा अहमस्मृषे । (*AĀ* ii, 2.3).
7. तं शतं वर्षाण्यभ्यार्चत्, तस्माच्छतं वर्षाणि पुरुषायुषो भवन्ति । (*AĀ* ii, 2, 2)
8. अन्यगतलिंगानां तद्गतभगवदपेक्षया युक्तेः । (*NV* i, 1, adh. 12).
9. तं देवाः प्राणयन्त । (*AĀ* ii, 1.5).
10. स एषोऽसुः * * प्राणः । (*AĀ* ii, 1, 8).
11. सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषाः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात् (*AA* ii, 2, 2).
12. अथ देवरथः तस्य वागुद्धिः श्रोत्रे पक्षसी चक्षुषी ,युक्ते मनः संग्रहीता तदयं प्राणोऽधितिष्ठति । (*AĀ* ii, 3, 8).
The figure of the divine car is developed in the text: Now the Divine Chariot. Speech (Umā) is its yoking rod the two horses are the presiding deities of the ears, Mind (Rudra) is the driver. The Supreme takes its seat therein'. The above interpretation of the text has been supported by M. in his *BSB* with a quotation from the Skānda.
13. (अस्मिन् प्रकरणे 'एतद् ब्रह्म,' "ब्रह्मणो लोकः', 'ब्रह्मेमं पुरुषम्' 'उदरं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते' 'अ इति ब्रह्म' इत्यादिब्रह्मशब्दाभ्यासाच्च । (M. *BSB*. i, 1.28).

The second Sūtra, according to M., is based on the incident narrated in the *AĀ* (ii, 2.3) about Viśvāmitra's recital of the *Bṛhatīsahasra* (1000 *ṛcas*) three times, and god Indra (inspired by the Supreme Being) revealing himself to him in all his effulgence and offering him a boon as a mark of his appreciation. Viśvāmitra says to Indra: "Sir, I want to know you *well*". Thereupon Indra (inspired by the Supreme) declares to him—O Sage, I am Prāṇa. You are Prāṇa. All these creatures are Prāṇa. Verily Prāṇa is He who scorches (the worlds) and pervades the quarters with that form" and so on.

On the basis of the foregoing account in the *AĀ*, the pūrvapakṣa is raised in Sūtra i.1.29 that Prāṇa celebrated in this passage must be Indra himself and not B. because Indra proclaims himself *to the reciter* (*vaktuḥ*) *of Brahatīsahara*,[14] that he is Prāṇa. This Pūrvapakṣa is rejected by the Sūtrakāra who explains the claim of identity with Prāṇa put forward by Indra on a different ground of "*adhyātmasambandhabhūmāhyasmin*" (BS i.1.29), which may be translated as "by virtue of there being a profusion of the contact with the Supreme Self in him at the time".

What is significant here is the fact that the Sūtrakāra rejects the claim of identity put forward by Indra to be the Supreme B. (Prāṇa) and suggests a suitable interpretation of the words on the basis of which Indra's words have to be understood. The basis offered by him is that of *adhyātmasambandhabhūmatva* in Indra, at the time. We have, therefore, to determine what this key-word means in order to arrive at the correct interpretation of the passage in question. Before coming to the first word (adhyātma) in the phrase, we have to examine the other three expressions there: *sambandha*, *bhūmā* and *asmin*, as these may be expected to give the proper clue to the interpretation of the first word itself.

Now '*Sambhandha*' is a relationship and *bhūmā* is its profusion or preponderance. 'Asmin' may probably mean "in Him (Indra)" or "in the given context" (*prakaraṇa*). S. has sought to take it in the latter sense. But that hardly affects the point that the person putting up the claim of identity (I am Prāṇa) should necessarily have experienced *adhyātmasambandhabhūmā* in his own self at the time of making such a claim. So there can be no objection to taking *asmin* in the sense of "in Him" (i.e. Indra).[15]

14. विश्वामित्रं ह्येतदहः शंसिष्यन्तमिन्द्र उपनिषसाद । स हान्नमित्यभिव्याहृत्य बृहतीसहस्रं शशंस । तेनेन्द्रस्य प्रियं धामोपेयाय, तमिन्द्र उवाच । (*AĀ*. ii, 2.3)
15. M. has explained it in both the senses consistent with his own interpretation of the *adhi*. अधिकात्मनः परमात्मनो जीवेषु संबन्धबाहुल्यं ह्यस्मिन् वाक्ये विद्येते । अथवा, परमात्मसंबन्धो हि बहुलो ह्यस्मिन् विद्यते । (*TPD*).

Sambandha is a relationship between two persons and *bhūmā* is its profusion or preponderance. The Sūtrakāra has himself thrown further light on what he means by this phrase *adhyātmasambandhabhūmā* by referring us to the experience of Vāmadeva, who in RV. iv, 26.1 makes a similar claim of identity:—

Aham Manur abhavam Sūryaśca

from "Śāstradṛṣṭi": Śāstradṛṣṭyā tu upadeśo Vāmadevavat (B.S.1.1.). But what is *Śāstradṛṣṭi?*

S. has held that "Śāstradṛṣṭi" means "the realization of the oneness of Jīvātman with B. by means of a Ṛṣi-like intuition, the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture" and that it was thro' such a realization that Vāmadeva was able to give expression to his own sense of identity with all (*sarvātmakatva*) in terms of his being Manu, Sūrya, etc. Indra's claim in the present case is also to be similarly understood.

There are *serious objections* to accepting such an interpretation. The experiences of Vāmadeva, as recorded in *Ṛg Veda* (iv, 27, 1-2) go to show that he was distinctly aware of his own *former lives* and his difference from other persons including the gods and their births while he was still in his mother's womb. (*Garbhe nu san*) and that he was also vividly conscious of his being sheltered from all possible injury there, by the protective influence of the Supreme Power. This is clear from his own confession:—

गर्भे नु सन्नन्वेषामवेदमहं देवानां जनिमानि विश्वा ।
शतं मा पुर आयसीररक्षन्नध श्येनो जवसा निरदीयम् ॥
न घा स मामप जोषं जभारा भीमास त्वक्षसा वीर्येण।
ईर्मा पुरन्धिरजहादरातीरुत वाताँ अतरच्छूशुवानः ॥

This disproves S.'s assumption that Vāmadeva had ever attained any kind of an "Advaitic intuition" of the oneness of all.

As a matter of fact, true Advaitic realization as understood in S.'s philosophy can have no truck with identifying one *individual* (the Jīvātman *as such*) with the Paramātman *as such* i.e. with their respective attributes intact (*viśiṣṭaikya*). The true nature of identity acceptable to Advaita thought consists in what is known as "identity of bare essence (*svarūpamātraikyam*) shorn of all determinants associated with the terms brought into identity-relation. This sort of a rarefied identity would, by its very nature, militate against the claim of colorful identity put forward by Vāmadeva in:

"I was Manu and Sūrya

I was Ṛṣi Kakṣīvān the Brahmin". (R.V. iv, 26, 1).

We have also to take note that in such a bare identity of essence there can be no question of degrees of *intensity* or *profusion* (*bhūmā*).[1] The stage of *svarūpaikya* or *Cinmātraikya* as conceived in Advaita passes beyond the sphere of relations and degrees of relationships. In the circumstances, it would hardly be proper for anyone to speak of preponderance or profusion of such relationship of identity with the Adhyātma in Indra or Vāmadeva at the time.[16]

So long as "Sambandha" lasts duality will have to be.[17] All this would be unthinkable, impossible in Advaitic realization. Hence neither *Śāstradṛṣṭi* nor *adhyātmasambandhabhūmā* can be interpreted in the way way in which S. has sought to do.

In keeping with the phrase "on account of denoting himself" (*ātmopadeśāt*) used in the Sūtra, it seems more reasonable to take *asmin* there to refer to Indra himself than to take it to mean "in that chapter". In the same way, it seems pointless to take *'vaktuḥ'* in Sūtra 29, as referring to the speaker viz., Indra, as S. and R. have done. The 'speaker' is already implicated in the phrase *ātmopadeśāt* (by denoting *himself*). It would be needless to refer to him again by the word *'Vaktuḥ'*. This is a very strong indication indeed that by putting in this word here, Bādarāyaṇa wants us to understand that he is thinking of an altogether different Viṣayavākya in which the person addressed by the instructor (*upadeṣṭā*) happens to be a *vaktā* or reciter of something special. In the Viṣayavākya chosen by S., R. and others, from the *Kauṣītakī Up.* (iii, 1), King Pratardana son of Divodāsa is stated to have arrived at the dear abode of Indra "by means of *fighting and effort*",[18] and he is straightway asked to choose a boon. There is no recital made by Pratardana to justify the use of the expression *'vaktuḥ'* while referring to him. On the other hand, in the passages chosen by M. as the Viṣayavākya of the present *adhi.* the sage Viśvāmitra has pleased Indra by his tireless recitation of *Bṛhatī-sahasra* consisting of a *thousand ṛcas, three times*, as desired by Indra himself.[19] This certainly deserves to be taken into account in correctly identifying the Viṣayavākya intended by the Sūtrakāra. This would also have the advantage of not making the use of the word *vaktuḥ* superfluous in the Sūtra which by definition is required to be *alpākṣaram* (laconic).

16. I am aware that S. has not interpreted the words *sambandha* and *bhūmā* in these senses. These remarks are intended to show how the usual meanings of these words are also inapplicable from the monistic point of view. S.'s own interpretation of *adhyātmasambandha-bhūmā* will be examined in due course.
17. न हि स्वात्मनः स्वस्य संबन्धो भवति । यद्यध्यात्ममत्रोच्यते इति विवक्षितं, तर्ह्यध्यात्मभूमा' इत्येव स्यात् । संबन्धशब्दो व्यर्थः । तस्मादिन्द्रादिजीवेभ्यो विष्णोर्भेद एवात्र भगवतो विवक्षितः । (*TPD*).
18. प्रतर्दनो ह वै दैवोदासिरिन्द्रस्य प्रियं धामोपजगाम, युद्धेन च पौरुषेण च । (iii. 1).
19. तमिन्द्र उवाच – स वा ऋषे तृतीयं शंसेति । स ह अन्नमित्यभिव्याहृत्य बृहतीसहस्रं शशंस । (*AĀ.* ii, 2.3).

Seen in this light, it would be clear how aptly the Sūtrakāra has substituted *vaktuḥ* for *śamsituḥ* with due regard for further economy of syllables! and as an indication of trustworthiness of the instruction given to a deserving person.[20]

It is not a little strange that while S. is keen on making out Indra of the *Kauṣītakī Up.* to have attained the intuition of oneness of all existence,[21] the same Indra while speaking to Pratardana is *too fully conscious of their difference in rank and status* and does not hesitate to remind Pratardana of his inferiority.[22]

In S.'s interpretation of *Na vaktuḥ....* (i.1.29) the conclusion arrived at is that on account of the *numerous references* (*Sambandhabhūmā*) to the inner self (*adhyātma*), the whole chapter((*asmin*) deals with B. and not with the self of some conditioned self or a deity like Indra. This cannot be a proper interpretation of the Sūtra.

An objection has admittedly been raised in the first half of this Sūtra. We have a right to expect it to be answered with a convincing explanation of how the speaker's denoting himself to be Prāṇa is to be reconciled with the Siddhānta view that Prāṇa is B. Without doing so, there is no point in repeating what has already been stated in Sūtra 28, that Prāṇa is B. on account of a multitude of references to the inner Self (B). This point has already been established in Sūtra 28, that there is *anugama* (connected reference) to B. in all the passages there to justify Prāṇa's identity with B.

The latter half of Sūtra 29 *does contain* the answer to the objection and an explanation of the claim made by Indra to be Prāṇa (himself). Only, S. and R. have not caught the point and have not utilized it for the purpose for which it has been intended by the Sūtrakāra, instead of shelving the answer[23] to Sūtra no. 30. The phrase *adhyātmasam-*

20. अस्माकं तु, विशिष्टं शस्त्रं शंसितुर्विश्वामित्रस्य नेन्द्रोऽन्यथोपदेष्टुमर्हतीति युक्तिसूचनाय सार्थकमिति। (*NS.* p. 153).
21. इन्द्रो नाम देवतात्मा स्वात्मानं परमात्मत्वेनाहमेव परं ब्रह्म इत्यार्षेण दर्शनेन यथाशास्त्रं पश्यन् उपदिशति स्म। (S. *BSB.* i.1, 30).
22. Cf. "Indra said to him, "a *superior* does not choose for an *inferior*. Choose for yourself". This is in reply to a polite request of Pratardana that Indra himself may be pleased to choose the boon which he considers best for mankind!
23. See their introduction to Sūtra 30—
कथं तर्हि वक्तुरात्मोपदेश: ? (S).
कथं तर्हि प्रज्ञातजीवभावस्येन्द्रस्य स्वात्मन उपास्यत्वेनोपदेश: संगच्छते ? तत्राह (R).
In M's interpretation Sūtra 30 raises a point of order against the conclusion embodied in 29 and answers it from the standpoint of Mysticism:
नन्वत्र यदि प्राणपदेन इन्द्रेणापि विष्णुरेव स्वात्मादिसर्वगततयोच्यते, तर्हि "**मयि प्राण**:' इत्यादिप्रयोग: स्यात् *** इत्याशंकां परिहरत्सूत्रं व्याचष्टे – "शास्त्रदृष्ट्येति' । (*TP*).

bandhabhūmā hyasmin has, therefore, to be explained in such a way as would actually incorporate the (esoteric) grounds on which Indra has actually put forth his claim to be Prāṇa (B), so that his claim could stand fully reconciled with the Siddhānta position, that Prāṇa is B. This cannot be done save by taking *asmin* to refer to Indra and *adhyātmasambandhabhūmā* as meaning "intensive spiritual relationship with a Power greater than himself, designated by the term 'Adhyātma viz. the Viśvāntaryāmi".

S.'s position in Sūtra 28, that Prāṇa must be regarded as B. as it possesses the characteristics of being that which is most beneficial to man (*manuṣyāya hitatamam*) is also hard to sustain. If "being most beneficial to man" signifies the means of achieving the highest goal of human aspirations viz., Mokṣa this, in S.'s philosophy is attainable by Jñāna which alone is capable of destroying Ignorance. It is thus Jñāna that should be regarded as "most beneficial to man" and not B. However, if B., itself is conceived as the highest good and if this B. is to be further conceived as the infinite pure consciousness, the question would have to be answered—with reference to whom should such pure consciousness be regarded as being "most beneficial?" It cannot be with regard to an embodied self like Pratardana; for such a self will cease to be, in Mokṣa, according to S.'s philosophy. It cannot be with regard to the pure self also; for the pure self being itself infinite and impartible, above good and bad, there can be no possibility of saying 'this is beneficial to it and that will *not* be'. For the same reason, it would also be imposible to talk of something being beneficial to it and something else being *most* beneficial. It is a being devoid of generality and particularity.

Nor can the characteristic of being unconcerned with works and their effects be accepted as a mark of Brahmanhood as contended by S. For, in *Kauṣ. Up.* (iii, 9) it is expressly stated that B. causes him whom It wishes to lead up from these worlds, to perform good deeds and the other one to do bad deeds whom it wishes to pull downwards.[24] S.'s further statements that (i) Prāṇa as B. has the power of bestowing and taking back life because of the reference "as long as Prāṇa dwells in the body so long surely there is life" and (ii) that Prāṇa alone as B. has the power to "lay hold of the body and make it rise up" are inconsistent with the conception of Nirveśeṣa-B. which is all-pervasive and not conditioned by time and place and is also devoid of activity and organs.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

24. एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति एष एवैनमसाधुकर्म कारयति यं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्यो अधो निनीषति। (*Kauṣ. Up.* iii, 9).

There are difficulties in accepting R.'s interpretation also of Sutras 29 and 30. By '*adhyātma*' R. understands "the exclusive lordly attributes of the Supreme Being such as being the most beneficial to mankind, the inspirer of good and bad deeds, *sarvādhāratva*[25] etc. This is certainly better than S.'s interpretation of 'adhyātma'. But then, it is difficult to see the necessity, in R.'s case, for the expression *sambandha* in the wording of Sūtra 29. The word *adhyātma* itself according to R. carries the sense of the exclusive attributes of the Supreme B.[26] The meaning intended by R. would thus be fully conveyed by the words *adhyātmabhūmā* without infixing '*sambandha*'. His overall interpretation of Sutra 29 suffers from the same limitation as S.'s in that it too does not construe the latter half of the Sūtra as embodying any convincing explanation of how the claim of Indra to be Prāṇa (B) is to be reconciled from the Siddhānta point of view. Instead, R. explains that part of the Sūtra as merely asserting over again that *in this context* there is a multitude of connections pertaining to the Supreme B. This fails to satisfy the expectations raised by the trenchant wording of the objection in the first half of the Sūtra and does not do justice to the Sūtrakāra's method of silencing objections then and there. See the manner of wording followed in:—

न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्न, अनादित्वात् (ii,1,36).
विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न, प्राचुर्यात् (i.1.13).

M., therefore, offers a fresh interpretation of the *adhi.* in the light of Viṣayavākyas chosen from the *A.A.*[27] Introducing Sūtra 29, M. writes: It should not be argued that because Indra instructs Viśvāmitra, the reciter (*vaktuḥ*) of *Bṛhatīsahasra,* he (Indra) himself is Prāṇa when he says "O Sage, I am indeed Prāṇa" (*ātmopadeśāt*). For in this context, Indra says further on: "You are Prāṇa, All the beings are Praṇā".[28] This should have set Viś. thinking; for he knew very well that Indra was certainly *not* Prāṇa. It should similarly set *us thinking* as to what Indra was driving at when he made such a solemn declaration: "You are Prāṇa; all the beings are Prāṇa". These words have evidently been uttered with a deeper meaning and in an esoteric sense that after proclaiming the Supreme Being present in himself as Prāṇa (Paramāt-

25. See R.'s *Vedāntadīpa* i, 1, 30.
26. परमात्मासाधारणधर्मसंबन्धो ह्यध्यात्मसंबन्धः तस्य भूमा बाहुल्यमस्मिन् प्रकरणे विद्यते । (*Śrībhāṣya* i, 1, 30).
27. Tho' the principles of interpretation enunciated in Sūtras 29 and 30 are capable of being applied with equal force to the other dialogue between Indra and Pratardana in the *Kauṣ. Up.* and others of the same kind elsewhere, in the Upaniṣads, by *upalakṣaṇa* and *atideśa,* there is, as we have seen, *special propriety* in basing the discussion here on certain sections of the *AĀ.* There is no reason to think, however, that M. is fighting shy of the passages from the *Kauṣītaki Up.* chosen by S. and R.
28. प्राणस्त्वं प्राणः सर्वाणि भूतानि । (*AĀ.* ii, 2, 3).

man),[29] Indra wishes to point out that this Prāṇa or Paramātman is the Supreme Lord (*adhyātma*[30]) present equally in Viś. and in all other beings as well—in other words, the all-pervading One. Such all-pervasiveness does not obviously belong to Indra who is, after all, a particular deity and a Jīvātman. These statements of Indra are made in response to a request made by Viś. that he would like to know Indra (better).

This request is itself suggestive of a deeper sense of the words. For Indra *as such* is already known to Viś. He would not, therefore, have asked to know him again (as Indra). Even supposing that he had, the latter part of Indra's pronouncement "You are Prāṇa; all the beings are Prāṇa" could not have been uttered in its literal sense or have been taken in that sense. We have, therefore, to understand that Viś.'s request to Indra *Tvām eva vijānīyām* had a special significance and that Indra's pronouncement in response to it was made in the most solemn accents of a great mystic truth.

In other words, seeing the luminous appearance of Indra before him Viś. sensed at once that there was some greater Power speaking to him thro' Indra and wanted to know (i) its identity and (ii) its supreme attributes. To the first part of the question the answer came from Indra: "I am Prāṇa O Sage," and to the second: "You are Prāṇa—all these beings are Prāṇa. Prāṇa is that which scorches all."[31]

Thus, "Prano'ham; Pranas tvam and Prāṇas sarvāṇi bhūtāni;" all fall into one and the same pattern of mystic utterances made in that solemn moment when the individual spirit stands flooded by the Divine Light as its own Antaryāmi—no less than as the Antaryāmi of everything and of every one in the whole Universe (*Viśvāntaryāmi*). It is the impact of this mighty contact of the Antaryāmi that finds ecstatic expression in words like:

प्राणो वा अहमस्मृषे प्राणस्त्वं प्राणः सर्वाणि भूतानि.
अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च (*RV.* iv, 26, 1)
अहमन्नमहमन्नम् (*Taitt. Up.* iii, 10, 6)
अहं विश्वं भुवनमभ्यभवाम् (*Taitt. Up.* iii, 10, 6)

29. प्रकृष्टानन्दरूपत्वात् प्राण इत्यभिधीयते । (M. *AĀ.* C.).
30. अधिकात्मनः परमात्मनः संबन्धो ह्यध्यात्मसंबन्धः । (M. *AĀ.* C.).
31. भवेदयं विरोधो यद्यत्रेन्द्रेण प्राणतयात्मोपदेशः क्रियते; न चैतदस्ति यतो ह्यस्मिन्प्रकरणे स्थितस्य "प्राणो वा अहमस्मि" इति परमात्मत्वमुक्त्वा तस्यैव प्राणाख्यपरमात्मनः "प्राणस्त्वं प्राणः सर्वाणि भूतानि" इत्यादिना बहुदेहसंबन्धः सर्वगततत्वमेवेन्द्रेणोक्तं विद्यत, इत्यर्थः । अथवा, इन्द्रे बहुपरमात्मसंबन्धो विद्यते, तदपेक्षयैवायमुपदेशो न स्वापेक्षया । कुत : ? 'प्राणस्त्वम्' इत्यादिनास्य प्राणस्याध्यात्मत्वेनान्तर्यामित्वेन सर्वगतत्वोक्तेर्विद्यमानत्वात् । न चैतदिन्द्रे जीवविशेषे युक्तमित्यर्थः । अन्यथा, त्वामेव जानीयामिति ज्ञातपूर्वेन्द्रस्य मुनेः प्रश्नस्यैवासंभवात् । संभवे वा, 'प्राणस्त्वम्' इत्यादिपरिहारवाक्यासंगतेश्च ।
अस्मत्पक्षे तु, तेजोबाहुल्यादिन्द्रेऽन्योऽपि वर्तते, कोऽसौ ? विष्णुश्चेत् कीदृश इत्यभिप्रायद्वयेन प्रश्ने सति, "कस्त्वम्" इति प्रश्नस्य प्राणो वा अहमस्मि इति परिहारः, कीदृशोऽसावित्यस्योत्तरतया उत्तरवाक्ययोजनोपपत्तेरिति । (*TP.* i.1.29).

Dry reason may object to all this. If Indra had intended to tell Viś. that it was the Supreme that was actually present in all as the Universal Antaryāmi Prāṇa), why did he not convery his meaning thro, a simple and straight statement: "Prāṇa is *in* me; Prāṇa is *in* you. Prāṇa is *in* all beings?"

Sūtra 30 answers this question, according to M. by pointing out that it is usual in mystic tradition to use words like 'I, you and All' in the sense of the Antaryāmi in describing mystic experiences and intuitions.[32]

This is illustrated in the Sūtra by the utterance of Sage Vāmadeva in RV when he was in the ecstasy of a similar experience of the Antaryāmi: *Śāstradṛṣṭyā tu upadeśo Vāmadevavat* (BS i. 1. 30). The term "Śāstra" here, according to M.'s interpretation, refers *directly to the Antaryāmi*. He cites the relevant authority for this from the *Bhāgavata* (i, 6, 17):—

[स्वप्नो मायाग्रहः शय्या जाग्रदाभास आत्मनः ।
नामरूपक्रियावृत्तिः] **संविच्छास्त्रं परं पदम्**[33]

Thus 'Śāstra-dṛṣṭi' *directly means Antaryāmi-dṛṣṭi* (the standpoint of the Antaryāmi or Inner Ruler of all. This is much more compact and forthright than the way in which the term has been explained by S. and R. S. explains it as "the intuitive vision gained thro' the teaching of the Śāstra" (i.e. identity texts). R. says it is 'the insight based on scriptural texts which teach that the individual self constitutes the 'body' of the Supreme B. along with the principle that words denoting the bodies extend in their connotation to the possessors of those bodies, as is seen in the use of words like 'man', 'god', etc. in the world.

Both these are devious explanations as compared with M.'s. R.'s principle that words denoting the 'body' are capable of extension of connotation to the owner of the body is not derived *solely from Scripture*. It is known thro' common worldly experience and usage also. It is, therefore, only partly derived from Scriptural authority. Hence it

32. अन्तर्यामिणमीशेशमपेक्ष्याहं त्वमित्यपि ।
सर्वे शब्दाः प्रयुज्यन्ते सति भेदेऽपि वस्तुषु ।। (M. *BSB*. i.2.13).
A similar tendency is reflected in another passage occurring in the *AĀ* itself in a dialogue of the sense organs (deities) with Prāṇa. *Tvam uktham asi tvam idam Sarvam asi Tava vayam smaḥ Tvam asmākam asi* (*AĀ*. ii, 1.4). "You are the *Uktha* (you raise us up) you are all this. We are yours" (at your service).

33. "(I began to contemplate) That Ātman from whom proceed all the states of the Jīvātman—such as dreams, caused by impressions, deep sleep devoid of awareness of objects of dream and waking, and activities connected with name and form—the one who is all-knowing, the all-ruling guide and the highest goal to the attained". (Tr).

would not be proper to speak of it as Śāstradṛṣṭi *exclusively*. His theory of body-and-soul relationship between Jīva and B. has necessarily to recognize that the body depends on the soul and that the soul is the *antaryāmi* of the body. Thus, it seems futile to deny that the Antaryāmitva of B. is the core of the concept of *śarīraśarīribhāva* relationship between Jīva and B., in R.'s philosophy. It would be more logical then for R. to interpret "Śāstradṛṣṭi" itself as Antaryāmidṛṣṭi straightway instead of arriving at it thro' the round-about channel of *śarīraśarīribhāva* relation between Jīva and B. grounded on the Antaryāmitva of B.

It deserves to be noted in conclusion that as the present *adhi.* rejects the identification of Prāṇa with Indra in his capacity as an individual soul, howsoever eminent, it is adverse to the interests of Monism. At the same time, in proposing a mystic interpretation of the identity-statements here, it affirms its unshakable faith in Theism. There is thus no substance in S.'s contention that the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, tho' for the most part favoring the doctrine of difference between Jīva and B. have affirmed their faith in Monism in *two* out of the five hundred and fifty-five sūtras—one of which is *Śāstrodṛṣṭyā tu updeśo Vāmadevavat*[34] (i.1.30) and the other *Ātmeti tūpagacchanti grāhayanti ca* (iv.1.3). We shall see about the second one in its proper place.

The last sūtra of this *adhi.* has been very clumsily interpreted by S. with many an unauthorized addition (*adhyāhāra*) of words. According to him, the Sūtra says, "If it be argued that B. is not the sole theme of these sections of the Up. because the characteristic marks of the individual soul and of the chief breath are also mentioned there, we say no to this. For (on such an interpretation) three types of meditation (will have to be admitted). Also because, the application of the term Prāṇa to B. on account of the presence of the marks of B. has been accepted (elsewhere[35]) and because, here also the characteristic marks of B. such as being most beneficial to man, are connected with the passage under discussion".

This interpretation is open to several objections. Firstly, the phrase 'on account of the three types of meditation' (*upāsātraividhyāt*) has

34. ***** अनुवदत्येवाविद्याकल्पितं लोकप्रसिद्धं जीवभेदम् । प्रतिपाद्यं तु शास्त्रार्थमात्मैकत्वमेव दर्शयति–'शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्' इत्यादिना (S. *BSB*. i.3., 19).
ननु, जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदं न क्वापि सूत्रकारो मुखतो वक्ति; किन्तु भेदमेव, अतो नैक्यमिष्टम् । तत्राह–प्रतिपाद्यंत्विति ।
(Ānandagiri on i.3, 19). This is itself an indirect admission that barring *two* Sūtras, the entire body of Bādarāyaṇa's work has no support to give to S.'s position!

35. All the words in brackets are to be supplied in S. interpretation of Sūtra 31. [एवं सति] उपासात्रैविध्य [प्रसंग]ात् प्राणशब्दस्य ब्रह्मणि वृत्तेः [अन्यत्र] आश्रितत्वात् [च] ।

been enlarged by S. into 'on account of (the undesirable contingency of) three types of meditation (having to be recognized)'—by adding to it the deprecatory expression 'prasaṅgāt' (*upāsātraividhya [prasaṅgāt]*). This disagrees with the normal practice of the Sūtrakāra, who does not forget to add such a deprecatory expression where he intends to draw attention to the adverse consequences of accepting a Pūrvapakṣa contention, as in: *Apītau tadvatprasaṁgāt* (ii, 1.8).

The absence of the deprecatory ablative *prasaṅgāt* (after *upāsātraividhya*) here shows that S. is merely reading his own idea into the Sūtra which does not intend to deprecate the three types of Upāsanās at all. Further, in the Viṣayavākya chosen by S. there is clear reference to the characteristics of Indra also, who tells Pratardana "Know me only. That is what I deem to be most beneficial to men" (iii.1). This should lead to four types of upāsanās in the Pūrvapakṣa, if we adopt S.'s line of argument. If the marks of Indra are to be appropriated to B. by means of *Śāstradṛṣṭi*, it could be done in respect of the marks of Jīva and Mukhyaprāṇa too and there would be no case for three types of Upāsanās in the Pūrvapakṣa.

The term *āśritatvāt* (having been accepted) in Sūtra 31 has been connected by S. with a remote antecedent *to be supplied*, in the form of a long clause: *'Brahmaliṅgavaśāt Prāṇaśabdasya Brahmaṇi vṛtteḥ.'* Again, after *'āśritatvāt'* an unauthorised term *anyatrāpi* (elsewhere also) has been added by him. Both these are unnecessary. *Āśritatvāt* could very well be connected with its nearest antecedents: *'upāsātraividhya'* and *'iha'*, giving quite a good sense. His explanation of *tadyogāt* is also open to question. The pronoun *tat* here can easily be referred to the preceding *upāsātraividhya* instead of referring to the remote idea of the marks of B. (*brahmaliṅga*). This also involves a repetition of the idea already expressed in the first Sūtra by the term *anugamāt*. Thus, S.'s attempt to rule out the threefold upāsanās mentioned in the Sūtra, in this connection, is unsustainable and goes against the natural drift of the wording of the Sūtra.

R., therefore, wisely departs from S.'s interpretation. He accepts the conclusion which follows from the natural drift of the sūtra and explains that the three types of Upāsanās are but variations of the same Brahmopasanā under three different aspects which are complementary. According to his explanation, these threefold Upaāsanās are (1) of B. with the totality of Jīvas as its body (ii) of B. as qualified by the Acit (inanimate reality)—element constituting its body and (iii) of B. in its own nature.[36] But the way in which he has here brought Prāṇopāsanā

36. परमात्मन एव स्वाकारेण, जीवशरीरकत्वेन, प्राणशरीरकत्वेन चोपासात्रैविध्यात् । (R. *Vedāntadīpa* i.1.32).

under Acidviśiṣṭabrahmopāsanā is not in agreement with the Upaniṣadic view where Prāṇa has been treated as a deity and, therefore, as a sentient principle (cetana).[37] Moreover, since there is an inseparable relation (*apṛthaksiddhi*) of Cit and Acit with B. in R.'s philosophy, there would seem to be hardly any scope for pure Svarūpopāsanā of B. unrelated to its modes, in his view.

M., therefore, disagrees with this interpretation and explains that the three types of Brahmopāsanās contemplated by the present text (*AĀ*) are (i) the inward (ii) outward and (iii) all-pervasive upāsanās of B.[38] These three kinds of Upāsanā are in accordance with the fitness of different orders of Adhikārins viz., (i) Devas, (ii) Ṛṣis and Gandharvas and (iii) men.[39] M. has further explained that in the present context of the AĀ these three forms of Upāsanā have been clearly indicated as under:—

(i) *Sa etam eva sīmānam vidārya etayā dvārā prāpadyata* (*AĀ.* ii, 4.3). 'The Supreme Vāsudeva cleft open the seam of the skull and entered the heart thro' the doorway of the Suṣumnā-nāḍi.' This refers to *inward upāsanā.*

(ii) *Sa etam eva Puruṣam Brahma tatamam apaśyat* (ii, 4.3). 'The Supreme who entered inside saw Himself as Puruṣa the all-pervading One.'[40] This refers to all-pervasive upāsanā.

(iii) *Etad dha sma vai tad vidvāan āha Mahidāsa Aitareyaḥ* (*AĀ.* ii, 1.8). 'Knowing all this Mahidāsa Aitareya declares......' This is said with reference to external upāsanā.

M. has further explained in his Bhāṣya that the reference to Mahidāsa Aitareya in this context in the *AĀ* is with particular reference to external Upāsanā, and not merely as the seer and author of the Āraṇyaka, which would be superfluous. He has accordingly cited the authority of *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* where Mahidāsa has been mentioned as an Avatar of Viṣṇu.

Justifying the categorical assertion of the Sūtrakāra that the "three forms of Upāsanā of B. have been taken up as the subject of this con-

37. 'तान् वरिष्ठः प्राण उवाच' 'य एवायं मुख्यः प्राणः' 'अपहतपात्मा ह्येषः' इत्यादिश्रुत्या मुख्यप्राणस्य चेतनत्वात्, तल्लिंगनिर्वाहाय अचिद्विशिष्टोपासनोक्त्ययोगात् । (*TC.* p. 413 b).
38. **अन्तर्बहिः सर्वगतत्वेन इत्युपासात्रैविध्यात् इहाश्रितत्वाच्च** । (M. *BSB.* i.1.31).
39. 'अन्तः प्रकाशा बहिःप्रकाशाः सर्वप्रकाशाः । देवा वाव सर्वप्रकाशाः ऋषयोऽन्तः प्रकाशाः, मनुष्या एव बहिःप्रकाशाः" इति चतुर्वेदशिखायाम् । (M. *BSB.* iv. 3, 16).
40. As Vādirāja has so well pointed out, the entry etc. of the Supreme is for the sake of upāsakas to meditate on Him: ननु, भगवानेव स्वरूपान्तरं व्याप्तमपश्यदित्युच्यते, स च नोपासक इति चेत्; सत्यम्; अन्ततस्तद्भक्तानामुपासनार्थमेव तत्प्रसंजनमिति भावः । (*TPG.* i.1.31).

text and on account of their fitness", M. points out that the Śāstras intend that different orders of adhikārins have to practise Upāsanās of B. in accordance with their intrinsic fitness:[41]

"By some the Supreme is to be meditated upon as *abiding everywhere*; by some others as abiding *in* the heart and by some others externally *in* His manifestations as Avatāras of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, etc. The Lord is to be sought by the sacrificers *in* the sacred fires, and other rites; *in* their own hearts by Sages who have controlled their senses and vital airs and *in* idols and external forms by the unenlightened and as all-pervading by those of the highest calibre.

41. तत्तदुपासनायोग्यतया च पुरुषाणाम् —
"अग्नौ क्रियावतां विष्णुर्योगिनां हृदये हरिः ।
प्रतिमास्वप्रबुद्धानां सर्वत्र विदितात्मनाम्" ॥ इति ॥ (M. *BSB*. i.1.31).

PĀDA II

INTRODUCTION

There are seven *adhi.-s* in this Pāda. Except the last one establishin the Samanvaya of the name (Vaiśvānara) with a view to securing the Samanvaya of several characteristic marks like *pācakatva, pāvakatva*, *antaḥpratiṣṭhānatva*, the rest of the adhis establish the Samanvaya of significant names which admittedly denote things other than B. The *Liṅgas* chosen for Samanvaya here are partly other than those associated with *Anyatraprasiddha-nāmātmaka-śabdas*, already taken note of in the first Pāda.[1] These marks which are open to divergence of opinion are here finally referred to B. on the basis of other names and marks which are decisive in their import.[2] It may be true enough that in an overall sense, the Sūtra *Tadadhīnatvād arthavat* (i.4.3) as interpreted by M. would be capable of establishing the Samanvaya in B. of all names and *liṅgas* commonly applied to others on account of the overruling criterion that the bases of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) of all these names and lingas are ultimately determined by Its will. But this does not render the attempt at a detailed Samanvaya of the Anyatraprasiddha and Ubhayatraprasiddha-Nāmalingātmaka-śabdas in the first three Pādas unnecessary. For the Samanvaya worked out in several *adhi.* there, helps to amplify the thesis of B.'s Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva in all its richness of thought and detail.[3]

Each of the adhis. here has its own governing idea of discourse (*adhikarṇopādhi*). These have been shown in M.'s interpretation to be

1. अन्यत्र प्रसिद्धनामानि तत्र तत्र स्थितैर्लिगैर्भगवन्निष्ठानीति प्राक् प्रसाधिते सति, तत्रासन्दिग्धलिंगप्रहाणेनेतरेषां समन्वयोऽत्रोच्यत इति । (*TCP* p. 415 b).
2. असंदिग्धभगवन्नामलिंगादिभिः संदिग्धलिंगसमन्वयः । (*TCP* p. 415).
3. तत्तच्छब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तगुणलाभस्य वक्ष्यमाणसापेक्षत्वेऽपि तत्तत्प्रकरणस्थगुणमात्रलाभः पूर्वाधिकरणाक्षेपः समाधानं च तत्तदधिकरणमात्रसाध्यम् । (*TC*. p. 422 b).
अवयवशक्तिलभ्यपरमैश्वर्यादिमत्त्वरूपगुणलाभस्येत्यर्थः (*TCP*).

arranged in some logical order.[4] These points have been elucidated in the *TC* of Vyāsarāya. The first adhi. secures for B. the Samanvaya of the positive characteristic (*bhāvarūpam liṅgam*) viz., all-pervasiveness (*saravagatatva*). The next one (*Attradhi.*) harmonizes the mark of 'dissolving all' which consists of an activity (sarvasamhartṛrūpakriyāt ṛmakam liṅgam). The third (*Guhādhi.*) deals with another distinctive activity of the enjoyment of the fruits of (good) Karma of Jīvas by B. (*Karmaphalabhogarūpakriyātmakam liṅgam*). The *Antara-adhi.* attempts the Samanvaya of the positive mark of being present within the eye together with the activity of enjoying such presence.[5] The next *Antaryāmi-adhi.* attempts the Samanvaya of a positive mark of being present in all and controlling their activities from within.[6] The *Adṛśyatvādhi.* secures the Samanvaya of negative characteristics.[7] The last Vaiśvānarādhi., establishes the Samanvaya of the name Vaiśvānara along with a number of liṅgas such as *pācakatvam.*

This sequence of adhi. rests on the logical order of ideas. Factual presence of B. in beings takes precedence over Its activities there. Hence the presence of B. in all beings has been given precedence in the opening adhi.[8] Then comes the characteristic of "devouring all" dealt with in *Attā carācaragrahaṇāt* (i.2.9); and thereafter the attribute of enjoyment of the fruits of good Karma of Jīvas, as the latter is a more specialized characteristic than that of universal consumption (in Pralaya). Then come in order dual-characteristics of *antas-sthitvā ramaṇam* (*antaraḥ*) and *antar-yāmitvam.* The precedence of the former over the latter is again due to the fact that in the former, the ground of *anyatraprasiddhi* is determined on the basis of the Śruti, while in the latter, it is by a *liṅga.* The latter is also designed to meet an objection brought up against the idea of enjoyment (*ramaṇam*) incorporated in the previous adhi.[9] Then comes the turn of negative liṅgas like "being unperceived" (*adṛśyatva*). After dealing with the claims of words based on pure 'liṅgas' the *name* 'Vaiśvānara' which is anyatraprasiddha and whose samanvaya facilitates the harmonization of many other characteristic marks is taken up last.

4. एतद्भावाभिधं लिगं क्रियालिगे ततः परम्
अन्तर्याम्यन्तरश्चेति क्रियाभावाख्यमुच्यते ।
अदृश्यत्वाद्यभावाख्य श्रुतिलिगादिका परा । (*AV.* i, 2, Ver. 4-5).
5. 'अन्तर' इत्यस्यान्तःस्थितिरूपभावसहितरमणरूपक्रियात्मकं लिगम् ।
6. अन्तर्यामीत्यत्र तत्सहितनियमनरूपक्रियात्मकं लिगम् ।
7. अभावात्मकं लिगम् ।
8. विद्यमानस्यैव क्रियान्वयात्, क्रियातो भावस्य प्राथम्यम् । नहि क्रियासामान्यस्य स्थितिसामान्यापेक्षित्वमिव स्थितिसामान्यस्य क्रियासामान्यापेक्षित्वमस्ति । (*TC.* p. 435).
9. बहुव्यापारवतः तद्धेतुकविक्षेपेण दुःखप्रसंगात् इत्यन्तरत्वे आक्षिप्ते, यत् यदनधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिप्रतीतिकं तन्नियमने तस्य दुःखादि । ईश्वरस्तु सत्तादिप्रद इति सत्तादिप्रदत्वरूपान्तर्यामित्वप्रतिपादनात् 'अन्तर' इत्येतदानन्तर्यं अन्तर्यामीत्यस्य । (*TC.* p. 436 b).

CHAPTER XXIV

THE OMNIPRESENT PRINCIPLE

1. *Sarvagatatvādhikaraṇam* (i.2, 1-8)

M. opens the first adhi. here as follows: In the previous *adhi.* it was shown that B. is all-pervasive (*Brahma tatamam AĀ.* ii, 4.3).[10] The same has been further celebrated in the next Āraṇyaka in this way: "Him the Bahvṛcas laud *in* the great Uktha (Brihatīsahasra), the Adhvaryus *in* Agni, the Chandogas *in* the Mahāvrata Stotra. The wise ones proclaim Him to be present *in* this earth, *in* heaven, *in* the wind, the sky, the waters, herbs, trees, moon and the stars. *In* all these beings, they declare Him to be existing as B." (iii, 2.3). However, as the same Being is further spoken of as "Of this, the yonder Sun is the essence. Therefore, the Sun faces each and every man. The Sun is the soul of the moving and the stable ones" (ii.2.3). There are also indications of the description of the Jīvātman in '*Cakṣurmayaḥ śrotramayaś Chandomayaḥ*' (iii.2.2). As B. is all-pervasive it cannot be contained in limited beings and things. The Being referred to in *Etam hyeva bahvṛcā*.......must, therefore, be other than the Supreme B. (Prāṇa). The pūrvapakṣa that this being is the Sun receives further support from the statement: *Mahāpuruṣa iti yam avocāma Samvatsara eva pradhvamsayan anyāni bhūtāni aikyābhāvayan anyāni. Tasyaitasya asāvādityo rasaḥ sa yaścāyam aśarīraḥ prajñātmā yascāsāvāditye ekam etad iti vidyāt. Tasmāt Puruṣam puruṣam pratyādityo bhavati*" (iii, 2.3).

This is set aside by showing that in this context the use of the term B.[11] which by its established usage refers to the highest B. is sufficient to disprove the claims of Āditya, Jīva and others.

10. Vide passage quoted under उपासात्रैविध्यात् (*BS.* i.1.31).
11. सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते । (*AĀ.* iii, 2.3).

The next Sūtra *Vivakṣitaguṇopapatteśca*[12] (i.2.2) supports the siddhānta by pointing out that the concluding passage of the Āraṇyaka (iii.2.4) speaks of that Being as the all-pervasive one who cannot be thought of in all His fulness, by any one; who is not knowable in His fulness by others; who sees all; thinks of all, knows all; who is the inner Person in all.[13] This description cannot be applied to the Sun or to any other being. As B. is all-pervasive it can be present in every limited being too, like space.[14]

The next Sūtra (i.2.3) 'Not the embodied because it is impossible', shows how all-pervasiveness is not possible in the embodied soul (which is atomic in size). The expression 'Śārīra' used in this Sūtra goes to show that the being referred to in the Viṣayavākya as *Aśarīraḥ prajñātmā* (*AĀ*. iii, 2, 2) cannot be equated with the individual self as contended by the Pūrvapakṣin on account of certain other *liṅgas*. The fourth Sūtra (*Karmakartṛvyapadeśāt*) shows that in the text *Ātmānam parasmai śamsati* (*AĀ*. iii, 2, 3) B. is the subject of discourse and the Jīva is the exponent. This again points to their difference. The sixth Sūtra cites evidence of Smṛti in support of this distinction. The seventh shows that as B. is to be meditated upon in the heart, the allusion to its being present in the heart of man in spite of its being all-pervasive is not irreconcilable. The expression *"nicāyyatvāt"* used in this Sūtra (from √Cāyṛ to see, should be enough to show that the Upāsanā of B. as existing in all the beings[16] is not merely an assumptive worship but an act of sincere faith based on facts.[17] The concluding Sūtra: *Sambhogaprāptir iti cenna vaiśeṣyāt* (i.2.8) emphasizes that tho' an all-pervasive being (like space) B. is *not*, however, obliged to share the suffering and sorrows of the Jīvātmā in spite of its existing in the body along with him. This is because of the intrinsic nature of the difference between them resting on the sovereignty, omniscience and all-powerfulness of B. and the limited power and understanding of Jīvātman.[18]

12. विवक्षितत्वं च वक्ष्यमाणत्वम् । वक्ष्यमाणे हि विवक्षा भवति तथा चाश्रुतत्वादीनामुपसंहारस्थत्वात् बलवत्ता इत्यर्थः । (*TC*. p. 434 b).
13. स यो ऽतोऽमतोऽनतोऽदृष्टोऽविज्ञातो ऽनादिष्टः श्रोता मन्ता द्रष्टाघोष्टा विज्ञाता प्रज्ञाता सर्वेषामन्तरपुरुषः (*AĀ*. iii.2, 4). इत्यादेश्चोपसंहारस्थत्वेन बलवत्त्वात् तदनुसारेणोपक्रमस्थादित्यादिश्रुतेरर्भकैकस्त्वादिलिंगानां च नेतव्यत्वात् । (*TC*. p. 432 b).
14. अल्पोकस्त्वस्य च व्योमवदिति सौत्रपदसूचितेन —
'एकत्राप्यनवस्थाने सर्वत्रावस्थितिः कथम् ?
एकत्रैव तु संस्थानं नैवात्र प्रतिपाद्यते' । इति न्यायेन सर्वगतेऽपि संभवात् । (*TC*. p. 430).
16. सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते । एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते । (*AĀ*). मीमासन्ते is used in the sense of उपासते See S. *BSB*. i.1.25.
17. उपासनाया मानसक्रियात्वेनार्थाभावेऽपि संभवादिति शंकायां उपासनाया ज्ञानात्मकत्वादर्थाभावोऽसिद्ध इति परिहर्तुं चायृ–दर्शन इत्यस्माद्धातोर्निष्पन्नस्य निचाय्यशब्दस्य प्रयोगः । (*TC*. 435 b).
18. जीवपरयोरेकशरीरस्थत्वे समानभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न । सामर्थ्यवैशेष्यात् । उक्तं हि गारुडे–
सर्वज्ञताल्पज्ञताभेदात् सर्वशक्त्यल्पशक्तितः ।
स्वातन्त्र्यपारतंत्र्याभ्यां संभोगो नेशजीवयोः ॥ (M. *BSB*. i.2.8).

Thus even a rapid glance at the wording of the Sūtras of the opening adhi. especially Sūtras 2 and 3 would be enough to confirm the position of M. that the Sūtrakāra is sincerely upholdlng the doctrine of Theism that B. is completely different from the Jīvātman and is possessed of transcendental attributes which the Śrutis ascribe to It with a full sense of their truthfulness.

Interpretations of Saṁkara and Rāmānuja.

S. and R. start the *adhi.* with *Chān. Up.* (iii.14) as their Viṣayavākya: "Tranquil, one should meditate on It as 'Tajjalān'. Let him form a resolve for himself. He who consists of mind, whose body is Prāṇa, whose form is light and whose will comes true...."[19]

The question accordingly is whether the being to be meditated upon as having the aforesaid attributes is the individual self or B. S. and his commentator present the objection thus: It is the individual Self who is endowed with mind, breath etc. B. is without mind and breath and is pure. So, the object of meditation here is the individual soul itself. The Siddhānta view is that B. alone is to be meditated upon, as the attributes of *"Satyakāmatva"*, being greater than the earth etc. are decisive. The attributes of Manomayatva etc. (according to *Bhāmatī*) can be aligned with B. in view of the identity of the Jīva with B. The attributes of B. (such as *satyasaṅkalpatva*) cannot, however, be aligned with the Jīvātman; For it is the embodied consciousness that is superimposed on B. The substratum of an illusory appearance of snake is conceived as having the attributes of causing fear etc. which are distinctive of the snake. But the snake is *not* conceived as having the distinctive attributes of the rope such as its ropeness and easy approachability. For, prior to the illusion there is no snake to speak of in the rope; while at the time of the illusion there certainly is the rope.[20]

These reasonings are fallacious. It is true that the substratum (of any illusory appearance) is present with its own specific nature at the time of the (mis) apprehension of the superimposed object; whereas, there is no superimposed object when the substratum is apprehended. But it is equally true that when the substratum is perceived *as such* in its distinctive form, it cannot be credited with the attributes of the superimposed object. A rope when it is perceived in its distinctive form *as a rope*, which can be easily approached without hesitation and hand-

19. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत अथ खलु क्रतुमयः पुरुषो * * * * स क्रतुं कुर्वीत, मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसङ्कल्प .... ।
20. समारोपितस्य हि रूपेण भुजंगस्य भीषणत्वादिना रज्जू रूपवती, न पुना रज्जुरूपेणाभिगम्यत्वादिना भुजंगो रूपवान्, तदा भुजंगस्यैवाभावात् किंरूपवत् ? भुजगदशायां तु, न नास्ति वास्तवी रज्जुः तदिह समारोपितजीवरूपेण वस्तुसत् ब्रह्म रूपवदुच्यते । न तु ब्रह्मरूपैर्नित्यत्वादिभिर्जीवः तद्वान् भवितुमर्हति । (*Bhāmatī*).

led, is not surely credited with the attributes of inspiring fear etc., belonging to the snake. In the present case, the substratum is presented in the text in its distinctive form of possessing the attributes of *satyasaṅkalpatva*, etc. which are sufficient to establish its true identity as B. Such a presentation will certainly militate against B. being accommodated with the attributes of manomayatva and others, as is sought to be done by S. and his commentators.

Moreover, in strict Advaitic theory the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. belong to the Saguṇa B. The Saguṇa B. and the Jīva are both superimposed on the Nirguṇa. That being so, there can be no relation of substratum and the superimposed (*adhiṣṭhānāropyabhāva*) between the first two. The ascription of *manomayatva* and other attributes belonging to the Jīvātman to B. in the manner suggested by S. would make the proposition of the Śruti requiring meditation on B. as *manomaya* etc. *as invalid as the* ascription of the property of inspiring fear to the rope (outside the illusion). Nor is it necessary from S.'s point of view that upāsanā should be carried on with attributes which really pertain to the object of upāsanā. The present text of the *Chān. Up.* (iii. 14, 1-2) being regarded as an *upāsanāvākya*,[21] the Jīvātman himself can very well be regarded as endowed with the attributes of *satyasankalpatva, jyāyastva*, etc. even tho' these may not belong to him. In that case, the Pūrvapakṣa's contention would hold true and the Siddhāntin's objection that *satyasankalpatva*, etc. could *not* be referred to the Jīvātman would lose its point.

The way in which S. interprets the Sūtras of the present *adhi.* is also open to objections. In the first place, the choice of the Viṣayavākya (from *Chān. Up.* iii. 14, 1-2) is far from appropriate. The presence of the mark of *satyakāmatva* and other attributes of B. in the viṣayavākya leaves no room for any doubt whether the object of meditation is the Supreme B. or the Jīvātman. As for the marks of *manomayatva* and others, they can be accommodated in B. in the light of the ruling given in the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* by understanding *maya* in the sense of abundance. At any rate, the "Apacchedanyāya" is dear to the Advaitin. It would easily help to establish the superiority of the mark of B. over the Jīvaliṅgas of *manomayatva* in the present case and preclude the Pūrvapakṣa from arising at the very outset. It may also be recalled that in the previous *adhi.* S. himself has set aside the Jīva and Mukhya Prāṇalingas in view of the unity of theme (*ekavākyatā*) in regard to B. as borne out by the *upakrama* (initial) and *upasamhāra* (final) passages.[22] This same principle of interpretation if applied here would show that there is a clear upakrama in favor of B. in the words *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* (*Chān. Up.* iii.14.1) and an *Upasamhāra* also in the same direction: *Etad Brahma* (iii.14.4). In accordance with these, the marks of *manomayatva* etc. could all be naturally construed in accordance with the Brahmalingas. If this is done, there would be no case for the present Pūrvapakṣa and consequently no need to go into it at all in this adhikaraṇa!

21. सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत । (*Up.*).

Coming to the details of S.'s interpretation of the Sūtras here, we find that the term 'Sarvatra' as used in Sūtra 1, finds no justification whatever from the point of view of his Viṣayavākya. This deserves to be contrasted with the position in M.'s interpretation. There the Viṣayavākya from the *AĀ.* (iii, 2.3) refers to B.'s presence *in so many things, places and beings all over the cosmos with deep feeling*.[23] The word *sarvatra* in the Sūtra strikes a corresponding chord in the Śruti from which M. has drawn his viṣayavākya.

Another deficiency in S.'s rendering of the present *adhi.* is that the first Sūtra here does not contain the predicate of the proposition moved viz. "that which is to be meditated upon as consisting of mind etc. is B". (*Manomayatvādinā upāsyam brahma*). We are left in the Sūtra, as interpreted by S., with the bare mention of the reason (*hetu*) by which such a proposition is intended to be established. This again contrasts unfavorably with M.'s interpretation where the main proposition based on the Viṣayavākya from *AĀ.* is briefly stated in the words of the Sūtra *Sarvatra* (*ucyamānam*) Brahmaiva. The Being spoken of everywhere in the passage of the AĀ. (iii.2.4.) in such terms as "He who is without a body who is essentially Wisdom, who is in the Sun He should be known as the same. Therefore, the Sun faces every one" is the Supreme B. itself. According to M. the subject of the proposition viz. (Tat)=B. *is given throughout the Samanvayādhyāya by anuvṛtti from the fourth Sūtra* (i.1.4).

The attribute of *Satyakāmatva* etc. moreover, are after all *mithyābhūta* (false) according to S. For this reason, they cannot properly be regarded as being the purport of the Śruti (*śrutitātparyavat*),[24] or based on sound reason (*Upapattimat*). In these circumstances, one has to wonder how the Sūtrakāra could bring himself to speak of them in such

22. उपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां हि वाक्यैकत्वमवगम्यते * * ब्रह्मलिंगयोगात् ब्रह्मोपदेश एवायमिति गम्यते । (S. *BSB.* i.1.31).
23. एतं ह्येव बह्वृचा महत्युक्थे मीमांसन्ते * * एतमग्नौ * * एतं दिवि, एतं वायौ, एतमाकाशे * * सर्वेषु भूतेषु एतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते । (*AĀ.* iii, 2.3).
24. वेदेऽप्युपादेयत्वेनाभिहितं विवक्षितं भवति इतरदविवक्षितम् । उपादानानुपादाने तु वेदवाक्यतात्पर्यातात्पर्याभ्यामवगम्येते । (S. *BSB.* i.2.2).

glowing terms as "The qualities desired to be expressed (*vaktum iṣṭāḥ*) and appropriate in B".[25]

The third Sūtra in S.'s interpretation becomes superfluous as the second itself has established the reasonableness of holding *satyakāmatva* etc. to belong to B. and not to Jīvātman. The relationship of object of activity and agent (*karmakartṛvyapadeśa*) supposed to be mentioned in Sūtra 4, can as well be brought within the scope of the words *śabdaviśeṣa* used in Sūtra 5 which would render the fourth Sūtra unnecessary.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. the passage *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma....... anādaraḥ* (*Chān. Up.* iii.14, 1-2) as a whole represents the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the Jīvātman and not the earlier part *alone* as in S. The argument of the Pūrvapakṣa according to R. briefly is: The being referred to by the expression Brahma in "all this is indeed B. ***" is the Jīvātman himself. The world "*all*" denotes the entire world from the four-faced Brahmā to the blade of grass. In referring to B. as "all this" the Śruti means it to be understood that the individual soul which in the course of its beginningless transmigration has been born in countless species is not inaptly designated as being "*all this*". The Supreme B. on the other hand, is opposed to all evil and imperfections. It cannot be identified with *all this* changing world. We have, therefore, to take it that it is the individual soul that has been referred to as being the source of the world in "*Tajjalān*". Such a statement also would not be incongruous; for the individual soul may also be regarded as the *cause* of the world thro' its contact with Avidyā, Karma, etc., while in its essential state, it is inviolate and infinite. The term B. is also used many a time to denote Jīvātman. There is, therefore, no difficulty in treating the whole passage as referring to the meditation of Jīvātman.

The Siddhānta view is: Only the Supreme B. can be "of the nature of all" (*Sarvātmakam*). It is out of the question to suppose that the individual soul can be "all this". One self cannot have the nature of another self. How then can it have the natures of all? As for B. it is of the nature of all, in the sense that it has all this (world of matter and souls) for its modes.[26] The imperfections of the modes do not affect the purity of B. The causation of the world and denotation by the term "B" cannot be properly attributed to the individual soul. Thus

25. विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेः । (*B.S.* i.2.2).
26. आत्मनश्च परस्य * * * शरीरात्मभावेन सर्वात्मत्वोपपादनात् । (R. *Vedāntadīpa* i.2.1).

it follows that the Supreme B. is alone the subject matter of the passage and the object of meditation in the given context of the *Chān. Up.*

In accordance with the above Siddhānta, R. interprets the first Sūtra as follows: "Everywhere (i.e. in this world referred to by the word *all* (in "all this is B.")—the being which has been denoted by the term "B." and placed in apposition with the world and spoken of as partaking of the nature of all, is indeed the Supreme Being. The particle *iti* placed after *tajjalān* sums up the reason (*hetu*) why B. is said to be *all this*.[27] By using the expression *khalu* (verily) the text teaches that both these facts, of B.'s *Sarvātmakatva* and *kāraṇatva*, are well-known.

This interpretation of R. puts too much strain on the words of the Sūtra. It deserves to be noted that the expression used in the Sūtra is *sarvatra* and not *sarvam*. Had the Sūtrakāra wanted to establish here that B. is of the nature of all (*Sarvātmaka*), he would have used the appropriate word for it viz., *sarvam following* the reading of the Śruti (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma*) cited as Viṣayavākya by R. and as interpreted by him. But he has used instead the expression "*Sarvatra*" which means "everywhere" *and not* "everything" (is Brahman): *This by itself is an indication that R.'s Viṣayavākya is beside the point* and M.'s is more in keeping with the wording of the Sūtra. R. has also to interpret "*prasiddha*" in Sūtra i.2.1 in the abstract sense of "being well-known" (*prasiddhatva*). Above all, he has to import (by *adhyāhāra*) a whole predicative clause placed in brackets below:

Sarvam khalvidam brahmeti nirdiṣṭe vastuni, (*Sāmānādhikaraṇyena tadātmakatayā nirdṣṭam Param Brahmaiva*):—

"(What is denoted by the word Brahman) in the text *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma* (and placed in apposition with it, is only the Supreme B). This is because according to R.'s interpretation, only the minor term (*pakṣa*) and the reason (*hetu*) have been given in the Sūtra (i.2.1) and the predicate—(the most important element) has to be imported by *adhyāhāra*. According to M., however, the predicate (=Brahman) is carried over the entire Samanvayādhyāya by right of *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra i.1.4 as a matter of principle. This is not accepted by S. or R. Hence the awkwardness of their interpretation of the present Sūtra[28] and of many others. It is otherwise difficult to see why R.'s commentator Sudarśana Sūri should have resorted to the desperate remedy of

27. तज्जलानिति हेतुतः सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति प्रसिद्धवदुपदेशात्, ब्रह्मणो जातत्वात् ब्रह्मणि लीनत्वात् ब्रह्माधीनत्वाच्च हेतोः ब्रह्मात्मकं सर्वं खल्विदं जगत् । (*Śrībhāṣya* i, 2, 1).
28. अस्मद्रीत्या आध्यायपरिसमाप्ति प्रत्यधिकरणमनुवर्तमानेन तत्त्विवतिपदेनैव साक्षात्साध्यबोधसंभवे, अत्यन्तव्यवहितस्यानुवर्तमानेनापकर्षेण वा पर्यवसानद्वारा साध्यबोधोक्तेरयुक्तत्वात् । (Rāgh *TCP*. p. 443b).

suggesting that certain negative predicates like *na aśabdam* (from i.1.5), *na itaraḥ* (from i, 1, 16) or *na anyaḥ* (from i, 1.21) may be taken over by *anuvṛtti* from the previous Pāda; or else the negative predicate *na śārīraḥ* can be borrowed from the next Sūtra (i.2.3)! This, he says, would be tantamount to giving us an affirmative proposition in favor of B.—in the end,[29] in the sense that *if* what is taught as being *sarvātmakam* in *Chān. Up.* iii.14 is neither the *Prakṛti nor Jīvātman,* it must *in other words be the Supreme Brahman.*[30] But the point is that even in this roundabout construction, it is still necessary for R. to insert the words "what is referred to by the term B." by way of extension of the minor term.[31] All this should make it clear that M.'s interpretation is in a position to do better justice to the wording of the Sūtras of this *adhi.*

29. Viz. सर्वत्र (सर्वात्मकत्वेन ब्रह्मशब्दाभिधेयं) [नाशब्दम्; नेतरः; नान्यः; न शारीरः] (किंतु ब्रह्मैव) प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।
30. यदत्रोक्तं श्रुतप्रकाशे – नाशब्दं इति वा, नेतर इति वा अन्य इति वा पूर्वपादात् अनुवर्तते वा 'न शारीर' इति वक्ष्यमाणमपकृष्यते वा । तस्य पर्यवसानात् ब्रह्मैवेति लभ्यते नाध्याहार इति । (*TCP.* p. 442-43).
31. तत्र "ब्रह्मशब्देनाभिधीयमानं" इत्यस्य एतावताध्याहारापरिहारात् । (*TCP.* p. 443b).

CHAPTER XXV

BRAHMAN IS THE ALL-EATER

2. *Attradhikaraṇam* (i, 2, 9-10)

Attā carācaragrahaṇāt.

After establishing the presence of the Supreme B. everywhere in the Universe (*sarvagatatva*), Bādarāyaṇa turns in this *adhi.* to emphasize another aspect of Divine Majesty[1] that of devouring all that It has itself created[2] (*Sarvāttṛtva*).

The Viṣayavākya chosen for the *adhi.* by M. is "Whatever He brought forth He resolved to eat. He eats everything. Hence the all-devourership of 'Aditi' (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2, 5).[3] Here, the word *Aditi* in the feminine,[4] raises a Pūrvapakṣa that the attribute of all-devourership belongs to the deity Aditi and not to the Supreme B. which has been described in the Up. to be a non-eater (Cf. *anaśnan* Mund. Up. iii.1.1). This latter objection is met in the next *adhi.*

The use of the term "Death" (*Mṛtyu*) in the beginning of the Viṣayavākya,[5] in the statement that "Whatever He created He resolved to devour" is sufficient to show that by 'eating' here is meant the destruction of the Universe,[6] or its dissolution which has been incorpora-

1. यदस्मिन्नध्याये समन्वीयते तत्सर्वं लक्षणत्वेन प्रकृतं इत्यानन्दमयाधिकरणेऽभिहितम् । (*NS.* p. 159 b).
2. सर्वात्तृत्वरूपापूर्वगुणलाभार्थं च लिंगस्यैव समन्वयोक्तेः । (*TCP.* p. 446 b).
3. नैवेह किंचनाग्र आसीन्मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत् * * * सोऽकामयत * * स यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तुमध्रियत सर्वं वा अत्तीति तददितेरदितित्वम् । (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2.1-5).
4. For M's explanation of the use of the feminine gender in such instances see his C on *BS.* i.4.28.
5. नैवेह किंचनाग्र आसीत् । मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत् ।
6. मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत् इत्युपक्रमे मृत्युशब्दात् 'यद्यदेवासृजत तत्तदत्तुमध्रियत' इति सृष्टिप्रतियोगित्वात् भक्षणस्यापि संहारविशेषत्वात्, ऊर्णनाभ्यादिवच्च । (*TC.* p. 449).

ted in the definition of B. given in i.1.2. The Siddhāntin points out that as there is no mention of "Aditi" the deity, in the preceding paragraph (*Bṛh. Up.* 1, 2, 4) and as the present paragraph justifies the use of the term 'Aditi' to denote the 'eater' by saying that "He eats up 'whatever' (*yad yad eva*) He created" this iterative points to the eater of all that has been created. Such a being can only be the Supreme B. which has been recognized as the creator of all. Hence "all-devouring" also must be one of its characteristics. This wider definition of Aditi has been given in the Śruti to preclude the possibility of assigning to the word *Sarvam* in this context a restricted sense of whatever falls within the province of the deity so that the eating may be viewed as an attribute of the deity itself. This underlying purpose of giving a wider sense to '*Sarvam*' has been highlighted by the still more comprehensive expression *carācaragrahaṇāt* in the Sūtra. The next Sūtra Prakaraṇāt (i.2.10) clinches the matter by pointing out that other details regarding the creation of waters and the four-faced Brahmā referred to in the previous section[2] leave no room for doubt that the topic under discussion pertains to the Supreme B. alone.[8]

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja.

S. and R. have, however, chosen for this *adhi.* a passage from the *Kaṭha Up.* (i.2.25). While S. treats Sutras 9 and 10 as one *adhi.*, R. regards Sutras 9-12 as one *adhi.* (*Attradhikaraṇam*). Tho' there is not much difference of opinion about the overall interpretation of the *adhi.* among the commentators, the Viṣayavākya chosen by S.:—

Yasya brahma ca kṣatram cobhe bhavata odanaḥ

Mṛtyur yasyopasecanam **** (*Kaṭha*, i, 2.25).

("For whom the Brahmin class and the warrior class are both food and Death is as sauce") does not precisely answer to the wording of the Sūtra: *Attā carācaragrahaṇāt* (i.2.9). This is not the case with M.'s Viṣayavākya. There the words *Sarvam vā atti* (*Bṛh. Up.* i.2.5) have their exact counterparts in *carācara* and *attā*. In S.'s interpretation, on the other hand, the 'eater' (*attā*) has got to be understood through *Upalakṣaṇa* from the use of the words *odamam* (food) and *upasecana* (sauce) occurring in the text of the *Kaṭha.*, while *Brahma ca kṣatram ca* have to indicate the movable and the immovable worlds,

7. "There was nothing whatever here in the beginning. All this was envoloped by Death. From Him as he was worshipping Himself water was born. That which was froth of water became solidified. It became the Earth. What was the seed—from it was born the year (Prajāpati). When he was born, He opened His mouth. The baby (Prajāpati) cried *bhāṇ*. That became speech" (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2, 1-4).
8. M. *BSB.* i. 2, 10. See Also *Manu* i.8).

(*carācara*)[9] by secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*). This shows that the Viṣayavākya has *not* been properly selected by S. and R. The same objection applies to the interpretation of the second Sūtra. S. has referred therein to the text "the knowing self is not born and does not die (*Kaṭha.* i, 2, 18) as establishing that the eater is the Supreme Being.[10] But the first quarter of the same verse which speaks of its not being slain when "the body is slain" and the next verse "If the slayer thinks that he slays and if the slain thinks that he is slain, both do not undrestand" refer to contact with the physical body and susceptibility to delusion of being the slayer or the slain. These are clear marks of Jīvahood. Hence the text *Na jāyate* *** cannot be held to refer to B. in any straight sense.

There is thus greater cogency in M.'s basing the *adhi.* on the above-quoted passages from the *Bṛh. Up.* By denying *attṛtva* to the Jīvātman and conferring it, instead on B. (even according to S.'s own showing) the present *adhi.* also refuses to give any quarter to S.'s doctrine of identity of Jīva and B. and to his Nirviśesa Brahmavāda.

9. It would be difficult to get at the idea of the immovable from *brahma* or *kṣatra* both of which are movable!
10. इतश्च परमात्मैवेहात्ता यत्कारणं प्रकारणमिदं परमात्मनः । (S. *BSB.* 1.2.10).

CHAPTER XXVI

ENJOYER OF FRUITS OF GOOD KARMA

3. *Guhādhikaraṇam* (i.2, 11-12)

The Guhādhikaraṇa establishes the samanvaya in B. of the mark of "enjoying the fruits of (good) karmas" performed by the Jīvas.[1] This is apparently incompatible with B.'s freedom from karma. Hence, in the interests of Samanvaya of such liṅgas, this *adhi.* is introduced. The Viṣayavākya is from the *Kaṭha Up.*:—

"The two imbibing the fruits of karma, in the world of good deeds, have entered the secret place"[2] (i.3.1). This text presents two obstacles to its Samanvaya in B. One is the reference to the enjoyment of the fruits of Karma as already mentioned and the other is the use of the dual in referring to the drinkers (*pibantau*).[3] The Supreme is reputed to be a non-eater (*anaśnan*) in the Mund. Up. (iii.1.1). It is *One only.* The use of the dual in referring to B. cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, contends that in this text we have a reference to the Jīvātman alone as the true and actual enjoyer of the fruits of karma and that as Īśvara or the Supreme Being happens to be closely associated with the Jīvātman in the body, while the latter is enjoying the fruits of his karma, the former also is in a way spoken of as enjoying the same fruits. It is a purely figurative usage based on what is known as the *Chattrinyāya*. Hence, the dual *'pibantau'*.

1. अत्र लोकतोऽन्यत्र प्रसिद्धस्य कर्मफलभोक्तृत्वलिंगस्य विष्णौ समन्वयसमर्थनादस्ति शास्त्रसंगतिः। (*TP*).
2. 'ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे। छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति'। (*Katha. Up.* i.3.1).
3. इह तु, प्रातिपदिकार्थः कर्मफलभोक्तृत्वं, प्रत्ययार्थो द्वित्वं च कर्मबन्धरहिते निर्भेदे च ब्रह्मणि न युक्तम्। (*TC.* p. 457 b).

This is how S., R. and many others have interpreted this Upaniṣadic text and the Sūtra based on it, in their Siddhānta view. The Pūrvapakṣa, according to these commentators, is the contention of Sāṅkhya philosophy that the two imbibers referred to in the Up. are *Buddhi* and *Jīva.*

M. rejects this interpretation as it fails to give a direct samanvaya in B. (*and B. alone*) of the mark in question (*Samanvetavyalinga*)—in the primary sense of the words, as required by the principle of Samanvaya formulated by the Sūtrakāra. It would be seen that the samanvaya of such a mark in B. in the way in which M. has accomplished it, would give us a new insight into the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa in which the teaching of the Śruti 'Other creatures live upon a fraction of Its bliss' (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 32), finds fulfilment. He feels that it would be a travesty of Samanvaya to divert this text from B. to Jīvātman. By making the samanvaya of this text figurative in B. and primary with reference to Jīvātman (as the imbiber), the whole spirit and drift of samanvaya as conceived and carried out till now stand violated. M.'s criticism of this interpretation is brief but significant: *Na ca jīve samanvaya ucyate,* that no Samanvaya of Scriptural words, phrases and marks in their highest primary sense has been contemplated in the Jīvātman by the Sūtrakāra. For throughout the Samanvayādhyāya, the harmonization of texts (whether they contain *spaṣṭbrahmalinga* or *aspaṣṭabrahmalinga* or words which are *anyatra, anyatairva* or *ubhayatra prasiddha-nāmātmaka* or *lingātmaka*) has to be carried out in B. and B. alone. There can be no swerving from this fundamental position of the Sūtrakāra (*Tat tu samanvayāt*) even in a single instance. It is precisely with reference to this criterion that S.'s and R.'s interpretation of this *adhi.* have to be tested.

M. presses for a direct Samanvaya of the mark of the enjoyment of the fruits of karma and of the dual number in B. in the only way in which it could be done without infringing on the oneness of Divine essence or exposing it to entanglement with karma. He has accordingly suggested that the two 'enjoyers' of karmaphala (*pibantau*) referred to in the Upaniṣadic text should be viewed as the two forms of B. known as Ātmā (present in the *Svarūpadeha* of Jīvas) and the Antarātmā or inner controller of the embodied self as such. In a specially mystic sense unknown to the systems of S. and R., M. visualises the Supreme B. as condescending to enjoy the best of what we individuals have to offer to it thro' our inmost nature and thro' our life's works as the Indweller of our hearts not only throughout our mundane career but also in the beyond. Tho' the Supreme has nothing to do with our enjoyment of the fruits of our good karma in its grosser sense, the

Upaniṣads do ascribe to it some kind of a 'subtler food than is eaten by the embodied self'. (*Brh. Up.* iv, 2.3).[4] The idea finds its echo in another significant passage in the *Īśa Up.* (Ver. 4 d) 'In that B. the activities of creatures are offered by Mātariśvan.[5] These ideas culminated in the doctrine of surrender of the fruits of one's good deeds to the Supreme Being and their gracious acceptance by the Supreme, in a manner transcending human comprehension, in the Theism of the *Bhagavad Gītā*:—

I am the enjoyer of all sacrifices and their Ruler[6] (ix. 24).

Enjoyer of all sacrifices and austerities[7] (v. 29).

I partake of that offering of the disinterested devotee (ix. 26).[8]

In this interpretation, the reference to B. as not being susceptible to "enjoyment" has naturally to be taken in the sense of not being liable to the enjoyment of inauspicious fruits.[9] This would give us a fresh insight into the significance of the statement of the Upaniṣad—He is Bliss. Getting bliss he enjoys bliss (*Taitt.* ii, 7). And there is nothing compromising to Divine Majesty in investing it with such enjoyment.[10]

The use of the dual does not also conflict with the oneness of Divine essence. What is denied of B. in the Śrutis is internal difference as between substance and attribute within its own being but not infinite richness of the content of its being. This is clear from the text referring to numerous aspects of the Antaryāmitva of B.:—

Rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhūva
Tadasya rūpam praticakṣaṇāya
Indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyate
Yuktā hyasya Harayaḥ śatā daśā[11] (*Ṛv.* vi, 47, 18).

*Ayam vai Harayaḥ ayam vai daśa ca sahasrāṇī bahūni anantāni ca. Tadetat brahma apūrvam anaparam anantaram abāhyam (*Brh. Up.* ii, 5.19).

4. तस्मादेष **प्रविविक्ताहारतर** इवैव भवत्यस्माच्छारीरात् आत्मनः । (iv. 2.3).
5. तस्मिन्नपो मातरिश्वा दधाति । (*Isa.* 4).
6. अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव च ।
7. भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसाम् ।
8. तदहं भक्त्युपहृतमश्नामि प्रयतात्मनः ।
9. अशुभभोगाभावविषयं तद्वाक्यमिति भावः । (*TP*).
10. *Ko hyevanyāt kaḥ prāṇyāt yadeṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt. Eṣa hyeva ānandayāti (Taitt. Up.).*
11. "With reference to each form (of the Jīva) He became the original. That form of His is for this one to know. The Supreme is known in many forms by His powers. Tens and hundreds of Haris are united. *He is the Haris the tens and thousands of them. This B. is at the same time without a before and an after, without inside and outside.

Yadekam avyaktam anantarūpam[12] (*Mahā N. Up.* 1.5)

Ekam rūpam bahudhā yaḥ karoti[13] (*Kaṭha.* ii, 2.12).

The descriptive epithet *Chāyātapau* (shade and light) applied to the twin aspects of B. has been explained by M. to mean that B. is like the cool shade to the devotees[14] and like the scorching light of the Sun to the wicked.[15] He draws attention to the very significant fact that in the very next verse following *Ṛtam pibantau* (i.3.1) we have a large number of epithets describing the *Pibantau* and all of them are given in the *singular*.

Yas setur ījānānām akṣaram Brahma yat param.

Abhayam titīrṣatām pāram (*Kaṭha.* i.3, 2)

In the above verse, the marks of being "the bridge" over the ocean of Samsāra, the Imperishable Para-Brahman,—the shore of fearlessness point clearly to B. as being the subject matter.[16] We see here that "Ṛtam pibantau" is "caught between the two verses *Yasya brahma ca kṣatram* ca and *Yas setur ījānānām* (i, 2, 24; i, 3, 2) both of which refer admittedly and *exclusively* to the Supreme B. The evidence of this textual clasp or "*Saṁdaṁśa*", as it is called in Mīmāṁsā, would show that its subject matter must be identical with that of the preceding and succeeding verses—viz. *only B.* (and not *Jīva and B.*).

According to M. and his commentators, the Sūtrakāra has specially used the word *ātmānau* (in the dual) which is not found in the *Viṣayavākya*, in order to lay special emphasis on the point that the two drinkers in question are but the two forms of the Supreme B. known as Ātmā and Antarātmā and not the Jīvātmā and Paramātmā. The advantage of this particular word (ātmā) is that by its root meaning of ādānādikartṛtvam (enjoying whatever is desired), it is capable of suggesting the mark to be specially correlated to B. in this *adhi.—(the samanvetavyaliṅga)* viz. enjoyment of karmaphala of Jīvas, conveyed by the term *ṛtam pibantau* in the Viṣayavākya.[17] At the same time, this expression *ātmānau* (in the dual) has a special purpose of pointing to the Ātmā and Antarātmā forms as being the imbibers in question—as supported by other texts.[18] This advantage would not have been there

12. "That which is One, unmanifested and of many forms".
13. "Who makes His One form manifold".
14. Cf. घृणीव छायामरपा अशीय । (*RV.* ii, 33, 6).
15. विद्वदविदुषोः सुखदुःखकारणत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः । (*TP*).
16. 'गुहाप्रवेशात् ब्रह्मशब्दात्सेतुत्वादक्षरत्वतः ।
पारत्वादभयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मैवात्र निगद्यते ॥' (*TC.* p. 461).
17. भवति हि पिवच्छब्दवत् आत्मशब्दोऽपि आदेयं कर्मफलं माति, अनुभवतीति व्युत्पत्या कर्मफलभोक्तृत्वलिंगप्रतिपादकमिति भावः । (*Raghu. TPB*).
18. आत्मान्तरात्मेति हरिरेक एव द्विधा स्थितः ।
निविष्टो हृदये नित्यं रसं पिबति कर्मजम् ॥
इति बृहत्संहितायाम् । (*M. BSB.* 1.2.11).

if the Sūtrakāra had merely used the word *pibantau* instead of *ātmānau* to identify the "two drinkers".[19] (Pibantau guhām praviṣṭau taddarśanāt).

The concluding phrase *taddarśanāt* (so it is found) in Sūtra i. 2.11 has been explained by M. as referring to authorities in support of the view that the two forms of Paramātman are seated in the heart. The passage cited in this connection is *R.V.* x.114.1 which speaks of:

"The two shining forms (gharmā) of the Lord, present everywhere, which have taken their abode specially in the body composed of the three elements of *Tejo'banna* and to which (body) Mātariśvan has also repaired to wait upon those two".[20]

That these two are forms of the Supreme B. can be seen from the succeeding lines of the same *Rk* in which again, the singular number has been used to denote the being in question:—

Vidur devās saha sāmānam arkam (x. 114. 1 d)
Ekaḥ suparaṇas sa samudram āviveśa
Sa idam viśvam bhuvanam vicaṣṭe
Tam pākena manasā'paśyam antitah. (x. 114.4).

The expression *Guhām praviṣṭau* plays the role of a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa*[21]—an adjective which contains the reason why the two drinkers of the fruit of *ṛta* should necessarily be identified with the two forms of the Supreme B. (*ātmānau*). 'Entry into the cave' is an exclusive mark of the Supreme in a much larger and deeper sense than in its ordinary application to the individual,[22] for the Supreme is present in the body and in the Jīvasvarūpa as its Antaryāmi and as its Bimba form. It is to lay special emphasis on this point that according to M. and his commentators, the Sūtrakāra has given precedence to the term: *Guhām praviṣṭau* in the wording of the Sūtra, over the claims of the leading words of the Viṣayavākya: *Ṛtam pibantau* and their shorter equivalent pibantau. Vādirāja in his *TPG* makes a special point that as the Jīvātman abides in the *nāḍī* in the waking and dream states and in the belly of the Lord in Suṣupti, he is not at any time really abiding in the heart.[23]

19. Raghu. *TPB*. p. 85.
20. 'घर्मा समन्ता त्रिवृतं व्यापतुस्तयोर्जुष्टिं मातरिश्वा जगाम ।' (*RV*. x. 114. 1 ab).
21. *TD*.
22. The *TC*. (p. 461b) points out that this characteristic is specially associated with B. in the opening sentence of the *Taitt*. passage ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम् * * यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम् (*Taitt. Up*. ii, 1). गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् (*Kaṭha*. i, 2, 12) गुहां प्रविश्य तिष्ठन्तीम् (ii, 1.7). गुहाशयायैव न देहमानिने । (*Bhāg*. iv, 3, 22).
23. वस्तुगत्या जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोर्नाडीस्थस्य, सुषुप्तौ च हरेः कुक्षिं प्रविष्टस्य न कदाचित् गुहाप्रविष्टत्वमिति ज्ञेयम् । (*TPG*. p. 33).

Interpretations of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Others

S., R. and others introduce their Pūrvapakṣa here in favor of Buddhi and Jiva from the Sāmkhya standpoint. The Pūrvapakṣin is made to argue that "*pibantau* *** denote Buddhi and Jīva and not Jīva and Īśvara (B) because Buddhi and Jīva are both 'limited'. For this reason the Jīva can properly be said to reside in the cave of the heart (*Guhām praviṣṭah*). This is not possible for B. which is all-pervasive (to the Vedāntin). The enjoyment of the fruits of Karma (*ṛtapāna*) is a distinctive mark of Jīvahood. Tho' Buddhi as an insentient principle cannot be invested with real enjoyership (*bhoktṛtva*) it can still be described as enjoyer on account of its intimate association with the enjoying self. This can be understood in the light of the *Chattrinyāya*.[24] Thus Buddhi and Jīva together are to be accepted as *pibantau* for all practical purposes. The further description of the two drinkers as 'shade and light' fits them admirably as Buddhi is unintelligent and Jīvātman is intelligent.

Rejecting this *prima facie* view of the Sāmkhya S., R. and others try to establish the Siddhānta view that the two drinkers meant here are to be identified as Jīva and B. S. argues that starting from the mark of 'enjoyment of the fruit of Karma' we are in a position to fix the identity of one of the two drinkers with a sentient principle viz. the Jīvātman. This gives us the clue to the identification of the other drinker mentioned conjointly with him. This second drinker cannot possibly be an unintelligent principle like Buddhi but must indeed be another sentient principle. It cannot be another Jīvātman as there cannot be two Jīvātmans in the same body. The other drinker must, therefore, be the Supreme B. or Īśvara himself. We arrive at this conclusion by applying the well-known maxim of *Asya gor dvitīyo 'nveṣṭavyaḥ*. When we hear the statement—'We should find a second to this cow, we naturally look for another animal of the same species—i.e. another cow to match it but not for a horse or an ass. Having thus arrived at the true identity of the two drinkers as Jīvā and B. we can explain the supposed difficulty of reference to the entry into the cave of the heart, in respect of B. Tho' B. is all-pervasive, it can be spoken of as having entered the heart just as Viṣṇu is said to be present in the Sālagrāva—(*stone*). As for enjoyment of karmaphala, tho' B. is not really the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, it may be referred

24. A group of men may be described as carrying umbrellas, even tho' one or two in the group may be going without them. This is known as the 'principle of the umbrella-carriers.

as enjoyer (*ṛtam pibat*) on the analogy of *Chattrinyāya.*[25] Thus the conclusion stands that the two beings which have been described in this Upaniṣad and in the present *adhi.* as *ṛtam pibantau, guhām praviṣṭau* etc. are Jīva and B.

The first objection to these interpretations is that they transgress the limits of Samanvaya as set by the Sūtrakāra, exclusively in B. This principle has to be rigidly adhered to in the interpretation of the adhikaraṇas in this Adhyāya. M. undertakes to show how there is no overstepping this limit of Samanvaya in B. in this *adhi.* also and how the dual can be explained without bringing the Jīvātman into the picture, as one of the drinkers and *'Guhām praviṣṭau'*.

Apart from this, his commentators Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha have shown that the reasons given by S. and R. to opt for Jīva and B. as against their own Pūrvapakṣas are not strong enough. Turning to S., the application of Chattrinyāya to bring Īśvara also within the scope of enjoyment of karmaphala (*ṛtapāna*) would be a purely formal affair. It would never make Īśvara a real and active enjoyer of *ṛta* in the full sense of the term which is the purpose of undertaking Samanvaya of various liṅgas in B. In fact, the Jīvātman himself is not a true and real enjoyer of Karmaphala in S.'s philosophy! All doership and enjoyership belong in reality to Buddhi or *antaḥkaraṇa* whence they are said to be superimposed on Jīvātman due to Avidyā. Where then is the logic in applying chattrinyāya from Jīva to Īśvara, when neither happens to be an enjoyer in reality?

For the same reason that doership, enjoyership and such other properties belong to Buddhi or *antaḥkaraṇa,* the mark of enjoyership would not be competent to establish one of the *pibantau* to be a sentient being in the first instance. How then can one proceed to argue that the other "enjoyer" associated with it must *also* be *another sentient being* viz. Īśvara? As Buddhi alone is given as the true enjoyer, the second to it may as well be the Jīvātman associated with it and having a superimposed enjoyership. This will rule out Īśvara who has not even a superimposed enjoyership of karmaphala. In this way, the Sāmkhya Pūrvapakṣa would prevail. Just as it can be argued that an enjoyer of *karmaphala* must be a sentient being, it can also be argued that such a being must also be a dependent creature (*asvatantra*). This would give us the Jīvātman as one of the drinkers and Buddhi as the second one by association with it. As an instrument of enjoy-

25. R. has suggested an alternative explanation that both Jīva and B. are agents with regard to the act of "drinking" (*pibat*) one (*Jīva*) being the actual drinker and the other (*Īśvara*) causing it to do so. But this also involves *lakṣaṇā* in respect of Īśvara.

ment it can by courtesy (*upacāra*) of Lakṣaṇā be called an "enjoyer".[26] Thus, in the final analysis, the dubious role of Īśvara as 'enjoyer' in S.'s interpretation reduces it to the same unsatisfactory level of the Sāmkhya contention in favor of Buddhi and Jīva. There is not much to choose between the two positions.

The next Sūtra *Viśeṣaṇācca* (on account of Its being qualified) has been explained by M. as referring to the manner in which the duals in the previous mantra: *Ṛtam pibantau* have been replaced by singulars in the very next verse:—

Yas setur ījānānām akṣaram brahma yat param

Abhayam titīrṣatām pāram (Kaṭha i, 3, 2).

This change from the dual to the singular is a further proof that in both the cases, one and the same being is the subject of reference and that it is none but or besides B.[27] S. and R. on the other hand think that *Viśeṣaṇāt* (BS. i.2.12) refers to the way in which Jīva and B. have been portrayed towards the close of this section in *Kaṭha Up.* as the attainer and the attained (*gantṛ-gantavya*) thro' the illustration of a traveller and his goal. This is not a conclusive argument. For we may admit this particular relationship between Jīva and B. and yet hold that the text *Guhām praviṣṭau parame parārdhe* refers *not* to Jīva *and B.* but to B. alone in its *two forms,* as contended by M. We have to note here that the evidence of the singulars referring to the same topic in the preceding[28] and succeeding[29] lines is nearer to the duals by position than the subsequent reference *at the end*[30] *of the section* depicting Jīva and B. as attainer and attained. It is, therefore, farfetched to interpret *Viśeṣaṇācca* as S. and R. have done.

The purpose of samanvaya of texts in B. is to make clear how B. directly possesses the transcendental attributes of which the Śrutis speak in different ways. In the present case, this purpose is best served by accepting M.'s interpretation of *pibantau* as set forth above. The other interpretations err in bringing the Jīvātman unauthorisedly under the purview of Samanvaya.

In the analogy of *Asya gor dvitīyo'nveṣṭavyaḥ* introduced by S., the affinity of species between the given object and the other one to

26. किंच, पिबतोर्बुद्धिजीवत्वे किं छिन्नं, किंवा जीवेश्वरत्वे लब्धम् ? परेणापि जीवे तदभ्युपगमात् । ईश्वरे समन्वयसिद्धिरिति चेन्न । ईश्वरे लिंगस्यौपचारिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । एवं च, जीव एव समन्वयः साधितः स्यात् । ततश्च किं पूर्वपक्षिणापराद्धम् ? तेनापि पातृत्वस्य बुद्धौ लाक्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । (*TP.* i.2.11).
27. 'यः सेतु' रिति पिबतोरेकवचनेन विशेषणात् एक एव पाता, स च ब्रह्मत्वविशेषणाच्च विष्णुरेवेति भावः। (*TP*).
28. यस्य ब्रह्मच क्षत्रं च (i.2.25).
29. यः सेतुः । (i.3.2).
30. सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् (i.3.9).

match it, is directly conveyed by the word *gauḥ*. But in the case of the two drinkers (*pibantau*) no such affinity in respect of their sentiency is included in the expressed sense of the words *pibantau, guhām praviṣṭau*, etc. The expressed sense is merely their duality as drinkers etc. Whether this dual refers to two different persons or two *forms* of the *same person* has to be settled on the basis of *other evidences*. The application of the '*Asya gor dvitīya*' nyāya to support S.'s interpretation is not, thus, free from objections.

In the Sānkhya Pūrvapakṣa and S.'s Siddhānta interpretation there is the same resort to *Chattrinyāya* in applying the substantive *pibat* to Buddhi and B. respectively. The fact, therefore, remains that in both the cases, the actual drinker is only the Jīvātman. This agreement between the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta on the most essential point of dispute reduces further discussion of it to a much ado about nothing.[31]

R.'s position also fails to make B. the actual enjoyer of the fruits of *ṛta* as required by the specific intention of the epithet *pibat*. That is why he has also resorted to the *Chattrinyāya* to justify B. being designated as *ṛtam pibat*. It is true that R. is in a better position to resort to this *nyāya* than S. as he accepts the Jīvātman to be a real enjoyer of karmaphala—whereas to S. such enjoyment is only *āvidyaka* and, therefore, not an intrinsic property of the Jīvātman. Still, R.'s interpretation is unable to establish a direct samanvaya of the mark of *ṛtapāna* in B. which is and must be the purpose of the adhikaraṇa. There is really no need for R. to fight shy of making B. a real enjoyer of the fruits of the good deeds of souls—a position which as pointed out earlier has good support in the Up. and the *Gītā*.

R. has no doubt given an alternative explanation that B. is referred to as *ṛtam pibat* in the sense that it causes the Jīvātman to enjoy the fruits of karma. If the causal derivation is to be pressed into service, it would be more pertinent to treat it as the basis of primary denotation of the term *pibat* as applied to B. on the basis of the principle:

"*Svātantrayam (tadgatatvam ca) śabdavṛtter hi kāraṇam*".

That would help direct samanvaya of the mark in B. and obviate the need for taking Jīvātman also into the samanvaya, by making the dual refer to two forms of B.

31. पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्ते च बुद्धौ ब्रह्मणि च छत्रिवल्लक्षणैव, पाता तु जीव एवेति, प्रमेये विशेषाभावेन व्यर्था चिन्ता—

मात्रयापि प्रमेयस्य भेदाभावे हि वादिनोः ।
शब्दमात्राय कलहो न युक्तो मूर्खयोरिव ॥ (*TC.* p. 474).

It deserves to be noted that the *Kaṭha* text refers only to the enjoyment of the fruits of good karma (*Sukṛtasya ṛtam*) and by implication excludes those of bad ones—thus indicating that the Jīva prone to the enjoyment of bad karmas also is not thought of here.[32] This also confirms the stand taken by M. that the dual must be interpreted in terms of two forms of B. rather than in terms of Jīva and B. That alone will give us a complete and undivided samanvaya of the text and the lingas in B. as in the case of the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa. This *adhi.* makes it clear that multiplicity of forms is compatible with B.'s oneness.[33]

32. जीवपक्ष एव धर्मफलवाचिऋतपदं न युक्तम् । तस्याधर्मफलं प्रत्यपि भोक्तृत्वात् । ईश्वरपक्षे तु, तद्युक्तम् । (*TC.* p. 462).
33. (आनन्दमयाधिकरणे) ब्रह्मावयवत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मत्वमिति तत्र व्युत्पाद्यम् । अत्र तु, अनेकत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मत्वमिति । (*TC.* p. 458).

CHAPTER XXVII

BRAHMAN IS CONTROLLER AND ENJOYER WITHIN

4. *Antarādhikaraṇam* (i. 2, 13-17)

This *adhi.* is based on the instruction given by (the deities of) the sacred fires to Upakosala, disciple of Satyakāma Jābāla, in *Chān. Up.* iv, 11-15, embodied in the ff. passages:—"The Person seen in the Sun I am He. I am indeed He."[1] "Then the fires said to him, "Upakosala, you have this knowledge of ourselves *and* the knowledge of the Ātman".[2] "The Person seen in the eye, He is Ātman, eternal, fearless. This is B. He by whose power, when one drops liquid butter or water into the eye, it runs to the sides"[3] (without sticking). "He is the leader of the beautiful, the bestower of brilliance".[4] "Then there is a superhuman Person. He leads them to B".[5]

There is a decided improvement in the way in which M. has endeavoured to show that the purpose of this adhi. is to establish the samanvaya in B. of the mark not only of "being present in the eye" and the Sun etc., and controlling them, but of "enjoying the bliss of it". He holds that this is indicated by the use of the expression *'anta-raḥ'* instead of *'antaḥ'* as on an earlier occasion (B.S.i.1.20). He renders it as 'one who is present in the eye and the Sun, controls their activities *and enjoys the bliss thereof: Antas sthitvā ramaṇakṛt antaras samu-*

1. अथ हैनं गार्हपत्योऽनुशशास * * य एष आदित्ये पुरुषो दृश्यते सोऽहमस्मि, स एवाहमस्मि । (iv, 11.1).
2. ते होचुरुपकोसल, एषा सोम्य तेऽस्मद्विद्या, आत्मविद्या च । (iv.14.1).
3. य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतमभयमेतत् ब्रह्म तद्यदस्मिन् सर्पिर्वोदकं वा सिंचति, वर्त्मनी एव गच्छति ।
4. एष उ एव वामनीरेष उ एव भामनी : (iv.15, 3-4).
5. तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति । (*Chān.* iv, 15, 5).

dāhṛtaḥ (AV. i.2.13).[6] It is because of this presence of B. in the eye that it does not get stained when butter or water is poured on it. It is because B. is present in the Sun that the latter is not stained by what it shines on.[7]

The idea of enjoyment of blissfulness (*ramaṇam*) which M. finds in the wording of the sūtra is derived by him from the significant description in the Up. text as *kam brahma* and in the text of the Sūtra: *Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānāt* (i, 2, 15) J. points out that it is a legitimate presumption that the Sūtrakāra, whose regard for brevity is admitted, would not have sacrificed it and used the longer word *antaraḥ* in preference, to *antaḥ* without *sufficient reason.*[8] We have, therefore, to concede the point to M. that *antaraḥ* has been used with a specific intention and meaning as explained by him. He has accordingly shown that this idea of the enjoyment of bliss (*ramaṇam*) is also implicit in the etymology of the word *ātman* used in the Up. text (iv.15.1) while describing "the person in the eye".[9] The significance of the word *'ātman'* has also been explained by J. as "one who enjoys what is worthy of being appropriated"[10]—viz. bliss. The second sūtra of this *adhi.* embodies the mark (liṅga) in support of the thesis. The third recalls the context, the fourth establishes unity of theme between *'Asmadvidyā and Ātmavidyā'* by citing evidence of the concluding passage (*upasamhāravākya*) and the last sūtra refutes the Pūrvapakṣa with two powerful points.

The manner in which this *adhi.* has been dealt with by S. and R. creates an overlapping with the earlier: Antastaddharmopadeśāt (i.1. 20) as interpreted by them. For in both these *adhi-s.* the topic discussed by these commentators is the same viz. "the Person in the eye". The only difference is that in the earlier *adhi.* the discussion is based on passages relating to this topic from the *Udgīthavidyā* of the *Chān. Up.* (i. 6, 6-7) while in the present it is based on passages of similar tenor in the Upakosala Vidyā of the *same Up.* (iv.15, 1-5). This by itself is not a sufficient ground for reopening the same topic. S.'s commentator Vācaspati has attempted to justify it on the basis of a fresh objection (*adhikāśaṅkā*). His point is that in the earlier *adhi.* (i.1, 20-21) the Pūrvapakṣa is based on the plea that the person seen in the eye is an individual soul of high eminence; whereas *here* the

6. The etymology of this word is given by J. अन्तः शब्दोपपदात् रमतेर्न्मन्तात् ड इति डः । उणादयो बहुलं इत्युपपदलोपः । (*NS.* p. 164).
7. See *Kath. Up.* ii, 2.11.
8. विवक्षितं चैतत्सूत्रकारस्य । अन्यथा, "अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्" इतिवत् "अन्तरुपपत्ते" रित्यवक्ष्यत्' लघु चैवं सूत्रं स्यात् 'अन्तर' इति कुर्वन्निममेवार्थं प्रतिजानीत इति । (*NS.* p. 164).
9. रमणं चात्मशब्देनादेयं मातीति चोच्यते । (*AV*).
10. आदेयमुपादेयं सुखं सुखसाधनं च मात्यनुभवतीति निर्वचनेन * * आङ्पूर्वात् ददातेर्मन्यतेश्च क्विप् । (*NS.* p. 164).

Pūrvapakṣa is that it is the reflected self,[11] or the image of some person standing before the eye (*pratibimbātmā akṣyadhikaraṇah*—S. *BSB.*). S. himself has conceded here that the Jīvātman or some divinity may also be regarded as the person in the eye, for purposes of Pūrvapakṣa.[12] But the *Bhāmatī* is of opinion that their case is not strong enough[13] and that therefore, the (correct) Pūrvāpakṣa is only in favor of the reflected image (*chāyā* or *pratibimba*)—the reason being that the attribute of being directly perceived (*pratyakṣatva*) is actually ascribed, in the Up. text *Eṣa dṛśyate* (Chān. iv. 15, 1) to "the person in the eye". This is incompatible with the Jīvātman (and B.) and compatible only with the reflected self.[14] This, according to Vācaspati, affords sufficient justification for subjecting the passages of the Upakosala-Vidyā relating to the person in the eye to a critical examination in order to fix his correct identity even tho' the same topic had been discussed earlier with reference to certain *other passages* from the *Udgīthavidyā* of the same Up. (i, 6, 7-8) seemingly in favor of the Jīvātman or some powerful deity.

The *Bhāmatī* has thus labored to justify the opening of the present *adhi.* on the ground of significant divergence of the Pūrvapakṣa here from the earlier one. But it is open to us to see if the fresh Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the reflected self put up by S. and Vācaspati has really a better claim to be considered than the previous one in favor of the Vijnānātman and others raised and dismissed in the earlier *adhi.* The point is this. If, as the *Bhāmatī* itself concedes, we have here to abandon the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the Vijnānātman because of the incompatibility of the attribute of *pratyakṣatva* ascribed to the person in the eye in the present Viṣayavākya (*Eṣa dṛśyate* in *Chān. Up.* iv, 15.1), the other attributes of *Puruṣatva* and *amṛtatva* mentioned in the same Viṣayavākya[15] and the mark of freedom from sin by knowing the person in the eye, not to speak of the attribute of the person being the abode of all beings (*Samyadvāma*), source of all beauty (*Vāmaniḥ*) and vigor (*bhāmaniḥ*) in the Universe would all of them be *much more incompatible with a mere* "reflected self seen in the eye". The Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the Pratibimbātmā on which the *Bhāmatī* stakes its all, in order to justify the reopening of the discussion here,—after all that has been said about the identity of the person seen in the eye,

11. तस्माच्छायापुरुष एवात्रोपास्य इति पूर्वः पक्षः । (*Bhāmatī*).
12. तत्र संशयः – किमयं प्रतिबिबात्माक्ष्यधिकरणो निर्दिश्यतेऽथवा विज्ञानात्मा, उत देवतात्मा इन्द्रियस्याधिष्ठाता, अथवेश्वर इति । (S. *BSB.* i. 2, 13).
13. संभवमात्रेण तु जीवदेवते उपन्यस्ते । (*Bhāmatī*).
14. एष दृश्यत इत्येतत् प्रत्यक्षेऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ।
परोक्षं ब्रह्म न तथा प्रतिबिंबे तु युज्यते ॥ (*Bhāmatī*, i.2.13).
15. य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मा *** एतदमृतमभयम् .... । (*Chān.* iv.15, 1).

by way of *Taddharmopadeśa* in adhikaraṇa 7 of Pāda i, is thus, in a worse position than the earlier Pūrvapakṣa. How then could such a manifestly weaker Pūrvapakṣa provoke an *adhikāśaṅkā* and necessitate a fresh *adhi.* to dispose of it? These objections apply *mutatis mutandis* to R.'s interpretation also.

In M.'s interpretation, on the other hand, the Viṣayavākya of the present *adhi.* has nothing to do with the identity of "the person seen in the eye (*Cakṣurantasthaḥ*)." Hence, there is no fear of any overlapping between this *adhi.* and *adhi.* 7 of Pāda 1. That *adhi.*, as we have seen, deals according to M.'s interpretation with the Being which has been described in some Mantra passages as being present in a number of divinities and it seeks to fix the identity of that being with B. The issue raised in the present *adhi.* is more specific and particular viz. who is the Person referred to as being present in the eye and in the presiding deity thereof (viz. the Sun).[16] In other words, in the earlier *adhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa was raised with reference to a large number of deities like Indra, Agni, Brhaspati,, Sūrya and Varuṇa. In the present *adhi.* it is restricted to the Agnis which claim to be the person in the eye (and the Sun)[16]. There are also other important features which distinguish the Pūrvapakṣas in the two *adhikaraṇas*. In the earlier one, it rests on the bare statement to the effect (*Śruti*),[17] while here it is reinforced by other Tātparyaliṅgas like *abhyāśa*[18] and *arthavāda*.[19] In view of these distinguishing features of M.'s Pūrvapakṣa here, it cannot be regarded as covering the same ground as the one in the earlier adhi. The *Gatārthatāśaṅkā* thus stands effectively ruled out in M.'s interpretation, while it is irremediable in the other interpretations following S.'s.

The conclusion reached by S. that the person seen in the eye is "Parameśvara" is open to difficulties inherent in his own double-decker theory of B. For example, if he means by Parameśvara the "Kārya-B" (relative B. or effect-B. equated with Hiraṇyagarbha),[20] the attributes of immortality (*amṛtatva*) and fearlessness (*abhayatva*) and absolute bliss (*aparichinnasukham*) ascribed to the Person in the eye, in the Up. text would *not* be true of it. On the other hand, if the Nirguṇa-B. is meant, the reference to the path of light (*arcirādimārga*) to be traversed by the knower of the Person in the eye would interpose a difficulty as according to S. that path leads only to the effect-B.[21] Simi-

16. तत्रान्तःस्थत्वसामान्यमिह चक्षुरन्तःस्थत्वम् । तत्र इन्द्रादीनामनेकेषामिह त्वग्नेरेव । (*TCP.* p. 493 b).
17. तत्र श्रुतिमात्रेणेह त्वभ्यासादिभिरिति महान् भेदः । (*TCP.* p. 493 b).
18. सोऽहमस्मि, स एवाहमस्मि । (*Chān. Up.* iv, 11, 1).
19. उप वयं तं भुंजामो अस्मिल्लोकेऽमुष्मिल्लोके य एवं विद्वानुपास्ते । (iv.11, 2).
20. See S. on *BS.* iv. 3, 7-11.
21. S. *BSB.* iv.3, 14.

larly, S.'s interpretation of the second Sūtra in this *adhi.* (*Sthānādi-vyapadeśācca*) as answering the objection as to how the omnipresent B. can be said to be confined to the eye[22] is superfluous as such an objection has already been met in the Sūtra *Arbhakaukastvād* **** (i.2.7). His interpretation of i, 2, 15 here, as "on account of the mention of what is characterised by pleasure" (*Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānāt*) is far from adequate. Pleasure (*Sukham*) is not an exclusive attribute of B. as it is found in the Jīvātman also. The term *Sukhaviśiṣṭa* will have, therefore, to be taken in the plenary sense of being endowed with unlimited pleasure (bliss) so as to distinguish the Person in the eye from the Jīvātman. But then, B. as conceived by S. is pure bliss (*sukhamātram*) without being "bliss-ful" (*sukha-viśiṣṭa*). The description of this pure B. as *Sukhaviśiṣṭa* (possessed of bliss) by the Sūtrakāra would not, therefore, be consistent with Nirguṇavāda. If in order to avoid this difficulty, the Sūtrakāra is taken to refer only to the Saguṇa-B., a different difficulty would arise that the Saguṇa cannot very well be credited with perfect and unlimited bliss contemplated by the spirit of the Up. passage[23]:

Yad vāva kam tad eva kham yadeva kham tad eva kam.

The next Sūtra (i, 2.16) has been explained by S. as "on account of the mention of the path of light etc. associated with the knower of B. who has heard the secret of the Upaniṣad". This path of light is *not*, in S.'s view, the route of the knower of pure B.; but only of the Upāsaka. The mention of the mere route is also insufficient to prove that the person in the eye is the Supreme B. Looking to the express statement in the text about "a Person *not human*[24] who leads them to B. (*Chān. Up.* iv, 15,5), it would seem more pertinent to let the word "*Ka*" (in *Ka-gati*) in the Śruti and Sūtra denote the Supreme B. itself and interpret '*gati*' to mean its actual attainment (*prāpti*) instead of relegating the term "*ka*" to the subordinate position of an optional suffix tagged on to the previous word (*upaniṣat*) as S. and other commentators have done. As this suffix is purely optional according to Pāṇini, the Sūtrakāra could have economized by dropping it altogether. If a better reason and purpose can be found for its use in the Sūtra, as suggested by M., it certainly deserves consideration.[25]

In the concluding Sūtra of this *adhi.* S. and others have tried to refute the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the reflected self and the Jīvātman

22. कथं पुनराकाशवत्सर्वगतस्य ब्रह्मणोऽक्ष्यल्पं स्थानमुपपद्यत इति, अत्रोच्यते । (S. *BSB*. i.2.14).
23. इतरेतरविशेषितौ तु कंखं शब्दौ सुखात्मकं ब्रह्म गमयतः । (S. *BSB*. 1, 2.15).
लौकिकसुखस्य साधनपारतंत्र्यं क्षयिष्णुता चामयः तेन सह वर्तत इति सामयं सुखम् । (*Bhāmatī*).
24. '*Amānavaḥ*' is S''s reading. M. reads *mānavah* (=dear to God i.e. '*Vāyu*').
25. श्रुतोपनिषद्व्रतोपासनानां ब्रह्मगत्यभिधानाच्चान्तरो विष्णुरेव, ब्रह्मोपासकस्य हि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः। (*TP*. i.2.16).

on the ground that the former does not always abide in the eye;[26] while the latter who is in general connection with the whole body and the senses cannot also be said to be *permanently located in the eye alone*.[27] This way of interpreting the expression '*anavasthiteḥ*' in the Sūtra (i.2.17) necessitates the importation of extra words (italicized above) into the Sūtra. Apart from that, the term *anavasthiti*>*anavasthā* denotes in logical parlance the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. There is also evidence of its use in this sense by Bādarāyaṇa himself in *Samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ* (ii, 2.13) as accepted by S. himself.[28] To ignore this established sense of the term and give it a very *tame* sense of Jīva's not (permanently) abiding in the eye is to miss the logical terseness and trenchancy of the Sūtrakāra's critique.

S.'s argument that the Jīvātman cannot be confined to the eye as he is in general contact with the whole body is not such a formidable objection against the Pūrvapakṣa. It is open to the Pūrvapakṣin to argue that tho' connected with the whole body, the self is here described as being located in the eye to facilitate meditation on it even as in the Siddhānta view B. tho' all-pervading is required to be meditated upon in the eye and in such other places.[29]

Madhva's Interpretation

M. has, therefore, found it necessary to give a fresh interpretation of the sūtras of this *adhi.* From the same Viṣayavākyas and context of the Upakosala Vidyā, he draws the important conclusions that (i) it is in virtue of the presence of B. in the eye (*sthānaśakti*) that water or butter dropped into it, flows out without staining the eye[30] and (ii) that it is by virtue of the power of this presence of B. in the eye (*ātmaśakti*) that men are endowed with the splendour of manliness and women with grace and beauty.[31]

He has made the happy suggestion that the term *yat* at the head of the clause *tad yad asmin sarpir vodakam vā siñcati* be interpreted in the sense of "*yasmāt*" (by reason of whose power and presence),[32]

26. न तावच्छायात्मनश्चक्षुषि नित्यमवस्थानं संभवति । (S. *BSB*).
27. तथा विज्ञानात्मनोऽपि साधारणे कृत्स्नशरीरेन्द्रियसंबन्धे सति, चक्षुष्येवावास्थितत्वं वक्तुं न शक्यम् । (S. i.2.17).
28. ततश्च तस्य तस्यान्योऽन्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थैव प्रसज्येत । (S).
29. ब्रह्मणस्तु, व्यापिनोऽपि दृष्ट उपलब्ध्यर्थो हृदयादिदेशविशेषसंबन्धः । (S. *BSB*. i.2.17).
30. अत्राक्षिस्थपुरुषसंबन्धादक्ष्णोरसंगत्वाख्यशक्तिर्व्यपदिश्यते (*TP*) स्थानादिशब्दात् स्थानादिशक्तिरुपलक्ष्यते । (*TD*).
31. श्रुतौ वामेति भामेति शब्दाभ्यां स्त्रीपुरुषरूपसर्वप्रेरकताया उक्तत्वात् इति भावः । उक्तं हि तत्त्वप्रदीपे वाम सौन्दर्यं भाम तेजः तत्प्रधानत्वात् स्त्रीपुरुषाः वामभामशब्दिताः तन्नेता वामनिर्भामनिरिति । (*TC*. p. 497 b).
32. यत् यस्मात्, यस्य प्रभावात । (*TP*. i.2.14).

This places the instruction of the fires to Upakosala in a new light.[33] The characteristics of *Vāmanītva* and *Bhāmanītva* ascribed to B. in the Upaniṣadic text, as interpreted by M., add to our sense of Divine majesty more effectively than any of the other interpretations of these texts. M.'s interpretation echoes the spirit of the *Gītā* verse: (x, 41):

Yad yad vibhūtimat sattvam śrīmad ūrjitam eva vā

Tat tad evāvagaccha tvam mama tejomśasambhavam.

He is the only commentator who has directly interpreted the words of the Śruti *kam brahma* and of the *Sūtra: Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānāt* (i.2.15) in the sense of being endowed with unlimited bliss (*pūrṇasukham*). This bliss he points out is an expression of Its nature and is not external to its being.[34] The cpd. *sukhaviśiṣṭa* has been accordingly explained by him as *sukhena viśiṣṭam* being "distinguished" i.e. supreme (*viśiṣṭa*) by virtue of its unlimited bliss.[35]

Explaining the Śruti *kam brahma* (*Chān. Up.* iv, 10, 5) M. points out that as "B" itself denotes 'fulness' (*pūrṇatā*) the word *"ka"* is placed in apposition with "B" to show that this *pūrṇatva* or perfection is due to its blissful nature. The other word *'kham'* in the Upadeśa is interpreted by M. as perfect wisdom (*Jñāna*). The particle *eva* (only) placed after *sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānāt* in the Sūtra is according to M. intended to stress that the reference to the possession of unlimited bliss is by itself sufficient to settle the question of identity of the Person in the eye with B.,[36] without giving the further evidence of its unlimited wisdom as well (*kham brahma*).

As the Viṣayavākya of *Śrutopaniṣatkagatyabhidhānācca* (i.2.16) speaks of a superhuman being coming down from on high to lead the knower of the Person in the eye (and who meditates on Him) to the highest goal, it seems reasonable to expect this point to be referred to in the Sūtra by some suitable expression. From this point of view, M.'s interpretation of the phrase *'kagati'* in the Sūtra as embodying such a reference to the superhuman being (Vāyu) leading the knower of the

33. 'यत्स्थानत्वादिदं चक्षुरसंगं सर्ववस्तुषु ।
स वामनः परोऽस्माकं गतिरित्येव चिन्तयेत्' ॥ (M. *BSB.* i, 2, 14).

34. नात्र सुखविशिष्टशब्दस्तद्वत्तामाचष्टे येनानुपादेयः स्यात्; किन्तु सुखस्यैव वैशिष्ट्यं पूर्णतालक्षणम् । (*NS.* p. 164).

विशिष्टं च तत् सुखं च विशिष्टसुखम् । कडाराः कर्मधारय इति परनिपातः । सुखेन विशिष्टमिति वा, सुखेषु विशिष्टमितिवा सुखविशिष्टम् । 'कं ब्रह्म खं ब्रह्म' इत्युपक्रमे कं सुखं ब्रह्म पूर्णमिति पूर्णत्वविशिष्ट-सुखरूपत्वाभिधानात् । (*TDP*).

35. सुखेन श्रेष्ठो हि तदा भवेद्यदि तत्सुखं श्रेष्ठं भवेदित्यर्थात् वैशिष्ट्यं सुखधर्मो भवति । (*NS.* p. 164).

36. अनयोर्हि श्रौतयोः कंखमिति शब्दयोः स्वतः पूर्णसुखज्ञानवाचिनोर्ब्रह्मपदसमानाधिकृतयोः संकोचकरणा-भावात् । (*TC.* p. 491).

truth to B.[37] comes closer to the spirit of the original text. The manner in which S., R. and others have treated *'ka'* (in "kagati") in the Sūtra as a purely dispensable suffix does scant justice to the literary judgment and calibre of the Sūtrakāra.

There is a decided advantage in connecting the word *ka* in the Sūtra (i, 2 16) with "gati" and interpreting the cpd *kagati* as "the attainment of the Supreme B. by one who has understood the true nature of the person in the eye". Such a syntactic relation of the words *ka* and *gati* would be able to silence a powerful objection from the Pūrvapakṣa that as the Fires tell Upakosala "You have this knowledge of ourselves *and* the knowledge of the Ātman",[38] the teaching about the Person in the eye is really Agnividyā (*asmadvidyā*) and only the teaching *"kam brahma kham brahma"* is Brahmavidyā, and that the Sūtrakāra is not justified in claiming the earlier teaching (about the person in the eye) also to be of B.[39] M.'s interpretation is best fitted to show that this objection of break of topic (*prakaraṇaviccheda*) is silenced by the Sūtrakāra by pointing to the authority of the mark (*liṅga*) in the concluding part (*upasamhāravākya*) to the effect that the knower of the Person in the eye attains the Supreme B.[40] (thro' the good offices of the *'Puruṣo 'mānavaḥ'*).

Thus, by disconnecting *'ka'* from *'gati'* and mis-connecting it with *'upaniṣat'* S. and others have lost an effective means of silencing the above objection. Their way of interpreting *gati* as path of light would *not* be a conclusive evidence that the knower of the person in the eye attains the Supreme unless that path is the path of the Supreme B. This cannot, however, be conceded by S. for reasons already mentioned. The position of the knower of "the Person in the eye" becomes absolutely secure when *ka* is connected with *gati* and the entire phrase understood in the sense of attainment of B. (Brahmagati). This is what M. has done by more purposefully construing *kagati* as a cpd word meaning attainment of B.

The last Sūtra: *Anavasthiter asambhavācca netaraḥ* (i.2.17) is explained by him as follows. The person seen in the eye cannot be Agni. For in the first place, it is not possible for one Jīva like Agni to control another as both are dependent beings. If in spite of this dependent

37. कगतिरिति ब्रह्मगतिः कं ब्रह्मेति प्रकृतत्वात् 'केन' वायुना गतिरिति वा 'को वायुरिति शब्दितः इत्यभिधानात् । (*TP.* 1.2.16).

38. एषा सोम्य ते अस्मद्विद्या आत्मविद्याच । (*Chān.* iv. 14, 1).

39. तस्मादग्निविषयत्वमेव चक्षुरन्तःस्थविद्याया इत्याशंकां परिहरन् सूत्रं पठित्वा, तदुपात्तश्रुतिमेवोदाहरति श्रुतोपनिषत्केति । (*TP.* i.2.16).

40. यदीयमग्निविद्या तर्ह्येतद्विद्ययाग्निप्राप्तिरेव फलत्वेनोच्येत, न ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः । अन्यविद्ययान्यप्राप्तेरयुक्तत्वात् । अतो ब्रह्मप्राप्तिफलैतद्विद्याया ब्रह्मपरत्वमेवेति भावः । (*TP.* i.2.16).

position, Agni controls another Jīva, the deity Agni would in its turn be liable to similar control by another Jīva and so on *ad infinitum.*[41] If the Pūrvapakṣin should try to avoid the regress by recognising one Supreme Independent Being as controlling Agni it would be more appropriate to regard this Supreme Being itself as the controller of the embodied self from within the eye and ascribe to the deity only a derivative control over the self.[42] M. accordingly holds that when the Agnis tell Upakosala that they are the Person in the eye (*akṣiṇi Puruṣo dṛsyate* and *so 'ham asmi sa evāham asmi* (iv. 15.1; 11, 1) such statements are to be understood in terms of their Inner Ruler (Antaryāmi).[43] What the Agnis refer to as Ātmavidyā is the rulership of the same B. in its all-pervasive aspect.[44]

41. जीवस्य जीवान्तरनियामकत्वेऽनवस्थितेः (परतंत्ररूपजीवत्व) साम्यादसंभावाच्च न जीवः ।
(M. *BSB.* 1.2.17).

42. तथाच, यथास्मत्पक्षे, सति राज्ञि, मण्डलेशे प्रजानां राजशक्त्या नियम्यनियामकभाववत्, ईश्वरशक्त्या जीवानां जीवान्तरनियामकत्वसंभवः । न तथा परपक्षे संभवति । परेणेश्वरानभ्युपगमादिति भावः । (*BD.* i.2.17).

43. न चात्मविद्या इत्युक्तिविरोधः । तस्या अन्तर्यामिविषयत्वोपपत्तेः । (*TP.* i.2.16).

44. न चात्मविद्येति पृथगुक्तिविरोधः । तस्याः सर्वगतात्मविद्यात्वाभिधायकत्वात् तस्यैव ब्रह्मत्वात् ।
(*TP.* i.2.16).

'आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादात्मा हि परमो हरिः' ।

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE INDWELLING SPIRIT

5. *Antaryāmyadhikaraṇam* (i, 2, 18-20)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the mark of having the entire cosmos for its 'body' and of its being its inner controller. The Viṣayavākya is from the *Brh. Up.* (iii, 7, 3-23) beginning with Prithivī and *ending with the passage* in the Mādhyandina recension which refers to the 'One who dwells in the Ātman and is other than the Ātman, whom the Ātman does not know, whose body the Ātman is, and who controls the Ātman from within—that is your Ātman, the inner controller, the immortal".[1]

Tho' the Supreme B. has been established in the previous *adhi.* as the Antaryāmi in the Sun, etc., this *adhi.* takes note of a supervening objection (*adhikāśaṅkā*) to the concept of Antaryāmi. The task of controlling things requires effort in proportion to the vastness of the range of control and nature of the objects controlled. The bigger the effort the greater will be the distraction of mind. A hard-pressed mind can hardly be joyful. The conclusion established in the Antarādhikaraṇa that B. is the indwelling spirit in the eye, the Sun and moon etc. (*antas-sthaḥ*) and is full of bliss (*raḥ*) thus appears to be untenable. This objection is disarmed here by showing that B. is the immanent principle of the entire cosmos and not merely of a few things here and there in it. It controls the whole Universe from within and without.

1. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मा, अन्तर्याम्यमृतः *** योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् ** योऽग्नौ ** योऽन्तरिक्षे *** यः प्राणे ** यो विज्ञाने *** य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः ।

The concept of Antaryāmi as expounded in this *adhi.* stands for very much more than the idea of one controlling another by necessity or accident. It stands for a deep metaphysical truth that B. is the source of all reality, activity and powers possessed and enjoyed by finite reality in all forms. That being so, there is no fear of B. getting tired of over-exertion or by any opposition to its will and losing hold of its essentially blissful nature.[2]

Madhva's Pūrvapakṣas

The Pūrvapakṣas suggested by the terms of Viṣayavākya are in favor of Prakṛti and certain Abhimāni-Jīvas associated with the respective elements and entities mentioned in the Viṣayavākya.[3] The Jaḍa-Prakṛti is the stuff of which Pṛthvi and other substances are constituted. It can, therefore, be properly described as having these substances as its 'body' in the larger sense of being their constitutive essence (*Svarūpam*). Tho' non-material substances, space and Ātman can also be spoken of as the body of Prakṛti in a figurative way. As the cause subsists in its effects, Prakṛti can be said to be present (*tiṣṭhan*) in Pṛthvi, Āpah, etc. As the relation between a (material) cause and effect is one of identity and difference, the former can be said to be present in the effect as well as to constitute its essence or 'body'.[4] Pṛthvi and other substances being controlled by the Antaryāmin can also be suitably explained figuratively with reference to Prakṛti, as it is an accepted fact that an effect is, in a sense, dependent on the cause and is determined by it. Even the statement "It controls the Ātman" can be justified on the ground that the self's activities carried out thro' the body ultimately depend on Prakṛti. The other statement in the Viṣayavākya "Whom the Ātman knows not" can be explained on the basis of the inscrutable nature of Prakṛti, as stated in such texts as: *Apratarkyam avijneyam* (*Manu.* i.5).

The description of the Antaryāmi as "the seer never seen, the hearer who is never heard" can also be applied to Prakṛti without difficulty. For, the sense-organs are the products of Prakṛti. They are the instruments of our hearing, seeing and other acts of knowledge. It is grammatically permissible to construe the instrumental case in the sense of

2. यत् वस्तु स्वात्मना देवदत्तेनानियतं देवदत्तानधीनसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिकं तदेवात्मनो देवदत्तस्य प्रतीपं चित्तविक्षेपकं भवेदिति हि दृष्टम् । इदंतु जगत् ईश्वराधीनसत्तादिकम् । तत्कथं तस्य चित्तविक्षेपकं भवेत् ? न राजादिवन्नियामकत्वमात्रमन्तर्यामित्वमपि तु सत्तादिप्रदत्वमित्युक्तं भवति । (*NS.* p. 166).
3. सच 'यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्' इत्यदिना *** सर्वात्मकत्वात् प्रकृतिः तत्तज्जीवो वा युक्तः । (M. *BSB.* 1.2.18).
4. शरीरशब्दस्य स्वरूपेऽपि प्रयोगात्. प्रकृतेश्च पृथिव्यादिसर्वात्मकत्वात् । न च यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् इत्यादेरनुपपत्तिः । "व्याप्तं कार्येषु कारणम्" इत्यादिना कारणस्य कार्यस्थत्वोपपत्तेः । (*TP.* i.2.18).

the agent where necessary. It may also be viewed as referring to the Abhimāni of **Prakṛti.**

The Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the Abhimāni-Jīvas is presented as follows:—The Antaryāmis of Pṛthvī, Āpas, Tejah, etc., are the respective Jīvas who are accredited to them as their "Abhimānis". These Jīvas can naturally claim their respective spheres of 'abhimāna' as their physical 'bodies'. Since the abhimānins are Cetanas and the abhimanyamāna-principles are material, it is natural that the latter do not know their abhimānis. Even the statement, "The Ātman does not know Him" presents no difficulty; for the embodied souls are not competent to know the (superior) Jīvas who hold sway over them as their Abhimānins.[5] The otherness or indwelling nature of the Antaryāmin in Pṛthvī, Vāyu, etc. is perfectly compatible with the Antaryāmi being the Abhimāni-Jīva of those principles. The statement "who dwells in the Ātman and controls the Ātman" can also easily refer to the (superior) Jīvas who are the Abhimānis of the respective principles like Pṛthvī and who are also in a position to control our embodied selves.[6]

Madhva's Siddhānta View

M. raises a very pertinent question here in order to arrive at the proper Siddhānta. He asks us to ponder for a moment whether the principles mentioned in the Viṣayavākya such as Pṛthvi, Āpah, Tejah, are to be taken as purely material principles or as sentient ones. In the former case, it would make no sense to predicate that they *do not know* the Antaryāmi. As insentient principles, they have no power to know at all. In these circumstances, the reference to an object of knowledge in their case would be obviously unwarranted. If such statements are only intended to deny the existence of knowledge in their case, such a negation would still be uncalled for; as there is no possibility of the possession of knowledge in what are admittedly insentient principles. These difficulties point to the conclusion that the principles mentioned in the Viṣayavākya denote their respective Abhimānicetanas and *not* the Jaḍatattvas of those names. If this is accepted, it would follow that the Antaryāmi whom they fail to know in full is the Supreme Being and no other.

The description of this Antaryāmi as "Antaraḥ[7]" signifies, according to M., that the Supreme B. enjoys His own inward bliss without

5. आत्माज्ञेयत्वादि चात्माभिमानिनो जीवस्य दुर्ज्ञेयत्वादिना युक्तम् । (*TCP* p. 503b).
6. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानं यमयतीत्येतदपि तत्त्वाभिमानिनां अस्मदाद्यात्मनियामकत्वात् युक्तम् । (*TC* p. 503).
7. अन्तरो यमयति ।

external ingredients. He is also the most intimate object of our adoration, who should be dearer to us than our dearest possessons, kith and kin.[8]

The description of Pṛthvī and other principles as 'bodies' of the Antaryāmi is to be understood in their etymological sense or thro' figurative usage *(gauṇīvṛtti)*; but not in the conventional sense of material bodies. Where the conventional sense is inappropriate, we have to adopt the figurative indication.[9]

As we cannot ascribe a physical body to B. statements such as: whose body is the earth, whose body are the waters' * * * * are to be construed either etymologically (*yaugikārtha*) in the sense of that which is liable to disintegration (*Viśaraṇa*) by His Divine Will; or that in which the Supreme delights to be present;[10] or in a figurative sense of being subject to His control like the physical bodies which are subject to the soul's control. It should be noted here that tho' Cetanas (souls) are indestructible, the bodies they take on during their worldly career are liable to decay and thro' such bodies they are also considered to be subject to decay and, therefore, eligible to be spoken of as Śarīram of the Antaryāmi, in the etymological sense of the term.[11] In the figurative sense (gauṇārtha) of dependence, the Abhimāni-cetanas of Pṛthvī and other substances can be described as bodies of the Antaryāmi because they are completely under the control of the Antaryāmi.[12]

The first Sūtra here: *Antaryāmī adhidaivādiṣu taddharmavyapadeśāt* (i. 2, 18) sets forth the grounds in favor of the Siddhānta view that the Antaryāmi is B.—viz. of being uncomprehended in full by the deities of Prthvī and other principles and of Its being their inner controller. That these two are decisive marks of B. is seen from the text "He who is present everywhere, but is not heard, or reached or thought out, guided, seen or commanded by others, the Person dwelling in all creatures.[13]

8. प्राणबुद्धिमनःस्वात्मदारापत्यधनादयः ।
यत्संपर्कात्प्रिया आसंस्ततः कोन्वपरः प्रियः ॥ (*Bhāg. X*, 21, 27).
9. There is sanction for this in construing the *mantra*: *Indro nabhasvān*..... which by the Vedic injunction: *Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhate* is subordinated to the Gārhapatyāgni and made to denote Agni (thro' Gauṇī-Vṛtti) rather than Indra by conventional denotation. See *TC*, p. 504-05b.
10. शीर्यते नित्यमेवास्माद्विष्णोस्तु जगदीदृशम् ।
रमते च परो ह्यस्मिन् शरीरं तस्य तज्जगत् ॥ (M. *BSB*, i.2.20).
11. न चायं योगः आत्मविज्ञानपदोक्ते चेतने न संभवतीति वाच्यम् । चेतनस्यापि देहद्वारा शीर्णताय विद्यमानत्वात् । (Raghū. *TPB*, p. 96).
12. पृथिव्याद्यभिमानिजीवानामीश्वरवशत्वात् तच्छरीरत्वमिति गौणत्वमुक्तम् । (*TCP*, p. 505b).
13. 'स योऽज्ञोऽश्रुतोऽगतोऽमतोऽनतोऽदृष्टोऽविज्ञातोऽनादिष्टः सर्वेषामन्तरपुरुषः ।
(*AĀ*, iii.2.4) q. by M. in his *BSB*, i.2.18).

The next Sūtra shows there is no evidence in the Viṣsyavākya for the Pūrvapakṣa's claim on behalf of Prakṛti and Jīvas. Tho's this Sūtra does not actually refer to the Cetanas, such a reference may be taken to be implied in it as the reason given in regard to Prakṛti that there is no mention of its characteristic attributes (*ataddharmābhilāpāt*) can be extended to them also.[14] The characteristic attributes of Prakṛti are its insentiency (*acetanatva*) and possession of the three qualities *Sattva, rajas* and *tamas* (triguṇa) while subjection to Samsāra is the characteristic of Abhimānicetanas.[15] These are nowwhere mentioned in the Viṣayavākya. The contrary attributes of *ātmatva, amṛtatva, adṛṣṭatva* and *draṣṭṛtva* are mentioned, which decide the issue in favor of B. The third Sūtra continues the refutation of the claims of Jīvas including Yogi-Jīvas[16] by citing another weighty reason that in both the Kāṇva and the Mādhyandina recension of the Up., the Antaryāmi has been expressly differentiated from the Ātman (individual Cetanas).[17]

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S.[18] and R.[19] confine their Pūrvapakṣa to Jīvātaman and have excluded Prakṛti from its scope in Sūtra 18. S. includes Abhimānidevatās also in the Pūrvapakṣa; but his commentator Vācaspati after some discussion holds that only Jīvas *as a class* are to be made the subject of the Pūrvapakṣa.[20] His objection is that the attributes of *draṣṭṛtva* etc. are incompatible with Prakṛti.[21] But there seems to be no need to fight shy of including Prakṛti in the Pūrvapakṣa in the opening Sūtra because, there is a *definite attempt* at refuting the claims of Prakṛti in Sūtra 19, which S.[22] and R.[23] have themselves interpreted accordingly. The objection that Prakṛti does not possess *draṣṭṛtva* is going rather too far at the Pūrvapakṣa stage, forgetting that these two commentators have

14. This is done in M.'s interpretation, merely by implication and not by the force of "*ca*". The *TDP* brings both Prakṛti and Jīvas under the scope of *ataddharmābhilāpa* by interpreting "tat"—in the dual (*tayos Smārtajīvayoḥ*). R. in his bhāṣya reads *śārīraśca* as part of Sūtra 20.
15. Excepting Cit Prakṛti.
16. अतस्तद्धर्माभिलापादेव तत्तज्जीवशंकायां निरस्तायां, योगिजीवमन्तर्यामिणमाशंक्यमानं विशेषयुक्त्या निराकरोति । (*TD* i.2.20).
17. य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमयति ।
18. तस्मात् पृथिव्याद्यभिमानी कश्चिद्देवोऽन्तर्यामी स्यात् । योगिनो वा कस्यचित् सिद्धस्य यमयितृत्वं स्यात् (*S*).
19. किमयमन्तर्यामी प्रत्यगात्मेति परमात्मेति किं युक्तम् ? प्रत्यगात्मेति । (*R*).
20. एकवचनं च जात्यभिप्रायम् तस्माज्जीवात्मैवान्तर्यामी । (*Bhāmatī*).
21. यद्यपि प्रधानस्यादृष्टत्वामतत्वाविज्ञातत्वानि सन्ति, तथापि तस्याचेतनस्य द्रष्टृत्वश्रोतृत्वमन्तृत्वविज्ञातृत्वानां श्रुतानामभावात् * * न प्रधानस्यान्तर्यामिता । (*Bhāmatī*).
22. तस्मात्प्रधानमन्तर्यामिशब्दं स्यात् । (S. i.2.19).
23. स्मार्तं प्रधानं, शारीरो जीवः, स्मार्तं च शारीरश्च नान्तर्यामी ।
(R.i.2.20). But he is inclined to think that Prakrti is brought in only by way of illustration. Cf.
यथा स्मार्तमचेतनं सर्वज्ञत्वनियन्तृत्वसर्वात्मकत्वादिकं नार्हति तथा जीवोऽपि ।
(*Śrībhāṣya* i.2.20). See later for Criticism of his view.

themselves granted to Prakṛti some sort of thinking or seeing power in a secondary sense *(Gauṇam īkṣaṇam)* in their Pūrvapakṣa in B.S.i. 1.5. Since S.'s Nirguṇa B. is of the nature of pure consciousness and not a 'seer' in the active sense of that term, this difficulty will remain with S. also. Prakṛti need not, therefore, be denied some kind of *gauṇam draṣṭṛtvam,* adequate for purposes of a Pūrvapakṣa, especially in the light of the mark (liṅga) of having *Pṛthvī* etc. as its 'body'.

The *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru* develop S.'s Pūrvapakṣa as follows. B. cannot be Antaryāmin. A controller (*niyantā*) must have a physical body and sense organs. Oniy then can he be expected to control his own body, senses or other persons and things with their aid. This can be seen in the case of a carpenter who exercises control over his tools with the help of his body. But B. has no body or organs.[24] The Jīvātman has them. Hence only the latter can be the Antaryāmin in question.[25] He can be said to control the world thro' the agency of unseen merit. And he satisfies the other conditions of being 'the unseen seer' (*adṛṣṭo draṣṭā*) etc. It cannot be said that if we accept the Jīvātman as the Antaryāmi, we would be obliged to seek another controller for him. The risk of an endless regress of such controllers should be eno' to forbid us from going beyond the Jīvātman.[26]

Śaṁkara's Siddhānta

In reply to this Pūrvapakṣa S. and his commentators have tried to make out that B. too may be presumed to have a body of some sort. The phenomenal world, as we see it, is a modification of the Avidyāśakti of B. (according to Advaita metaphysics). This may, in a sense, be taken to stand in the position of a physical body like that of an individual soul acquired by its own past karma. With such a body, B. can be deemed to control the world of matter and souls as Antaryāmi.[27]

They have also tried to show that the contingency of having to accept another controller over B., in case It is accepted as the controller of the souls, can be averted *by not recognising any distinction between* them and accepting their identity of essence instead.[28]

24. प्रवृत्तिनियमलक्षणं हि कार्यं चेतनस्य शरीरिणः स्वशरीरेन्द्रियादौ वा शरीरेण वा, वास्यादौ दृष्टम्; नाशरीरस्य ब्रह्मणो भवितुमर्हति । ****(*Bhāmatī*).
25. तस्मात् परिशेषाज्जीव एव चेतनो देहेन्द्रियादिमान् द्रष्टृत्वादिसंपन्नः *** *** (*Op. cit*).
26. यदि पुनरात्मनोऽपि नियन्तुरन्यो नियन्ता भवेत् वेदिता वा, ततस्तस्याप्यन्य इत्यनवस्था स्यात् । (*Op. cit*).
27. देहेन्द्रियादिनियमे नास्य देहेन्द्रियान्तरम् ।
तत्कर्मोपार्जितं तच्चेत् तदविद्यार्जितं जगत् ॥'
तथाच, सर्वं विकारजातं तदविद्याशक्तिपरिणामः तस्य शरीरेन्द्रियस्थाने वर्तत इति ** शक्नोति तन्नियन्तुम्
(*Bhāmatī*).
28. तस्याप्यन्यो नियन्ता इत्यनवस्थादोषश्च न संभवति भेदाभावात् । भेदेहि सति, अनवस्थादोषोपपत्तिः (S). न चानवस्था नहि नियन्त्रन्तरं तेन नियम्यते, किन्तु यो जीवो नियन्ता लोकसिद्धः स परमात्मैवोपाध्यवच्छेदपरिकल्पितभेदः तथा व्याख्यायत इत्यसकृदावेदितम् । तत्कुतो नियन्त्रन्तरं, कुतश्चानवस्था ? (*Bhāmatī*))

Criticism

It is needless to say how futile and farfetched such arguments are. We are asked to look upon the phenomenal world, which is the product of B.'s Avidyāśakti as its body, for purposes of controlling the world of beings. But then we may ask how B. *first* managed to create a phenomenal world without having such a body of its own. If it had one already, there will be no point in the Pūrvapakṣa. If B. could create a phenamenal world without a body of its own, it may as well be expected to control it without the need for a body. In either case, the Pūrvapakṣa would *not* arise.

It is also irrelevant to make use of the concept of a figurative body (*gauṇaśarīra*) when the Pūrvapakṣa argues that B. cannot be the controller (*niyantṛ*) because it has no body of *its own.* Surely, S. himself cannot afford to admit that the phenomenal world, which is the product of the Avidyāśakti of B. is, in any true sense, its (actual) body—except in a purely figurative sense.

After all, the Nirguṇa B. of Advaita can never be regarded as controller (*niyantṛ*). It would, therefore, he nedless to try to provide it with some sort of a 'body' to enable it to control the world. The Saguṇa-B. may of course be regarded as the controlling spirit (Antaryāmi). But then, the phenomenal world cannot be termed the body of Saguṇa B. within the meaning (or definition) of "body of B." put forward by the *Bhāmatī* viz. (*tadavidyārjitam jagat*)—'what has been projected and earned by its Avidya.'[29] The crucial point of objection here is that in Advaita metaphysics, it is only the Nirguṇa (or Nirviśeṣa) B. that is both the substratum *(adhiṣṭhāna)* and the object *(viṣaya)* of Ajnāna. The Saguna B. is only another projection of the Nirguṇa in Avidyā. Hence, Avidyā cannot be regarded as having Saguṇa-B. for its *viṣaya* or as belonging to it *(tadīya).* That being so, the phenomenal world, which is a modification of this Avidyā, cannot be spoken of as having been earned by Saguṇa B. by its own Avidyā. In that sense, then it cannot be treated as the 'body' of the Saguṇa B. And without such a body, it cannot function as Antaryāmī.[30]

The only effective way in which the regress of controllers can be prevented is by accepting self-originating controllership and independence of B. as the controller of all else and *not* by taking away the controllership of B. by declaring that the distinction of controller and controlled is purely empirical. Regression of controllers cannot be

29. शुद्धं न नियन्तृ । अशुद्धं त्वविद्याकल्पितत्वात् नाविद्याविषयः । (*TC.* p.509b).
30. तस्याविद्याविषयत्वाभावान्न तदीयत्वमविद्यायाः इति न तदविद्यार्जितं जगदिति, न तच्छरीरत्वम् । (*TCP.* p. 509b).

ruled out even on the empirical level. For just as the empirical Jīvātman has a controller in the person of the empirical Īśvara, the latter likewise would be or *may* be subject to control by another empirical Īśvara above Him.[31] The only effective and meaningful way in which a regress *(anavasthā)* can be nipped in the bud is by making the Antaryāmin *ex hypothesi* self-directed and Independent Controller.[32]

There is no use merely tinkering with the idea of a conventional distinction *(Vyāvahārikabheda)* in trying to avoid such a regress. The problem will have to be faced honestly and solved in all sincerity by making the controller *(niyantṛ) ex hypothesi* self-sufficient and independent and the controlled intrinsically dependent on it in the 'Pāramārthika' sense of that term. That is what M. has done and that is what S. has failed to do. He has gone to the extent of throwing the Śruti and Sūtra overboard by concluding with his usual parenthetical comment that the difference between Jīva and B. as the *niyamya* and *Antaryāmi* taught by the Sūtrakāra here and elsewhere is purely conventional *(vyāvahārika)* and nothing more.[33]

S.'s further contention that two separate selves cannot be accommodated in the same body[34] is not well-founded. The play of two selves in the same body is not an unknown phenomenon in the case of persons 'possessed' by evil spirits.[35] Apart from that, references are not wanting in the Upaniṣads to show how sometimes more than one self-conscious principle is at work in a given organism.[36]

There is room for improving the manner in which S. and R. have connected the locative *adhidaivādiṣu* in Sūtra 18 with the first word *antaryāmi*. Instead of saying 'In the Adhidaiva and others, the Antaryāmi referred to is B. (*adhidaivādiṣu antaryāmi Brahma*), the locatice

31. काल्पनिकभेदेन नियन्तृत्वादिकं युक्तमिति चेत्तर्हि यथा देहादिनियन्तुर्जीवस्य व्यावहारिकभेदवानीशो नियन्ता तथेशस्यापि व्यावहारिकभेदवानन्यो नियन्ता स्यादिति व्यावहारिकनियन्तृपरंपरयानवस्था स्यात् । (*TC*. p. 509).
32. अथ "वैशेष्यात्' (i, 2.8) इत्युक्तन्यायेनेशस्य स्वातन्त्र्यादिविशेषान्न नियन्त्रन्तरं तर्हि अनवस्थापरिहारो नाभेदेन; किन्तु स्वातन्त्र्येणेति सत्यभेद एवास्तु । (*TC*. p. 509).
33. भेदव्यपदेशात्, भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न, वैशेष्यात् ' इत्यादिकमतीतं, 'शारीरश्चोभयेऽपिहि भेदेनैनमधीयते इति **वर्तमानं**, विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ, भेदव्यपदेशात् इत्यादि **चागामि** भेदप्रतिपादकं–
    अद्वैतिभिर्व्याक्रियते कथमद्वैतदूषकम् ।
    सूत्रजातं स्वसिद्धान्ततया लज्जां विनैव तु ।
    असकृच्छ्रुतिभिः सूत्रैर्भेदे यत्नेन साधिते ।
    मिथ्यार्थतां कथं ब्रूयात् सूत्राणां भाष्यकृत्स्वयम् ? (*TC*. p. 573ab).
34. शारीरान्तर्यामिणो र्भेदव्यपदेशो न पारमार्थिकः एको हि प्रत्यगात्मा भवति न द्वौ प्रत्यगात्मानौ संभवतः । (S. *BSB*. 1.2.20).
35. ग्रहाद्याविष्टशरीरेऽहमर्थरूपप्रत्यग्द्वयदर्शनात् । (*TC*. p. 510b).
36. 'हन्तास्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रामाम तद्यस्मिन्नुत्क्रान्ते * * * हन्तेदं पुनःशरीरं प्रविशाम * * * तद्यस्मिन्नः प्रपन्नः' (*AĀ*. ii, 1, 4). इत्यादावेकस्मिन् शरीरे चक्षुराद्यभिमान्यनेकाहमर्थश्रवणाच्च (*TC*. p. 510b).

"*adhidaivādiṣu*" could be connected with better purpose with the reason *(taddharmavyapadeśāt)*. The expression *adhidaivādiṣu* is not absolutely necessary to suggest the Viṣayavākya; for the term *Antaryāmi* which means one who is present within and controls from within would readily suggest the famous Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛh Up.* in which the teaching about the Antaryāmi is given *twentyone times* (ii, 7. 3-23). On the earlier occasion also (BS. i, 2, 13) the Sūtrakāra has preferred to indicate the context and Viṣayavākya without such aids. (cf. *antas taddharmopadeśāt*).[37]

On the other hand, if we cannect *adhidaivādiṣu* with the following *taddharmopadeśāt* referring to the reason and take the locative to signify the respective contexts *(prakaraṇas)* relating to the *adhidaiva*, *adhyātma* and so on, it would be possible to bring out the point that not only is there clear mention of the characteristics of B. in these contexts but also that there is repetition *(abhyāsa)* of those characteristics in the different Prakaraṇas (of adhyātma and adhidaiva). That would be an added advantage to the Siddhānta.[38]

S. and R. have been content with interpreting *Ataddharmābhilāpāt* in Sūtra 19 as "on account of the mention of the characteristics of B. This point has already been established in Sūtra 18 by the expression *'taddharmopadeśāt'*.[39] It would be definitely preferable to take the negative compound *ataddharmābhilāpāt* in the sense that the distinctive attributes of Prakṛti such as its triple qualities *(triguṇa) have not been mentioned* in the Viṣayavākya.[40]

R. reads the words "Śārīraśca" from Sūtra 20, as part of Sūtra 19. He also thinks that Prakṛti *(Smārtam)* itself has been introduced here (in Sūtra 19) *only* as an illustration[41] and *not* because it is the subject of a Pūrvapakṣa in this *adhi.* requiring refutation. It is difficult to accept any of these contentions. In the first place, there is no particle

37. अन्यथा, अन्तः तद्धर्मत्यादौ '**आदित्यादिष्वन्तः**' इति साध्यं निर्दिश्येत । (*TC*. p. 512).
38. वरं हि वैयर्थ्यादपि लक्षणा । एवं हि न केवलं तद्धर्मव्यपदेशमात्रं; किंतु तस्याभ्यासोऽप्यस्तीत्युक्तं भवति । (*TC*. p. 513b).
39. यच्च द्वितीयसूत्रे 'अतद्धर्माभिलापो नाम प्रधानधर्मविरुद्धधर्माभिलाप इत्युक्तम्, तन्न । आद्यसूत्रस्थेन 'तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात्' इत्यनेन पुनरुक्तेः । ब्रह्मधर्मो हि प्रधानधर्मविरुद्ध एव । (*TC*. p. 513b).
40. तस्मात्, त्रिगुणत्वादिधर्माभिलापाभावादित्येवार्थः (*TC*) प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधार्थकनञः क्रियापेक्षत्वेनासामर्थ्येऽपि 'असूर्यंपश्या' इत्यादाविव कर्तरि चेति ज्ञापनात् समासः । (*TDP*. i.2.19).
41. See: His summing up of the point: एतदुक्तं भवति–**यथा** स्मार्तमचेतनं सर्वज्ञत्वनियंतृत्वसर्वात्मत्वादिकं नार्हति, **तथा** जीवोऽपि, अतद्धर्मत्वात् इति (i.2.20).
    George Thibaut has *not only not caught R.'s point here*, but has completely *passed over this passage* in his Tr. of R.'s Bhāṣya on this Sūtra. See G. Thibaut. *Vedānta Sūtra with the C. of R.* Motilal Banarasidas Ed. 1962, p. 231.

"*vat*" after *Smārtam* in Sūtra 19 to support R.'s view that Prakṛti has been brought in merely for the purpose of an illustration. There is no need for any illustration at all. It cannot also be contended that as the claims of Prakṛti do not deserve special consideration in the Pūrvapakṣa, its presence in the Sūtra has to be accommodated just by way of an illustration. In that case, there is no need for the Sūtrakāra to devote equal attention to the refutation of the claims of Prakṛti according to R. also *in other places* such as *Nānumānam atacchabdāt; Prāṇabhṛcca* (i.3, 3-4). We have seen in connection with M.'s Pūrvapakṣa that there is adequate basis for a separate Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of Jaḍa-Prakṛti.

CHAPTER XXIX

INTEGRATION OF NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES IN BRAHMAN

6. *Adṛśyatvādhikaraṇam* (i, 2, 21-23)

This *adhi.* deals with the Samanvaya in B. of negative attributes like invisibility, being ungraspable, having no organs and so on, as described in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i, 1.6) and elsewhere. It has been held that B. and its attributes are an identity of essence.[1] But if this should apply to negative attributes also, B. may itself be reduced to a negation.[2] This difficulty is solved in the present *adhi.* by showing that negative attributes are integrated with B. in the same way as positive attributes are, without in any way undermining the unity and positive character of B. This is possible because reciprocal negation or the difference of a given thing from another is the essence of the thing in question *(dharmisvarūpa)* and is integrated with it by means of 'Viśeṣas' which allow of distinctions to be made where exigencies of usage require them, without however imposing any distinction of essence.[3] While the negation of particular attributes in B. qualifies It, the fact of B.'s being so qualified is a positive characteristic.[4] There is nothing wrong in looking upon such distinctions also as forming part of the essential nature of B. Thus the *adhi.* answers as *adhikāśaṅkā* in relation to the positing of negative attributes and the difficulties that may be raised against their Samanvaya in B.

1. एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किंचन ॥ (*Brh. Up.* iv, 4, 19; 20).
2. अदृश्यत्वादीनां तु धर्माणां ब्रह्मणा अभेदो न युज्यते; तेषामभावत्वात्, ब्रह्मणो भावत्वात् । भावाभावयोरैक्यस्य विरुद्धत्वात् इति । (*NS.* p. 167 b).
3. तदेवं विशेषस्य सर्ववादिभिरंगीकार्यत्वात्, तद्बलेन धर्मधर्म्यादिव्यवहारोपपत्तेर्युक्तमदृश्यत्वादिगुणानां ब्रह्मणैक्यमिति सिद्धम् । (*NS.* p. 171 b).
For the concept of Viśeṣas and its place in M.'s philosophy see my *Phil. of Madhva*, pp. 45-57.
4. दण्डित्ववत् अभाववत्त्वस्य धर्मत्वेन विवक्षितत्वात् । (*NS.* p. 167).

The *adhi.* is also connected by *ākṣepasaṅgati* with the conclusion established in the preceding one. There, the mark of 'not being comprehended by Pṛthvī and other divinities' had been appropriated to B. But in a passage in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.6) some of these characteristics are found ascribed to "Akṣara".

Madhva's Pūrvapakṣas.

This gives rise to various Pūrvapakṣas—such as that this Akṣara is or must be (i) the Jaḍa Prakṛti or (ii) Cetana Prakṛti or (iii) the four-faced Brahmā or (iv) Rudra; but not at all B. It should be noted that in M.'s view, the Jīvātman (*śārīraḥ*) does not come within the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa of this *adhi.*, as he does in the interpretations of S., R. and others.

The first Pūrvapakṣa derives support from the description of Akṣara in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.7) as the source of the world. The illustrations of the spider producing its web and drawing it in; of herbs and plants growing on earth and of hair growing on the head support the idea of material causality (*Viśvopādānatva*) of Prakṛti. Tho' causality is found in the efficient cause also, a material cause is more intimately connected with its effect than the efficient cause. Therefore, it deserves priority of consideration.[5]

The Cit-Prakṛti also is entitled to the designation of "Akṣara", as she has an imperishable body.[6] As the Abhimāni-devatā of Jaḍa Prakṛti, Cetana-Prakṛti can be spoken of as the material cause of the world in a figurative sense (*gauṇārtha*). This is not possible in the case of B. which is not the Abhimāni-devatā of Prakṛti.

Two clear references to the four-faced Brahmā in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.1*a* and i.1.9*cd*) hold between them as between a pair of tongs (*Saṁdaṁśa*) a reference to the science of Brahmā (i.1.1*c*) and to the mark of being born (*Jāyamānatva*) pertaining to the four-faced Brahmā. This lends support to the view that the Akṣara in question is the four-faced Brahmā. There are also grounds to favor Rudra.

The Pūrvapakṣa lays great stress on the fact that this Akṣara described in *Muṇḍ.* i.1.7 as the source of the world is further on represented as the lowest limit or starting point (*avadhi*) in a rising scale of gradations culminating in "that which is higher (*paraḥ*) than what lies beyond (*parataḥ*) the Imperishable (*akṣara*):

5. अबाधेऽन्तरंगस्योपादानत्वस्य त्यागायोगात् । (*TC*. p. 516 b).
6. तत्राक्षरशब्दस्य–
'कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते' (*Gitā*, xv. 16) इति स्मृतिसिद्धत्वात् । (*TC*).

Akṣarāt Parataḥ Paraḥ (ii, 1, 2).

This makes the identification of the Akṣara with the Supreme B. impossible. For no Vedāntin could consent to deprive B. of its summit position and place it at the base or *starting point* of a gradational series affirmed in *Akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ*. Hence Akṣara must be Prakṛti.[7]

There is one more difficulty. The *Muṇḍaka* refers to two Vidyās—the higher and the lower. The Ṛg Veda and other Śāstras by which alone B. has been declared to be knowable in B.S.i.1.3-4, have been put down here as Lower Vidyā. The same B. cannot again be made the subject of the higher or Para Vidyā, which is contrary to Apara Vidyā. Consequently, Akṣara which is proclaimed to be knowable by Paravidyā[8] cannot be the Supreme B. It can only be the Prakṛti.[9]

Siddhānta View.

The Siddhānta shows that these Pūrvapakṣas are all groundless. The illustrations of the spider and the web, of plants and herbs growing from the earth and of hairs and nails being produced from the human body do not necessarily imply that B. is the material cause of the Universe. These illustrations are compatible with the thesis of B.'s being only the efficient cause. This point has been thrashed out by M. in his C. on the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa of the B.S. This obviates the need to concede material causality in a secondary sense (Gauṇārtha) to Cit-Prakṛti in support of the Pūrvapakṣa in her favor. The claims of four-faced Brahmā are weaker still. The term Brahmavidyā at the beginning of *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.1c) does not refer to him. This should be clear from the description of this Vidyā as "the foundation of all wisdom" (i.1.1c) and the concluding passage of *Muṇḍ.* (i, 2, 13) "To him he brought the science of B. by which one knows the Imperishable, the true".

The difficulty created by the phrase "*Akṣarāt parataḥ Parah*" is easily resolved, says M. when we remember that the Śāstras recognise the existence of *three Akṣaras* (eternal principles of that name) viz. Mūla-Prakṛti (which is insentient) Cit-Prakṛti and Paramātman.[10] The first one provides the stuff out of which the material world is formed; the second is the presiding deity (*abhimāni-devatā*) of the first and

7. परत्वावधित्वस्य ब्रह्मण्ययोगान्न तस्याक्षरत्वं युक्तम् । (*TC*. p. 515 b).
8. अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते । (*Muṇḍ*. i, 1.5).
9. अपरविद्यात्वेनोक्तऋगादिविषये शास्त्रयोनौ ब्रह्मण्येव तत्प्रतियोगिभूतपरविद्याविषयत्वस्यासंभवात् 'अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यत' इति श्रुत्या प्रकृतेरेव तत्संभवाच्च । (*TC*. p. 517).
10. श्रीः परा प्रकृतिः प्रोक्ता चेतना विष्णुसंश्रया' इति स्कान्दे । (M. *BSB*. i.2.22).

the third and the highest is Para-Brahman. M. explains that these three Akṣaras stand in an ascending order of imperishability beginning with Jaḍa-Prakṛti and ending with the Supreme B. That being so, the Akṣara (No. 1) which stands at the starting point of the gradational series (*paratvāvadhibhūtam*) is the Jaḍa-Prakṛti and not the Supreme B. which has been proclaimed in *Muṇḍ. Up.* i, 1.7 as the primary source of all creation. There is thus no difficulty in identifying the Akṣara which is the primary source of the world (i.1.7) with the *Parataḥ Para-Akṣara* or the Supreme Akṣara which transcends the two other Akṣaras (*Muṇḍ.* ii, 1, 2).[11]

It is fully conceded by M. that the Akṣara that is placed at the starting point of the series of the three Akṣaras in *Akṣarāt Parataḥ Paraḥ* is different from the Akṣara that stands at the summit of that series. It is this Paramākṣara[12] that is the primary and independent source of all finite reality, taught in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.1.7) in the sense of being the source of the existence, conscious life and activity (*sattāpratītipravṛtti*) of all else. The Cetana-Prakṛti and the Jaḍa-Prakṛti as secondary and tertiary Akṣaras have their place and function in the scheme of evolution of the world. The Jaḍa-Prakṛti provides the material stuff of the Universe (*Viśvopādāna*) and the Cetana-Prakṛti acts as the presiding deity over its creative evolution. None of these two has, however, any independent power to evolve or to preside over the evolution. The Supreme B. remains the only primary source of all evolution and control of all finite reality—the unseen originator and sustainer of all that goes on in the life of the Universe. This is the great truth the *Muṇḍ. Up.* seeks to impress on us when it says:

Yathorṇanābhiḥ sṛjate gṛṇhate ca
Yathā pṛthivyām oṣadhayas sambhavanti /
Yathā sataḥ Puruṣāt keśalomāni
Tathākṣarāt sambhavatīha viśvam (i.1.7)

Here, the first illustration emphasizes B.'s role as Creator without being the material cause of the world; the second points out how Karma of Jīvas is duly taken into account in bringing about diversity in creation just as the difference in the nature and quality of the seeds determine the nature of the crops produced on the soil of the earth and the last points to the effortlessness of B.'s creatice activity.

11. Also: व्यक्षराभिधानात् 'अक्षरात्परतः परः' इत्यपि (पूर्वोक्तस्य तस्यैव) विशेषणं (नान्यस्य) । (M. BSB. i.2.22).
अक्षरत्रयाभिधानेन अक्षरात्परतः परस्याप्यक्षरान्तरत्ववचनात् । (J. *NV*. i.2.21).
12. चतुर्विधनाशरहिते विष्णावेव अक्षरशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्य पौष्कल्यात् * * * विष्णुरेवाक्षरशब्दमुख्यार्थः इति । (*TCP*. 516 b).

The difficulty raised by the Pūrvapakṣa in accepting the Supreme B. as the subject matter of two contrary Vidyās like Parā and Aparā has been solved by M. in a very simple way without affecting the position and prestige of the Vedic lore. This is done by bringing to light the bifocal approach of the Ṛṣis to their Vedic heritage. M. says:—

The same body of Vedic literature is to be looked upon as Parā and Aparā according as it is directly and primarily connected with the Supreme B. and its quest or with a multiplicity of divinities, their mythology, the science of sacrifice and other matters.[13]

How the Vedic lore as a whole can be harnessed to Brahmadṛṣṭi has been the main theme of the Samanvayādhyāya. The principles of higher interpretation of the Śāstra expounded therein are the guides which help us to discover the Paravidyā in the Aparavidyā.[14]

This fresh way of interpreting Paravidyā adopted by M. in the present context of Parataḥ parākṣaravidyā and its equation with the Akṣaravidyā removes the difficulty of establishing unity of thought between the teachings: *Tathākṣarāt sambhavatīha viśvam* (i, 1. 7) and *Akṣarāt parataḥ Paraḥ*. (ii, 1, 2).

The second Sūtra: Nor the other two because of the distinction of attributes and the statement of difference (i.2.22) as interpreted by M. means: The two Prakṛtis (Jaḍa and Cetana) and the deities Brahmā and Rudra[15] are not the Akṣara described in the Upaniṣad as the Invisible one and the source of the Universe because the first two are ruled out by the qualifying epithets of (i) all-knowing and (ii) 'transcending that which is higher than what lies beyond the Akṣara' (*akṣarāt parataḥ paratvam*), applied to the Invisible. The latter two (Brahmā and Rudra) stand eliminated by reason of their being differentiated (*bhedavyapadeśāt*) from the Invisible Akṣara in the following passage:[16] From Him, this Brahma is born (*Muṇḍ.* i.1.9); when the knower perceives the Supreme Lord who is other (*anyam īśam*).[17] The two Prakṛtis are also eliminated by evidence of there being three Akṣaras in all—of which the Supreme Being is the summit-Akṣara.

13. ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः
ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः ॥ (M. *Muṇḍ.* Up. c.)
See also CHAP. II. p. 7-9. *ante*.
14. ऋगादिरूपा एकैव विद्या सन्न्यायैः प्रमितब्रह्मविषयकशक्तितात्पर्योपाधिना परा, मोक्षसाधनप्रमाहेतुत्वात्; अन्यथा त्वपरा, तदहेतुत्वात् । (*TC*. p. 518).
15. चिदचितोः प्रकृतित्वेनैक्यं, जीवत्वेन ब्रह्मरुद्रयोरिति, "इतरौ" इति चत्वारोऽपि गृह्यन्त इत्याहुः । (*TDP*. i.2.22).
16. "तस्मादेतत् ब्रह्म..." इति, 'अन्यमीशम्' इति च विरिंचरुद्रयोरदृश्यत्वादिगुणकाक्षरात् भेदव्यपदेशाच्च । न विरिंचरुद्रौ इति यथाक्रमं हेतू । (*TDP*. i.2.22).
17. जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम् । (*Mund.* iii, 1.2).

Thus, the first sūtra mentions the points which favor the Siddhānta position. The second one mentions the points which are against the interests of the Pūrvapakṣas and the third mentions an attribute of B. which supports the Siddhānta and is also at the same time unfavorable to the Pūrvapakṣa.

Śamkara's Interpretation.

Vācaspati introduces S.'s Pūrvapakṣa here, as follows[18]: 'An insentient effect like the Universe can be traced only to an insentient cause such as Prakṛti and not to a sentient being like B. Because of this disparity of nature between the cause and the effect in this case, B. cannot be the source of the Universe referred to in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* passage: *Tathākṣarāt sambhavatīha viśvam* (i.1.7).

This objection is thus ruled out by the reply[19]: The Universe is not the result of a physical transformation of B. but an illusory appearance (*Vivarta*) like that of a snake in the rope due to Adhyāsa. Such illusory transformations are not bound by the requirement of any affinity of nature between the cause and the effect. There is thus no difficulty in holding that B. which is devoid of the attributes of visibility etc., and is the subject-matter of Parāvidyā is the source of the Universe.

But in S.'s own Bhāṣya, there is no reference to the niceties of *Pariṇāmavāda* Vs. *Vivarta* in formulating the Pūrvapakṣa or in refuting it. S. speaks lustily of Parameśvara[20] However, he does make a significant observation that "it is unnecessary that two things of which one is compared to another should be of absolutely the same nature". This evidently gives the clue to Vācaspati to develop the adhikaraṇaśarīra in more outspoken terms of Vivartavāda than S. It is, however, not clear why Dr. Radhakrishnan does not go into Vācaspati's views here as he does elsewhere.[21]

The above interpretation of Vācaspati and the *Kalpataru* with reference to the *Nirviśeṣa-B.* renders the present discussion out of place in the *present* Pāda. It is also open to question how far S. and his commentators would be justified in raising a Pūrvapakṣa here outside the Sūtra from the standpoint of transformation (Vikāravāda) when

18. परिणामो विवर्तो वा सरूपस्योपलभ्यते ।
चिदात्मना तु सारूप्यं जडानां नोपपद्यते ।।
जडं प्रधानमेवातो जगद्योनिः प्रतीयताम् ।। (*Bhāmatī* i.1.21).
19. विवर्तस्तु प्रपंचोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽपरिणामिनः
अनादिवासनोद्भूतो न सारूप्यमपेक्षते ।। (*Bhāmatī* i.1.21).
20. एवं प्राप्तेऽभिधीयते–योऽदृश्यत्वादिगुणको भूतयोनिः स परमेश्वर एव स्यान्नान्य इति । (S. *BSB.* i.2.21).
21. See his *Brahmasūtra* pp. 278; 332.

according to their own interpretation, the same Pūrvapakṣa has been officially embodied and refuted by accepting Vivartavāda as the Siddhānta in *Na Vilakṣaṇatvād asya....* (ii, 1.4). The present Pūrvapakṣa should either have waited till B.S. ii, 1.4, or the latter discourse should stand cancelled in the light of the present discourse as superfluous.[22] The Vivarta interpretation is also inconsistent with the illustrations of spider etc. given in the text of the Up. The latter half of the Sūtra i.2.21 appeals to "the statement of the attributes of B." (*dharmokteḥ*) such as its "knowing all, perceiving all". A Brahman such as this which is further said to be attained by knowers "departing thro' the way of the Sun (*Muṇḍ. Up.* i.2.11) is obviously the Saguṇa-B. which is certainly *not* the substratum of the illusory transformation appearing as the world. It is the Nirguṇa or Nirviśeṣa-B. that is the substratum of such illusory appearance in S.'s metaphysics. But then, the Sūtrakāra is *not* thinking of such a B. here!

Vācaspati's unwarranted enthronement of Nirviśeṣa-B. here, creates a further complication to the wording of the Sūtra i.2.22 where reference is made to the Supreme B. as "the heavenly Person *without a body*, which distinguishes it from the Jīvātman. If the aim of the Vedānta Śāstra is to dispel the sense of duality as S. and his commentators are never tired of contending, we should expect the Sūtrakāra here and elsewhere to emphasize the identity between Jīva and B. instead of laying repeated emphasis on their mutual differences and differentiating attributes. The spirit and letter of all the three Sūtras of the present adhikaraṇa are also hostile to S.'s Abhedavāda.

R. has restricted his Pūrvapakṣa in favor of Jīvātman to the phrase *Akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ* and has tried to sustain it exclusively upon it. But the attributes of divinity (*divyatva*) pervasion (*vyāpti*) being without breath etc. with which the higher than the highest (*akṣarāt-parataḥ paraḥ*)—"Invisible" is endowed in the Upaniṣadic text (ii. 1.2) prevent a Pūrvapakṣa in favor of Jīvātman. That is why M. has excluded the Jīvātman (Śārīra) from the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here.

22. The *Kalpataru* attempts a feeble explanation of this:
न विलक्षणत्वादित्यत्र परिणाममतं कृत्वाचिन्तया परिणामसारूप्ययोर्व्याप्तिर्निराकरिष्यते। अत्र तु, विवर्तसादृश्ययोः परिणामस्तु तत्रत्य इहानूदितः ।
(i.221). But see again *Kalpataru* on the *saṅgatti* for ii, 2.11.

CHAPTER XXX

BRAHMAN THE ALL-DIGESTING PRINCIPLE

7. *Vaiśvānarādhikaraṇam* (1, 2.24-32)

This *adhi.* marks a fitting conclusion of the two Pādas devoted to the Samanvaya of Anyatraprasiddha-words.[1] As the Samanvaya of several marks (*liṅga*) like "being the digester of food (*pācakatva*), being the seat of homa (*homādhikaraṇatva*) is secured by the Samanvaya of the name 'Vaiśvānara' here, it has been advisedly taken up in the present (*liṅga*) pāda, notwithstanding its character as a *nāmapada*.[2]

The *adhi.* has also a larger purpose to serve as pointed out by the *TD*. It reinforces the Samanvaya of all such *other* names of deities occurring in various places in the Sūktas covered by earlier *adhi-s*[3] as well as in Sūktas addressed to Pṛthvī, Vāyu and other deities, not so far explicitly dealt with in any *adhi.*[4] Apart from this, there is also another justification for the *adhi.* as pointed out by the *NSP* and as fully brought out in the elucidation of the Pūrvapakṣa in the *TC*. It is only in the course of this *adhi.* that the Sūtrakāra himself enunciates the principle of *Sakṣād apyavirodham* (i, 2.28) which embodies a convincing answer to what may be regarded as the most formidable objection to the very attempt at Samanvaya of all names and descriptive phrases found in the Śāstra, in B., that it would put an end to all

1. पादद्वयार्थत्वेनैकत्र प्रवेशानुपपत्तेः पादद्वयशेषोऽयमत एव पादद्वयान्ते निबन्धनम् । (*NS*. p. 171 b).
2. अत्र लोकतोऽन्यत्रप्रसिद्धवैश्वानरनाम्नः पाचकत्वाद्यनेकलिंगसमन्वयसिद्धये ब्रह्मणि समन्वयः । (*TP*).
3. एवं तावच्छ्रुतिलिंगानामन्यत्रप्रसिद्धानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयं प्रदर्शयता, पादद्वयार्थनिगमनाय सर्वनाम्नां सर्वलिंगानां च समन्वयदृढीकरणत्मको ** ऽयमधिकरणराज आरभ्यते । (*TD*).
4. तथापि पृथिवीवाय्वादिसूक्तगतानामप्यधिकरणान्तराभावात् अनयैव दिशा तत्तद्देवताभूतपरत्वाच्चेत्यतिदेश-सूचनाय "न देवता भूतं च" इति सामान्यतः सूत्ररचना । (*TPG*).

commerce of life based on accepted usage of words to denote particular persons or things on the basis of Yogarūḍhi.[5]

The Viṣayavākyas of this *adhi.* are taken from (i) *Chān. Up.* (v. 18.1): Whoever meditates on this Supreme Lord occupying the space of a span (in the heart) as Vaiśvānara transcending all measure (*abhi-vimāna*[6]); (ii) from the *Bṛh. Up.*[7] (v. 9.1): This Agni which is here within a person is the Vaiśvānara by whom that which is eaten is digested and (iii) the passage in the R.V. (vi.7.1):

> *Mūrdhānam divo'ratim pṛthivyā Vaiśvānaram*
> *ṛta ājātam agnim*
> *Kavim samrājam atithim janānām āsannā pātram*
> *janayanta devāḥ.*[8]

Pūrvapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that 'Vaiśvānara' is either the fire-god (*devatā*) or the material energy of fire (*bhūtam*) because of the *express statement* based on the established usage of the word in the sense of fire. The marks of 'digesting the food' etc. are also inapplicable to anyone but Agni. The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the identification of Vaiśvānara with the Supreme Lord in the *Gītā* (xv. 14), the contextual relation with "Ātman-Brahman",[9] characteristics such as transcendence of measure (*abhivimānatva*[10]), destruction of sins by knowing the self (*asya sarve pāpamānaḥ pradūyante* (Chān. Up. v. 24.3) and such other grounds could not override the express statement in terms of Agni (as *Devatā* or *bhūtam*) because the evidence of Samākhyā, Prakaraṇa, Liṅga, etc. is admittedly inferior to that of 'Śruti' (express statement[11]).

It would not be open to the Siddhāntin to argue that the express statement in favor of Agni can be made to refer directly (*mukhyataḥ*) to B. on the basis of the ruling given in the *Antastaddharmopadeśa-adhi.* (i.1.20) earlier. In that case, the term 'Vaiśvānara' would cease to be an *Anyatraprasiddhaśabda* for purposes of Samanvaya. Nor can

5. सर्वशब्दानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वये, लोके संव्यवहारविरोधेनान्यत्र प्रसिद्धनाम्नो रूढस्य यौगिकस्य वा कस्यापि समन्वया-योगात् इति सर्वाक्षेपसमाधानाय 'साक्षादप्याविरोधं' इति सूत्रेणात्रैव समाधानात् । (*NSP*. i, p. 149)
6. यस्त्वेतमेनं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते । (*Chān. Up.* v.18.1).
7. अयमग्निर्वैश्वानरो योऽयमन्तः पुरुषे, येनेदमन्नं पच्यते । (v.9.1).
8. "The gods have made Vaiśvānara, the source of the heavens, the feet of the world, the one born for right knowledge of men the Supreme, all-knowing Lord, all-exceeding Protector, the chief resort of all their activities." (Tr).
9. महाशालाः समेत्य मीमांसांचक्रुः को न आत्मा, किं ब्रह्मेति । (*Chān. Up.* v.11.1).
10. अभितो विगतं मानं मर्यादा यस्य तं, सर्वगतमिति यावत् । (*BD*. 1.2.24).
11. श्रुतिलिंगवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् । (*PMS*. iii, 3, 13).

such anyatraprasiddhi be established on the basis of the principle of *Jagadvācitvāt* (BS.i.4.17) *to be enunciated.* If it is conceded on the authority of that ruling that all words are primarily applicable to B. alone by right, it would cripple all purposeful linguistic commerce elsewhere, in the world, and bring it to a standstill. If, however, one should attempt to justify the use of words elsewhere to denote different things of the world on the basis of the ruling in *Śarīrarūpakavinyastagṛhīteḥ* (BS.i.4.1) that words used in the scripture denote other things only by reason of their relationship to B. which is the primarily-denoted in all such cases, it would mean that outside of B. the application of words to denote particular persons or things is governed entirely by secondary signification, based purely on Lakṣaṇā or Gauṇī-Vṛtti and in no case by direct denotation thro' primary signification.[12] That would lead to absurd consequences that a word like Indra which according to this view would primarily denote B. may as well be applied to Agni and a word like Agni applied to Indra. Such promiscuity would cut at the root of all distinction between *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā.*[13]

Lastly, the Pūrvapakṣa contends that if words like Agni, Vaiśvānara, etc., are to be regarded as primarily denotative of B. alone, the accepted distinction of Sūktas in the Vedas, as "Agni Sūkta", "Indra-Sūkta" and so on and the distinction of Vidyās taught in them as between "Agni-Vidyā", "Ātmavidyā", "Akṣi-vidyā", "Prāṇa-vidyā," etc., would cease to have any meaning—as everything would be Brahmavidyā. In this way, the Pūrvapakṣa, here, poses a formidable challenge to all the Samanvayādhikaraṇas, so far established!

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta establishes that Vaiśvānara is B. For even tho' the *anyatraprasiddhi* of the term Vaiśvānara in respect of Agni and the marks of all-pervasiveness (*Sarvagatatva*) etc. of B. contained in the Viṣayavākya are both equally balanced, in the sense of each being *niravakāśa* in its own sphere (i.e., not admitting of any other explanation) and as this circumstance makes the name Vaiśvānara equally applicable to both Agni and B (*ubhayasādhāraṇa*); still, it must be concluded that the Vaisvānara referred to in the text under discussion is the Supreme B. alone. The reason is that "Vaiśvānara" is found qualified by the epithet "ātmā" in the disputed passage[14]; and "Ātmā"

12. यदि च शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेरिति वक्ष्यमाणन्यायेन मुख्यार्थभूतब्रह्मसबन्धादन्यत्र प्रयोगस्तर्हि, गंगादिशब्दानां तीरादाविवान्यत्र लक्षणादिः स्यात् । (*TC*. 529 b).
13. तथाच, ब्रह्मणि मुख्यानामिन्द्रादिशब्दानामग्न्यादावग्न्यादिशब्दानां चेन्द्रादौ प्रयोगः स्यात्। (*TC*. p. 529 b).
14. वैश्वानरशब्दस्य विष्णावेव प्रसिद्धात्मशब्देन विशेषणात् । (M. *BSB*. i.2.24).

by settled acceptance denotes the highest B. and B. alone in its fullest primary sense.[15] This is a clinching argument. We have thus the establishment of the Siddhānta in the first Sūtra on the basis of a supporting evidence (*Sādhakapramāṇa*) in the form of an express statement (*Śruti-pramāṇa*).

The next Sūtra *Smaryamāṇam anumānam syād iti* (i.2.25) makes use of a parallel passage from the Smṛti by way of an inferential support to what has been established.[16] The Smṛti text carefully chosen by M. is from the *Bhagavadgītā*:

Aham Vaiśvānaro bhūtvā prāṇinām deham āśritaḥ
Prāṇāpānasamāyuktaḥ pacāmyannam caturvidham (xv.14)

which both directly and expressly establishes the identity of Vaiśvānara with B. For this reason, this text has to be preferred to the other passages from the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and other sources from which S., R. and others have chosen the text.[17]

The next Sutra (i.2.26) sets aside the objection that Vaiśvānara cannot be B. because of the references in the text to Agni and his characteristics such as being the digester of food (*pācakatva*[18]) and indwellingness (*antaḥpratiṣṭhāna*[19]). The latter part of the Sūtra shows how scripture contemplates that B. (*as* Vaiśvānara) is to be meditated upon as the indwelling spirit of all,[20] as lauded by every name, as the guiding principle of all functions, the accomplisher of all. The fourth Sūtra concludes the discussion by pointing out that for these reasons Vaiśvānara cannot be the god of fire or the element of fire (*ata eva na devatā bhūtam ca*). By rejecting the identification of Vaiśvānara (B.) with the Jīvātman, the divinity of fire etc., this *adhi.* also registers its disapproval of the thesis of monism.[21]

The last five Sutras of the *adhi.* take the opportunity of reviewing important objections most likely to be raised against this theory of direct Samanvaya of all Śāstra in B. The serious nature of some of these objections has already been made clear in the elucidation of the pūrvapakṣa of this adhikaraṇa. It is to be expected of a Samanvayā-

15. This point is established in the Sūtra i.1.6 and in द्युभ्वाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् । (i.3.1) and its force has been accepted by S. also, in his C.
16. अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा (*Gita* xv. 14) इति स्मर्यमाणमत्रापि स एवोच्यत इत्यस्यानुमापकं, समाख्यानात् । (M. *BSB*. 1.2.25)
17. For discussion of their views see later.
18. येनेदमन्नं पच्यते । (*Brh. Up*. v.9.1).
19. योऽयमन्तः पुरुषे । (*Brh. Up*. v.9.1).
20. तथा दृष्टयुपदेशात् । (*BS*. 1.2.26).
21. अत्रापि परपक्षेऽपि वैश्वानरस्य जीवत्वं निषिद्ध्य ब्रह्मेत्युक्तेः तद्भेदार्थतैव । (*TC*).

cārya of the Sūtrakāra's position that he should be able to give convincing answers to these objections and vindicate the governing principles of his grammar of Samanvaya as part of his interpretative technique in relation to his Brahma Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. M. has shown in his C. how the last five sūtras placed at the conclusion of the Pādas dealing with the Samanvaya of *Anyatraprasiddhaśabdas* fulfil this purpose.

Briefly, the nature of the obstacles which stand in the way of Samanvaya in B. of names, epithets and marks commonly applied to other things and the manner in which these have been overcome in the Sūtras have been explained by M. as follows: It may be true eno' that all words used in scripture primarily denote B. But it is equally true that the wise and the unwise, the initiated and the uninitiated persons have to carry on certain worldly activities within the framework of the Vedic tradition and ceremonial. Such activities and responses presuppose the use of words. Since, in the strictest truth, there are no words which are not primarily applicable to B. and none, whatever, which is primarily applicable only to things of the world, in the scriptures, the wise ones have necessarily to depend on the use of such words as primarily apply to B. and make use of them to denote other things and persons covering the practical interests of their lives.[22] This may be illustrated by the analogy of the well-known Bhāṭṭa theory of *Śabdaśakti* that tho' words primarily express the sense of the universals or class-essence of things, it is accepted that in ordinary parlance they denote 'particulars' (rather than class-essence) in the interests of purposeful activity. Similarly, in the Siddhānta view here, of B. being the One primarily denoted by all scriptural words, practical and meaningful activity is to be explained by the acceptance of well-defined regulations in the application of words derived from scripture. If a word like Indra with its accepted sense in the commerce of life were to be applied indiscriminately in the sense of Agni or Vāyu, regulated adjustments and purposeful activities could not be carried on. Hence wise ones adhere to the regulation that for purposes of empirical life the distinctive senses assigned to such words by language and lexicon have to be accepted as binding and meaningful and act upon such an understanding. Language and lexica recognise that a word like *'Vahni'* has the power to convey the sense of "fire". But they do *not* recognise that a word like "Indra" has similarly the power to give the sense of "Agni" (fire).

22. अनन्ययोगेन ब्रह्मवाचकैरपि तैर्ज्ञानिनो हानादि (व्यवहार) सिद्धयर्थमन्यत्राग्न्यादौ व्यवहरन्ति । तदन्ये तु, ज्ञानाभावादेव इत्युपगमात् । एवमभ्युपगमे च, प्रसिद्धेरन्यथोपपत्तिसिद्धेर्न तद्विरोधश्चेति जैमिनिराचार्यो वक्तीत्यर्थः । (*TP*. 1.2.28).

The distinction of hymns (*Sūktavyavasthā*) is explained by the Sūrtakāra on the basis of several points of view complementary to one another, attributed to thinkers like Jaimini, Āśmarathya, Bādari and others. We are told how Āśmarathya takes his stand on B.'s distinctive manifestations in and thro' the respective deities and principles connected with them, in order to explain the extended application of words originally denoting B.[23] Bādari explains it on the basis of the need to remember and seek B. in and thro' Agni etc.,[24] and Jaimini on the ground of *Sampatti*[25]—that the seeker reaches Agni or other deities by worshipping them and thro' them the Supreme B. who is their Antaryāmī, in due course. The first view of Jaimini is *Sākṣad apyavirodha*, of which the other views are partial expositions. It is the primary basis of Samanvaya initiated by the Sūtrakāra, that all words in Scripture primarily denote B. as it is in B. that words find the fulfilment of their fullest primary sense and that this does not involve any contradiction with established usage of words in empirical life to denote lesser things.

We have here, in M.'s interpretation of the last five Sūtras, of this Pāda, a very thoughtful exposition of the entire basis of Śāstrasamanvaya in B. It brings out the mystic aspect of the philosophy of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads as the words of God dealing primarily with Him, in their original sense and only by way of concession to empirical thought and language with other things in a descending scale of meanings and values. This in its turn embodies a new concept of meaning.

The different views of how words originally meaning B. come to be applied to other things, ascribed by the Sūtrakāra to Jaimini Bādari and Kāśakṛtsna have been explained by M. as aspects of Bādarāyaṇa's own all-embracing wisdom, with a striking poetic metaphor.[26]

Review of Other Interpretations

S. brings the gastric fire, the elemental fire and its deity under the scope of doubt in the present *adhi.* by reason of the use of the common term Vaiśvānara in the Viṣayavākyas and the individual self and B. by reason of another common term *'ātmā'* as he thinks that the term "Vaiśvānara" is *not* found used for the Ātman anywhere else. R. drops the Jīvātman from the scope of the doubt and confines it to

23. तत्र तत्र प्रसिद्धावप्यग्न्यादिषु ब्रह्मणोऽभिव्यक्तेरग्न्यादिसूक्तनियम **इत्याश्मरथ्यः** । (M. *BSB*. 1.2.29).
24. तत्र तत्रोक्तस्य विष्णोरग्न्यादिष्वनुस्मर्यमाणत्वात् तन्नियम इति **बादरिः** । (*ibid*).
25. साक्षादप्यविरोधं वदन् **जैमिनिः** सूक्तादिनियममग्न्यादिसंप्राप्त्या मन्यते–एनं विष्णमग्न्यादावामनन्ति, "योऽग्नौ तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिना । (*BSB*. 1.2.32).
26. व्यासचित्तस्थिताकाशादवच्छिन्नानि कानिचित् ।
अन्ये व्यवहरन्त्येतान्यूरीकृत्य गृहादिवत् ॥ (M. *BSB*. i.2.28).

the other four only, on the basis of the common term "Vaiśvānara". His commentator explains that tho' the term "Ātman" is common to Jīva and B. the former has to be left out of the scope of doubt as the term Ātmā is qualified by the other term "Vaiśvānara" in the passage: *Vaiśvānaram ātmānam* which is not otherwise and elsewhere known to be applied to the Jīvātman.

As the gastric fire is only an aspect of the elemental fire, it need not be separately mentioned for purposes of sound Pūrvapakṣa. It can be seen from the wording of Sūtra i.2.27 that Bādarāyaṇa did not consider it worthy of being included in the Pūrvapakṣa as the commentators have done.[27]

S.'s view that "Vaiśvānara" is *not* found applied to Ātman is incorrect; for we have the statement:

> *So'yam ātmā catuṣpāt * * * * sthūlabhug*
> *Vaiśvānaraḥ.*

in the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* (ii-3) which denotes Jīvātman, according to S. and his commentators. His way of bringing the Jīvātman within the sphere of the Pūrvapakṣa here, on the basis of "the common term Ātmā" is unsustainable in the light of the firm stand taken by the Sūtrakāra in *Dyubhvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt* (i.3.1) that the term "Ātman" primarily denotes the Supreme B. and *not* the Jīvātman. It is only on this firm ground (and not on such a weak one as the one put up by R.) that the Jīvātman has got to be eschewed from the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here. This is what M. has done.

The reason (*hetu*) by which S. establishes the Siddhānta view in Sūtra 24, that Vaiśvānara is B., is that of the distinction of Vaiśvānara's having heaven etc. for his head, and limbs (*dyumūrdhatvādi viśeṣaṇāt*). According to R. the reason is the mark of being investigated by the seekers of Mokṣa, such as Aupamanyava, in the context of the Viṣayavākya and the possession of the attributes of *Sarvātmatva* etc. As the inclusion of the (Jīv)ātman in the Pūrvapakṣa has been shown to be unsustainable, the Siddhānta view that Vaiśvānara is B. can more easily and directly be established on the ground of the use of the term "Ātman" itself in apposition with Vaiśvānara in the Śruti text: *Ātmānam Vaiśvānaram upāste* (*Chān. Up.* v.18.1) instead of relying on inferential marks to establish the point as R. has done.[28] As for S., the distinction of *dyumūrdhatva* etc. which he presses into service here, has been indented upon by him once again under Sūtra

27. अत एव न देवता भूतं च । (i.2.27).
28. परमात्मासाधारणधर्मः विशेष्यमाणत्वात् । (R).

26 in the explanation of the *hetu: Puruṣa (vidham) api cainam adhīyate.* It is not usual for the Sūtrakāra to fall back upon such repetitions. We have, therefore, to go in for a fresh interpretation of *viśeṣāt*[29] (i.2.24) which would be free from such difficulties. The interpretation offered by M. is, therefore, better.

The explanation of the remaining Sūtras, too, as we have it from S. and R. leaves much to be desired. The second Sūtra: *Smaryamāṇam anumānam syād iti* (i.2.25) appeals to a Smṛti text in corroboration of the Siddhānta view that Vaiśvānara is B. The passage that should most readily have suggested itself to commentators in this connection is:

> *Aham Vaiśvānaro bhūtvā prāṇinām deham āśritaḥ*
> *Prāṇāpānasamāyuktaḥ pacāmyannam caturvidham.*
> (*Gītā* xv.14)

Instead of taking their stand on this clearly worded text, establishing the identity of B. with Vaiśvānara, S. and R. have sought to explain the Sūtra in a roundabout way quoting a different verse from a different source—*the Viṣṇu Purāṇa*:

"He of whom Agni is the mouth, heaven the head......worship to Him, the self of the Universe."[30]

S.'s explanation of this Sūtra is that from the shape of B. described in this *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* passage, which is a Smṛti, we infer the existence of a Śruti text from which this Smṛti is derived and this in its turn, helps us to conclude that such a Śruti text is verily the One from the *Chān. Up.* mentioned in the opening Sūtra (as dealing with the Vaiśvānara).

According to R. the term *Smaryamāṇam* stands for what is 'recollected' or 'recognized' and *anumānam* stands for the exclusive characteristic of a given thing (*lakṣaṇam*). What the Sūtra means is that it is recognized from the Śrutis and Smṛtis that the attributes of having heaven for the head, etc., is an exclusive property of B. This again brings in a further recognition that as these same characteristics are found in the passage dealing with the Vaiśvānara in the *Chān. Up.* that Vaiśvānara is indeed B.

29. वैश्वानरशब्दस्य आत्माशब्देन विशेषणात् । (M).
30. यस्याग्निरास्यं द्यौर्मूर्धा खं नाभिश्चरणौ क्षितिः ।
सूर्यश्चक्षुर्दिशः श्रोत्रे तस्मै लोकात्मने नमः ॥ (*VP.*).
It should be noted that there is *no reference whatsoever to Vaiśvānara* in this verse.

But if *Smaryamāṇam* is to be taken in this unusual sense, we can as well pass from one direct statement (Śruti-pratyabhijñā) as in the Gita passage to another direct statement in the Śruti thro' such act of recognition, instead of passing from one characteristic mark to the recognition of another, giving natural precedence to *Śrutipratyabhijñāna* over *liṅga-pratyabhijnāna*.

S.'s line of argument is more inadequate and inconclusive. The presence of a *Smṛti* text like the one cited from *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* which speaks of the attributes of the Lokātman would of course point to the existence of a probable Śruti text of corresponding sense, as its source, on the basis of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā *dictum*: *Asati hyanumānam*. But, such a source could as well be found in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* text (ii, 1, 4):

अग्निर्मूर्धा[31] चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिश:श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदा: ।
वायु: प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमास्यं पद्भ्यां पृथ्वी ह्येष सर्वान्तरात्मा ॥

where there is *no mention of Vaiśvānara*! The Mīmāmsā dictum on which S. and his commentators rely can only help us to establish that there must be an original Śruti source corresponding to the sense of the given Smṛti passage.[32] In the present instance, it would not necessarily prove that that Śruti text *must also be one connected with the "Vaiśvānara Vidyā"*!

To achieve this result it would be more proper to choose a more decisive passage *mentioning the Vaiśvānara*—such as the one from the *Bhagavadgītā*, as the text capable of leading to the inference[33] that in the Śruti text also the Vaiśvānara spoken of is B. This is the straight and simple mode of interpretation which M. has adopted.

Commenting on the words: *Tathā dṛṣṭyupadeśāt* (in Sūtra i.2.26) S. writes that the words: *Prādeśamātram abhivimānam ātmānam Vaiśvānaram upāste* (*Chān.* v.18.1), can be interpreted without the *gastric fire being set aside*, on account of the perception of B. being taught *in this manner*. Explaining the phrase "in this manner" he writes : that this may be understood on the analogy of such a teaching as *Mano brahmetyupāsīta* (Let one meditate on mind as B.) or in the sense that the Supreme Being is to be perceived as Vaiśvānara (the gastric fire) to the extent of its having gastric fire called Vaiśvānara for its limiting condition (*upādhi*) on the analogy of passages like *Manomayaḥ prāṇaśarīro bhārūpaḥ* (*Chān. Up.* iii, 14.2[34]). But then, if Vaiśvānara is to be treated merely as a Pratīka or symbolic base in S.'s sense of Pratīkopāsanā, it would be *ultra vires* for the Sūtrakāra to attempt to establish the Samanvaya of such a term as Vaiśvānara in B. —even as there is no attempt in the Sūtra to establish the Samanvaya of things used as Pratīkas in S.'s sense. The knowledge of a Pratīka cannot also confer the actual benefits of Brahman-knowledge such as dissolution of all sins, as we have it stated in the Śruti text (*Chān. Up.* v.24.3). The same objection holds true in respect of the meditation of the limited or the conditioned aspect of B.

In his C. on Sūtra i.2.28, S. writes further that there is no difficulty or contradiction even if we take it that the Supreme B. by itself[35] is to be worshipped as bearing the names of Agni,[36] Vaiśvānara, etc., in their etymological senses of 'one who leads in front', etc. Here, his explanation of the word *Sākṣād* is obviously forced, in the sense of 'unconditioned existence' (*Kaivalyārtha*[37]), free from *Upādhis*. Its natural and simple sense is one of 'immediacy' (of denotation)—a sense more in accord with M.'s interpretation of the Sūtra and one with which R. also concurs.[38]

In any case, if S. can bring himself to concede here that terms like Agni Vaiśvānara etc., can be applied to B. in their fullest etymological senses, he is bound to accept in the same way that by the same token, scores of other terms discussed in the earlier contexts like *Ānandamaya*, *Ākāśa*, *Prāṇa*, etc. and yet others to be discussed hereinafter, like *Akṣara*, *Vajra*, *Pañcajana*, *Prakṛti*, etc. are all of them capable of being applied to B. in the fulness of their etymological meanings. That would necessitate the acceptance of the conclusion that the chief objective of the Samanvayādhyāya in the Sūtras is to bring out the fulness in B. of those attributes which determine the application of numerous names and epithets to things other than B. (as their inner Ruler). That would be a conclusive vindication of M.'s interpretation of the aim and substance of the Samanvayādhyāya.

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31. असौ वाव लोकोऽग्निर्गौतम' (*Chān.* v, 4, 1) इति श्रुतेरग्नेर्द्युशब्दपर्यायत्वात् । (*Rāgh TCP.* p. 538b).
32. Speaking about the being who has the attributes of *dyumūrdhatva*, etc.
33. अहं वैश्वानरो भूत्वा (*Gītā* xv. 14) इति स्मर्यमाणमत्रापि स एवोच्यत इत्यस्यानुमापकम् । (M. *BSB*. 1.2.25).

34. जाठरापरित्यागेन दृष्ट्युपदेशात् । परमेश्वरदृष्टिर्हि जाठरे वैश्वानरे उपदिश्यते, 'मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत' इत्यादिवत् । अथवा, जाठरे वैश्वानरोपाधि: परमेश्वर इह द्रष्टव्यत्वेनोपदिश्यते, 'मनोमय: प्राणशरीरो भारूप,' इत्यादिवत् । (S. *BSB*. 1.2.26).
35. निश्चिते च पूर्वापरालोचनवशेन परमात्मपरिग्रहे, तद्विषय एव वैश्वानरशब्द: केनचिद्योगेन वर्तिष्यते विश्वश्चायं नरश्चेति, विश्वेषां वायं नर इति, विश्वे वा नरा अस्येति । (S. *BSB*. i.2.28).
36. अग्निशब्दोऽप्यग्रणीत्वादियोगाश्रयणेन परमात्मविषय एव भविष्यति । (S. i.2.28).
37. अथवा, तस्य यत्केवलं साक्षिरूपं तदभिप्रायेण । (S. *BSB*. i.2.28).
38. जैमिनिराचार्यो वैश्वानरशब्दवत् अग्निशब्दस्यापि परमात्मन एव साक्षात् अव्यवधानेन वाचकत्वे न कश्चित् विरोध इति मन्यते । (R).

S. and R. have explained Sutras 29, 30 and 31, as elucidating the purpose and propriety (in the Siddhānta position of Vaiśvānara being B.) of one or more of those peculiar characteristics which have been ascribed to the Vaiśvānara in the Viṣayavākya. These characteristics are Vaiśvānara's being limited by the measure of a span (*prādeśamātratva*), his representation as a man (*puruṣavidhatva*), and his having the altar etc. for his chest and so on (*uraḥprabhṛtīnām Vedyāditvopadeśaḥ*).

According to S. all these three Sūtras deal with the purpose and propriety of the attribute of *prādeśamātratvam* in B.[39] It may be observed that the difficulty felt in regard to this point has been overcome already under the Sūtra *Arbhakaukastvāt* (i.2.7)—not to speak of the explanation implicit in *Tathā dṛṣṭyupadeśāt* (i.2.26), in the present adhi. itself. The sūtra, therefore, deserves to be viewed from a different point of view, instead of being subjected to a redundant explanation.

R. makes each of the three Sūtras tackle a separate difficulty.[40] As it is not a case of the same point on which alternative views of different authorities are set forth, the Vikalpa mode of reference adopted by the Sūtrakāra in citing the names of Āśmarathya, Jaimini, Bādari, would seem to be uncalled for in R.'s interpretation. There is also the additional obligation of importing (*adhyāhāra*) of a fresh predicate into each one of the Sūtras, to get the desired sense in R.'s interpretation. These difficulties are avoided in M.'s interpretation of the last five Sūtras as intended to answer certain difficulties incidental to the thesis of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B. We have already seen how M. interprets them.

As explained by him, these five Sūtras are appropriately placed at the conclusion of the present Pāda. They could not have been placed anywhere else. The discussion raised in them would be out of place at the end of the fourth Pāda, because the purpose of that Pāda (according to M.) is also to deal with the Mahāsamanvaya of the constitutive elements of words—their accents and syllables not excepted, for the edification of Uttamādhikārins. *At that stage of thought,* there is no question of classification of Sūktas or Vidyās or partial manifestation of B. in certain things worshipped by the seeker. The discussion would not also be appropriate at the end of Pāda iii, dealing with the Samanvaya of *Ubhayatraprasiddha-śabdas*. For, after establishing the Samanvaya of *Ubhayatraprasiddha* words in B. in their primary sense, no objection could possibly arise that if such words are primarily denotative of B. they could not be used elsewhere—as such an objection would be confronted by a counter-objection that if words denote other things than B., primarily, they could not denote B., with the result that the concept of *Ubhayatraprasiddha* words would become inconceivable. The only appropriate place, then, for raising the issue, as above, is at the close of the Samanvaya of *Anyatraprasiddhaśabdāḥ* viz., at the end of Pāda ii.

39. कथं पुनः परमात्मपरिग्रहे प्रादेशमात्रश्रुतिरुपपद्यत इति तां व्याख्यातुमारभते – अभिव्यक्तेरिति । (i.2.29).

40. प्रादेशसंबन्धिन्या मात्रया परिच्छिन्नत्वं कथमुपपद्यते तत्राह । (R. i.2.30).
पुरुषविधत्वं परस्य ब्रह्मणः किमर्थमिति तत्राह । (R. i.2.31).
कथं तर्हि उरःप्रभृतीनां वेद्यादित्वोपदेशः ** इत्यत्राह । (R. i.2.32).

PĀDA III

Ubhayatraprasiddha-Nāmaliṅgātmakaśabdasamanvayaḥ

This Pāda establishes, in the main, the Samanvaya in B. of words and phrases which are Ubhayatraprasiddha—i.e., have an application to B. and to other deities, persons and things of the world in the Scriptures themselves and in the prevailing usage outside the Śruti.[1] As the subdivision of words and phrases into *nāmātmaka* and *liṅgātmaka* has been shown in the earlier Pādas, it has not been deemed necessary to make separate allotment of Pādas for similar subdivision in regard to Ubhayatraprasiddha terms also. Clarifying the scope of Samanvaya in this Pāda, J. writes in his *NS* that in the two previous Pādas, words and phrases which, because of their denoting other beings and things than B. in the estimation of the world, are liable to be taken as denoting those same beings, persons and things and *not* B., when met with in the Śrutis also, were shown to be applicable in the Śrutis to B. alone in virtue of their inherent denotative capacity *(śakti)* and purport *(tātparya)*. In the present Pāda, however, words and phrases which, in the world, are accepted as having a denotative capacity in respect of *both B. and other* beings and things of the world are shown to have denotative capacity and purport *only in respect of B.*-when such words and phrases come to be looked upon, on the strength of certain grounds of Pūrva-pakṣas when met with in Scriptural writings, as having their main purport elsewhere than in B.[2] The advantage to the Siddhānta of the Samanvaya of such words and phrases is, as usual, the realization of B.'s Sarvaguṇapūrṇatvam.

1. *Tatra cānyatra ca prasiddhānām śabdānām Viṣṇau samanvayam prāyeṇasmin pāde darśayati* (M. *BSB*. i.3, 1). The term *'prāyeṇa'* (in the main) is to exclude the Devatādhi. and Apaśūdra-adhi. which are not concerned with Samanvaya of words. They deal with side issues re. the right of the gods to Vedavidyā and its denial to Śūdras.
2. *NS*. p. 172.

CHAPTER XXXI

BRAHMAN IS THE SUPPORT OF THE COSMOS

1. *Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam* (i, 3, 1-7)

The opening *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya of the mark: "being the abode or support of heaven and earth and the rest *(dyubhvādyāyatanam)*. The Viṣayavākya chosen is from *Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 2.5 which speaks of "the Being in whom heaven and earth and the sky are woven along with the mind and the vital airs. Know Him only as Ātman and abandon all other talk".

M. introduces the doubt here by way of an *ākṣepasaṅgati* touching the mark of being the subject of Paravidyā. It was affirmed in the *Adṛśyatvādhi* that B. is the subject of Paravidyā. But in another part of the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.2.5), this characteritic of being the subject of Paravidyā appears to be affirmed, in the following words: "Know Him alone as the Ātman and cease all other talk", of *some other Being* which has been described as the abode of heaven and earth etc. If this latter were different from B, the attribute of being the subject of Paravidyā would also have to belong to that other one and not to B. as already established. Hence the need to investigate the identity of the being in whom heaven and earth are woven,—with B.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: The Being which is the abode of heaven and earth and of vital airs etc., is either the god Rudra, Chief Prāṇa, Prakṛti or Jīvātman. There are texts which contain marks favoring them: We read of Rudra in *T.Ā.* (x.37.1) : O Rudra, you are the abode of vital airs and the destroyer of all. Enter me (but destroy me not)". In

another text of the *Ghṛtasūkta* (Khila Śruti) we read "May the wielder of Pināka bow, clad in skin, the lord of the vital airs (prolong our lives)". These point to the person described as the abode of Prāṇas being the god Rudra. A passage in the *Bṛh.Up.* (iii, 7, 2) says: 'O Gautama, it is by Vāyu, the thread, that this world and the other are held fast'. There is another text in *Bṛh.Up.* (iii, 8, 4) : In Ākāśa (Prakṛti) every thing is woven and interwoven. A further statement in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii, 2.6) in the context under discussion runs : 'That One moves within, taking many births'. This points unmistakably to the Jīvātman as the abode of the vital airs etc., for he is subject to births and deaths. The Pūrvapakṣin further contends that tho' there may be a solitary text saying that all the worlds and their denizens are woven in Viṣṇu (B)[2a], the texts which refer to Rudra as the abode of the worlds are *numerous*. The mark of 'being born in many ways[3], is irreconcilable with B. and is applicable only to Jīva.

The Pūrvapakṣa further argues that the Siddhāntin cannot overturn the Pūrvapakṣa by contending that even tho' there are numerous texts which tend to favor Rudra's being regarded as the abode of the vital airs etc., these are liable to be overridden by the context of B. indicated by the mark: He is the goal of the released.[4] For a direct statement (Śruti) favoring Rudra and others is weightier than the context (*prakaraṇa*). The mark of being born many times and in many ways cannot be set aside on the strength of the word 'Ātman' (which in the Siddhānta view is exclusively applicable to B.) or of the *prakaraṇa*.

Nor can it be explained away in the sense that B. manifests Itself in various forms to prompt various activities from within, in the evolutionary series, as has been made clear under the Sūtra: Kāraṇatvena cākāśādiṣu.... (i, 4, 15). Such explanations of the mark of being born (Jāyamānatva-liṅga) are not available to the Siddhāntin at the stage of this Pūrvapakṣa here; because, such a defence put up by the Siddhāntin is to be derived from the Siddhānta to be established in the present *adhi.* itself and it cannot, therefore, be used at the stage of the present Pūrvapakṣa itself. Moreover, the Sūtra: *Kāraṇatvena....* (i 4, 15) deals with a different issue viz. whether there is any inconsistency in holding the same B. to be both the cause and the effect[5], in putting forth the evolutionary series by virtue of its immenence in the causal stuff and its effects at each stage. Moreover, it stands to reason to hold that the

2a. *Sarve vā ete Prāṇāśca prāṇinaśca devāśca divyāni ca lokaśca lokinaśca alokāśca alokinaśca Viṣṇāv eva otāśca protāśca* (*Śruti* q. *TP.* i, 3, 1).
3. *Eṣo antas carate bahudhā jāyamānaḥ* (ii, 2.6).
4. *Amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 2.5).
5. In so far as words like Ākāśa, Vāyu etc., would denote the same B. in their primary senses, in the interpretation of the passage: *Ākāśād Vāyuḥ; Vayor agniḥ; agner āpaḥ.* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1).

Jīvātman tho' beginningless is born in the sense of getting embodied or thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. But the Supreme B. is *not subject to either of these processes.* Even the text cited by the Siddhāntin : *Ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate* (T.Ā. iii, 13.1) 'the unborn is born in many ways' has reference only to the Jīvātman because he has no birth in respect of his intrinsic essence (*svarūpa*) tho' he takes birth thro' physical embodiment. In this way, the grounds of Pūrvapakṣa are stronger and otherwise inexplicable. We have, therefore, to admit that the word 'Ātmā' used in the present context will have to be taken in the sense of the Jīvātman himself particularly in view of the marks like "being born" which cannot be explained otherwise (*niravakāśa*).

Siddhānta

अचेतनजनेरन्या चेतनस्य जनिर्यथा ।
तथोभयजनेरन्या ब्रह्मणोऽपि जनिर्मता ॥

The Siddhāntin says:

There is a wide difference of meaning in the 'birth' (production) of an inanimate principle like water or fire and birth of a sentient person like a human being. The former undergoes physical transformation of essence. The sentient being merely gets embodied without any transformation of its essence (of *caitanya* etc.). In the same way, the 'birth' of the Supreme B. referred to in Srutis like '*Ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate*' can very well be of a different order from the birth of a Jīva or of an insentient material principle—partaking of the nature of a 'manifestation' (*prādurbhāva*). That B. has the transcendental power of such manifestations of forms which are all of the essence of pure bliss and Caitanya, untouched by material defilement, is stated in the Śāstras[6], and has to be accepted on their authority. It is not a matter to be ascertained by perceptual evidence or inference.

The text '*Ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate*' (without being born, he takes many births) *does indeed refer to B* and *not* to the Jīvātman; for it concludes with a further statement : whoever knows Him *in this way* becomes immortal[7]. This passage moreover occurs in the Puruṣa-Sūkta which deals with the highest B.

It would thus be proper to conclude that the mark of 'being born' should be deemed capable of being applied to B. (*sāvakāśa*) in view of

6. Cf. *Strīpummalābhiyogātmā deho viṣṇor na jāyate.*
Kim tu nirdoṣacaitanyasukhām nityām svakām tanum.
Prakāśayati saiveyam janir Viṣṇor na cāparā.
(*Brahmāṇḍa* Q. M. *VTN.* iii).
See also Tilaka c. on *Rāmāyaṇa* III, 64. p. 442. col. 2.
7. *Tam evam vidvān amṛta iha bhavati.*

the inalienable superiority of the primary sense of the word 'Ātmā' (occurring in the same text) in respect of B. As for the names Rudra, Pinākī, Krittivāsāḥ etc., appearing in the various Śruti texts cited for the Pūrvapakṣa, they can all of them be applied to B. in their etymological senses as elucidated by M. in his Bhāṣya:-

He is Rudra because He cures the disease of births and deaths. He is Īśāna (Ruler) for He rules over all. He is Mahādeva the Supreme and splendid one. He is Pinākī in the sense that those who have crossed the sea of life and death and have obtained release take their stand on Him and imbibe *(pi)* pure bliss *(nāka)*. He is Śiva the blissful; Śarva because He closes the gates of happiness against the wicked. He is Kṛttivāsāḥ who shelters and dwells in this body covered with skin, to guide it in its development. He is 'Viriñca' as He educes the world out of His will, and so on[8].

In this *adhi.* the first sūtra *Dyubhvādyāyatanam svaśabdāt* refers to the evidence of the word 'Ātmā, contained in the Viṣayavākya, in-support of the Siddhānta. The expression *'svaśabda'* in the Sūtra stands for its equivalent *'Ātmā'* in the Upaniṣadic text:

Tam evaikam jānatha Ātmānam (Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 2, 5) even as in Pāṇini's Sūtra : *Sabhā rajāmanuṣyapūrvā* (ii, 4, 23) the rule that a Tatpuruṣa cpd. ending with the word *sabhā* (court) should be in the neuter when preceded by the word 'Rājā' or by a word denoting a non-human being—has been clarified by commentators pointing out that the word 'rājā' here stands only for its synonyoms like 'īna'. and Īśvara' and *not for itself.* The use of the word *Sva* in the present sūtra also serves to bring out the point that its equivalent in the Up. text viz. "Ātmā" stands exclusively for B. in its primary sense. This makes it capable of establishing the conclusion that the Being referred to as the abode of heaven and earth etc., must of course be B. Any other mode of reference in the sūtra such as by *'tacchabdāt'* would not have served the desired purpose as it would not show clearly which particular word in the Viṣayavākya has been intended by the Sūtrakāra to establish his conclusion that Dyubhvādyāyatana is B.

The next Sūtra : *Muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāt* (i. 3,2) supports the conclusion established in the first sūtra by citing the evidence of a characteristic mark of B. The mark is that of being the one to which released souls go. The expression *upasṛpya* (that which is to be approached)

8. *Rujam drāvayate yasmād Rudrastasmāj Janārdanaḥ*
Īśanād eva ceśāno Mahādevo mahatvataḥ

(M. *BSB*. i, 3, 3).

signifies not only something that is reached by another but also that that Being *has no beyond. (prāpyāntararahitatve sati prāpyatvam).*

The next Sutra: *Nānumānam atacchabdāt* (i, 3.3) dismisses the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the Being in question is either Pradhāna (Prakṛti) or Rudra, as we do not find any word in the text which refers to either of them. The words *na anumānam* may be read as *na* + *ānumānam* and the Taddhita-form *'Ānumānam'* could be explained as referring to Prakṛti, Rudra and others, who in the respective systems favoring them, have been established on the basis of Inference (*anumāna*) or of Āgamas whose validity itself is established on the strength of inference,[9] regarding the satisfactoriness of their prescribed Sādhanas to achieve prescribed goals.

The next Sūtra *Prāṇabhṛcca* (i, 3, 4) rules out the claim of Jīvātman and Vāyu[10] to be regarded as the 'Dyubhvādyāyatanam'. The reasons are those mentioned earlier, viz., the inapplicability of the word 'Ātmā' in its primary sense to either of them and the other grounds[11] mentioned in i, 3, 2-3.

The next Sūtra *Bhedavyapadeśāt* (i, 3, 5) has reference to the Śruti 'When he sees the Lord different from his own'[12] (Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 1, 2).

The last Sūtra: *Sthityadanābhyām ca* refers to another decisive characteristic of 'abiding and eating' by which B. and the Jīvātman have been shown in the scriptures to be completely different from each other. The text cited is *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii.1.1) which contrasts the glory of the Supreme Being with the miserable position of Jīvātman in Samsāra.

We cannot accept the contention that the eater and the non-eater referred to in this Up. text (iii, 1.1) cited in the Sūtra are merely Buddhi and Jīva and not Jīva and B. because in the *Paiṁgī-Brāhmaṇa* the above passage has been quoted and so explained.[13] A closer examination would show that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the very next passage in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii, 1, 2) where

9. *TC*. p. 551. See also Śrikumāra's C. on Bhoja's *Tattvaprakāśa*. TSS. LXVII. 1920. p. 27.
10. चशब्दात् वायुश्च समुच्चीयते । (*TDP*).
11. चशब्दात् प्रागुक्तहेतूनां नञश्च समाकर्षः । (*TP*).
12. अत्र 'पश्यति' इति प्रकृतो जीवः प्रतियोगित्वेन संबध्यत इत्यभिप्रेत्येयं श्रुतिः जीवेशभेदे प्रमाणीकृता । (TC. p. 455 b).
13. The Brāhmana-text has been quoted by S. in his C. on *BS*. i, 2.12. He explains it as showing how enjoyership is there superimposed on Sattvam to bring out the ultimate truth of how in reality *kartṛtva* and *bhoktṛtva* belong neither to Sattvam (Buddhi) nor to Kṣetrajña (Jīva).

the 'eater' has been designated as the "Puruṣa" who becomes deluded by Anīśā (Prakṛti) and frees himself by the grace of God. This shows that the 'eater' cannot be an insentient principle like 'Sattvam' of the Sāṅkhyas. We have, therefore, to take it that these two terms *Sattvam* and *Kṣetrajña* used in the *Paiṁgirahasya-Brāhmaṇa* denote the Jīvātman and the Supreme B. respectively and not Buddhi and Jīva. M. and his commentators have given plenty of other references from *Gīta*,[14] the *Bhāgavata*,[15] from the Kośā[16] and other sources[17] testifying to the use of the words Sattvam and Kṣetrajña in the sense of Jīva and B.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. has the following Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta: The abode of heaven and earth etc., has been described as 'the bridge of the immortal'. This cannot be B. Being itself the immortal, how can it be the bridge of immortality?[18] A bridge, moreover, lies between two ends—the nether one and the farther one and helps to contain or regulate the flow of water. But B. is declared in the Śruti to be unlimited and shoreless:[19] *anatam apāram* (*Bṛh. Up.* ii, 4, 12). We have, therefore, to take it that the abode of heaven and earth which has been described as the bridge of (to) immortality (*amṛtasya setuḥ*) is either Prakṛti[20] or the unmanifest subtle elements (*bhūtasūkṣma*)[21] or Vāyu;[22] or the individual self whose knowledge leads to immortality and who is the abode of objects of his enjoyment and fruition. As the discriminating knowledge of Prakṛti and Puruṣa leads to the attainment of release, Prakṛti can also be regarded as the bridge leading to immortality. And Prakṛti as the material cause of all things in the world is their abode. As effects partake of the nature of their cause, all things may be said to be woven into Prakṛti.

The Siddhānta view is that the abode (*āyatanam*) in question is B. because of the use of the word for (B.'s) own self—i.e. words like *Ātmā* and *Sat*, in these contexts. B. is called the bridge of immortality in a figurative sense—leaving out the other idea associated with a bridge—viz., of its being circumscribed by two ends (*pārāvāra*). It

14. XIII. 3.
15. V. 11, 13—This verse refers to Jīva and Kṣetrajña as distinct beings.
16. सत्त्वमस्त्रीषु जन्तुषु । (*Amara* iii, 5.212).
17. *Raghūvaṁśa* ii, 8.
18. *Bhāmatī* i.3.1.
19. *Bhāmatī* i, 3.1.
20. S. *BSB*. i, 3.1.
21. *Avyākṛtam bhūtasūkṣmam* (*Bhāmatī* i.3, 1).
22. वायुना गौतम ... (*Bṛh. Up.* iii. 7. 2.) इति वायोरपि विधारणश्रवणात् । (S).

is taken purely in the sense of supporting immortality.[23] After all, the Pūrvapakṣa also has to resort to some kind of figurative interpretation here when it makes Pradhāna or any other the bridge of immortality.[24] We may also take it that it is *knowledge of B.* which has been described as the bridge to immortality (but *not* the abode of heaven etc. *as such*).[25] Such knowledge leads to B. and in that sense it serves as a bridge. It has its two sides—the starting point and its culmination. It is this knowledge of B. that figures as the logical predicate of the proposition: *amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ*. The use of the masculine form of the pronoun (*eṣah*) is to be explained as being due to the influence of the gender of the grammatical predicate (*setuḥ*).[26]

Criticism

S.'s Pūrvapakṣa is altogether too feeble in that it misses the more serious ground for a really powerful Pūrvapakṣa furnished by the mark of 'being born in many ways (*bahudhā jāyamānaḥ*),[27] to be met with further down in the very next verse (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 2.6). Even conceding the force of the objection that the immortal is not different from B., it is difficult to see how the Jīvātman could be shown to be a bridge leading to the immortal i.e. B; for the Jīvātman is only the traveller on the bridge and not the bridge itself! Until the difficulty created by the mark of "being born in many ways" is satisfactorily overcome, the Siddhānta can hardly be established. This is the greatest flaw in S.'s interpretation of this *adhi*.

Even the interpretation that B. is the supporter of immortality (tho' not the bridge thereof) is beset with difficulties created by S.'s own metaphysics. The question will naturally arise as to how this immortality is to be conceived of. Would it be the cessation of Avidyā? In that case, would this termination of Avidyā be defined as a reality; or would be put down to the category of what the Advaitic dialectician is disposed to regard as belonging to the fifth order of predication (*pañcamaprakāratā*)?[28] If the cessasion of Avidyā were a reality, Mokṣa would have to be identical with *Brahmasvarūpa*. That would make it impossible for B. to be regarded as the 'supporter' of Mokṣa

23. So 'asmākam pāravattāvarjam vidhāraṇatvamātreṇa yogād rūḍhim parityajya pravartsyati (*Bhāmatī*).
24. Nahi mṛddārumayo mūrtaḥ pārāvāramadhyavartī*** Kimtu pāravattāmātraparo lākṣaṇikas setuśabdo' 'bhyupeyaḥ (*op. cit*).
25. *Apara āha* ***ātmajñānam amṛtatvasādhanatvāt setuśrutyā samkīrtyate, na tu Dyubhvādyāyatanam (S. *BSB*. i.3, 1).
26. Satyapi jneyaprādhānyanirdeśe jnānasya phalasādhanatvena guṇakarmatvābhāvat prādhānyam. Pulliṅgam tu vidheyasāpekṣam (*Kalpataru* i, 3.1).
27. R. and M. have taken due note of it.
28. 'न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।
यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ।। (*Ānandabodha*).

(*amṛtatvavidhārakam*), as required by the Siddhānta view on *Amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ*. In the other alternative, the question would arise as to where Avidyā has its location,—in the conditioned self (ego) or pure consciousness? If the ego is the locus of Avidyā, the same ego will have to be the locus of its destruction also. In that case, it would be the Jīvātman who would be the supporter of *amṛtatva;* for it resides in him and not in B. Even if we make pure consciousness the locus of Avidyā as contended by Sarvajñātman and his school of interpretation, release or Mokṣa would have to be accepted as having its locus in the Jīvātman and not in pure consciousness. Otherwise, the principle of coordination between bondage and release in the same substratum would be violated.[29] If bondage has pure consciousness for its locus, it can hardly be maintained that the cycle of transmigration involves only the ego or the reflected self and not pure consciousness itself.

The second interpretation[30] of S. that it is the knowledge of B. that is the bridge of immortality is also open to objection. In the first place, there are other passages in the Up. which directly refer to B. as the bridge.[31] There is no need for all the roundabout argument in favor of making *Jnānaṃ* the bridge indicated by the pronoun *eṣaḥ*. Eṣah can directly refer to 'Ātmā' (mentioned in the same passage):

Tam evaikam jānatha Ātmānam
amṛtasyaiṣa setuḥ (*Muṇḍ*. ii, 2, 5).

S. waxes eloquent in this Sūtra that the real intention of the Śruti here in describing B. as the abode of heaven and earth and in asking us to "know Him alone and cease all other talk" is to call upon us to *dissolve* this very world of effects, of heaven and earth, the sky, mind, vital airs, etc. (which are woven into B.) in the same B., as a product of sheer nescience and know the self alone to be the substratum of all these illusory appearances.[32] One can readily endorse the position that B. is the basis of all in a very real and meaningful sense of being the abode of all. But it is not necessarily true that the things which abide in B. are themselves unreal being only projections of Avidyā and appearances of nescience. The Śruti would have it that they are *deliberate* and *purposeful* creations of B.[33] The fact that the world

29. अन्यथा, बन्धमोक्षयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं न स्यात् । (Rāgh. *TCP*).
30. Tho' ascribed to an "*Aparaḥ*", in S.'s bhāṣya, it has been practically adopted as an alternative interpretation and backed in the *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru*.
31. *Chān. Up*. viii; 4.1; *Bṛh. Up*. iv, 4, 22.
32. Yat sarvam avidyāropitam tat sarvam paramārthato Brahma. Na tu yat Brahma tat sarvam ityarthaḥ (*Bhāmatī* i, 3.1).
33. Tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya (*Chān. Up*. vi, 2, 3)
So'bhidhyāya śarīrāt svāt sisṛkṣur vividhāḥ prajāḥ (*Manu*. i, 8).

abides in B.—as stated in the passage,[34] goes to emphasize the glory and greatness of B.; while S.'s interpretation of the passage seeks to reduce B. to the barest abstraction.[35] The Sūtrakāra would not have waded thro' so much of complicated Samanvaya, if all that he wished to teach about B. was that it is in essence but the barest abstraction:

Nirviśeṣabrahmaliṅganirūpaṇam Pādārtham āha (*Kalpataru* i.3.1).

It would not be easy for S. to get away with his interpretation of the phrase *svaśabdāt* in the Sūtra consistent with the theme of Nirviśeṣa-B. established here. "Ātman" is said to be "the word for B." Does it *denote* B? Is it capable of doing so? In that case B. would cease to be Nirviśeṣa; for only the Saviśeṣa can be denoted. If the word Ātman is merely applied to B. by way of Lakṣaṇā, even Prakṛti can be similarly denoted by the same word from the Pūrvapakṣa point of view. It also deserves to be noted that the manner in which the Up. text refers to heaven and earth etc., as being woven into B. and having B. for their abode, suggests an intimacy of contact which it would be a gross abuse of language to associate with illusory appearances superimposed on a substratum.

The plain meaning of the Sūtra: *Muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāt* is that the *Dyubhvādyāyatana* referred to in Sūtra no. 1 must be deemed to be the Supreme B. because it and not Prakṛti or Jīva is the goal that released souls themselves reach. If we accept this plain sense of the Sūtra, it would follow that even the Mukta Jīvas are different from B. which they seek and reach. Such a position is not acceptable to S. He, therefore, seeks to reduce its importance by diluting the meaning of the words '*Mukta*' and '*Upasṛpya*' with irrelevant details. The irrelevancy of S.'s details may be seen from the fact that the Sūtra has been content to use the word *Mukta* without any prefix or qualification whatsoever; which must be sufficient to show that it is intended to be taken in its universally accepted sense of a soul released from Samsāra,—without the need to go into the question of what caused the bondage and how, which is what S.'s interpretation tries to bring into prominence. In the same way, he takes a liberty in interpreting '*Upasṛpya*' as "by knowing". He conceives Mokṣa in terms of identity with B. where there is no room for one 'attaining' or approaching another which is what *Upasṛpya* really means. If on this account, the refer-

34. *Yasmin otam manaḥ prāṇaiśca sarvaiḥ.*
35. This does great violence to the idiom of the Sūtrakāra when he says "Dyubhvādyāyatanam" and of the Up. which says: *Yasmin dyauḥ pṛthivī cāntarikṣam otam.* Such language is not used in respect of *śuktirajata* (nacre) which is the stock example of S.'s *Vivartavāda*.

ence is taken to be to the Saviśeṣa-B. the *adhi.* would be out of place here in the Pāda devoted to Nirviśeṣa-B. (as S. would have it).

Similar misfits are to be found in the interpretation of the remaining Sūtras also. The reason given in Sūtra 3, that scriptural texts contain no word denoting Pradhāna is equally true of S.'s Nirviśeṣa-B. —the theme of this Pāda. The reason given in Sūtra 4 to rule out the individual soul (*Prāṇabhrcca*) that it does not possess omniscience and other qualities is also true of S.'s Nirviśeṣa-B, the theme of this *adhi.* and Pāda. In Sūtra 5, the declaration of difference (*bhedavyapadeśa*) to which the Sūtrakāra makes a pointed reference has been explained away by S. as the subject-object relationship in which the individual soul and B. have been made to stand to each other in the statement: *Tam evaikam jānatha ātmānam.* But this is purely a differentiating factor and not a difference of essence which is what the expression *bheda* primarily denotes. It is because S. cannot afford to accept an ontological difference between Jiva and B. that he is obliged to interpret the Sūtra in this way. But where a difference of essence between Jīva and B. is found clearly expressed in the words of the Śruti: *Juṣṭam yadā paśyati anyam īśam asya mahimānam iti vītaśokaḥ* (Muṇḍ. Up. iii, 1, 2) there is no point in closing one's eyes to it and substituting in its place a difference which is relevant only to the use of language in describing an act of knowing.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. confines his Pūrvapakṣa to the Jīvātman and keeps out Pradhāna, Vāyu and others from its scope. This goes against the internal evidence of the Sutra i, 3, 3, in which the claims of Prakṛti are expressly repudiated. R.'s explanation that 'Anumāna' or Pradhāna has been cited by the Sūtrakāra simply *by way of illustration*[36] and not because it is included in the Pūrvapakṣa is far from convincing. There is particularly no reason to think of Pradhāna *(anumānam)* in this connection unless it is equally entitled to be brought within the scope of the doubt and the Pūrvapakṣa. Its inclusion by way of illustration adds in no way to the strength of the refutation of the claims of Jīvātman. R.'s commentator has, however, tried to put in an explanation and a justification for excluding Pradhāna from the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa. His argument is that Pradhāna has already been ruled out under the *Īkṣatyadhi* in the Sūtra *Gauṇaścen nātmaśabdāt* by the use of the word "Ātmā" which eliminates insentient Pradhāna. No further doubt could therefore, arise under the present *adhi.* in respect of Pradhāna in the face of the same expression "Ātmā" occurring in *tam evaikam jānatha*

36. Yathā * * * pradhānam na pratipādyam evam Prāṇabhṛd api ityarthaḥ (*Śrībhasya.* 1, 3.3).

ātmānam (Muṇḍ. Up. ii, 2, 5). But this kind of argument can cut both ways. It may be argued with equal force that the doubt in regard to the Jīvātman also would *not arise* for a similar reason. Under the Sūtra: *Asmin asya ca tadyogam śāsti* (i, 1, 19) it has been admitted by R. that the individual self joins the Supreme Ānandamaya-B. in release. This would be sufficient to establish that the Jīvātman is completely distinguished from the Supreme B. That being so how can a doubt arise that the Being which has been described here as the "bridge of immortality' in the sense of its enabling one to attain to immortality by going beyond the ocean of Samsāra may be the individual soul itself? If a doubt can still arise in respect of Jīvātman on account of other powerful grounds such as that of "being born" (*jāyamānatvaliṅga*), there are also equally good grounds to put up the claims of Pradhāna,—notwithstanding the presence of the word 'Ātmā' in the present context, which can be figuratively applied to Pradhāna as it belongs[37] to B.

As insentient matter, Pradhāna is acknowledgedly the stuff of which the material world is made,—even according to R.'s philosophy. It can, therefore, be readily conceived as the abode of heaven and earth (*dyubhvādyāyatana*) for purposes of Pūvapakṣa,—especially in the light of passages in the Upaniṣads such as *Yad bhūtam ca bhavacca bhaviṣyac ca ityācakṣate ākaśā eva tadotam ca protam ca* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 8, 7). It is also much easier to think of Pradhāna as the abode of heaven and earth etc., than to conceive of the Jīvātman as the abode of all! There is thus no special advantage in eliminating Pradhāna from the scope of the Pūrvapakṣa here, as R. has done. It leads to unnecessary strain in trying to put up an artificial explanation for the express mention and refutation of the claims of Pradhāna by the Sūtrakāra himself, by reading the two successive Sūtras as a single one.

It deserves to be noted in conclusion that like M., R. has also taken note of the mark of "being born" in the statement of his Pūrvapakṣa and has likewise interpreted the Sūtra *Bhedavyapadeśāt* (i, 3, 5) as pinpointing the difference in essence between Jīva and B. The natural drift of all the Sūtras in this *adhi.* is unmistakably detrimental to the interests of Advaitavāda.

37. *Ātmīye Pradhāne ātmaśabdaprayogaḥ.*

CHAPTER XXXII

BRAHMAN IS OF THE NATURE OF INFINITE BLISS AND ALL-TRANSCENDING

2. *Bhūmādhikaraṇam* (i, 3, 8-9)

The *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the word Bhūmā occurring in *Chān. Up.* (vii, 23, 1): *Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham* (He who is perfect is indeed infinite bliss itself). The word Bhūman means the Perfect One. It is derived from bahu (many) + the suffix *imanic* with the change of *bahu* to *bhū* and conveys the idea of plenitude (of attributes). Tho' an abstract noun by derivation, it is found used substantivally in the present context[1] and is accordingly treated as a Nāmapada. It is found applied in the Śrutis to B[2]. and to other principles like Vāk, Prāṇa[3] etc. It is in this way, an Ubhayatraprasiddha-śabda (current in respect of B. and other principles) at the stage when one is *not* in a position to determine the relative strength of its use in the initial statement (*upakramaśruti*) in the ordinary sense of Prāṇa and of its use in the corroborative text (*samākhyāśruti*) in the highest sense of B. (Viṣṇu).[4]

According to J. the discussion here arises out of the conclusion established in the Ānandamayādhi. that B. is the blissful. This blissfulness is, however, found to be associated with One who is called Bhūmā in *Chān. Up.* (vii. 23, 1): 'He who is Bhūmā is bliss. There is no bliss in the limited (*nālpe sukham asti*). It can be gathered from these two statements that the bliss spoken of here as *tat sukham*

1. Similar forms like *aṇimā* and *mahimā* are used substantivally in the Up.
2. Viṣṇur vai devebhyo bhūyān tasmād bhūyān nāma (*Śruti* q. by M. in *ṆV.* i.3.8).
3. Prāṇo vā aśāyā bhūyan (*Chān. UP.* vii. 15.1).
4. Upakramasamākhyayor balābalājnānadaśyām sāḍhāraṇyam (*TC.* p. 562).

is of the infinite unlimited kind, not found in limited creatures. If the Bhūmā possessing such unlimited bliss were different from B., the conclusion established in the Ānandamayādhi. (earlier) that illimitable bliss is the exclusive characteristic of B. would become null and void. Thus it becomes necessary to establish the identity of this Bhūmā with B.

The *TC* presents the sequential connection of this *adhi.* (by way of *ākṣepasaṅgati*) in a different way with its immediately preceding *adhi.* as follows. The attributes of all-pervasiveness (*sarvagatatva*) immortality (*amṛtatva*) delighting in oneself (*ātmakrīḍatva*) which are affirmed of the Bhūmā in *Chan. Up.* (vii, 24, 1; and 25, 2) have all been ascribed in the previous *adhi.* to the 'Dyubhvādyāyatanam' (See *Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 2, 11; and iii, 1, 4). If, then, this Bhūman here should turn out to be other than B., the being which has been shown to be Dyubhvādyāyatanam would likewise have to be regarded as other than B. It is, therefore, necessary to affirm the identity of Bhūman with B. here. As the Pūrvapakṣa of the present adhi. thus arises by way of bringing up an objection to what has been established in the previous *adhi*, this *adhi.* stands connected with it by *ākṣepasaṅgati*.

The *Kalpataru* (C. of S.'s school) introduces the sequence in another way. In the previous *adhi.* the Dyubhvādyāyatana was shown to be B. on the ground that the word *Ātman* (the word for B.) has been used in the Up. passage describing it. But the same word *(ātmā)* is found applied in a passage of the *Chān. Up.* (vii, 1, 3) to what is evidently *not* B. viz. "Prāṇa." This makes the reason given in the previous *adhi.* inconclusive.[5] The present adhi. by showing that Bhūman which is the theme of the discourse here is *not* Prāṇa but B. removes this difficulty and makes it clear that 'Ātman' used in the opening passage: *Tarati śokam ātmavit* refers only to B.

But then, the passage *Tarati śokam ātmavit* where we have the expression *Ātmā,* is found at the commencement of the chapter (*Chān. Up.* vii, 1, 3) *far away* from the immediate set-up of the passage which sparks off the discussion. It is also possible to hold that even tho' Prāṇa is *not* B. the statement *Tarati śokam ātmavit* can be brought into line with the topic of B. ((*Brahmaprakaraṇa*) by assuming that it refers to the fresh topic of B. which is to be introduced with the words: *Atha sa ātmādeśaḥ* (*Chān. Up.* vi. 25, 2) after terminating the intervening discourse on Prāṇa (from vii. 1, 4 to vii. 25. 1). The right way of finding an *ākṣepasaṅgati* should be on the basis of some word or

5. Ātmaśabdāt Dyubhvādyāyatanam brahmetyuktam. Tatra ātmaśabdaḥ Prāṇe anekāntaḥ. 'Tarati śokam ātmavit' ityatra abrahmaṇi Prāṇe prayogāt ityākṣepikī saṅgatiḥ (*Kalpataru*).

marks like *amṛtatva* (vii, 24, 1) *sarvagatatva* (vii, 25, 1) etc., which are actually found right in the heart of the description of Bhūman.

Pūrvapakṣa

The question to be decided in this *adhi.* is whether Bhūmā is Prāṇa or B. The pūrvapakṣa is—Bhūman is the Chief Prāṇa (deity) because the whole discourse on Bhūman beginning with Nāma and going thro' a hierarchical series constituted by *Vāk, manaḥ, saṁkalpa, citta* etc. concludes with the assertion: 'Verily, Prāṇa is greater than Āśā' without mentioning any other principle as being superior to Prāṇa. Then it goes on to dilate on the glory of Bhūman. This clearly shows that Prāṇa is intended to be accepted as Bhūman the blissful. There are only two possible ways open to the Siddhāntin by which he could hope to establish the opposite view that Bhūmā is B. One way is to admit that Prāṇa is merely the deity Vāyu and Bhūman alone is B. Another is to declare that both Prāṇa and Bhūman are B. i.e. to say, they are identical. But we find that in the present context, Bhūman has been mentioned without positing any other principle over and above Prāṇa. It is a legitimate presumption that if Bhūmā were intended to be recognized as other than and superior to Prāṇa, the question would naturally have been asked by Nārada, as in earlier cases, 'Sir, is there anything superior to Prāṇa?' And Sanatkumāra would have answered, 'Yes, Bhūman is superior to Prāṇa' and then have sung the praises of Bhūman. For, after all, the purpose of giving a hierarchical order of principles of name, speech, mind, will, thought, etc. is to emphasize the highest eminence of Bhūman towering over and above all else *including Prāṇa*. This silence and omission to name Bhūman as greater than Prāṇa points clearly to the conclusion that in the opinion of the Upaniṣad, Bhūman is not something higher than Prāna but Prāṇa himself.

The other alternative that both Prāṇa and Bhūman are identical with B. cannot also be seriously maintained. For, the Upaniṣadic text refers (vii. 15, 3) to people shoving together with a poker or burning up "Those from whom Prāṇa has departed".[6] This departure from the body (*utkramaṇa*) is understandable with reference to Prāṇa the deity taken as Bhūman. For the concept of Bhūmatva has nothing to do with all-pervasiveness, as applied to Prāṇa. The word Bhūma and its allied forms *bhūyān, bhūyasī* applied to *Saṅkalpa,* Vāk etc., clearly shows that *bhūmatva* (or *bhūyastva*) consists in excellence or superiority of attributes (*guṇajyaiṣṭhya*) and is not necessarily connected with all-pervasiveness. Thus, while Prāṇa (the deity) who is not an all-

6. अथ यद्यप्येतान् उत्क्रान्तप्राणान् शूलेन समासं व्यतिषं दहेत् नैनं ब्रूयुः पितृहासीति *** ।

pervasive being (*vibhu*) can be said to depart from one's father or mother at the time of their death, B. cannot be conceived as departing from anywhere or going up anywhere.

Thus, the mark of *utkramaṇa* or departure of Prāṇa forbids the identification of Bhūman with B. There is no doubt a description of Bhūman as pervading all, existing below, above, in front and everywhere, in *Chān. Up.* vii. 25, 1. But this cannot force us to take the departure associated with Prāna (=Bhūman) as a figurative statement. For, 'utkramaṇa' (of Prāṇa $<$ Bhūman) is "given" by express statement (*padaśruti*) in the form of a specific word (*'utkrānta'* in the text); whereas, the idea of all-pervasiveness of Bhūman is to be *gathered* from a judgment formed by the coordination of a number of words used in the text into a sentence (*vākyam*) which according to principles of Mīmāmsā interpretation is inferior in status to (*pada*)—śruti. This statement about the all-pervasiveness of Bhūmā will, therefore, have to be given a figurative sense (*gauṇārtha*) that Bhūman may be *mentally pictured* as existing here, there and everywhere, without its actually existing simultaneously in all those places.[7]

Siddhānta

It will be seen that in formulating his Pūrvapakṣa, M. has emphasized two main points (i) *upakrama* or the manner in which the instruction about Prāṇa has been given in the Up. so as to preclude the acceptance of Bhūman as a higher principle than Prāṇa;[8] and (ii) the presence of the decisive marks of Prāna such as his departure from the erstwhile living persons: *'Utkrāntaprāṇān'* (*Chān. Up.* vii, 15, 3) *ityādi*[9] *tallingāt'* (M. BSB. 1. 3. 8).

His answers to these two points will be explained in due course, after dealing with his actual interpretation of the Siddhānta Sūtra: *Bhūmā samprasādāt adhyupadeśāt.* As interpreted by M. this Sūtra adduces *two* powerful reasons (and not only *one* as most other commentators have held) to establish that Bhūman is B. The reasons are (i) *samprasāda* and (ii) *adhyupadeśa.* 'Samprasāda' means infinite bliss (*pūrṇasukham*)[10] and 'adhyupadeśa' means scriptural teaching

7. *TC.* p. 567b.
8. Nāmavāgāditāratamyam āśāvasānam uktvā, 'Prano vā āśāyā bhūyān' iti Prāṇasyottamatvam cābhidhyāya, taduttamam anuktvā Bhūmna āmnānāt (*TP.* i.3.8).
9. The significance of the term *ādi* used by M. has been well-brought out by Vādirāja in his gloss, *GD* on the *TP*, as highlighting the idea of how by His gracious presence in the bodies of one's near and dear ones, Prāna inspires in all men feelings of deep affection and attachment to parents, friends and relatives and rouses revulsion and distaste towards their dead bodies by his departure.
10. Prasīdatyanena iti prasādaḥ sukham. Samyak prasādaḥ samprasādaḥ. (*NS.* i.3.8).

about B.'s all-transcending glory.[11] The first point is established by the very implication of the statement made in the Upaniṣad about Bhūman—viz. 'He who is infinite is bliss'. A little reflection would show that this must be infinite, unlimited bliss that the Upaniṣad is having in mind,—because, the latter half of the same text comes out with a significant denial that there can be any bliss in what is limited (empirical). This denial would make sense only as applied to sentient beings, as only sentient creatures have any awareness of bliss. But while an absolute denial of bliss for all sentients would not be a valid proposition, denial of *infinite bliss* in respect of finite beings like the Jīvas would not be so. The idea of infinite bliss (*pūrṇānanda*), the contrary of finite bliss, carries with it the idea that it transcends all other bliss. *Ex hypothesi* such infinite bliss can belong to only One Being. The idea of two Beings both having all-transcending bliss *vis a vis* each other would be a contradiction in terms.[12] Hence, the Jīvas as a class become automatically eliminated and the Supreme B. alone has to be accepted as Bhūman in the sense of possessing infinite bliss. It is pure bliss unmixed with any kind of pain or misery. This is brought out in the *Sūtra*, according to the *TC* by the use of the word *samprasāda* whose derivation carries the sense of destruction of all pain.[13]

The all-transcendence (*sarvottamatva*) of Bhūman is brought out in the Up. by not specifying or particularising the counter-correlative in relation to which alone the said transcendence of B. is to be conceived, —unlike in the other cases of Nāma, Vāk, etc. As a matter of fact, all finite reals have been deliberately and at one sweep brought within the sphere of counter-correlation in respect of Bhūman's all-transcendence. This is clear from the significant statements of the Up.: *Nālpe sukham: Bhūmaiva sukham,* which hold good in respect of transcendence as well.[14] If this were not so, Bhūman would not be all-transcending in bliss and power. That would mean Bhūman is less than some all-transcending principle (other than itself). In that case, it would be self-contradictory for the Up. to have described the Bhūman as having the whole gamut of finite reality as the counter-correlative of its transcendence.[15]

11. Adhiśabdo hi Īśvaravācī. Tathā ca, viśeṣānukter akhileśatvam evoktam bhavati. Na caitad asiddham. Namāvāgādīnām pūrvapūrvādhipatyasya uktatvāt (*NS*. p. 173b).
12. सर्वशब्दस्यासंकुचितत्वेनान्योन्यनिरूपितोत्कर्षस्य द्वयोरयोगात् (*TCP*. p. 568b).
13. संप्रेत्युपसर्गद्वयपूर्वकात् 'षद्लृ' विशरणगत्यवसादनेतिधातोरकर्तरि च कारके संज्ञायामिति करणे घञ् प्रत्यये रूपम् । (*TCP*. p. 574).
14. किञ्चायं चरमकक्ष्यापन्नो भूमा सर्वोत्तमः । 'नाल्पे सुखम्' इति निरुपपदाल्पप्रतियोगित्वोपादानाच्च । (*TC*. p. 568-69b).
15. असर्वोत्तमस्य कस्माच्चिदल्पत्वेन, निरुपपदाल्पत्वस्य तत्प्रतियोगित्वायोगात् । (*TC*. p. 569b).
तथासति, "नाल्पे" इत्यनेन भूम्न्यपि सुखनिषेधापत्त्या, "भूमैव सुखम्' इत्यनेन विरोधापत्तिरिति भावः (*TCG*).

The idea that B. is the all-transcending Reality and not merely one that transcends *some particular limit of glory* in a set series is also contained in the Śruti text:

Viśvataḥ paramām nityam (Mah N. Up. XI.2).

"The exalted above all, the eternal"—which M. has cited in his explanation of the words "adhyupadeśāt" of the Sūtra.

Consistent with this position, M. has taken great care to point out in his C. on the *Chān. Up.* and elsewhere (See his *BSB*. iv, 1, 4) that the right and proper way of meditation (*upāsanā*) on Nāma, Vāk, Prāṇa, etc. taught in the Upaniṣads is to meditate on the Supreme Being who is present in those principles and their presiding deities. It is the Supreme B. that is and must be the object of right meditation. This is the true meaning of Pratīkopāsanā according to M.[16] We cannot worship what we know to be a mental fiction. The only way to bring out the truth of B.'s all-transcending glory and power is to let it speak for itself by making the whole of finite reality the counter-correlatve of its transcendence. This is the reason why Bhūmā has not been mentioned as specifically or particularly transcending Prāṇa. It is an irony of fate that commentators who have interpreted the words of the Sūtrakāra: *Samprasādād adhyupadeśāt* as signifying that Bhūman is B. because it transcends (only) the Samprasāda (be it understood in the sense of Prāṇa or Jīvātman) should have fallen into the very error of setting a limit to B.'s transcendence while theoretically disclaiming any such intention. That is why M. has chosen to treat *adhyupadeśāt* as a self-contained reason side by side with *samprasādāt* and conveying the sense of absolute transcendence: *Sarveṣām upari upadeśāt.* It certainly shows a truer philosophical perspective and judgment of what is due to the Supreme B. and a deeper realization of the meaning of Divine majesty and transcendence.

One of the strong points of the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of Bhūman being Prāṇa is that there has *not* been any further question and answer as to which is greater than Prāṇa. Commentators have tried to get over this difficulty in different ways. S. holds that even tho' the knower of Prāṇa has been complimented as an "Ativādin",[17] this is

16. Nāmādiprāṇaparyantās saptamyarthāḥ prakīrtitāḥ.
Tṛtiyāpañcamīṣaṣṭhīcaturthyarthāśca sarvaśaḥ
Śabdāste brahmaśabdena sambadhyeyur yadā tadā
Brāhmaṇo 'sya mukham yadvad ātmā vai putrako yathā
Yathā ca yūpa āditya evam eva prakīrtitāḥ
* * * * * (M. *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya* vii, 1-15).
Vide also: Chapter on Pratīkopāsanā in my *Phil. of Madhvācārya.* pp. 301-05.
17. Prāṇo hyevaitāni sarvāṇi......Sa vā eṣa evam paśyan.... Ativādi bhavati (*Chān. Up.* vii, 15.4).

followed by another statement referring to the person who speaks of 'Satya' as the highest, as *"the Ativādin"*. This latter statement has a significant *"but"* (*tu*) which shows a turning away from the previous topic.[18] The question and answer method is not the only way of passing on to the next higher in the series. Seeing that Nārada had lapsed into silence after hearing the discourse ending with Prāṇa and the commendation of the Knower of Prāṇa as an 'Ativādin', Sanatkumāra *suo motu* initiates the discourse on Bhūman (as higher than Prāṇa) by impressing on Nārada that the "Prāṇa-Ativādin" is in reality no Ativādin. Only he who knows the Satya (viz. B)—the truly real and proclaims its transcendence is the true ATIVĀDIN. When the pupil expresses his eagerness to learn about the "Satya" and stand up for it, the teacher rewards him with his discourse on Bhūman. There is no substance therefore in the Pūrvapakṣin's contention.

R. follows more or less the same line of interpretation, with this difference that he brings out what made Nārada refrain from putting a further question. The impression he had gathered from the discourse ending with Prāṇa, with the words, 'He is an Ativādin who speaks of the excellence of Prāṇa' was that it was the crowning point of the instruction on Ātman. But the teacher knowing that there was a still higher knowledge to be attained (viz. of B.) gently broaches the topic with the words—"But really that one is an Ativādin who makes the Supreme declaration by means of the True". At the earnest request of the disciple to be initiated into the knowledge of the True, Sanatkumāra gives him the knowledge of Bhūman along with the steps to realise it.

M. and his commentators have tackled the point in a different way by supplying a full question, 'Sir, Is there anything superior to Prāṇa', *before* Sanatkumāra's statement *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati.*[19] This is done, says M. in his Bhāṣya on the *Chān. Up.* (vii.16) on the strength of the adversative conjunction "tu" which points to an ellipsis[20] which has to filled in accordance with the principle of exe-

18. *Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyena ativadati* (*Chān. Up.* vii. 16.1).
19. Eṣa tu vā ativadati yas satyenātivadati iti tuśabdo arthāntaradyotakaḥ. Asti bhagavaḥ Prāṇād bhūya iti praśno vyatihāryaḥ (M. *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya.* vii. 16).
20. M. has also stated in his C. on the *Chān. Up.* that this point has been established in the Sūtra *Vyatihāro viśimṣanti hītaravat* (*BS.* iii, 3.38). His C. on the said Sūtra is also to the same effect. The *TC* points out how this does not in any way render the present Pūrvapakṣa abortive. The present Pūrvapakṣa is raised by questioning the need for filling any ellipsis at all, here, as it may be contended that Prāṇa can be treated as identical with Satya in the same way as *vijnāna, mati, śraddhā,* niṣṭhā and *kṛti,* mentioned *subsequent to* 'satya' with the same *emphatic particle* 'tu' in each case (Vijñānam tveva vijijnāsitavyam....), are all accepted by the Siddhāntin to be identical with Satya (i.e. Brahman).

gesis taught in the *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā* and other sources.[21]

It may be recalled that the Pūrvapakṣa has laid stress on the exit of Prāṇa (the deity) from living beings at the time of death which is a distinctive characteristic (*niravakāśaliṅga*) of Prāṇa, incapable of being applied to Bhūman-Brahman which is all-pervasive. M. has shown in his Bhāṣya that this is not a formidable objection, having regard to the incomprehensible nature of Divine majesty. He cites the Śruti text: *Tam utkrāmantam Prāṇo anūtkrāmati*[22] (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4, 2) which refers to the exit of Prāṇa *following the exit of Brahman* from the body at the time of death.

The logic of activity and motion in something which is *by hypothesis* ubiquitous (*sarvagata*) has been discussed by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC* with great force and subtlety of thought:

जात्यादेः सर्वगस्यापि प्रतिव्यक्ति समाप्तिवत् ।
सर्वगस्यापीश्वरस्य क्रियाया अपि संभवात् ॥

The universal of the Logician subsists in its entirety in each particular and at the same time pervades all of them as a whole. How is this conceivable? In the same way, *activity* and *motion* tho' not conceivable in other ubiquitous substances, may be quite conceivable in B. The Śruti teaches that B. possesses the intrinsic attribute of activity, knowledge and power.[23] What makes activity and motion possible in substance is its '*aṇutva*' of dimension and not so much the absence of "*mahattva*"[24] in it. Otherwise, we may have to predicate the possibility of motion and activity in the Guṇas (qualities) of the Naiyāyikas, as these do not possess *mahatparimāṇa.* It should be noted here that in

21. That in a simple or a complex sentence where there is an ellipsis, that word, clause or sentence must be supplied without which the meaning of the whole would not be complete:
Yatrānavasaro 'nyatra padam tatra pratiṣṭhitam
Vākyam veti satām nītiḥ * * * *
22. This text does not merely refer to the exit of Jīvātman from the body followed by the vital airs, as S. and others have taken it. There are clear indications in the given context, of the complete dependence of Jīvātman at the time of his exit from the body, on the Supreme Being. We have reference in the preceding section (*Bṛh. Up.* iv. 3, 35-38) to the embodied self (*Śārīra ātmā*) being ridden by the Supreme Being (*Prājñena ātmanā anvārūḍhaḥ*) like a heavily laden cart going on creaking, driven by a driver (iv. 3.35). This is followed by the description of how officers and leaders of society gather round a King when he is going back to his place (*Rājānam prayiyāsantam ugrāḥ Pratyesasas Sūtā Grāmaṇyo abhiśamāyānti*) and take leave of him (iv: 3.38). These are sufficient to establish that the *Utkramaṇa* of the Jīvātman is *led by the Supreme Being* and is not a self-directed activity of the Jīvātman. (See BS. i, 3, 42 also). When the Supreme Being leads the Soul, out of his body, *Prāṇa follows the* Supreme Being. This must be the true import of the statement तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति । (*Bṛh. Up.*)
23. Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvikī jnānabalakriyā ca (*Śvet. Up.* vi, 8).
24. Aṇutva and mahattva are technical terms of the Nyāyaśāstra.

virtue of the inscrutable nature of the Divine Being, it is not difficult to conceive of B. as having both *'aṇu'* and *mahat* parimāṇas;[25] so that motion and activity can be rendered possible for it and compatible with its nature. It cannot be contended that there can be no activity or motion in a ubiquitous substance as such motion would not result in any spatial disjunction of the ubiquitous substance from its prior position. By the same token, it may be argued that God cannot possess knowledge, as such knowledge could not produce any result in Him, in the form of pleasure, pain or lingering potencies (*saṁskāras*). If God's knowledge is not governed by the law of fruits and results, as it is eternal and supra-empirical, the same would hold true in respect of His activity (such as that contained in *utkramaṇa*). It is possible to harmonize in Him apparently contradictory attributes as *aṇutva* and *mahattva* and account for activity or cessation of activity depending on the exigencies of situations, with the help of the concept of Viśeṣas,[26] operating with reference to latent and patent aspects of Divine activity.

As God or B. has innumerable forms of manifestations, all of them of spiritual essence identical with one another and yet distinguishable by reason of Viśeṣas, He can be described as moving from one place to another and yet being present everywhere simultaneously,[27] without the least contradiction of truth, because of His mysterious powers (*acintyaśakti*). The *utkramaṇa* of the Supreme Being from living beings at the time of their death along with the exit of Prāṇa (deity) is not, therefore, to be judged in the light of empirical ideas.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. presents his Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of vital air as a purely *material principle*.[28] The main ground of Pūrvapakṣa is that the series of questions and answers ends with Prāṇa and nothing is expressly mentioned as greater than Prāṇa. The Bhūman spoken of must, therefore, be the same as Prāṇa.

There is also the high praise showered on the knower of Prāṇa's greatness as an Ativādin. The eulogy of Bhūman in the words, 'Where one does not see anything else......' etc. can be easily referred to the state of deep sleep where the activities of all senses are suspended and only Prāṇa (vital air) with its fivefold modifications is "awake". The

25. cf. *Aṇor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān* (*Kaṭha Up.* i, 2, 20).
26. For a clear exposition of the concept of Viśeṣas and their place in M.'s philosophy see the chapter on Viśeṣas in my *Phil. of M.*
27. Cf. *Āsīno dūram vrajati śayāno yāti sarvataḥ* (*Kaṭha. Up.* i, 2.21).
28. Cf. Suṣuptyavasthām uktvā....pañcavṛtteḥ prāṇasya jāgaraṇam bruvatī.... (S. *BSB.* i.3.8).

happiness of Bhūman (*Yo vai bhūmā tat sukham*) is merely the bliss of this state of deep sleep.

The Siddhānta is that Bhūman represents the Nirviśeṣa-B. as it is mentioned as transcending the state of Suṣupti (*samprasāda*). Tho' samprasāda actually means the state of Suṣupti, the vital air which alone is awake (functioning) in this state is here referred to by the term Samprasāda by way of Lakṣaṇā.[29] The Bhūman is thus B. transcending as it does this Samprasāda. The eulogy of Prāṇa-Ativāda is not final; for step by step beginning with 'name' the seeker is led to the highest, going beyond (*adhyupadeśa*) Prāṇa-Ativāda to Satya-Ativāda. This turning away from Prāṇātivāda to Satyātivāda (which is the same as the doctrine of Bhūman) has been indicated by the deliberate use of the particle "*tu*" while introducing the latter.[30]

Criticism

In making insentient fivefold vital air the subject of his Pūrvapakṣa, S. has underrated the importance of the word Ātmā which figures in the *Upakrama* or opening passage and which he himself had shown to be an exclusive epithet of the Supreme B. in the preceding *adhi.* (i. 3. 1). The words *Bhūmaiva sukham* would *not* easily admit of a Pūrvapakṣa in favor of an insentient principle such as vital air; as bliss (*sukham*) is, by all accounts, an attribute of a sentient being, —which vital air is *not*. It is evidently for this reason that R. has thought it fit to abandon S.'s Pūrvapakṣa in favor vital air and substitute in its place, a sentient principle. But then he goes to the other extreme of over-generalizing the meaning of the word "Prāṇa" to denote Jīvas in general, which is equally remote. The best thing would be to treat Prāṇa as the deity presiding over vital air in accordance with the *Abhimāni-nyāya* accepted by the Sūtrakāra himself (BS. ii. 1. 5). The Upaniṣads have familiarised us with the concept of Prāṇa as a prominent deity thro' many parables.[31] There is no doubt, the Pūrvapakṣa would gain in weight and substance if Prāṇa is taken in the sense of the deity of that name as M. has done. The consideration that Prāṇa has been mentioned along with a number insentient principles like name, speech, mind, etc., does not affect the position of Prāṇa as a sentient principle or the authority of Scriptural sanction in favor of treating Prāṇa as a deity. The use of the word *Puccha* in the ślokas recited in connection with Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, etc. in the *Taitt. Up.* as understood by S. offers a parallel. There, out of the five cases of its occurrence, only

29. Samprasāda iti suṣuptasthānam ucyate. tasyām avasthāyām Prāṇo jagarti iti Prāṇo atra samprasādo abhipreyate (S. *BSB.* i.3.8).
30. This point has already been explained.
31. See *AĀ.* ii, 4, 1, 4; *Chān. Up.* v, 1, 7; *Bṛh. Up.* vi; 1; 13-14; *Kauṣ. Up.* ii 14.

in one case connected with Ānandamaya the word *Puccha* has been taken to be applied to B. by reason of *Śrautaprasiddhi*,[32]—the same word *puccha* used in the other cases being set aside as referring to purely material kośas. There is no reason why a similar exception cannot be made in respect of Prāṇa, here. However, M. has held with thorough-going consistency and on good authority that the terms Nāma, Vāk, Manas, Sankalpa Smara, Āśā, etc. have *all of them* been used in this discourse in the sense of their respective presiding deities such as Uṣā, Svāhā, Parjanya, Mitra, Rudra, Sarasvatī and so on.[33]

We have seen that greatness in terms of superiority of attributes rather than all-pervasiveness would be the only uniform and consistent sense in which the word Bhūman and its allied forms can be taken for purposes of this discourse. Even the infinite bliss of B. on this view would be commensurate with the infinite superiority of its attributes over those of the others.[34] But the Nirviśeṣa-B. of S. could not be called "Bhūman", in this sense. As Bhūman is the ultimate goal of seekers of Mokṣa, it would not do to say that Bhūman's superiority of attributes is due to superimposition (*guṇādhyāsa*). The fruit of realising Bhūman is stated in the Up. to be "freedom of movement in all the worlds".[35] What one should expect from realisation of the Nirviśeṣa would be the automatic cessation of the worlds and all desire for attaining any of them and not a prospect of sojourning in all of them at one's will and pleasure. The whole trend of the conclusion, *artha-vāda* and *phala* here is thus inconsistent with the requirements of Nirviśeṣavāda.

It is not only *not difficult* to treat the two ablative forms *samprasādāt* and *adhyupadeśāt* as distinctive grounds for establishing the conclusion that Bhūman is the Supreme B.; but much more meaningful to do so. Even the minor objection to such an interpretation that there is no conjuncive particle to connect the two reasons[36] is not so insurmountable as may appear at first sight. The conjunctive *ca* from *the next Sūtra in the same adhikaraṇa* can very well be taken over to meet the requirement without any difficulty. If this is done, *adhyupadeśa* would give us the sense of an absolute transcendence of B. *over*

32. Tad apyeṣa śloko bhavati—
    Asan eva sa bhavati....
    Asti brahmeti ced veda.... (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 3).
33. For further details see M.'s *Chān. Up. Bhāṣya* (vii, 1-17).
34. The details of Guṇatāratamya among these deities and connected information have been given by M. in his *Chān. Up.* C:—
    प्राणात्तु भगवान्विष्णुरनन्तगुणतोऽधिकः ।
    नित्यमुक्तो नित्यशक्तिर्नित्योद्रिक्तगुणः प्रभुः ।।
35. सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति । (vii. 25, 2).
36. V. S. Ghate, the *Vedānta*, p. 168.

all else, instead of a purely relative sense of being more than or greater than vital air (when taken syntactically connected with *samprsādāt* as denoting a single *hetu*).

S. expresses his conclusion as follows: Bhūman is only B. and *not Prāṇa*.[37] This can be read as two different propositions—one negative and another affirmative. In the former case, the predicate of the proposition "not Prāṇa" will have to be *supplied* in the Sūtra. This would be a very unusual procedure in what purports to be a Samanvayādhyāya where B. is already assumed as the predicate of every proposition, that is moved there with reference to various minor terms (pakṣas) like Ānandamaya, Ākāśa, Vaiśvānara, Akṣara and so on, that are mentioned there in the respective Siddhānta Sūtras of the respective adhikaraṇas, together with their appropriate reasons. On the other hand, if the conclusion sought to be established by the Sūtra i, 3, 8 is purely affirmative that Bhūman is B. the reason given for arriving at such a conclusion viz. because of being taught subsequent to Prāṇa[38] would be quite inadequate and misleading; for in the Bhūmaprakaraṇa itself in the Chān. Up. (vii, 17-21) we have further instructions given about *vijnāna, mati, śraddhā nisṭhā* and *kṛti after the instruction about Prāṇa*. But these are not B. according to S.[39] Even conceding the point that they are the indispensable means of attaining Bhūman, there is bound to be a difficulty from another quarter. For, according to S. himself there are Upadeśas in the *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 3-5) about *manomaya vijñānamaya* and *ānandamayakośas* (which are *not B.*) given subsequent to the Upadeśa about Prāṇamaya. It makes no difference to the question that in the *Taitt. Up.* these upadeśas about *manomaya* etc., are given by going beyond *"Prāṇamaya"* whereas, in the present context of the *Chān. Up.* the instructions on *vijñāna, mati* etc. are given subsequent to "Prāṇa", as such. For after all, Prāṇa-maya is only a modification of Prāṇa according to S. and it partakes of the same nature. This is confirmed by the fact that the śloka which has been cited in the *Taitt. Up.* in respect of Prāṇamaya reads:

> *Prāṇam devā anuprāṇanti manuṣyāḥ paśavaśca ye/*
> *Prāṇo hi bhūtānām āyuḥ* (ii.3).

In the Bhṛguvalli of the *Taitt. Up.* (iii, 4-5) we have clear *upadeśas* about *manas* and *vijñāna* which are *not B.* according to S., subsequent

37. परमात्मैवेह भूमा भवितुमर्हति, न प्राणः, कस्मात् ? संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् । (S. *BSB.* i.3.8).
38. *Prāṇād ūrdhvam upadeśāt* (S.).
39. According to M. the whole series beginning with Satya and ending with Ahaṁkāra are all B.'s essential attributes as affirmed by the Sūtra: *Saiva hi satyādayaḥ* (iii, 3.39) and are also to be meditated upon. Hence, the difficulty which faces S. does not arise in M.'s case—For explanations of these words see M. *Chān. Up. C.* vii. 16-21.

to Prāṇa itself. It is clear from these evidences that the circumstance of being imparted subsequent to Prāṇa (*samprasādād adhyupadeśāt*) —as understood and interpreted by S. is not an adequate or conclusive proof of Bhūman's identity with B.

It is not possible to look upon the text 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, that is Bhūman' (*Chān. Up.* vii. 24.1) cited by S. under *BS.* i.3.9 as establishing the Nirviśeṣatva of B. For, in the same breath the Up. goes on to give further instruction about Ātman (*Athāta ātmādeśaḥ*) in vii, 25, 2, where it says: "Verily, he who sees *thus,* who thinks *thus,* who understands *thus,* he delights in the self. . . .". This shows the enlightened one who has attained Bhūman sees, thinks, understands and delights in it. The denial of seeing, thinking and understanding must, therefore, refer to the enlightened soul *not caring to see or be interested in* seeing or thinking about anything, *other than* B. It would not necessarily follow from this statement that *others do not exist* at all. All that the statement conveys is that the enlightened self is absorbed in its communion with and contemplation on Bhūman and has no eyes, or thoughts for anything else that is 'less' (*alpam*) as compared with B. The apparent contradiction between the two statements:

'*Yatra nānyat paśyati nānyat śṛṇoti nānyad vijānāti,*
and '*Sa vā eṣa evam paśyan evaṁ vijānan*'

can be resolved very reasonably by acknowledging that in the highest state of liberation where Bhūman is attained, the enlightened self realises that he derives all his assets, be they his life, breath, hope, mind, speech, memory or anything else, from the *highest source* of all—viz. B. (Ātman).[40]

Far from establishing the extinction of individuality or merger of the self in Bhūman, this passage underlines the fact of *complete dependence* of the individual on the Supreme B. (Bhūman) even in the highest of ralisation.[41] The words of the sūtra: Dharmopapatteḥ (i.3.9) referring to 'the *appropriateness of the attributes*' are a clear rebuff to the concept of the *Attributeless* Brahman (Nirviśeṣa).[42]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

According to R. "Prāṇa" in the Upaniṣadic passage here, stands for the Jīvātman. He introduces his Pūrvapakṣa accordingly as follows:

40. *Chān. Up.* vii.26.
41. Tasya ha vā *evam paśyataḥ* **** Ātmataḥ prāṇa ātmata āśā ātmatas smaraḥ, ātmato balam, ātmato vijnānam, ātmatas saṅkalpaḥ (vii.26).
—*Yadadhīnam vinā nānyat kincid asti kutaścana* (M. *Chān. Up.* C).
42. Which is regarded as the —*Pādārtha.*

The discourse begins with need for investigating the Ātman. To facilitate the realisation of Ātman, the teacher sets forth the meditation on a series of principles given in an ascending order beginning with *Nāma* and ending with Prāṇa. As the initial emphasis on Ātma-vidyā cannot be reconciled with the final emphasis on meditation on Prāṇa as a purely material principle, and as there are also subsequent references to Prāṇa as father, mother and so on, it would be proper to take it that Prāṇa here represents the Jīvātman with whom vital air is so closely associated in life.[43] As no higher principle than this Prāṇa has been mentioned in the questions and answers introduced here, the Bhūmā with which the discourse is concluded must be taken to be the same as the Jīvātman.

The Siddhānta is that Bhūman is B. because even tho' the questions and answers conclude with Prāṇa, there is a a clear statement further on, to the effect that the one who meditates on Satya (i.e. B.) must be deemed to be superior to the one who mediates on Prāṇa and holds Prāṇa to be the highest. This superiority of Satyātivāda to Prāṇa-Ativāda arises from the superiority of Satya over Prāṇa. Satya denotes B. It is the Bhūman in question because it has been taught subsequent to (over and above) the Jīvātman termed as Prāṇa.[44]

Criticism

It seems unnecessary to reject the well-established connotation of Prāṇa as the presiding deity of vital air. It would meet the requirements of Prāṇa's departure from father, mother, etc., referred to in the *Up.* As the term "*utkrānta-prāṇān*" applied to father, mother, Ācārya, etc. "from whom Prāṇa has departed" refers to their respective Jīvas whose bodies have been left behind, it would be impossible to interpret the expression "Prāṇa" in the sense of Jīvas. It would make no sense to say that the Jīvas of father and mother have departed from themselves (i.e. their Jīvas)!

It is neither pertinent nor helpful to interpret *samprasāda* as Jīva. The awkwardness of Lakṣaṇā is not altogether avoided in this interpretation when it comes to the turn of Prāṇa which is the term found in the Upaniṣad. Above all, the mere fact of the instruction about Bhūman being given going beyond Jīva is not certainly competent to establish Bhūman's identity with B. For we find that *vijñāna, mati, śraddhā* and others have also been referred to *after* Prāṇa, with the

43. Teneha Prāṇaśabdanirdiṣṭah Prāṇasahacārī pratyagātmaiva, na vāyuviśeṣa-mātram. (*Śrībhāṣya* i.3.7).
44. Samprasādaḥ Pratyagātmā. Pratyagātmano adhikatayā bhūmaviśiṣṭasya satya-śabdābhidheyasya upadeśāt ityarthaḥ (*Śrībhāṣya* i.3.7).

same emphatic particle "*tu*" attached to each of them as in the case of Satya (which alone has been accepted as B.).

Even conceding that śraddhā and the rest have been brought in only as aids to the realisation of B. and that, therefore, they all come within the scope of Brahmopadeśa itself, there is no smooth sailing for R.; for in the interpretation of the text from *Kaṭha. Up.: Mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt Puruṣaḥ paraḥ* (i.3.11) cited in BS. i, 4, 1, R. and his commentator have held that Mahat there denotes Jīvātman[45] and Avyakta the physical body[46] (*śarīram*) or unevolved non-sentient mater which entering into a particular condition becomes the physical body.[47] As this Avyakta here is said to be "beyond" and superior to Jīvātman there will be a glaring miscarriage of the reason (*hetu*) put forward in the Sūtra i, 3.7, that Bhūman must be B. because it is taught after and subsequent to Jivātman as being superior to him, following R.'s interpretation.

The fact that the word Samprasāda has been used in the sense of Jīvātman in some other place (*Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 3) ought *not* to misguide us into assigning the same meaning to that word in the present context also regardless of other considerations which militate against assigning to it the same meaning here and the risks involved in doing so. We have, therefore, to prefer M.'s interpretation of *samprasādāt adhyupadeśāt* to those of his predecessors. It is a straight and simple one and gives us the best possible meanings to the words *samprasāda* and *adhyupadeśa* of which philosophy can justly be proud.

45. Ātmaiva mahān iti ca viśeṣyati (R. i.4.1).
46. Ratharūpaṇena vinyastasya śarīrasyātra avyaktaśabdena grahaṇād ityarthaḥ (*ibid*).
47. Bhūtasūkṣmam avyākṛtam hyavasthāviśeṣāpannam śarīram bhavati (R. i.4.2).

CHAPTER XXXII

BRAHMAN THE HIGHEST IMPERISHABLE

3. *Akṣarādhikaraṇam* (i, 3.10-12)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the term 'Akṣara' which means the Imperishable (*na kṣarati*). It is common to B. and Cetana-Prakṛti (*Śrītattva*)[1] in Scriptural usage. It may be recalled that the properties of "being unseen" etc. had been ascribed to the Supreme B. in the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (i, 2, 21-23). But we find these attributes applied to "Akṣara" in *Bṛh. Up.* (iii, 8, 11): "That Akṣara, O Gārgi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving. There is none but It that perceives (independently); none that hears. It is in this Akṣara that Ākāśa is woven like warp and woof". If this Akṣara were to be different from B. the attributes of "being unseen" etc. already ascribed to B. in the earlier *adhi.* would have to belong to some other Being than B. called Akṣara. Hence, the matter requires to be settled.

The doubt arises whether this Akṣara is B. or Cetana-Prakṛti because the term Akṣara is found applied to both in various Scriptural texts. As the Viṣayavākya speaks of the Akṣara's seeing, perceiving and thinking,[2] we have to exclude the Jaḍa-Prakṛti, the syllable *om* and Avyākrtākāśa which are also denoted by the word Akṣara, from the scope of the present doubt and Pūrvapakṣa here.

1. According to M. Cetana-Prakṛti is the presiding deity of Jaḍa-Prakrti and is to be identified with 'Śrī'. For authorities see M *GB*. vii, 5; xii, 1-3; *GT* vii, 5; xv and *GB* xv. She is also called Akṣara-Puruṣa according to M.
2. Adṛṣṭṛ, aśrutam śrotṛ amatam mantṛ (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 8, 11).

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is the Akṣara referred to here is Cetana-Prakti or Śrītattva which is *one of the three Akṣaras* (the middle one, to be precise) referred to in *Akṣarāt parataḥ paraḥ* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 1.2).[3] The *Gītā* (xv. 16) also refers to the (middle) Akṣara by the term Akṣara-Puruṣa as distinguished from the Kṣara-Puruṣas or Jīvas, whose bodies are liable to destruction while the body of Akṣara-Puruṣa (Śrītattva) is imperishable.[4] An earlier passage in the same context of the *Bṛh. Up.* (iii, 8, 9) refers to the sun and the moon being maintained in their positions by the Akṣara. From the *Āmbhṛṇī-Sūkta* of *RV* x, 125, we gather that it is the Śrītattva which supports the sun and the moon and all other lesser deities. The *Gītā* (xii.3) describes Śrītattvam as the Akṣara that is unchanging, unmanifested and beyond description.

The Pūrvapakṣa stresses the point that even tho' 'being unseen' and such other attributes of Akṣara may be compatible with B., the attribute of "not eating anything: *Na tad aśnāti kiṁcana* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 8, 8) which has been ascribed to the Akṣara here, is irreconcilable with the Supreme B. which has been proclaimed by the Sūtrakāra himself as the Cosmic Eater (i, 2, 9). The middle Akṣara or Cetana-Prakṛti faces no such difficulty. The statement about not eating anything can be explained with reference to it in the sense of having no power to eat anything independently—just as even tho' many eternal substances subsist in Pralaya, the Śruti says: "...Ātmā alone existed in the beginning. Nothing else winked" (*Ait. Up.* i, 1) because the existence of the others was absolutely dependent on the will of the Supreme Being.

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta is that Akṣara referred to in the present discourse is the Supreme B. For the term Akṣara which denotes indestructibility is applicable in its fullest sense of freedom from all the *four kinds of destruction*[5] only to the Supreme B. It is for this reason that it has been called the 'highest Akṣara (*Paramam akṣaram*) in the Śrutis and Smṛtis.[6] Moreover, in the given context of the *Bṛh. Up.* (iii.8, 7) we find that after describing Ākāśa to be the nourishing principle or warp and woof of heaven and earth and what fills the space between them and whatever is said to be past, present and future,[7] the Śruti

3. Cf. * *Aparam tvakṣaram yā sā Prakṛtir jaḍarūpikā*
* * * * *akṣaratrayam īritam* (M. *BSB.* i, 2, 22).
4. *Śrīr akṣarātmetyuditā nityaciddehakā yataḥ* (M. *GT.* xv. 16).
5. Cf. Anityatvam dehahānir duḥkhaprāptir apūrṇatā
Naśsas caturvidhaḥ proktas tadabhāvo Hareḥ sadā (M.*GT.* ii, 17).
6. *Gītā* viii. 3.
7. *Ākāśa eva tad otam ca protam ca.*

goes on to declare that this Ākāśa (Cetana-Prakṛti) is, *in its turn*, woven into the Akṣara.[8] This confers on Ākāśa the status of being the nourisher of the whole cosmos while being in its turn dependent on and nourished by another principle,[9]—the Akṣara. This is precisely the position of Cit-Prakṛti in respect of B.[10]

It cannot be argued that the Up. is thinking only of Jaḍa Prakṛti as the material cause or causal substance of all that exists in the past, present and future when it says that all these are woven into Ākāśa and that the Akṣara which stands above it and into which it is woven is the Cetana Prakṛti itself and not the Supreme B. As a sentient principle credited with the power of seeing and thinking, the Akṣara into which Ākāśa is said to be woven like warp and woof cannot possibly stand in the relation of a causal substance towards the Ākāśa.[11] Nor is the world of Indra grounded in the world of Prajāpati as the effect in its material cause.[12] All such terms and descriptions as *ota*, *prota* and *āhita* used in this context, have, therefore, to be understood in one uniform sense of "being nourished by Ākāśa" (Cit-Prakṛti) or Akṣara as the case may be.[13] In both the cases, the nourisher and the nourished *must be* sentient beings. Ākāśa which nourishes others below it must be the Cit-Prakṛti and Akṣara which nourishes Ākāśa must be the Supreme B. It is because all beings are nourished by B. that the *Gītā* (vii, 7) says everything is woven into It. The Akṣara is B. because everything from Pṛthvī to Ākāśa (Cit-Prakṛti) is supported by B.[14] in a *far deeper sense* than they are supported by others.[15] This is implied by the preposition *pra* in the word *praśāsana* occurring in the Śruti[16] and in the Sūtra.[17] To bring out the full sense of the phrase: *Ambarāntadhṛtiḥ* (sustaining everything from the earth to Ākāśa, i.e. the entire cosmos), M. cites a number of texts in his *Bhāṣya* "He who is the mainstay of the three principles: (Prakṛti, Puruṣa and Kāla) supports heaven and earth (*RV.* i, 154, 4). He is the One glorious Lord. He is in all places and in many forms supporting all. When he sets down His burden of the cosmos, not wishing to bear it, the latter disappears (in Praḷaya)—*T.Ā.* iii, 14. "In

8. Etasmin khalvakṣare Gārgi ākāśa otaśca protaśca (iii, 8, 11).
9. *Sarvopajīvyatve sati anyaikāśritatvam.*
10. Cf. *Kaṭha. Up.* i.i, 11 *b; RV.* X. 125, *Gita* VII.6.
11. *TC.* p. 588b.
12. Kasmin nu khalvindraloka otaśca.... (iii. 6.1) ityādāvādheyatvasyāpyabhāvācca....(TC. p. 588).
13. Ekaprakaraṇasthasya otādiśabdasya nānārthatvam cāyuktam. Tasmād *'Rudram samāśritā davāḥ'; Rājñ rājyam samāhitam'* ityādāviva poṣyatvādikam eva otatvam. (*TC.* p. 588b).
14. According to M. *'ambara'* here means Cit-Prakrti.
15. *Gītā* vii.
16. Nahi pretyuktāsaṅkucitaviṣayatva *-ananyāyattatva-rūpaprakṛṣraśāsanamātreṇa* sarvadhṛtir anyasya yujata ityarthaḥ (Rāgh. TDP. i, 3.11).
17. BS. i, 3.11.

Him the cosmos grows up in all its diversity. In Him the gods and all others find their position" (*Mah. N. Up.* i, 2). The statement about Akṣara *not eating anything* is to be understood in the sense that the Supreme B. has no necessity of eating anything to sustain itself like other creatures.[18] M. has also brought out the all-embracing character of B.'s cosmic sway by citing here a very significant text from the *Ṛg Veda* (i, 164.36):

Saptārdhagarbhā bhuvanasya reto
Viṣṇos tiṣṭhanti pradiśā vidharmaṇi[19]

where the term *saptārdhagarbhāḥ* has intrigued many modern scholars.[20]

The concluding Sūtra: *Anyabhāvavyāvṛtteśca* (i, 3, 12) establishes that Akṣara is the Supreme Being because It alone has the unique distinction of possessing and uniting within itself a stupendous array of seemingly contradictory attributes—nowhere else to found co-existing, in things empirical.

The Viṣayavākya of this Sūtra runs: "It is neither gross nor fine; neither short nor long, unattached, without taste, without voice, without mind. . . ." (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 8, 8) and so on.

The purpose of such an apparently and absolutely negative description of Akṣara in this section after making it clear that it is the unseen seer, unperceived perceiver of all, the commanding ruler of all (*praśāstṛ*) and that in which everything finite is "woven" can hardly be to make out that this B. is *neither a substance nor a possessor of attributes*. It is to emphasize the supra-rational and trans-empirical nature of Divine majesty, attributes and personality.

The Sūtra (i, 3, 12) as interpreted by M. means: The Akṣara is the Supreme B. and no other because the Śruti text (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.8.8) *excludes* from It only such attributes like grossness and minuteness, heat and cold, light and shade etc. which belong to the nature and sphere of objects of the empirical world—which are material in their essence, dependent, liable to change and destruction and which are not found there to co-exist with their opposites.

There is a definite purpose in the Sūtrakāra's using the roundabout expression: exclusion of attributes found in mutual exclusion in other

18. *TP.* i, 3, 12.
19. "The seven deities presiding over the principles of Mahat, Ahamkāra and the five elements, which make the great cosmic womb carry out its responsibilities by the command of the Supreme Viṣṇu who bestows happiness on the world".
20. See Dr. Kunhan Raja *'Asya Vāmasya' Hymn.* Introd. pp. xxxv; xxxviii. Madras, '56. Also Muir *Sanskrit Texts,* 1873. p. 76.

substances (*anyabhāvavyāvṛtteḥ*)—instead of making a direct statement: *Sthaulyādivyāvṛtteḥ*. (on account of excluding grossness etc.). That purpose is to preclude the objection that if the negations "neither gross nor minute" etc. are intended to posit their opposites severally in B. these opposites being in the nature of mutually exclusive properties, cannot co-exist in one and the same Being. If the purpose of the description is pure exclusion of all conceivable properties in B. it would reduce it to a blank and a nullity. That would be opposed to the nature of B. endowed with existence, activity and transcendental form, as we gather from the Sūtras.[21]

These objections are set aside by showing that the Śruti excludes from B. such attributes as are generally found to be mutually exclusive only in respect of empirical entities. In other words, B. can combine in its being contradictory attributes of a trans-empirical nature without any logical difficulty arising. Its largeness in a trans-empirical sense is not necessarily incompatible with its minuteness in a trans-empirical sense. Its atomicity (*aṇutva*) in the same sense is consistent with its all-pervasiveness (*mahatva*) in the same sense. This is the esoterics of B. as we learn from the Śrutis:

Aṇor aṇīyān mahato mahīyān (Kaṭha. i, 2, 20)

The Cit-Prakṛti tho' possessed of trans-empirical attributes owes them to the Divine favor whereas in the Supreme B. these are self-derived. Herein lies the difference between the Supreme Akṣara and the middle Akṣara (Cit-Prakṛti). Therefore, in the highest sense B. alone as Akṣara satisfies the criterion of *anyabhāvavyāvṛtti* and of independent possession of even otherwise mutually exclusive properties as described in the Up.

M. refers in his *AV.* to the incomprehensible mystery of Divine nature which makes it possible for attributes which in the empirical sphere are always found to be mutually opposed and exclusive, to co-exist in B. because of their trans-empirical character:—

Avirodhena Govinde santyasthūlādikāni ca.[22]
* * * *tāni liṅgāni tadanyatra tvasantyapi*
(*AV.* i, 3.12)

The *TC* explains that tho' in the empirical sphere, out of two opposite attributes like minuteness and grossness only one of them can be

21. BS. i, 2, 1; 9; 23.
22. "विरुद्धैर्लक्षणैर्युतं ब्रह्म' इत्यनेनैतदस्माभिरभिप्रेतम् – तान्यस्थूलादिकानि, अणुत्वमहत्त्वादिकानि लिंगानि तस्मात् ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्र सहासन्त्यपि गोविन्देऽविरोधेनैव, सहेति यावत्, सन्तीति । न पुनर्विरोधमभ्युपेत्य एकत्रावस्थानमुच्यते; येन व्याघातः स्यादिति । (*NS.* p. 174b)

found in a given thing at a given time and place, it is possible for both of them to co-exist in B:—

Anyatra aṇutvamahatvayor ekaikamātrasya sattvepi * * * Brahmaṇi ubhayam upapannam (*TC.* p. 582 b)

We have the incident recorded in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* of how Yaśodā was able to perceive in the small mouth of the child Kṛṣṇa the entire cosmos of stupendous dimensions. The body of the child Kṛṣṇa was first bound by his mother with a small rope but seeing that it became insufficient, longer ones were brought and tried and even the longest ones could not encompass him and in the end she was able to bind him again with a small piece of rope. The difficulty of co-existence of contradictory attributes like grossness and minuteness of dimensions at the same time and place holds true only in respect of material and finite substances. As there is no internal difference (*svagatabheda*) in B. it is possible to conceive of and reconcile the coexistence of (elsewhere) contradictory and mutually exclusive attributes in it by the power of Viśeṣas and by reason of the great mystery of Divine nature as such,—which is the ultimate explanation of the problem:[23] *Tvayīśvare brahmaṇi no viruddhyate* (*Bhāg.* X, 4, 20). As an instance of attributes which are *not* found to coexist in the empirical sphere being found together in God J. cites eternality of knowledge found in Him and His creatorship without having a physical body.

M. concludes his interesting discourse on this topic with a profound observation that it is the privilege of philosophy to explain or at least help to understand the mystery of the Divine Being and its many wonderful attributes in meaningful ways and not to sweep away unceremoniously what baffles discursive thought as incompatibilities:

Ato viruddhavad bhātam api vyākhyāya tattvataḥ.

Yojanīyam Harau vākyam viruddhair lakṣaṇair yutam.[24]

(AV. i. 3, 12.)

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. raises the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of 'Varṇas'.[25] The syllable Om is the hypostatization of all sounds, words and name-forms.[26] Names

23. अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत् ।
प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य वैभवम् ॥ (*Mbh*)
24. Yato Brahma viruddhair lakṣaṇair yutam eva ato * * * * viruddhavat pratītam api vākyam tattvato vyākhyāya Harau yojanīyam. Yojayitum śakyam iti yojanā, (NS. p. 173).
25. Akṣaraśabdo varṇeṣu rūḍha iti varṇā eva akṣaram (*Bhāmatī* i. 3, 10).
26. Nāmāni ca omkārātmakāni (*ibid*).

and the objects denoted by them must be deemed to be of the same essence, as their apposition in linguistic description 'this is a cow' (*gaur ayam*), this is a tree (*vṛkṣo'yam*) shows.[27] This identity cannot be due to the relationship of means and ends. The idea of fire brought up by the knowledge of smoke is not expressed in the form of an identity judgment but thro' an oblique relationship: *from* smoke fire (*dhūmād vahniḥ*). Thus the entire world of physical reality from the earth to the sky is all bound up with names and strung together as it were (*otam ca protam ca*) in name.[28] Names are of the essence of *omkāra* and pervaded by it as we see from the Śruti—'As the leaves of a tree are all held together by the stalk, so is all speech held together by Om.' Verily the syllable Om is all this' (*Chān.* Up. ii, 23, 2). The entire universe thus goes back on the syllable Om and is woven into it. Its meditation has been taught in the Śruti cited above. The Akṣara, therefore, is the syllable Om.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that Akṣara is B. and not the syllable *om.* because the Śruti speaks of the entire universe of effects as being 'supported by Akṣara. The world is a transformation of B. and not of Varṇas. For, names and objects cannot be identified. Their natures are different. They are comprehended by different senses and they serve different purposes. B. is, therefore, the real Akṣara in its root sense of being imperishable (*na kṣarati*) or all-pervading (*aśnute*). The conventionally established meaning (*rūḍhārtha*) of Akṣara in favor of syllables has, therefore, to be overridden by the root sense of 'imperishable' which is applicable, in the light of the other consideration of supporting the whole word, to B. alone.

Criticism

S.'s Pūrvapakṣa proceeds on the presumption of an identity of (class) essence between the syllable (om) and the world of effects (*pṛthivyādyākāśāntam*) on the analogy of the identity of essence between a name and the object denoted by it. But in the wording of the Śruti text: "*In what* is Ākāśa woven" the relation between Ākāśa and that into which it is "woven" appears to be one of supporter and supported (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*) rather than identity of essence. The further, description of the Akṣara as "The seer" (*draṣṭṛ*), hearer (*śrotṛ*), thinker (*mantṛ*), knower (*vijñātṛ*) is also incompatible with the syllable (*varṇa*). For these reasons, the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of the syllables is

27. Sarvasyaiva rūpadheyasya nāmadheyātmakatvāt sarvam hi rūpadheyam nāmadheyasambhinnam anubhūyate gaur ayam vṛkṣo 'yam iti (*ibid*).
28. Tasmān nāmasambhinnāḥ prithivyādayo 'ambarāntāḥ namnā grathitā vid-dhāśca. (*ibid*).

out of place. Moreover, if the Akṣara is conceived as the syllable for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa which takes its stand on the hypothetical identity of essence between name and object, there would be no necessity at all for the intermediate reference to Ākāśa as that in which the world of effects differentiated by the threefold time is woven. This could as well have been dispensed with; for even without it, the principle of identity of name and object would hold true of Akṣara and the entire world of effects. The special position accorded to Ākāśa in this scheme *vis-a-vis* Akṣara is, by the way, an indication that Ākāśa is intended to stand for a much higher principle than Bhūtākāśa as S. and others have conceived of it. It would be highly improper to speak of 'the past, present and future' as being woven into Ākāśa (*Brh. Up.* iii, 8, 7), if this Ākāśa is to be identified with Bhūtākāśa which is non-eternal.

According to S., Akṣara here is Nirviśeṣa-B. But the irony of it is the word 'Akṣara' in its radical sense (*yaugikārtha*) of '*na kṣarati*' cannot be applied to that which is void of characteristics. Nor can such a Nirviśeṣa-B. be "spoken of by venerable Brahmins as the hearer, seer, thinker and knower" as the Up. (iii, 8, 11) tells us. It cannot be described as "supporting" the Universe. In S.'s philosophy, the Nirviśeṣa-B. is merely the substratum of the illusory appearance or superimposition of the world on it. '*Supporting the world*' (*ambarāntadhṛti* and *praśāsana*) in this case of Nirviśeṣa-B. can be nothing more than being the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world. This can hardly be the august sense in which the Śruti and the Sūtra are impressing on us that the great Akṣara is supporting the entire cosmos by the power of its *command* (BS. i. 3, 11). Unfortunately for S. the Saviśeṣa-B. is *not the theme* of this Pāda and the Nirviśeṣa of his conception can neither rule nor command the world even in a Vyāvahārika sense! The only alternative left would be to treat the *praśāsana* attributed to the Akṣara as purely illusory (*pratibhāsika*) and superimposed. Such a kind of *praśāsana* could also be ascribed to the Pradhāna by the Pūrvapakṣin without difficulty. The Siddhāntin could not, therefore, make a point of it against the Pūrvapakṣa.

The *Kalpataru* has tried to get over this difficulty of ascribing *praśāsana* to the Nirviśeṣa-B. by pleading that as 'ruling' is an attribute of a sentient being, it can readily be superimposed on B.—but not on an insentient principle like the Pradhāna of the Pūrvapakṣin. Royal status may sometimes be superimposed on the minister who is also surrounded by similar paraphernalia; but not on the palace walls.[29]

29. *Kalpataru* i, 3, 12.

If this argument concedes that there must be some affinity of nature or attributes between the substratum and the superimposed object (in an *āropa*), the illustration of the king and his minister would be out of place with reference to the Nirviśeṣa-B. which can never have any similarity of attributes with any 'knowing' self of our experience, controlling things under its power. As a matter of fact, the property of exercising the power of ruling (*praśāsana-kartṛtva*) belongs according to strict Advaita theory to the insentient *antaḥkaraṇa* and not to the Cetana (self) as such. As both Pradhāna and antaḥkaraṇa are insentient principles, the superimposition of rulership of the *antaḥ-karaṇa* on Pradhāna would be more appropriate from the Pūrvapakṣa point of view than the superimposition of the attribute of insentient *antaḥkaraṇa* on the Nirviśeṣa B.

In arguing that 'ruling' (*praśāsana*) which is an attribute of a sentient being can only be superimposed on Brahman, the *Kalpataru* is also conveniently forgetting the position taken up by Vācaspati Miśra himself under B.S. i, 2, 21 that similarity of attributes between substratum and the superimposed object is not an absolutely necessary condition of Āropa in Brahma-Vivartavāda.

Repudiation of the doctrine of identity between Jīva and B. is writ large on the concluding Sūtra *also* of this *adhi.*

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. presents his Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of Jaḍa-Prakrti and the Jīvas. Tho' the word Akṣara denotes 'Varṇas', the description of it as "not long, not short" etc., is not applicable to them. So no plausible Pūrvapakṣa could be raised on their behalf. The insentient Pradhāna has a good claim as it is the basis of all modifications from the earth to Bhūtākaśa and supports them. There is also a good case for the Jīvātman. As only a sentient being can control insentients, the Akṣara may be the Jīvātman also. The Siddhānta is that Akṣara is B. It cannot be Pradhāna because the Śruti refers to Akṣara as the support of all those existing in the past, present and future. This cannot be applied to Bhūta-Ākāśa which is itself created in time and is non-eternal. The Ākāśa which is the support of all and into which everything is woven must, therefore, be the Avyākṛta-Ākāśa otherwise known as Prakṛti. The Akṣara into which this is said to be woven must, therefore, be the Supreme B. It cannot be the Jīvātman as the Śruti refers to Akṣara's unobstructed sway over the whole cosmos which is unthinkable in the case of Jīvātman. Thus, the description of the Akṣara as that which sees, hears, and so on, excludes Pradhāna and the description of Akṣara as seeing all while remaining unperceived by others excludes Jīvātman. So, the conclusion is that Akṣara is B.

It is difficult to accept R.'s Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of insentient Pradhāna as the description of Akṣara as ruling the cosmos and being the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) preclude it form rising.[30] As rulership of the entire cosmos is contemplated by the Śruti passage, the Jīvātman's claims are also too slender to be seriously put up. The difficulties raised by R. himself point to the inescapable conclusion that while only a sentient principle will have to be thought of in connection with the Pūrvapakṣa here, it will also have to be one which occupies a *much higher position than the Jīvātman* and *is at the same time other than B.*

The Cit-Prakṛti (or Śrītattva) is the only one which could meet this requirement effectively. It is surprising that R. should have missed this important clue to the interpretaion not only of this *adhi.* but of many others bearing on the concept of Cit-Prakṛti in the *Brahmasūtras.*

30. *Nahi vacanam adṛṣṭvā pūrvaḥpakṣaḥ.*

CHAPTER XXXIV

BRAHMAN THE PRIMORDIAL SAT

4. *Sad-adhikaraṇam* (i, 3, 13)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the name 'Sat' occurring in various contexts pertaining to the creation of the world. The Viṣayavākyas are: 'In the beginning there was only the Sat (*Chān. Up.* vi, 2.1). All these beings have Sat for their source (vi. 8, 6). Issuing from Sat they know not that they do so' (vi, 10, 2) etc. The way the reason is worded in the Sautra proposition: *Īkṣatikarmavyapadeśāt Saḥ* (i, 3, 13) is sufficiently indicative of the term intended for samanvaya. It is not, therefore, mentioned in the Sūtra. As carrying the basic sense of 'cause or source in general' of *all* that is to be created, in the contexts of its occurrence, this term (Sat) is readily applicable both to Jaḍa-Prakṛti and to B. In this sense, it is an Ubhayatraprasiddhaśabda fit to be discussed in the present Pāda.

The Pūrvapakṣa is in favor of Jaḍa-Prakrti. It draws support from the way in which it is stated of the 'Sat' that 'it reflected, let me become many and grow forth' (vi. 2, 3). This presupposes some kind of a physical transformation of state (*vikāra*) on the part of the Sat, which would be in keeping with the nature of a material principle like Jaḍa-Prakṛti. The Siddhānta points out the main difficulty against the contention that as thought and reflection (*īkṣati*) have been ascribed (*Vyapadeśāt*) to the Sat in its creative activity (*karma*) it has to be conceived as a sentient Being. This is sufficient to rule out the claims of Jaḍa-Prakṛti.

Growth and becoming ascribed to Sat are, however, to be understood in terms of *manifestations* of a diversity of forms of B. so as to be present in and sustain the evolutes of Prakrti as and when they come into being.[1] (See *Taitt. Up.* ii, 6.). These manifestations are not to be regarded as the outcome of any physical transformation of B. They are to be conceived, on good authority, as being eternal but becoming patent by the power of Viśeṣas, as and when needed.[2]

The Siddhānta view is thus in a position to accept both the act of thinking (īkṣaṇa) and the activity of becoming many (or assuming many Forms) on the part of Sat, in the primary sense. This is not possible for the Pūrvapakṣa. It has to resort to Lakṣaṇā in explaining not only *īkṣaṇam* on the part of Jaḍa-Prakrti but also of its 'becoming many'; for, we read in the text of the *Chān. Up.* that after taking thought, the Sat created' *Tejas, ap* and *anna* which are, however described as Devatās (vi, 3, 3). As divinities, they cannot be transformations of Jaḍa-Prakṛti.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. devotes this *adhi.* to a discussion whether the fourfaced Brahmā or the Absolute is the object of meditation in the passage of the *Praśna Up.* (v.2) with the aid of the syllable Om, with all its three constituent *mātrās*. The Pūrvapakṣa takes its stand on the Phalaśruti "He is led by the chants of Sāman to the world of Brahmā"—i.e. Hiraṇyagarbha (v.5). This is obviously a world limited by space and not the supreme state.

The Siddhānta view is that the object of meditation here, is indeed the Absolute as it is clearly stated in v, 5 that "he *sees* the Person who dwells in the body,—the One who is higher than the highest concentration of life (*Jīvaghanāt*). As a rule, direct vision has the true for its content. As direct vision is referred to here (*īkṣate*), the meditation which caused it should also have been of the same Absolute. The reference to the limited reward of attaining the world of Hiraṇyagarbha thro' such meditation and vision is not, however, inconsistent. For unlimited reward of attaining the absolute goes only with the knowledge of the unconditioned B. But as the meditation here is of B. associated with the Upādhi (adjunct) of Omkāra, it is appropriate that its reward should only be limited to the attainment of the world of the fourfaced Brahmā. Later, as the realization of the unconditioned arises, there will be final release.

1. TC. p. 607.
2. Bahutvam ca avikāreṇaiva uktam—
'Ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate' (*TĀ.* iii, 13, 1) iti (M. *BSB.* i, 3, 13).

Criticism

It is difficult to agree with S. that the topic for discussion here is the one from *Praśna Up.* relating to the attainment of B. thro' meditation on Om. There is nothing to compel the acceptance of such an interpretation in the wording of the first part of the reason (*īkṣatikarma*),—such as the presence of a distinctive abstract-suffix (*tva-pratyaya*). In the absence of such a decisive indication in the wording of the Sūtra, it is open to us to choose a different Viṣayavākya pertaining to quite a different topic for discussion which would be free from this objection.[3]

However, granting that an abstract suffix may be understood, in this case, it would still be pertinent to point out that *a much better reason* than being the object of perception (*īkṣatikarma*) could certainly have been given to conclusively establish that the being attained by such meditation, in this case, is indeed the Supreme B. and not Hiraṇyagarbha. Such a reason is actually provided by the words *"Parāt param"* qualifying the Puruṣa attained. This is really a clinching piece of evidence. It precedes the words *Puruṣam īkṣate*. As such, it should have been given top-priority as *the hetu* in deciding the question instead of beating about the bush with a dubious reason of *īkṣatikarma* which has its doctrinal difficulties to overcome.[4] S.'s explanation that meditation on B. thro' Omkara carries only a limited reward comes into conflict with the clear pronouncement in *Praśna Up.* v, 7, that "by the mere support of Omkara the wise one attains that which is calm, unaging immortal, fearless, supreme".

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. disconnects *"vyapadeśāt"* (on account of mention) from the preceding '*īkṣatikarma*' in the Sūtra.[5] He treats the latter as embodying the subject of the proposition and the former alone as embodying the reason.[6] But it appears from the usage in other Sūtras like i, 2.18; i, 3, 5, etc., that it is best connected with a term which actually contains the particular reason in support of the Siddhānta. There is no need then to make the Sūtrakāra depart from his normal practice and look for the Siddhāntayukti outside the Sūtra and bring it up by way of further clarification of the word *vyapadeśa*, as R. has done.

3. The point is that the absence of a necessary abstract suffix can be overlooked only where there is concensus in interpretation, among commentators.
4. See *TC.* p. 611.
5. G. Thibaut has missed this point in his tr. of the Sūtra (i.3.12) according to R. (See p. 311), tho' he follows R.'s lead properly in the tr. of the Bhāṣya itself (p. 312).
6. Īkṣatikarma saḥ Paramātmā. Kutaḥ? Vyapadeśāt. Vyapadiśyate hi īkṣatikarma Paramātmatvena (*Śribhāṣya* i.3.12).

Since the reference to "Parākparam Puruṣam" and the wise one's freeing himself from all evil would preclude the rise of the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of Hiraṇyagarbha, R. bases it on an analogical ground that as meditaion on the first and the second elements of Om are associated with the attainment of this world and the world of interspace in the text (v.3-4), the third world mentioned as the goal of meditation on the trisyllabic *om* must also be taken to be a similar world of the four-faced Brahmā, out of regard for the evidence of '*Sannidhi*' (nearness of reference). But then, as a subscriber to the Aikaśāstrya view of the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāmsās, R. is bound by the ruling of Pūrvamīmāmsā in his intepretation of B. S. also, that Sannidhi is of inferior evidentiary value to Liṅga.[7] That being so, the Pūrvapakṣa could not arise on the basis of Sannidhi overriding the force of Brahmaliṅgas, such as the attainment of freedom from evil and Parātparatva. It is necessary, therefore, to look for a different topic of discussion so far as this *adhi.* is concerned.

8. *Ānantaryam acodanā* (*PMS*. iii, 1, 23). For illustration see *JNMV*. p. 120.

CHAPTER XXXV

BRAHMAN IS *IN* THE SMALL SPACE INSIDE THE LOTUS OF THE HEART AND IS TO BE SOUGHT AS THE SUPPORT OF ALL

5. *Dahara-adhikaraṇam* (i, 3, 14-21)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the mark of *being present in the lotus of the heart.*[1] The Viṣayavākya is from *Chān. Up.*: Now there is in this city of B. the small lotus as an abode. Inside is the small space (*ākāśa*). *What is inside that* is to be sought and understood. If the disciples should ask, '(of) what (excellence) is that which is within that small space, he should say: 'Of what measure (and excellence) is the Ākāśa outside, this Ākāśa within the heart is of the same measure (and excellence). Within it, heaven and earth, Agni and Vāyu, the sun and the moon, the stars and lightning abide" (VIII. 1, 1-3).

Prima facie this Ākāśa may be the elemental space or even the Jīvātman, or B. The *Mah. N. Up.* (xi. 7) speaks of an empty space (*suṣiram*) within the lotus of the heart turned face downwards. In the *Praśna Up.* (iii, 6) the Jīvātman is described as residing in the heart. In *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 1.1) the Supreme B. is also described as being present in the cave of the heart. The mark of being present in the lotus of the heart is thus common to these three.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapaksa is that it is the element of Ākāśa that is present in the lotus of the heart, or else the Jīvātman. In the opening sentence of *Chān. Up.* (viii.1.1) the element of Ākāśa is clearly mentioned as

1. *Dahare* Viṣṇur eva (M. *BSB*. i.3.14).

existing within the lotus of the heart and it is iterated (viii. 1, 3) that this is as much as the outer space and that all things subsist in it. This cannot be explained away as referring to B. on the basis of the Ākāśa-adhi. (i, i, 22). For, the *Mah. N. Up.* (xi) says, after referring to this lotus of the heart that *inside it is an aperture in which everything is rooted.*[2] This aperture cannot be identified with B. as the same *Up.* goes on to say that inside *that aperture* there burns upward a small steady flame,—at the centre of which Paramātman is to be found.

Moreover, if the small space within the lotus of the heart were itself B., the call of the *Up.* to seek *what is inside it* would make no sense. The answer to the question as to what is there inside the space in the heart-lotus is irreconcilable with the presumption that it is B. which is present in the space inside the heart-lotus. For, instead of mentioning that it is B., the *Up.* gives a curious answer: "As far as this world-space extends, so far the inner space extends and in it heaven and earth, sun and moon and everything else is contained. This is another way of saying that the inner Ākāśa in the heart is the equivalent of outer space and that, therefore, all that is contained in the latter is as good as being contained in the inner Ākāśa as well. The mark of freedom from evil would be in keeping with the nature of an insentient principle like Ākāśa. It follows then that it is this Bhūtākāśa which is present in the heart-lotus and further that it is the things contained in it such as heaven and earth which are to be sought and realized.[3] In this way, this Pūrvapakṣa poses a challenge to the Jijñāsāsūtra itself.

There is also support for the view that it is Jīvātman who is present in the heart-lotus. For in the subsequent sections of this Adhyāya, the claims of Jīvātman receive good support. We read—"The Ātman who is free from evil, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst who is Satyakāma etc. is to be sought" (viii.7.3). The Satyakāmatva of the Jīva can be explained from the point of view of his future status in release.

Siddhānta view

The Siddhānta here is that the mark of being present in the heart-lotus *(dahare sthitatvam)* and of being the support *(ādhāra)* of all, belong to B. and not to Bhūtākāśa or Jīvātman. Evil and sin can be meaningfully denied only with reference to a sentient being but not of elemental ether. As for the Jīvātman he is, tho' a sentient being, *not entirely free* from sin and evil during the state of Samsāra. In the

2. तस्यान्ते सुषिरं सूक्ष्मं तस्मिन् सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
3. *TC.* p. 618.

released state, he possesses no physical body and, therefore, it is not possible to think of him as residing in the space of the heart--lotus. (from that end). Thus the Jīvātman also stands ruled out.

The second sūtra of the *adhi.* points out that, during the state of Suṣupti, all creatures find their daily repose in the Supreme B. who is seated in the heart-lotus. Sūtra 3 makes clear that the attribute of supporting all referred to in *Chān. Up.* viii, 1, 3 is indeed the special property of B. as is asserted[4] in *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4, 22. Sūtras 5-6 refute the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that the being referred to as the sinless ātman in the Viṣayavākya is the individual, by showing that the Supreme B. alone possesses the attribute of being sinless, free from hunger and thirst, Satyakāma, Satyasaṅkalpa etc. *in the absolute sense of those terms.* The Jīva attains to this condition *only in release* and retains these attributes for ever afterwards *only by the grace of B.* He is, therefore, Apahatapāpmā, Satyasaṅkalpaḥ, etc. subject to the Divine Will and in a limited sense. Sūtra 7 points out then that it is the Other One (B.) which has been described as *Eṣa ātmā* in viii, 1, 5,—on attaining whom the individual self comes into the full realization of its own freedom from sin and fulfilment of desires *(satyakāmatva)* by the continued grace of B. This disposes of the Pūrvapakṣa argument that the being in the Daharākāśa must be Jīvātman because he has been referred to as Eṣa Ātmā......(viii, 1, 5). This is a very important point made by M.[5] Sūtra 8 shows that the objection that the unlimited B. cannot be contained in the small space of the heart-lotus has been given as appropriate answer on earlier occasions.

The 'curious answer'—the inner Ākāśa in the heart is as extensive as the outer one offers no difficulty to the Siddhāntin who looks upon this Ākāśa as *Brahmākāśa.* The statement is intended to bring out the inconceivable majesty of B. It means the Supreme Brahma-Ākāśa which is present in the elemental space in the heart is of the same unlimited essence and majesty as the Brahmākāśa present in the vast expanse outside and in which the sun and the moon etc. find their support.[6] The statement of the *MahNUp* (xi) that the aperture inside the heart is the support of the Universe does no conflict with the Siddhānta view that the support of all is B. The former is only a figura-

4. Ya eṣo antarhṛadaya ākāśas tasmin śete sarvasya vaśī sarvasyeśānas sarvasyādhipatiḥ...eṣa sarveśvara, eṣa bhūtapālaḥ.
5. Yatprasādān mukto bhavati sa Bhagavān pūrvoktaḥ (*M.BSB.* i.3, 19) Pūrvoktaḥ' Eṣa ātmā apahatapāpmā ityādi pūrvavākye tathā apahatapāpmatvādinā ukto na Jīvaḥ (*BD*).
6. Hṛtpadmagatākāśastham anveṣṭavyam iti sāmānyenokte, kim tad atra vidyate iti praśne, yāvān bahiḥ Paramatmākāśākhyas tiṣṭhati tāvān hṛdayapadmākaśe vidyate. Sa ca pṛthivyādyāśrayatvāt....anveṣṭayaḥ ityanvayopapatteḥ (*TP*).

tive way of saying that everything is rooted in B. which is present in the aperture—just as one may speak of the precious *jewel which is actually reposing in its case, as existing in the jeweller's shop.*[7]

M. has been quick to point out that there is difficulty only for the Pūrvapakṣin in making out a proper sequence of ideas between the question (*kim tad atra vidyate*) and its answer such as we have it in the text.[8] For, according to the Pūrvapakṣa, it has already been stated in the opening section that inside the heart-lotus there is a small space (*dahara ākāśaḥ*)—which is 'jaḍa'. To the further question as to what there is in such Ākāśa which deserves to be investigated, it would be pointless to say "Ākāśa". If to make this answer sound plausible one should try to construe the term *ākāśa* used in the latter half of the explanatory sentence (*tāvān eṣo antarhṛdaya ākāśa***) as a locative form (*antar hṛdaye ākāśe*)[9] and explain further that the unlimited space present in the small space should be investigated, it would create a fresh difficulty in as much as, unlike the Supreme B. which is by hypothesis endowed with inscrutable powers (*acintyaśakti*), Jaḍa-Ākāśa has no such mysterious powers. The explanation would, therefore, fall flat.

Nor would it be possible to explain that the small space in the heart is represented as unlimited and what is contained in it viz. heaven and earth ought to be investigated. The difficulty here is obvious. What is limtied (*dahara-ākāśaḥ*) cannot suddenly be "treated" as unlimited.[10] Secondly, by way of answer to the question what is there in it it would have sufficed to say—'the unlimited ākāśa.' Any further attempt to say that heaven and earth etc. are contained in it would be uncalled for. Moreover, the question is not simply as to what is contained in that Ākāśa but also as to its fitness to be sought, investigated and realized. We have already seen in the Dyubhvādyadhi. (i, 3, 1-7) that what is worth seeking and knowing is the One Supreme B. and nothing else. It would be ridiculous now to make Dyāvāprthvī etc. the worthy objects of investigation. Looking carefully at the wording of the *question and the answer*, we find that the singular has been advisedly used.[11] It would be out of place to think of a multiplicity

7. Suṣirasthabrahmasamstham suṣirastham itīryate
Manjūṣāsthopi hi maṇir gehastha iti gīyate (*TC*. p. 624).
8. *Ākāśapakṣa eva anvayābhāvaḥ* (*NV*).
9. By construing as *Tāvan eṣo 'ntar hṛdaye ākāśe "vidyamāna vyāptākaśo 'nveṣtavyaḥ"* ubhe asmin dyāvā prthvī samāhite....." See *BD*. p. 282 (i, 3, 14).
10. Nor can it be treated as an attempt at drawing a comparison as suggested in the *Bhāmatī a la Rāmarāvaṇayor yuddham Rāmarāvaṇayor iva*, as there is no word to *express* comparison.
11. Kim ca 'Tad anveṣṭavyam tad vāva vijijnāsitavyam' ityatra ekatvasya vidheyaviśeṣahatvena vivakṣitatvāt, 'vāva' ityavadhārṇācca jijnāsyasya ekatvam bhāti. Tacca dyāvāprthivyādīnām anekeṣām anveṣṭavyatve ananvitam syāt (*TC*. p. 624b).

of finite things like the sun and the moon as intended to be so solemnly investigated.

The Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of both Jaḍākāśa and the Jīvātman is thus untenable. The Siddhānta view that the Supreme B. is the Ākāśa spoken of here as (i) existing *in the small space in the heart-lotus;* (ii) as being sarvādhāra or providing support for all and (iii) worthy of being sought as such stands fully vindicated in M.'s interpretation.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. contend that the small space itself, in the heart-lotus, is B.—the Pūrvapakṣa holding that it may be either the elemental ether or the Jīvātman. It is difficult to see how the Jīvātman could be brought under the scope of a Pūrvapakṣa with reference to the word *dahara-ākāśaḥ* which by general convention refers to a material principle. It is of course natural that the Jīvātman should come into the Pūrvapakṣa as is clear from Sūtras 18-19 and the subsequent passages in the Viṣayavākya relating to the Samprasāda and the marks of freedom from sin etc. But he can do so only as being *present in the small space inside the heart-lotus* but *not in the guise of this ākāśa itself!* S.'s and R.'s siddhānta view that the small space *is itself B.* is opposed to the clear wording of the statement in the Viṣayavākya: 'What is there *in that* (small space) which must be investigated' (*Chān. Up.* viii.1.1)? The *Bhāmatī* has tried to argue that the relative pronoun *'tasmin'* refers *not* to the immediately preceding word *ākāśaḥ* but to the *remotely preceding* heart-lotus (*hṛtpuṇḍarīka*).[12] This is far-fetched. As it has already been clearly stated in the text that the small ether is there within the lotus; it would be pointless for the Śruti to raise the question again as to what is there in that lotus. Moreover, if, as S. has it,—the two relative pronounces *yat* in *tasmim yad antaḥ* and *tad* in *tad anveṣṭavyam* (viii, 1, 1), refer only to the small ether itself and *not to something present within that ether* (ākāśaḥ) as their antecedent, we should expect to find the masculine forms *yaḥ* and *saḥ* with reference to the *daharaḥ*.

R.'s commentator tries to overcome this difficulty by putting in an ingenious suggestion that an additional masculine relative pronoun *yaḥ* is to be *understood here* as referring to *Daharaḥ* and the *existing neuter form* (yat) should be taken to refer to the lordly attributes such as satyakāmatva present in the Dahara and that the question should, therefore, be interpreted as embracing both these aspects which are comprehended by forming an *ekaśeṣasamāsa* in the neuter with *yat*

12. 'Tasmin yadantaḥ' ityatra tacchabdo anantaram apyākāśam atilaṅghya hṛtpuṇḍarīkam parāmṛśati (i, 3.14).

and *yaḥ* put together and that this emphasises the need to investigate the Dahara and the attributes found in it.

This involves importation (*adhyāhāra*) of *yaḥ* which can be obviated by making the existing pronoun (yat) itself refer to *the Being present in the Dahara*—viz. Brahman as the object of the investigation. As such investigation would have to embrace the lordly attributes of B. they would all of them be coming in automatically without such a roundabout construction. Moreover, on this view, both the Dahara-ākāśa and the lordly attributes would be directly lodged in the abode of Dahara or within the Dahara itself and it would not yield the meaning desired to be established viz. that the Dahara-ākāśa is in the abode (lotus) while the lordly attributes are present in the Dahara itself.

In any case, to look upon B. as the very *ākāśa* that is present in the heart is clearly opposed to the testimony of many scriptural passages which clearly state that B. *is present in the ākāśa which is in the heart.*[13] It is *not* the *ākāśa* itself. That is why M. takes care to read the first word in the Sūtra i, 3, 14 as a *locative singular form* दहरे उत्तरेभ्यः *instead of as a nominative singular as S. and R. do.*

S. has argued under Sūtra 18 that the Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of the Jīvātman cannot stand, as the comparison made in *Yāvān vā ayam ākāśah.*....would not fit in with the Jīvātman who is limited by the Upādhis of *buddhi* etc. while Ākāśa is unlimited. His own view that B. is compared with Ākāśa is no better; for B. in its turn is also proclaimed to be vaster than the elemental Ākāśa in *Chān. Up.* iii, 14, 3. Anticipating this objection, S. has stated in his c. on i, 3.14, that this comparison is not intended to make out that B. is of the same measure or extent as outer Ākāśa but to rid B. of any idea of smallness of extent created by Its being said to be circumscribed by the lotus of the heart.[14] But then, in S.'s philosophy, Buddhi and other adjuncts do not limit the Jīvātman too in Suṣupti tho' Jīvahood continues in that state in virtue of the continuation of Avidyā. Thus, the true limiting factor of Jīvahood must be accepted as Avidyā alone in which case, the circumscription by the lotus of the heart would not operate as a concomitant of Jīvahood *per se.* As Jīvahood conditioned by Avidyā is admittedly all-pervasive, the reason given in Sūtra 18, to overthrow the Pūrvapakṣa in favor of Jīva would lose its point.

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13. *Ya eṣo antarhṛdaye ākāśas tasmin ayam Puruṣaḥ* (*Taitt. Up.* i, 6.1).
Yo veda nihitam guhāyām parame vyoman (*Op. cit.* ii, 1.1).
Tatrāpi dahram gaganam tasmin yadantas tad upāsitavyam (*Mah. NUp.* x.1).
14. Naiṣa doṣah. Puṇḍarīkaveṣṭanaprāptadaharatvanivṛttiparatvād vākyasya, na tāvattvapratipādanaparatvam. (S. *BSB* i, 3.14).

Continuing his argument against the Jīva, S. writes under Sūtra 19, that the complementary text *Eṣa samprasādo*......(viii, 12, 3) does not refer to the Jīvātman conditioned by Avidyā; but to the self which has realised its true nature: *Svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate.* The true nature of the Jīva is Bramanhood! The subject of the whole passage is thus the pure B. and not the conditioned self as contended by the Pūrvapakṣa. This overlooks the fact that the way in which the Jīva approaching the Paraṁjyoti is *still described* as moving about, playing etc. (*Chān. Up.* viii, 12, 3) does not support S.'s contention.

The wording of the Siddhānta: *Dahara uttarebhyaḥ* which purports to *deny* that Dahara is Jīvātman and establish that it is B. and the reference to the Jīvas going upto B. in Sūtra 15, and the attributes of Satyakāmatva etc. mentioned in the concluding part of the Dahara context are obviously against the interests of a monism, as the sūtras stand worded.

CHAPTER XXXVI

BRAHMAN THE MOST INTIMATELY DESIRED AND DESIRABLE VALUE OF LIFE

6. *Anukṛtyadhikarṇam* (i, 3, 22-23)

The *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of the mark of being accepted and looked up to as the most intimately desired and desirable (*ānukūlyena gṛhyamāṇatvam*). The above is the universally accepted characteristic of bliss. To the mystic and the Jnāni the Supreme Being is the dearest attraction.[1] The highest bliss which is ineffable and beyond description has been shown to be a characteristic of B. in the Bhūmādhikaraṇa and in the Ānandamayādhi.—where B. has been described as *anirukta* (inexpressible in all its fulness) and unknowable in full. In *Katha. Up.* (v, 12; 14) the bliss of the knower of B. has been spoken of as eternal, inexpressible and the highest[2] and Naciketas expresses his yearning[3] to know it and experience it. If, then, the bliss of the Jnāni were to have these characteristics, primarily, their ascription to B. earlier in the Ānandamayādhi. etc. would be unsustainable. Hence the issue has to be discussed here.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the attribute of being held to be most intimately desired and desirable belongs to the bliss of the Jñāni—about which the *Kaṭha Up.* says ('v, 12): The One Supreme Lord whose attributes of knowledge, bliss etc. are identical with His essence. Who has no peer or superior, who controls all, who makes His one form many to be in them all, only those who realise Him who is present in

1. That Self is dearer than a son, than wealth and than everything else and is the innermost (*Bṛh. Up.* i.4.8).
2. *Tad etaditi manyante anirdeśyam paramam sukham.*
3. *Katham nu tad vijānīyām kimu bhāti na bhāti vā.* The optative form (liṅg) expresses prayer wish and yearning (*cf. Pan.* iii.3.161).

themselves have eternal bliss." It is this same bliss of which in a succeeding *verse* (v. 14. *ab*) it is said—'Of this they hold that it is the highest ineffable bliss'. It cannot be that this refers to the Supreme B. It must be taken to refer to the bliss of Jnānis. Firstly the pronouns *tad* (that) and *etad* (this) are in the neuter like the term *sukham* while the Lord has been referred to in the masculine (v.12), in the first three quarters. The bliss of Jñānins is referred to in the last line of v, 12. It stands close to the words *tad* and *etad.*[4] It is, therefore, proper to conclude that it is the Jñanin's bliss that has been described in terms of being held to be the most earnestly desired.

The Siddhānta is that the Supreme Being has been referred to in the dialogue between Naciketas and Yama (v, 14) as the one about which it is asked whether it shines forth to others who want to know it, without its grace. Yama's answer is that it does not manifest itself to others without its own grace. Grace is the means of knowing the Supreme as the blissful one. This is suggested by the emotional fervor of the question: How can I know It—whether it will shine forth or not? The answer is implicit in the question that it shines forth to others, only by Its grace and not otherwise.[5]

The reason for this is contained in the Sūtra: *Anukṛtes tasya ca* (i.3, 22). viz., because all shining forth of things in the world is derived from the Supreme. Every movement, thought and activity in the life of finite reality, including the flashing forth of Svarūpasukha of Jnānis is but an "acting after" (*anukṛti*) the activity of the Supreme. "After the Supreme Lord, when He shines everything else shines. By His light alone all this shines forth and illumines. The ineffable joy of he Supreme is not illumined by the sun or the moon but by Its own inner light. It is His light that lights others."

This general statement includes the particular that even the bliss of Jñānins is subject to the same law.[6] It becomes manifested only by the gracious wish of the Lord. He is the energy that kindles the rays of other luminaries[7] and inspirits the spirits.

4. J. points out in his reply to this Pūrvapakṣa that the Supreme B. has been in fact referred to nearer still also in *Katha.* v. 13 and the words *Anirdesyam paramam sukham* (v. 14) signify as explained in the BD. *anirdeśyam paramam sukham paramātmarūpam.*
5. *Vāśabdo avadhāraṇe prasādam ṛte na bhātyeva* (*BD*).
6. इति वचनाच्च परमात्मैवानिर्देश्यसुखरूप: ।
न हि ज्ञानिसुखमनुभाति सर्वम्. न च तद्भासा (भाति) (M. *BSB*. i.3.22).
7. 'अहं तत् तेजोरश्मीत्' इति नारायणभासा हि सर्वं भाति (*Ibid*).
रश्मिर्जीव:, तं इन्दयति प्रेरयतीति रश्मीत् जीवप्रेरकम् (*BD* 1.3.20).

It will thus be seen that the Supreme Being is the one described as the highest ineffable bliss (*anirdeśyam paramam sukham*) and the primary source of every form of thought, activity and experience including the experience of joy by God-intoxicated souls.

The *TD* of Trivikrama observes that the Sūtrakāra has used the term *anukṛteḥ* in place of *anubhānāt* (following the wording of the Viṣayavākya) to make clear that not only 'shining forth (*bhānam*) but every other form of activity (*kṛti*) anywhere and everywhere in the realm of finite reality is owing to the power of the Lord.'[8] The *TC* (p. 645) quotes a sublime statement from the Epic: "The powers of heating, ripening, shrinking and illuminating things are not the Sun's own. They are the powers of Nārāyaṇa, O King".[9]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. locates the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.* in the passage "There the Sun does not shine... (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 2.10).[10] The question is whether that which is said to be not illumined by the Sun etc. is B. or some other luminary that is purely physical. The Pūrvapakṣa treats '*tatra....*' as a locative absolute and argues that since it is made out that *when It is present,* the Sun and the others do not shine, that which makes the Sun and other bodies pale into insignificance must be some other luminous body, perhaps larger and more luminous. The mention of the others shining *after it,* i.e. in imitation helps us to surmise that it must be some other physical light of like nature tho' it is not actually mentioned in the context. The pronoun 'that' (*tam anubhāti*) may well refer to something not actually referred to before, as in Pāṇini's Sutra *Tena raktam rāgāt* (iv.2, 1). Imitation (*anukṛti*) is of a like substance by another. But B. is dissimilar to all worldly objects. So, even tho' the passage occurs in a context relating to B., as it may appear from Yasmin dyauḥ...... (*Mund.* Up. ii, 2, 5) it has to be overridden by the incompatibility of the mark of imitation (being) of the like.

The Siddhānta is that as the Śrutis describe B. as of the nature of light (*bhārūpaḥ*) there is no need to go out for some other unknown luminous substance to explain the reference. The term '*tatra*' in '*tatra bhāti*' can as well be interpreted as 'in respect of' (*viṣayasaptamī*).

8. अनुकृतिशब्देनानुभानमुच्यते. भानस्यापि क्रियारूपत्वात्. अन्यकृतीनामप्युपसंग्राहार्थमनुकृतेरित्युक्तम्. नहि कापि क्रिया हरीच्छानुरोधमन्तरेण भवति (*TD.* i.3.22).
9. तापिनी पाचिनी चैव शोषिणी च प्रकाशिनी ।
नैव राजन् रवेः शक्तिः शक्तिर्नारायणस्य सा ।। (*Vedanta Explained,*
10. Not *Katha Up.* (ii, 2.15) as Radhakrishnan and Date p. 147) have it. For S. makes use of the preceding verses from Muṇḍaka to carry his point. These are not to be found in *Kaṭha Up.*

Imitation of one's action by another is not ruled out between dissimilar things. We speak of the iron ball burning after the fire (burning) therein. The text moreover, refers not merely to other shining heavenly bodies but to the shining forth of "all this" by the light of an "other". This points to B.

Criticism

The Pūrvapakṣa is far too feeble. Imitation of a dissimilar object cannot altogether be ruled out. For an unequivocal *locative absolute* in 'tatra' we should have the precise locative singular of the pronoun '*tat*': तस्मिन् सति. The analogy quoted from Pāṇini is not a principle of interpretation. It cannot be applied to determine the inter-relation of words in a full-fledged sentence so as to convey a coordinated meaning. As against such a slender basis of the Pūrvapakṣa, in favor of some other luminous substance, we have the *express mention of B.* and clear *references to its marks,*—in the passenges standing *immediately before* and *after* the given Viṣayavākya itself (ii, 2.10). Against such odds, the Pūrvapakṣa could hardly arise, in favor of an 'unknown something!' S. will have to change his Viṣayavākya to have a reasonably fair Pūrvapakṣa. There are other difficulties also. This being a Pāda devoted to Nirviśeṣa B., it would be out of place to speak of B. as "shining" (*bhāntam*) in the active sense of the verbal form or of the others shining by "Its" light. According to Advaita metaphysics, there is really no shining by or of anything except B.'s "self-shining". It would thus be improper to speak of the others "shining after" B. in any straight sense. A solemn statement of the Śruti about their shining after B. cannot also be explained away as a sort of superimposed shining as when the iron ball is said to be burning after the burning fire within. It is a far cry from the actual teaching of this text about the complete dependence of the world for all its activities on B. to the epistemological dogma of Monism read into it of B.'s not being open to any other's knowledge and the underlying content of all empirical cognitions too being B. pure and simple.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. reads Sūtras 22-23 as part of the Daharādhi. itself. They endorse the position that the Dahara section of the *Chān. Up.* relates to B. while the sections on Prajāpati's discourse to Indra have no direct bearing on B. and deal only with the true nature of the Jīvātman as distinct from the body, organs, psychological states and experiences, as such knowledge is also necessary for the realisation of B.

This would be an artificial bifurcation of the theme of the Up. It is significant that in Prajāpati section (viii, 7, 1) as well as in the Dahara section (viii, 1, 5) the Ātman has been described in the same terms as free from all sin, old age, death and sorrow and as being Satyakāma, Satyasaṁkalpa, etc. The words: "Reaching the Parañjyoti he appears in his own form" occur in both the sections (viii, 3, 4 and viii, 12, 3). These take away the force of the contention that the same being is not the subject of discourse in both the sections or that B. is not uniformly the subject of investigation throughout, as befits the requirements of Brahmavidyā. If R. should argue that the purpose of referring to the Jīvātman emerging in his own form (*Svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate*) in viii, 3, 4 is only for the purpose of underlining the glory of B. as the cause of Jīvatman's coming into his own stature, nothing prevents us from holding that in the Prajāpati section also, it is for the same purpose that the Jīvātman has been referred as coming into his own by the grace of the Supreme,—without trying to dismiss the whole section as not directly connected with B. and its nature.

As a matter of fact, the sublime unity of *Brahmadṛṣṭi* between the two discourses has to be arrived at by applying the principles of Samanvaya in B. already adumbrated by the Sūtrakāra.[11] Not to do so is to miss the entire spirit of the Sūtrakāra's systematization of the Upanishads as Brahmavidyā *par excellence* thro' Ekavākyatā and lapse into 'Bhinnavākyatā!' As the objection that the Jīvātman *appears to be dealt with* as the main theme of the Prajāpati discourse has already been anticipated and set at rest in Sūtras 18-19, by showing how even there B. continues to be the main theme, it seems needless to go over the same question in Sūṭras 22-23 (according to R.) notwithstanding the indication of the whole discourse on Dahara having been concluded once for all, in the Sūtra *Alpaśruter iti cet taduktam* (i. 3, 21) with a ring of finality.[12]

R. explains *anukṛti* in an unusual sense of Jīvātman's attaining equality of attributes (*sāmyam*) with B. in Mokṣa.[13] If the purpose of

11. The teaching about the Person in the eye (*Chān*. viii, 7, 4) has already been shown to refer to B. in BS. i, 1, 21; i, 2, 13. Sections viii, 10.1 and viii.11.1 referring to our dream and Suṣupti states focus attention on their control by Paramātman as shown by *Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 11 and iv, 3, 21. Section viii.12.1 dealing with the "unembodied Ātman" points clearly to B. who is unembodied (*aśarīra*) *for all time in the primary sense* while Jīvātman is embodied in Samsāra.
12. Cf. *BS*. iii, 3, 26; 33(S); 42 (R).
13. Dr. Radhakrishnan's statement (*The Brahmasutra*, p. 297) that "R. takes *anukṛti* to mean imitation" is incorrect 'Anukṛti' has been clearly interpreted by R. as *sāmyam* (equality).

these two Sūtras is, however, to establish such equality between them it would be encroaching on the province of Adhy. IV and these two Sūtras would be out of place in this Samanvayādhyāya. The wording of *anukṛteh* in the ablative implies only a reason and embodies no conclusion on the above lines! If their purpose is simply to establish that the Dahara section of *Chān. Up* is connected with B. and the Prajāpati section with Jīvātman only, the reason given to support such a conclusion would be insufficient; for the mere fact of *anukṛti* taken in the sense of parity of attributes (*sāmya*) would not necessarily establish that what has been treated in the earlier section is B. and what has been treated in the later section is Jīvātman.

CHAPTER XXXVII

BRAHMAN THE UNAFFECTED SEER OF OUR DREAMS etc.

13. *Suṣuptyadhikaraṇam* (i, 3, 42).

The mark of perceiving our dreams, good and evil, etc., is attuned to B. in its *primary sense,* in this *adhi.* It arises by way of an *ākṣepasaṅgati.* In *adhi.* 3, the "Akṣara" had been described as "the unattached (*asaṅgām*) without taste (*arasam*) etc. (Brh. Up. iii, 8, 8). The same characteristic is found applied to "One who perceives dreams etc." elsewhere. It appears from that account that the person described there is the Jīvātman. For we read, "After delighting in the condition of Suṣupti (dreamless sleep) he moves about here and there, seeing good and evil and passes on to different centres in respect of different species. Whatever he sees there, he is unaffected by it, for this person is indeed unattached to everything" (*Brh. Up.* iv. 3, 15).

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that this "Asaṅga" is the Jīvātman who, as everyone knows, is subject to the states of dreams and suṣupti. The Asaṅgatva ascribed to him, in spite of his seeing dreams and going thro' such other experiences and being visibly affected by them is to be explained on the basis of his identity of essence with B. The contrary assumption cannot be made that B. is the real seer of the dreams etc., in so far as It is also identical with the Jīvātman. Jīvātman is identical wiht B. only as pure consciousness—which is unattached. But this Caitanya-aspect has nothing to do with the seeing of dreams etc. Nor do the terms in which the Jīvātman is found differentiated from the Prājña-Ātman (B) in Suṣupti and Utkrānti come in the way of their identity of essence. For the Jīvātman who is implicated in these states is the qualified self (viśiṣṭa) which is naturally different

from the pure consciousness which is B. But the prototype (*viśeṣya*) which becomes so qualified is free at all times from the limitations, which have their origin in Avidyā. There is thus no difficulty in holding that the perceiver of dreams, suṣupti, etc., is the Jīvātman himself who is also the "Asaṅga" by virtue of his identity of essence with the pure consciousness of B.

The Siddhānta, in keeping with the requirements of Samanvaya of names and marks in their primary sense in B., establishes B. to be the perfect unaffected seer of dreams, suṣupti etc. (of the Jīvas) *in all their completeness.* The most significant point emphasized by the Siddhāntin is that the Śruti text does not say that the Puruṣa (B) *experiences* dreams etc. but merely that He *perceives* them. (*dṛṣṭvaiva*). This "seeing" is in the nature of a valid knowledge. It is not vitiated by the flaws in the interpretation of dreams to which the Jīvātman is liable. The statement in the Śruti "He is not affected by whatever He sees there", is supported by a reason—"for He is unattached to everything" (*asaṅgo hyayam Puruṣaḥ*). Only a well-established fact can be adduced as a supporting reason. It is a well-established fact that B. is pre-eminently the *asaṅga.* Therefore, it must be the seer of dreams etc. without being affected by them—as referred to here. To be sure, neither the Jaḍa nor Īśvara is subject to transmigration. Hence there is no possibility of attachment in either of their cases. As a transmigrating creature the Jīvātman is the only person liable to attachments. It is because of attachment that the Jīvātman gets entangled in a transmigratory career. His deliverance from it depends on his freeing himself from attachment (by the grace of God). As bondage and release must apply to the same individual, the Jīvātman cannot be absolutely "Asaṅga". The Śruti text illustrates the relation between the Jīvātman and B. in the states of Suṣupti and Utkrānti by the vivid analogy of a lover in the ecstatic embrace of his beloved and a cart laden with goods, being driven by the driver to its destination. Suṣupti is admittedly a state of pure blessedness and joy free from the inroads of error. The difference between Jīva and B., which, according to the Śruti and the Sūtrakāra, persists in that state, cannot at all be dismissed as unreal.

Experience shows that the Jīvātman is not impervious to the Vāsanās (impressions) of dreams or immune from their after-effects. In the circumstances, the categorical statement of the Śruti—'He is not affected by whatever He sees there (good or evil)' cannot with propriety be applied to the Jīvātman. For all these reasons, we have to interpret the passage from the *Brh. Up.* (iv. 3, 15-seq.) in what is

known as *antarṇītanijartha*' (suppressed causal sense)[1]—as a solemn description of the leading role of the Supreme B. in steering the Jīvātman thro' the states of Suṣupti, dreams etc., while remaining Itself aloof and unaffected by their repercussions. The clue to such an interpretation has been given in the *mantra* quoted in the Upaniṣad itself—'Having united the embodied self with sleep, He Himself sleepless looks on, upon the sleeping ones...' ...He is the golden Person (*Bṛh. Up.* iv. 3.11[2]).

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. sūtras 42-43 constitute one *adhi.* He takes for his Viṣayavākya passages from the *Bṛh. Up.* beginning with *Katama ātmeti yoyam vijñānamayaḥ...* (iv.3.7) and extending to the end of '*Sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yoyam vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu* (iv.4.22), covering 32 paragraphs of the third Brāhmaṇa of Adh. IV and 22 paragraphs of Brāhmaṇa iv.

The question debated here according to him is whether this discourse simply recapitulates the nature of the embodied self as an empirical creature or is intended to establish its true nature as being identical with the non-transmigrating B.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as the opening, the middle and the concluding parts of the discourse here are concerned with the colorful details of the nature of the embodied self, it must be accepted as the theme of the discourse. The passage which appears to strike a different note (iv. 4.22) should be brought into line with this running idea. The purpose of such recapitulation of the nature of the embodied self may be taken to be the eulogy of the embodied self who is the agent in the performance of karma. The opening and the concluding passages here have the words. Vijnānamaya*** while the passage coming in the middle describes the dream and other states of the embodied self. The words: Mahān aja ātmā (iv. 4.22) can somehow be explained to agree with the Jīvātman.

1. For examples see M. *Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya* iv.3, 7:—
द्रष्टुश्चक्षुषो नास्ति जिह्वा (   )
तद्वेतन्मे विजानीहि (*Bhāg.* iii, 25.30).
कृत्वा विवाहं तु कुरुप्रवीराः (*Mbh.* v.1.1).
2. The gist of the passage under discussion (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.15 seq.) has been given as follows by Vādirāja Tīrtha in his *TPG:* (i.i. *adh.* 13): "The Supreme B. having enjoyed His own innate bliss in the state of the Jīvas' suṣupti, enables the latter also to experience his own *svarūpasukha*. He then moves about in the *suṣumnā nāḍi* during the period of suṣupti. Observing the good and evil of the Jīvas and without being enveloped by them, He slowly moves down to the region of the neck into the respective nāḍīs (*pratinyāyam*) where creatures belonging to different yonis have their dream experience. Whatever good or evil the Jīva performs in the state of dream, subconsciously, or whatever frightening sights and things like that which the Jīva may chance to perceive there, the Supreme Lord is not at all affected by them".

The Siddhānta view is that after recounting the misplaced and commonly accepted ideas about the nature of the self as being born and going thro' different kinds of experiences, including dreams and suṣupti, the Upaniṣad goes on to proclaim the identity of this self with the one Supreme Being which is above all limitations and transmigratory bonds,[3] in the concluding passage: 'Verily he is the great unborn self......'.

Such an interpretation comes into conflict with the point emphasised by the Sūtrakāra that the Śruti teaches the difference between Jīva and Prājña in the states of *Suṣupti* and *Utkrānti.* It is not possible to get away with the explanation that this difference between Jīva and B. referred to in the Śruti (*Bṛh. Up.* iv. 3, 21; 35) is also by way of a recapitulation (*anuvāda*) of what is known to and accepted as ultimate truth by commonsense view, with a view to its being superseded by a higher realisation of their oneness.

For the difference between Jīva and Prājna in Suṣupti and Utkrānti, referred to in the Śruti (*Bṛh. Up.* iv. 3, 21; 35) *is not a datum given by commonsense view* or known to us from personal experience. It is a truth vouched for on the sole authority of Scripture.[4] Such an august truth cannot be summarily dismissed as something falling within the ambit of worldly experience and, therefore, to be superseded by a higher knowledge of identity between Jīva and B.

S. himself will have to concede that there is no erroneous knowledge in the experience of Suṣupti which, according to all accounts, is a foretaste of the bliss of Mokṣa (BS. iv. 4.16). The difference between Jīva and Prājña which is thus given by the evidence of this blissful state cannot, therefore, be dismissed as wanting in finality either, as it is given (iv. 3.21) in answer to an earnest request—Venerable Sir, Please instruct me further for the sake of my liberation (iv. 3.16).

3. संसारिणः परमात्मभावविधानाय आदिमध्यावसानेषु अनुवाद्यतयावमर्शं उपपद्यते (*Bhāmatī*).
4. Cf. *B.G.* xv. 8-10.

PĀDA IV

CHAPTER XXXVIII

INTRODUCTION

Anyatraivaprasiddha-Nāmaliṅgātmaka-Śabda-Samanvayaḥ.

The first three Pādas have, for the most part, dealt with the Samanvaya in B. of words and marks connected with B.'s being the author of the Universe—as defined in Sūtra 2. The present Pāda goes further and brings under the purview of Samanvaya such other words and marks also as are found to be exclusively connected in Scripture with beings and principles other than B. and which cannot, by ordinary canons of interpretation, be referred to B. The need for undertaking what appears to be a more or less impossible and impracticable task arises this way. In the opening Sūtra B. to be investigated has been conceived, as we have seen, as the Supreme Reality of infinite perfections. It is the inquiry into such a being that has been contemplated in the opening Sūtra. In keeping with this objective, it must be presumed that the definition of B. given in the second sūtra is only to illustrate the infinite perfections of B. and is not exhaustive of all of them. This leaves full scope for the Samanvaya of terms and marks from numerous contexts other than that of B.'s causality of the Universe. The attention bestowed by the Sūtrakāra on terms like *antah, jyotiḥ* in Pāda i, *Sarvatra, antara* in Pāda ii and *Bhūmā* and *Dahara* in Pāda iii makes it clear that he has *not* confined his Samanvaya to passages restricted to B.'s causality of the world and matters closely connected with it. In keeping with his larger purpose, then, it would be incumbent on him to establish the Samanvaya of words and marks which fall under the category of '*Anyatraivaprasiddha*'. As this group of words and marks presents peculiar difficulties, it is taken up in the concluding Pāda.

There is also another reason for establishing the Samanvaya of Anyatraivaprasiddha category of words. The Śrutis say that it is incumbent on us to know that all names and characteristics belong to the Supreme Reality without any exception whatsoever and that at the same time this Supreme Brahman is without a flaw or defilment and that such knowledge is indispensable for the attainment of Mokṣa.[1] If then, certain words like Avyakta, Jīva, Duḥkhī, Baddha, Pañcajanāḥ etc.., offering special difficulties for Samanvaya are left out of the purview of Samanvaya, the principle of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B. would be carried out only partially and not in its entirety. Whatever then may be the difficulties inherent in the Samanvaya of such Anyatraivaprasiddha words and characteristics, they will have be surmounted with special techniques of Samanvaya devised for the purpose. And that is what the Sūtrakāra has done in this Pāda. And it is as it should be.

Apart from this general consideration, the acceptance of the Supreme Brahman as Sarvasattāpravṛttiniyāmaka renders it possible to apply all names and characteristics associated with other principles to B. in the sense of its being the guarantor and sustainer of their bases of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) to different things. Speaking with special reference to the opening *adhi.*, it will be seen that it is necessary in the given context of the *Kaṭha Up.* to press for the deeper meaning of B. as well, to be given to the term "Avyakta" in the text: *Mahataḥ param avyaktam.* For, in a subsequent line there

Anādyanatam Mahataḥ param dhruvam nicāyya

tan mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate (i, 3.15.)

we read that one attains deliverance by realizing Him who is above Mahat. As deliverance is possible only by the realization of B. and not of Jaḍa Prakrti otherwise called Avyakta, it has got to be accepted that the Avyakta referred to as *Mahataḥ param* here and earlier will have to carry the deeper meaning of Brahman, without prejudice to its conveying its conventional meaning of Jaḍa-Prakṛti, where it is in order. This is possible only by invoking the principle of interpretation embodied in the phrase—*Śarīrarūpakavinyastagṛhīti* of the opening Sūtra, as it has been explained by M.

1. अव्यक्तदु:ख्यादिशब्दसमन्वयो निष्फल इति चेत् । मैवम् । ब्रह्मणो गुणान्तरपूर्तिवत् सर्वशब्दवाच्यतापि मुमुक्षुणा ज्ञेया । अन्यथा, 'नामानि...' इत्यादि श्रुतौ तद्वाच्यत्वोक्तिः, तथा 'प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात्' (*AĀ*, ii, 2.2) इत्यादिश्रुतौ वाच्यत्वोक्तिः, तथा 'नामायत्ता समतृप्यन् श्रुतेऽपि (*AĀ* ii, 3.8) इति श्रुतौ तज्ज्ञानान्मोक्षोक्तिश्च न स्यात् । अन्यथा, 'नामानि सर्वाणि...' इत्यादि श्रुतेर्दुःख्यादिशब्दान्यविषयत्वेन संकोचे मूलप्रमाणाभावात्, इन्द्रादिशब्दानामपि समन्वयो न स्यात् (*TC.* p. 752b).

According to S. and others, the purpose of this Pāda is, by and large, to demonstrate the *Aśabdatva* of Prakṛti presumed in Sūtra i. 1. 5, and to show how certain expressions and passages in the Śrutis which appear to refer to certain principles and categories of Sāṅkhya philosophy such as Avyakta (Prakṛti) have nothing to do with them and refer instead to "something connected with the Vedānta doctrine". Even this line of interpretation holds true only in respect of three or four adhikaranas while the remaining ones as treated by S. are of a miscellaneous nature. The inadequacy of this way of interpreting the adhikaraṇas of this Pāda has already been pointed out (PP. 26; 30). The details of his interpretations will be considered in their proper place.

Thibaut has expressed the view that R. has been able to show much more successfully than S. how the latter part of the fourth Pāda is *also* specially directed against the Sāṅkhya interpretations of Scripture, by taking a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for B's being the material as well as the operative cause of the world (*Vedānta Sūtras*, SBE. vol. xxxiv. Introd. p. xlv).

This assessment of the fourth Pāda as nothing more than a pure polemic against Sāṅkhya interpretations of certain Vedic texts does not do adequate justice to the larger purpose which the elaborate process of Samanvaya is intended to serve in elucidating the nature and attributes of B. as conceived by the Sūtrakāra. He has no doubt his own differences with Sāṅkhya philosophy, especially his refusal to accept Acetana-Prakṛti as the *independent source* of the world. We should, however, expect him to take up this matter at the right time and place in his well-planned work of four Adhyāyas of which the first and the second have been appropriately entitled Samanvaya and Avirodha chapters. Samanvaya implies some definite and *positive movement in a particular direction.* It is not a purely negative process—leading to a purely negative conclusion. This should be the key to the interpretation of any adhikaraṇa in any Pāda in the Samanvaya-Adhyāya.

It would be narrowing down the Sūtrakāra's philosophical vision to imagine that his task of throwing light on what B. is has been completely accomplished in the first five or six adhikaraṇas alone of the Samanvayādhyāya. There is sufficient evidence in this Adhyāya to show that the scope of Samanvaya has not at all been restricted to the discussion of cosmological texts—as can be gathered from the Bhūmā, Dahara and such other adhikaraṇas. There is nothing preposterous, as Thibaut would have us believe, in the assumption that *a whole Adhyāya should be devoted* to showing *what B. is* and *how It is.* He

agrees, however, that "after we once know what B. is, we are at once confronted by a number of Upaniṣadic passages concerning which it is doubtful *whether they refer to B. or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikaraṇas of Adhy. I are occupied* (p. xlv-vi). This is precisely the acid test of the correctness or other of the interpretations of the adhikaraṇas of Pāda IV of the first Adhyāya, as well, given by the different commentators. If this criterion is rigorously applied to their interpretation, it will be found that while S and R have striven hard to demonstrate that none of the passages discussed by them in the eight adhikaranas of this Pāda has anything to do with the Prakṛti or its products or to the Puruṣa of the Sāmkhyas, they have *not cared* to substantiate with equal force and consistency that Brahman remains instead, their subject matter. It deserves to be noted in this connection that their correlation of the Jagadvācitva and Vākyānvaya *adhi-s* with B. falls outside the scope of Pāda IV as conceived by them, in so far as their Pūrvapakṣas are *not* founded on Sāṅkhyan contentions as the subject matter.

Without positing B. as the counter-thesis established in each and every *adhi.* of this Pāda, also, the Sūtrakāra's efforts at establishing Brahma-Samanvaya* of Śāstra cannot be pronounced to be a complete success. That would be the consequence of following the lead of S or R in the interpretation of the *adhi-s* of the fourth Pāda as a pure polemic against the Sāṅkhya, whether partly or wholly. It is from such a predicament that M's new approach to the topics of this Pāda has saved the Sūtrakāra, by upholding with unwavering consistency that in every *adhi.* here, it is B which has been primarily established as the subject matter.

Scheme of Adhikaraṇas according to Madhva

There are seven adhikaraṇas in this Pāda, according to M. The first one establishes the Samanvaya in B. of terms like Avyakta, Jīva etc. used in certain contexts of the Śruti, in which a sense of inferiority of status or liability to bondage and misery and the like implicitly attaches to them. The second paves the way for the higher Samanvaya in B. of words current in the Karmakāṇḍa parts of the Vedas, such as the names of sacrifices and their accessories, without shaking the foundations of the sacrificial system as such. The third makes it possible to attune to B. terms which, if applied to it, are likely to expose it to an interrelation of supporter and supported with reference to its own self and being—which seems obviously inconceivable. The fourth reveals how B. fulfils the role of being both the mediate and the immediate cause in the process of creation without any incongruity

and answers to the names of the causes and the effects in turn, thro' its immanence in both. The fifth shows how terms denoting the Cause of the world used in different grammatical genders such as "Prakṛti" and "Puruṣa" are applicable to B. without difficulty. The *Samākarṣādhi.* (i, 4, 16-23) brings together complementary points of view thro' which 'Anyatraiva-prasiddha' words come to be applied to B. without hindrance to their application to their own respective spheres of reference also, in the empirical set-up. The last *adhi.* takes us into the domain of the language of Mysticism in which the Supreme reality is spoken of as the great Silence, the Void or the great Nothing and shows how this vocabulary is to be understood in its esoteric sense. This leads us to the summit of the grand concept of Sarvaśabda-śamanvaya in B.

CHAPTER XXXIX

BRAHMAN AS THE SUPREME UNMANIFEST

1. *Ānumānikādhikaraṇam* (i, 4, 1-9)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya of terms like Avyakta, Jīva, Duḥkhī, Baddha, etc. The term 'Ānumānika' in the opening Sūtra signifies the material principle of Avyakta, otherwise known as Mūla-Prakṛti. By analogical extension it also refers to 'Jīva[2]' who is referred to as bound (*baddha, duḥkhi*[3]). The Siddhāntayuktis supporting their Samanvaya with B. apply *mutatis mutandis* to these other terms also.

The Viṣayavākya is the famous passage in the *Kaṭha Up.* (i, 3, 11) where we read:

> "Beyond the Mahat is the Avyakta
> And *beyond Avyakta* the highest Puruṣa".

Here, Avyakta is placed in a position *inferior to* Puruṣa. As inferiority of status with reference to a higher being is unthinkable in B. we will have to admit that the term Avyakta (implying such inferiority of status) cannot be referred to B. and that it refers only to the Prakṛti of Sānkhya philosophy.

The Siddhānta is that *primarily* by the term Avyakta here the Supreme B. itself which is lodged in (*vinyasta*) the principle of Avyakta and abides in it, is meant. The same principle of interpretation applies to the other words Jīva, Baddha, Duḥkhī, Avara etc. met

2. Atra sarvatra avyaktapadam Jīvādyupalakṣaṇārtham. (*TP*. i.4.1).
3. Kāryakāraṇabaddhau tau (*Māṇḍūkya Up.* ii, 2). In "*Anena Jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya*" (*Chān. Up.* vi, 3, 2) the term Jīva generally denoting the Jīvātman is used with reference to the Supreme B. engaged in the act of creation. This brings it under the scope of this *adhi*.

with in the Śrutis.[4] The latter part of the first Sūtra refers to B.'s being 'lodged' in Avyakta which on account of its inferiority of status (to B.) is treated like unto a 'body' (*Śarīrarūpa*[5]). The suffix '*ka*' denotes inferiority of status of the 'body' so-called; for B. has no material body.[6]

The *Subālā Up.* (vii.)[7] speaks of the Avyakta, and others as the "body" of B. in this sense. The famous *Nāsadīya Sūkta* (RV. x, 129, 3) bears witness to the all-pervasive B. (*ābhu*) abiding in the Avyakta (*tuccha*) and remaining enveloped by it (*apihitam*) in the primordial state. It is to such texts that reference is made by the term *Śarīrarūpakavinyasta* in the Sūtra and not to the one from *Kaṭha Up.* (i, 3, 3) where we have a metaphor (*rūpaka*) describing the human body (*śarīra*) as a chariot in which the self is riding on the journey of life. For, the equation of Avyakta with the human body (*śarīra*) is not possible for the simple reason that the body is gross (*vyakta*) while Avyakta means "the subtle". Thus, words like Avyakta and Jīva primarily denote B. It is only in a lesser sense (amukhyārtha) that they denote Prakṛti and Jīvas.

The second Sutra: *Sūkṣamam tu tadarhatvāt* (i. 4.2) shows that strictly speaking, it is B. that deserves to be called the unmanifest (*avyakta*), "Jīva" (the upholder of life) and so on, in the fullest sense of the terms.

The next Sutra: *Tadadhīnatvād arthavat* (i. 4.3) cites the principle of interpretation which governs the application of terms like Avyakta, Jīva etc. which imply the possession of certain properties irreconcilable with B., so as to refer primarily to B. The principle is that the attributes connoted by terms like Avyakta, Jīva etc. are controlled by B. in the sense that their presence in them is determined by Its will.[8] To explain the point a little more clearly—there are two broad factors which determine the application of names to particular individuals. One is the possession of particular properties denoted by the term. The other is the fact of exercising overall control over the functioning of those properties possessed by the given thing by an-

4. 'Sa baddhas sa duḥkhī sa bandhayati, sa duḥkhayati iti, sa Jīvas sa Prakṛtis sa jīvayati iti sa prakaroti iti, so avaras so 'nityas so avarayati' q. *TP*. i.4.4.
5. यथा शरीरं पुरुषतंत्रं तथा परमात्मतंत्रत्वेन शरीरसमे प्रधानादौ स्थितस्येत्यर्थः (*TP*).
6. शरीरस्य रूपमिव रूपं यस्येति विग्रहः । कप्रत्ययेन मुख्यतो नेश्वरशरीरं, जडत्वादिना कुत्सितत्वादित्युक्तम् । (*TC* p. 766).
7. Quoted by R. *BSB*. ii, 3, 14.
8. तदधीनत्वाज्जीवाव्यक्तादीनां, तस्यैवाव्यक्तत्वपरावरत्वादिकमर्थवत्–
यदधीनो गुणो यस्य तद्गुणी सोऽभिधीयते ।
यथा जीवः परात्मेति यथा राजा जयीत्यपि ।। (M. *BSB*. i.4.4).

other.[9] We speak of a king being victorious in battle when it is the *soldier* who has actually fought and secured the victory. By convention, the undesirable contingency of having to say that the King is bound or is miserable when the soldier is bound or is miserable is prevented by defining the overall control (*svātantrya*) over the property possessed by another as consisting in not being liable to any degradation of status, power or prestige when such properties reside in the controller himself.[10]

As a human being the King will be subject to degradation of status if the misery of his subject were to reside in himself. So we refrain from using the term 'miserable' with reference to the King in the sense of his being the controller of the misery of his servant. The case is different with victory whose possession would not degrade the King. Hence we say the King has been victorious in the sense of his being the controller of the victory won by the soldier. But as Brahman by hypothesis is not liable to any degradation of status at any time on any account, there is no harm in predicating of it such terms as *avaraḥ* (inferior) *duḥkhi* (miserable) *baddha* (bound) *Jīvah* etc., in the sense of its being the controlling principle behind everything in the universe including the inferiority, misery, bondage and other limitations of creatures, the Jīvahood of Jīvas and the inferiority of 'Avyakta' to Puruṣa.

In the first Sūtra the term '*vinyasta*' (abiding in) applied to B. suggests that it is because of B's abiding in Avyakta that the latter itself is entitled to be called Avyakta. The term *śarīra* in Sūtra i. 4.1 refutes the counter-claim that B. comes to be called Avyakta because of its close contact with Prakrti which is primarily denoted by the term Avyakta. The point is that while Prakrti can be treated as the body of B. it is not permissible to think of B. as the body of Avyakta. As B. cannot have body inferior in essence to itself, we have to conclude that the *phrase* '*śarīrarūpaka* (*vinyasta*') conveys the idea of an inferior entity which is being viewed in the light of a 'body', so to speak, of B.

The fourth Sūtra points out that the primary sense of Avyakta cannot be Prakṛti as the Śruti recognises only knowledge of B. and not that of Prakrti to be indispensable for Mokṣa. Sūtra 5 rejects the contention that the text: By knowing the one which is without beginning and end and which is beyond the Mahat, one is freed from death'

9. अन्यगतशब्दार्थानुज्ञातृत्वं, तदधिकरणत्वं चेति द्विधा हि शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । (*TP*. i.4.4)
10. स्वातन्त्र्यं नाम, नियामकत्वे सति तदाश्रयत्वप्रयुक्तनीचत्वायोग्यत्वमिह विवक्षितम् । (*TC*. p. 755).
यं प्रति स्वातंत्र्यमुच्यते तदाश्रयत्वप्रमुक्तेत्यर्थः । बुद्धिस्थदुःखबन्धैश्वर्यादिस्तच्छब्दार्थः । (*TCP*. p. 755).

(*Katha. Up.* i.3, 15) recognizes the knowledge of Prakṛti which is beyond Mahat to be indispensable for Mokṣa. It points out that it is not Prakṛti but only the Supreme B. (Prājñaḥ) that has been described there as existing beyond Mahat; for it is B. that has been proclaimed earlier (*Katha.* i, 2, 20) to be subtler than the atom and vaster than the vast. This is a statement about the absolute subtlety and vastness of B. transcending all. *It includes the vastness of Mahat also.* Hence, that which is beyond Mahat cannot be anything other than B., in the full sense of the term . Sūtra 6 shows that as the topic in question pertains to B. the mark of immediate superiority of Prakrti to Mahat-tattva is to be overridden by the evidence of the contextual set-up (Prakaraṇa),[11] in favor of B. Sūtra 7 argues that in the *Kaṭha Up.* Naciketas has raised only three questions and has received answers to them only. They are about his father's goodwill towards him, the Svargya-Agni and B. No question has been raised about Prakrti. It would, therefore, be out of place to bring in the Prakrti as the chief subject matter of the discourse in place of B. Sūtra 8 shows that in addition to the denotative basis for the application of the term Avyakṭa being fulfilled in B. as established in Sūtra 2, there is the support of actual usage (*prayoga*) of the world in terms of B. in such texts as:

Avyakto avyaktāt sanātanaḥ (*Gītā* viii.20)
Avyakto akṣara ityuktaḥ (viii.21)

just as the term 'Mahat' which ordinarily refers to Mahattattva is used in the sense of the Supreme B. in texts like:

Mahāntam vibhum ātmānam matvā.... (*Kaṭha.* i.2.22)
Parātparam yan mahato mahāntam (*Mah.* N.1.5)

Sūtra 9 cites further support.[12] The term "*camasa*" which is generally understood in the sense of a sacrificial bowl has been specifically indentified with the head in *Bṛh. Up.* ii, 2, 3—"What is called the bowl with its mouth below and its bottom up is the head". This is equivalent to a prescription (*anuśāsana*) on the authority of Scripture to take *camasa* in the special sense of "head". In the same way, there is an all-comprehensive prescription in Scripture that "all names are to be applied to B.: "*Nāmāni sarvāṇi yam āviśanti*". This is analogous to the other prescription in the Śruti that *camasa* is to be taken in the sense of 'head'.

11. M. reads '*Prakaraṇāt*' as a separate sūtra while S. and R. read it as part of Sūtra 5.
12. S. and R. read this Sūtra as part of the next *adhi.*

According to S. the Pūrvapakṣa arises here by challenging the conclusion established in i.1.5 that the category of Prakrti is not recognized in the Śruti. The Purvapakṣa claims that Prakrti is recognized in the well-known text of the *Kaṭha Up.*: *Mahataḥ param avyaktam* (i, 3, 11). The siddhānta demolishes this contention and shows that the Avyakta referred to there is *not* Prakrti but the physical body. It argues that there is no worldly convention for the use of the term 'Avyakta' in the sense of Pradhāna, as it is not a category open to worldly experience (*alaukika*). The acceptance of Pradhāna by the Sāmkhyas is a matter of personal opinion. It can have no force in determining the sense of the Veda. The term Avyakta has, therefore, to be understood derivatively in the sense of the physical body. This meaning is supported by the general subject-matter of the passage (*prakaraṇa*) and by the circumstance of nothing but the body remaining after the mention of the senses, objects, mind, buddhi and mahānātmā.

Criticism

It seems pointless to set about trying to deny Scriptural recognition to the existence of Prakṛti *as a principle.* Since S. has *not* stood up for the *Samanvaya* of *all terms* met with in Scripture *in B.* in Sūtra i.1.4, there would be no harm to Samanvaya even if a few words like Avyakta occurring in the Śrutis are openly acknowledged to refer to Prakrti and a few other things in their primary sense. We have seen that the interpretation put on Sūtra i, 1, 5, making Prakrti 'Aśabdam' is itself unsustainable. The only understandable opposition to Prakṛti would be to its being accepted in the capacity of the cause of the world as taught in the Śruti (*kārṇatvena śābdatvam*). But *in the Viṣayavākya of this adhi. Avyakta does not at all figure as the cause of the* world. The text cited: *Mahataḥ param avyaktam* merely places Avyakta on a *higher footing* (*param*) than 'Mahat'. This cannot possibly lead to the assumption that it *must* be accepted *as the cause of the world.* For in the very next quarter we find the *same* term '*paraḥ*' used of the Puruṣa who is declared to be higher than Avyakta. Since Avyakta is the uncaused cause of everything according to Sānkhya, it cannot be a product of Puruṣa. This makes it clear that 'paraḥ' cannot be understood in the sense of cause *in one case alone.* Uniformity of thought requires that it should have the same sense of "being above", "greater than",—everywhere here. Thus, there seems to be no reasonable prospect of a Pūrvapakṣa arising on the ground of Avyakta's being regarded as the cause of the world from the wording of the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.*, as we have it.

Leaving aside the Pūrvapakṣa, the Siddhānta itself is left in an unenviable position. For, S. holds that Avyakta in the disputed passage does not mean B., but the subtle elements (*tejo 'abanna*) or Avidyā. This places the conclusion outside the jurisdiction of Samanvaya *in* B. To make '*Tejoabanna*' or Avidyā the cause of the world instead of B. is to shift the overpervasion of the definition of B. as Jagatkāraṇa (given in Sūtra i.1.2) from Sāṅkhya-Prakṛti to the one or the other of them—both being not-Brahman. This is burying Brahmavāda alive.[13]

On the other hand, if the purpose of the discussion is merely to show that the term '*para*' in '*Mahataḥ param*' does not signify the idea of causality of Avyakta with reference to Mahat or the world and that, therefore, no challenge to Brahman's causality is involved here in making out that Avyakta stands for Avidyā or some other thing—it would be equally open to us to hold that there can be no harm either in conceding that Avyakta signifies Prakṛti as there is no further commitment here regarding its being the cause of the world arising from this particular text. From this point of view, then, the discussion on Avyakta would still be futile.

As S. himself has both directly and indirectly admitted the existence under the aegis of B. of a beginingless positive principle possessing the characteristics of Prakṛti and to which ready recognition has been given in the Śrutis and Smṛtis,[14] it would be idle to contend that there is no Prakṛti or Avyakta so called and that there is only *Tejo-abanna* or Avidyā. There is no wisdom in conceding the substance of Prakṛti and quarrelling over the name to be given to it![15]

The manner in which S. has interpreted the latter half of the Sūtra embodying the reply to the Pūrvapakṣa is open to various objections. The point he wishes to make, in order to silence the Pūrvapakṣa, can be very clearly and more completely be conveyed by the words '*Śarīra-gṛhīteḥ*' (because by the word Avyakta only the body is referred to)—without the adjectival adjunct 'contained in the simile' (*rūpaka-vinyasta*) which can be easily gathered from the context. If it is absolutely essential to draw attention to the simile it should have been done without violating the precedence to be given to the adjective *rūpakavinyasta* over the substantive *śarīra*. In other words, had the

13. Cf. वृकेणापहृतं मेषमदायातिप्रयत्नतः ।
स चेत् व्याघ्राय दीयेत को लाभस्तेन सिद्धयति ? (*TC*. p. 770).
'It is no consolation to the poor goat if it is heroically rescued from the wolf and quietly handed over to the tiger'!

14. S. *BSB*. i, 4.3.

15. Read *NS*. pp. 191-92.

Sūtrakāra meant to convey what S. and R. have in mind, he would have read the latter part of the first Sūtra as: *rūpakavinyastaśarīra-gṛhīteḥ*. There is much less justification for the superfluous addition of *Darśayati* ca in the Sūtra after the vivid reference to the simile of the chariot. These are enough to show that '*Śarīrarūpaka*' is not to be interpreted in the unimaginative way in which S. and R. have explained it.

The interpretation of the second Sūtra as given by S. and R. is that even tho' the physical body is gross and cannot be deemed to be subtle or unmanifested (avyakta), what is really meant here by the term Avyakta described as higher than Mahat is the element of matter comprising heat, water and food (*Tejo-abanna*)—the subtle causal stuff of which this gross physical body is constituted. Such an explanation is both farfetched and uncalled for. As the root-meaning of 'Avyakta' is 'something which is very subtle and unmanifested' and as this something has been further stated to be *above Mahat*, we should naturally turn *in the first place to that which is subtle and unmanifested in its own right*—viz. Avyakta (Prakrti) as such and not to the physical body which is, for one thing, certainly not beyond the Mahat and what is worse, *very much manifested*, in the concrete sense of this term. This does not, however, justify our turning to Avidyā to get over the difficulty; for the expression *śarīra*[16] in *śarīrarūpaka* comes in the way of doing so. Further, in S.'s philosophy, Avidyā is intuited by Sākṣi and cannot, therefore, be said to be entirely unmanifested.[17] Being conceived as unlimited (*aparicchinna*) it cannot be said to possess the attribute of subtlety (*sūkṣmatva*)—the determinant of Avyaktatva.

According to S. the third Sūtra explains how the acceptance of a previous seminal condition of the world under various names like Avyakta, Prakrti, Ākāśa and Māyā is not the same as the acceptance of Sāmkhya-Prakṛti in another garb. For there is this vital difference between the two. The seminal state admitted by the Vedāntin is (1) completely dependent on B. (unlike the Prakṛti in Sāṅkhya) and (ii) the acceptance of such a state of the world is *very necessary*, as otherwise the Supreme Lord cannot be conceived as a creator.

The difficulty, however, is that in none at all of the two preceding sūtras of this *adhi.* as interpreted by S. (and R.) has Īśvara or B. been brought into the picture. The sudden coming in of Īśvara or B. in this

16. Śarīra signifies an effect while Avidyā is to be conceived always as the *causal stuff*.

17. There could be no proof of the concept of Avidyā if it remains unmanifested or unintuited even by the Sākṣī, in Advaita philosophy.

Sūtra cannot, therefore, be permitted.[18] The reason embodied in the phrase *Tadadhīnatvāt* doubtless needs a conclusion with which it has to be connected. But such a connection can readily be esta- blished with the following term: *arthavat* (-tvam), which can be taken as the predicate. Instead of connecting *Tadadhīnatvāt* and *arthavat* as *reason* and *predicate*, S. is obliged, by his interpretation, to find an imported predicate for the *hetu*: (because of the dependent nature of this Prakrit admitted by us) "there is no fear of accepting that Sankhya Prakrti is the world-cause" (*Na Pradhānakāraṇavāda āpadyate*). This disconnects "arthvat" from *tadadhīnatvāt* and obliges us to treat *arthavat* as the predicate of a fresh proposition: *Arthavatī hi sā* (S. *BSB.* i.4.3)—that the acceptance of a dependent Prakṛti is necessary and purposeful. This splitting of the proposition into two is sure to lead to *Vākyabheda*.

S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 4 that Avyakta cannot be taken in the sense of Pradhāna here because there is no statement in the text as to its being something to be known (*jñeyatvāvacanāt*) is not altogether sustainable. In the first place, even without an express statement to the effect that Avyakta should be known, it can be gathered that it *must be known*, from the very statement that *it stands above Mahat*. This inferiority of Avyakta to Puruṣa is also similarly *intended to be known*.[19] The contention that the term Avyakta here cannot denote Prakṛti because it hts not been expressly mentioned as one of the things to be known would apply to S.'s Avidyā also. How then could Avyakta be identified with Avidyā?

Refuting the contention of the Sāṅkhya that the text of the *Kaṭha* Up. (i, 3.15) refers to Pradhāna as an object of knowledge *and* as the means of deliverance, S observes that this (*Anādyanantam mahataḥ param dhruvam nicāyya tan mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate*) is a re- ference to Prājña-Paramātman and not to Prakṛti. But the difficulty with S. is that to him Prājña is only the Lower B. and it is only the knowledge of the Absolute which is devoid of all attributes of being a knower etc. that confers release. The Prājña referred to in the *Kaṭha* text is expressly qualified by the attribute of 'being *Mahataḥ param*'.

S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 6 is too sweeping in its anxiety to dis- miss Pradhāna as one of the principles to be recognized. Its knowledge

18. It will be seen that in M's interpretation, Īśvara or B. is significantly men- tioned as "Śarīrarūpakavinyasta" which makes it easy for us to take the pro- noun "Tad" in Tadadhīnavāt... in i, 4, 3 as referring to this B. This natural advantage is not available to S or R.
19. Knowing Mahat is knowing that it is above Buddhi and below Avyakta and knowing Avyakta is to know that it stands inferior to Puruṣa (B).

is after all important enough for the attainment of Mokṣa. There is no harm in agreeing that like the senses, the mind, etc., mentioned in *Kaṭha* i, 3, 10, Avyakta also has been mentioned as one of the principles to be known in such a way as would help emphasize the highest position of Puruṣa (B) *in the hierarchical gradation of tattvas*.[20] Otherwise as S.'s Avidyā also stands outside the pale of the three questions (relating to Agni, Jīva and B.—as understood by him) and the answers to them, it would be equally impossible to hold, as S. has done, that it is the existence of the principle of Avidyā that has been specially meant to be conveyed by the term Avyakta as being so necessary to understand the creatorship of the Lord.

Under *Mahadvacca* (i. 4.7) S. objects to the identification of Avyakta described as *Mahataḥ param* with Prakṛti on the ground that the 'Mahat' has been, in another verse, put in apposition with the word *'ātmā'* which denotes the self. As Prakṛti cannot possibly be held to be superior to Ātman, the identification of Avyakta with Prakṛti on the ground that it is above Mahat will have to be given up. But then, by the same reasoning, the equation of Avyakta with Māyā or Avidyā attempted by S. would have to share the same fate.

Review of Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R.'s interpretation of this *adhi.* is the same as S.'s in respect of the doubt, the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta. There is, however, some difference in the interpretation of Sūtras 2, 3 and 6. *His acceptance of Acit-Prakṛti*[21] *as a distinctive principle of his metaphysics* places R. in a very awkward position as regards the supposed "Aśabdatva" of Prakrti. He cannot, like S., afford to do without Acit-Prakrti in his system or hope to reduce it to Anirvacanīya-Māyā. The question whether this Prakṛti is to be regarded as being independent of B. or as being depen- dent on it, brought up by him under Sūtra 3, is not relevant to the theme of Samnvaya of the term 'Avyakta' in B. The Viṣayavakya too gives no clear support in its wording to Avyakta's being the cause of the world. The *adhi. cannot therefore be utilized* to establish the posi- tion that Avyakta is *not* recognized in the Śruti as cause of the world (*Kāraṇatvena aśabdam*). We are thus left with no alternative to ap- roaching the *adhi.* and others following it as positing a direct Saman- vayan in B. of terms like Avyakta which are *Anyatraivaprasiddha* and which for that very reason defy Samanvaya in B. thro' generally ac- ceptable canons so far considered. It is a case of '*Yakṣānurūpo baliḥ*'.

20. सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः । (*Kaṭha. Up.*).
21. न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषाश्च स्वरूपेण नाभ्युपगच्छामः । *** (*Śribhāṣya* i.4.3)

We have seen that some of the objections to which S.'s interpretation of Sūtras 1, 2 and 3 are open apply to R.'s explanation also. He prefers to connect the three questions and the replies to them (referred to in Sūtra 6) with the three objects of knowledge standing to one another in the relation of the means (*upāya*) the end ((*upeya*) and the person realizing B., (*upetṛ*) embodied in *Kaṭha Up.* i, 2, 14 and conveyed by the expressions *anyatra dharmāt* (other than the ordinary means) *anyatra adharmāt* (other than the ordinary goal) and *anyatra asmāt* (other than the ordinary agent). This involves the brushing aside of the three clearly worded and independent questions put by Neciketas relating to Svargya-Agni etc. and the answers given to them by Yama and the breaking up of what is after all a single topic (according to R.'s own showing) of realization of B. into three different questions, with much straining of language and squeezing them all within one and the same verse. The presence of a clear question about Svargya-Agni and reply to it increases the total number of questions to four, even if we agree with R. about the nature of the three questions embodied in the verse '*Anyatra dharmād anyatrādharmāt*' (*Kaṭha.* i. 2.14). That would clash with the Sūtrakāra's pointed assertion in i. 4.6, that *only* three questions were asked of Yama by Naciketas.

CHAPTER XL

BRAHMAN IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF KARMAKĀṆḌA ALSO

2. *Jyotirupakramādhikaraṇam* (i, 4, 10-11)

This *adhi.* focuses attention on all forms of words drawn from passages belonging to the sphere of Karmakāṇḍa relating to the names of sacrifices like Jyotiṣṭoma and their accessories, the seasons like Vasanta (Spring) when they are to be performed, words of call, offering and invocations such āgaccha, (ā)-yajeta, svāhā, vaṣaṭ, vauṣaṭ, phaṭ and so on, for purposes of Brahmasamanvaya. This goes beyond the limits of what has been achieved so far in that it seeks to make the constituent parts of these words themselves,—their roots syllables and accents as well, expressive of appropriate attributes of the Supreme B.[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that, in the first place, if such words drawn from the Karmakāṇḍa are sought to be referred to B. in their primary senses, the entire sacrificial system would collapse. The Karmakāṇḍa prescribes the performance of various sacrifices like Jyotiṣṭoma during particular seasons and lays down the order in which the different main sacrifices and their subsidiaries and parts thereof are to be performed. It specifies the beneficiary, names of priests and the sacrificer, the nature of the oblations to be offered and so on.

Secondly, if all this sacrificial vocabulary is to be referred to B. the whole system of Vedic sacrifices would become a dead letter. Such a Samanvaya of words of different parts of speech in a sentence con-

1. Cf. समन्वितानामन्यत्तासमन्वितानां च वाक्यानां पूर्वनयेषु पदवर्णस्वरादिभेदेनेह समन्वीयमानत्वात् (Rāgh. *TPB*. p. 147).

sisting of nouns, verbs, adjectives, indeclinables and compound-words would be a sheer impossibility. For e.g. a compound like 'Jyotiṣṭoma' is the name of a well-known sacrifice prescribed by the Vidhivākya: *Vasante vasante Jyotiṣā yajeta'* (Let him sacrifice every spring with Jyotiṣṭoma). It consists of two members *Jyotis* and *Stoma*,—the latter meaning the prescribed number of 'Stotras', which are spoken of as the "Jyotis". To be meaningful, the two terms should be in a position to express different meanings which are to be synthesized into a single concept. This cannot be done without admitting that words like 'Jyotiḥ' and 'Stoma' in 'Jyotiṣṭoma' have their own distinctive senses. Similarly if all the words in the sentence *'Vasante vasante jyotiṣā yajeta'* and the constituent members of the compound 'Jyotiṣṭoma' should have the same meaning of B., the sentence as a unit would be reduced to a string of names of B. and would be powerless to yield any valid judgment.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that from the point of view of the highest Samanvaya in B. accepted by the Śrutis and the Sūtrakāra, all forms of words, of any part of spech—single or compound, as well as their constitutive eelements are primarily expressive of the attributes of B. This is deducible from the following passage of the *AĀ.* cited as the supporting text in the Sūtra. It introduces the subject of such a comprehensive Samanvaya of all words; illustrates it with higher etymological explanations of certain names of Ṛṣis, metres, Sūktas etc. connecting them with B. and concludes with the impassioned pronouncement that all the ṛcas, all the Vedas,—nay all sounds refer to One Supreme B.

The passage in question runs like this: "The Supreme Lord entered the bodies of the gods and the human beings (as their Antaryāmi). He is Prāṇa who scorches. ***He entered therein for a hundred years. So human life is for a hundred years. Because He entered for a hundred years, He who is Himself (primarily answering to the words) 'Śatarcins' etc., they call Him (primarily) Śatarcins etc. (and *not those others* promarily) ****They call Him—*as such He is* (in the primary sense of those terms), by the names of Bharadvāja, Vasiṣṭha, Pragātha, Pāvamānya, Sūktam, Ṛcaḥ, Ardharca, Akṣara. All these Ṛcas, all these Vedas, *all these sounds* are to be understood as denoting only One Being—Prāṇa. They should be taken as ṛcas addressed to Prāṇa (B)".—(*AĀ* ii, 2, 1-2).

The above bears out the intention of the Śruti that all the words of the hieratic language irrespective of the classification of texts as Mantra, Brāhmaṇa or Upaniṣad and of their nature, composition or part of speech should be understood as referring *primarily* to the Supreme Being. The reference to names like Śatarcins is only by way of

illustration of the thesis that there is usage of the learned (*vidvadrūḍhi*) in respect of applying all names to B. The repeated references to the same point shows that it is not a casual statement. The reference to Him as 'He who is Himself that' (*etam santam*) and the emphasis on it (*eva*) clearly bear out the superiority of Mahāyoga-Vṛtti in favor of B., to ordinary worldly convention. The words *etameva santam* go to show that the wise ones proclaim Him who answers to the sense of the terms Śatarcins etc. by those names with the help of the above-mentioned derivation (of Śatarcins etc.). The words "He who is Himself that" imply that this is not a case of Lakṣaṇā—as when we speak of that which is not Gaṅgā as Gaṅgā. In other words, it is a case of Mukhyārtha[2] (primary sense).—*NS.* p. 188.

According to M. it is the foregoing text of the *AĀ* .which has been cited by the Sūtrakāra in support of his present proposition in Sūtra i.4.10, establishing the Samanvaya of terms like *Jyotiḥ* from the Karmakāṇḍa portion in B:—

Jyotiḥ (Tattu)[3] *upakramāt tu tathā hyadhīyata eke*

'The One denoted by the word Jyotiḥ (and others) is that B. only because the Aitareya-Śākhins starting with the illustrative statement—'The Supreme One entered the world. . . .' which embodies the etymological explanation of words like Śatarcins so as to refer to B. make the pronouncement: All these ṛcas, all these Vedas, all these sounds denote One Being—know all of them to be ṛcas addressed to Prāṇa".

The term "Jyotiḥ" in the Sūtra represents the Viṣayavākya—*Vasante vasante jyotiṣā yajeta*—a well-known Brāhmaṇa text laying down the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma. By extension it stands for the names of several other sacrifices also and their accessories. Tho' the term 'Vasanta' happens to be the first one in the Viṣayavākya, preference has been given to the term 'Jyotiḥ' in the Sūtra as it represents the name of a principal sacrifice which is the pattern of several others and has its own *Vikṛtis*, statement of reward etc. all together. The ablative *'upakramāt'*[4] in the Sūtra is explained by M. as standing for the submerged *lyabanta* form (*upakramam vidhāya*) as in *'Prā-*

2. The *TC* (pp. 778-90) brings together corroborative evidence from RV. viii. 69. 9; x. 114. 9; etc. in support of the technique of the primary application of words by Mahāyoga and Mahārūḍhiyoga without prejudice to ordinary application of the same words by mere *yoga* or *rūḍhi* to denote other things of the world. It also elucidates this fact with erudite analogies of such dual application of words from the Sūtras of Pāṇini, Śrauta literature, Nirukta, *Anukramaṇī* and Mīmāmsā rulings.
3. Follows by *anuvṛtti* from B.S. i.1.4.
4. S., R. and others read *'Jyotirupakramā'*. According to M. the *upakrama* serves to pinpoint the higher interpretation of terms like Śatarcins in B. on the basis *Vidvadrūḍhi* and *Mahāyoga.* The express statement that all names refer to B. follows in *Tā vā etās sarvā ṛcaḥ. . . .*"

sādāt prekṣate'. Sūtra 2 answers the Pūrvapakṣin's objection regarding the performance of Vedic sacrifices coming to a standstill. It also answers the objection regarding the impossibility of forming any valid judgment about B. from such Samanvaya.

The answer is that in the said higher Samanvaya the distinctive meanings of words and their component parts derived from accepted principles of grammar and etymology are duly taken into account to the extent necessary, in working out the details. For example in referring words like *Vasante* and *Jyotiṣā* (treated as vocatives here[5]) to B. the radical elements of these words in terms of *Vasan-tiḥ;* ji-oti-ṣaḥ and their accepted meanings are duly taken into account in giving a consolidated sense expressive of B. to them.[6]

There is no substance in the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that such a higher Samanvaya of Karmakāṇḍa texts in B. would cut at the root of the Vedic sacrificial system. The former does not interfere with the latter. Their spheres are different. They function at different levels of understanding. The technique of *Padasamanvaya* in B. is based exclusively on what have been aptly described by M. as Mahāyoga Vṛtti (higher etymology) and Mahārūḍhiyoga (higher etymology-cum-convention) of the Mystics and the learned sages. The ordinary interpretation in terms of sacrificial details is based purely on worldly convention (*Kevala* or *laukikarūḍhi*), derivation (*yoga*) etc. The one represents the plenary primary sense (*paramamukhyārtha*) and the other the generally accepted sense (*mukhyārtha*). While there is difference of content and sweep between them *there is no implication* that the normally accepted sense is *not a Mukhyavṛtti* but only a *Gauṇīvṛtti* (figurative one).

The Sūtrakāra makes it clear that acceptance of higher Samanvaya of texts in B. does not come in the way of the stability of the Karmakāṇḍa and its values by giving an analogy: *Kalpanopadeśācca*

5. For purposes of higher Samanvaya in B., M. reads the sentence *Vasante vasante Jyotiṣā yajeta* as a string of vocatives (splitting the last two words into *Jyotiṣa* and *āyajeta*.
6. Vasanti from *vasan-tiḥ* conveys the indwelling spirit which pervades all. Jyotiṣah is the Being from which the world is born, (*ji*) in which it is woven (oti) and which is of vast energy (ṣaḥ):

जातमोतं हरौ यस्मात् ज्योतिषः प्राणरूपतः ।
आयजेतश्चयजेतो वसन्तिश्च वसन् ततः ॥
(M. *AV.* i.4, 10-11).

This way of splitting the words Jyotiṣa and ā-jajeta differs from the Padapāṭha which is not concerned with the question of higher Samanvaya in B. but with ritualism. The *padaccheda* may conceivably vary according to needs. For full etymological explanations of the above words in conformity with M.'s interpretation see J.'s NS. pp. 181b-181.

madhvādivad avirodhaḥ (i.4.11). The term '*madhu*' which means 'honey' in its worldly usage, is also found applied to the Supreme B. indwelling in the Sun in one of the famous passages of the *Chān. Up.* (iii.1.1) in what is known as the *Madhu-vidyā*:

'Verily (the Supreme Being *in*) the Sun is the honey of the gods'. This is intended to convey the meditation on the Supreme Being, in an esoteric sense, as the honey made of the five ingredients of fame, splendour, senses, virility and health absorbed from the flowers—viz. the fivefold Vedic lore by the activity of the gods Agni etc. acting as bees. This higher sense in which '*madhu*' has been used here to denote B.[7] does not certainly annul the accepted sense of that word as honey produced from ordinary flowers in the world. The same is the case with the special connotation given to *Camasa* in Sūtra i, 4, 9. The stability of the Karmakāṇḍa is thus left undisturbed by its higher interpretation by way of Brahmasamanvaya.

The first part of the Sūtra: *Kalpanopadeśācca....* (i, 4, 11) is intended to make it clear that in formulating the higher Samanvaya of words in B. the Śruti not only concedes but accepts the worldly conventions, rules of grammar and etymology in determining the proper senses of the words to the extent necessary but goes beyond their limits and dives deeper into meanings with the help of *Mahāyoga* and *Mahārūḍhiyoga-vṛttis*[8] to arrive the highest Samanvaya of the whole body of Scripture in B. for purposes of the highest forms of Upāsanā which is the ultimate purpose of such Samanvaya and which has been commended in such inspiring accents by the memorable words of the AĀ—*Sarve vedās sarve ghoṣā ekaiva vyāhṛtiḥ Prāṇa eva Prāṇa-ṛca ityeva vidyāt* (ii, 2.2[9]).

For such Upāsanā to be meaningful, it is essential that the Samanvaya of words leading to it should be based *not on mere convention* which can tell us nothing about the *significance* of the words applied to B., but on deeper layers of understanding of the majesty of B. This could be achieved only by learning to look upon the entire body of scripture as a grand symphony of the majesty of the Supreme, the words and sentences thereof constituting the harmonious movements thereof

7. देवमध्वित्यादिकं तु मधुशब्दवाच्यत्वपरम् (TC. p. 794 b).
8. लोकक्लृप्ततत्तद्वाचित्वमबाधित्वैव लोकाक्लृप्तयोगवृत्तेः कल्पनया, व्युत्पादनेन ब्रह्मणः सर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वोपदेशात् (*TC.* p. 792).
9. Catching this inspiration at its source, M. rises to the heights of Mysticism in commenting on this text. He writes: Why only the names of the gods and the Ṛsis or of the Vedas? Even the very music of the spheres, the roaring of the seas and the clouds and the thud of falling trees voice the glory of B. किमु च वेदाः ? समुद्रघोषवृक्षपतनभेरीताडनादयः सर्वे घोषाः अपि तस्यैव नामानि यथायोगं योजनीयानि (M. on. *AĀ* ii.2, 2).

in the light of *Mahāyogavrtti*.[10] It is not for us to question the authenticity of the deep religious experience of the Ṛṣis who proclaimed. "They call *Him who is that* as 'Śatarcins, Bharadvājas, Mādhyamas. All these rcas, all these sounds refer to One Supreme Being. They are the Ṛcas of Prāṇa".

यद्वै किंचाध्यगीष्ठा नामैव तत्। नाम वा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेद: [11] (*Chān. Up.* ii, 3, 8).
तद्वियूय कवयोऽन्वविन्दन् ।
नामायत्ता समतृप्यन् शृतेऽधि[12] (*AĀ* ii, 3.8).

It is true enough at the same time that such an intensive form of Svara-varṇa-padasamanvaya is beyond the competence of ordinary men. This has been freely conceded by M.[13a] Its discussion in the Sūtras has, therefore, to be viewed as fulfilling strict theoretical requirements of the Śāstra as such and intended for the edification of top-level Adhikārins with the requisite ability to rise to the level of such higher exegesis and Upāsanā based on it. There is nothing to forbid lesser ones from taking such occasional peeps into it as may be commensurate with their powers of understanding. M.. following the Sūtrakāra has only led the way to such Mahāsamanvaya.[13b]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. and R. launch another attack on the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti to establish its foreignness to Scripture (*aśabdatvam*) in the present *adhi.* also. According to both the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.* is from the *Śvet. Up.* (iv.5.ab).

"The One Unborn, red white and black, who produces manifold offspring similar to herself in form...." The Pūrvapakṣa is that this one unborn principle which has been referred to as producing the creatures is the same as the Jaḍa-Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas which comprises the three strands of sattva, rajas and tamas.

10. *TP.* i, 4, 11.
11. Verily whatever you have learnt is indeed the name. Rg Veda is (His) name, Yajurveda...."
Cf. also: the oft-quoted Paurāṇika text:
वेदाक्षराणि यावन्ति पठितानि द्विजातिभि: ।
तावन्ति हरिनामानि कीर्तितानि, न संशय: ॥
12. Sifting all that, the wise ones understood all the bases if application resting on words. With ripened understanding thus obtained, they reached the contentment (of Mokṣa).
13. महासमन्वये तस्मिन्नाधिकारोऽखिलस्य हि ।
ब्रह्मैवधिकृतस्तत्र मुख्यतोऽन्ये यथाक्रमम् ॥ (M.AV. iii, 3, Ver. 35).
13b. Cf. also M.NV.iv.4 (concluding verses 1-10).
अहंतु तत्प्रसादैकमहास्पदबलोद्धत: ।
न्यायामृतार्णवमिममवगाह्य किभज्य च ।
संक्षेपविस्तराभ्यां च चकार व्याकृति कृतिम् ॥ (*NV*.iv.4).

Rejecting this interpretation of the Up. by the Sāṅkhyas, S. argues that taken by itself the mantra is not competent to decide whether the Ajā is the Sāṅkhya Prakṛti or a mere she-goat. There is no special reason like the context to fix its import in a particular way. A parallel may be cited from *Brh. Up.* ii, 2.3 where a cup '*Camasa*' is mentioned. Taken by itself, it is vague. Only the sentence following makes it clear that the 'head' is meant. In the present case, there is no such help. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the Ajā is the three subtle elements beginning with tejas i.e. *Tejah*, *ap.* and *anna.* and *not* the Prakṛti acceptable to the Sāṅkhyas. For we find in the *Chān. Up.* (vi.4.1) a clear statement ascribing the three colors red, white and black to fire, water and food (*Tejo'banna*). These terms *lohita, śukla kṛṣṇa* can be applied in their primary sense to *Tejo'banna;* whereas it would be necessary to resort to *Gauṇa-vrtti* in ascribing them to the three guṇas of Prakṛti.

Criticism

It is difficult to accept this interpretation. The opening Sūtra gives no indication whatever of the nature of the doubt or of the point at issue. This is not improved in the next Sūtra where the reading Jyotirupakramā....requires importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the subject (*pakṣa*) viz. Ajā, according to S. and R. With S.'s interpretation of Ajā as 'Tejobanna' and having regard to brevity of expression in the Sūtra, we should expect the Sūtra to be worded *Teja ādi* (tu tathāh-yadhīyata eke) instead of Jyotirupakramā (tu....).

The manner in which S. and R. have utilized the illustration of Camasa for their interpretation is strange. The identity of Camasa is fixed then and there in the *Bṛh. Up.* (ii.2, 2) and is left in no doubt. The word cannot, therefore, be cited as an example of uncertain meaning to discomfit the Sānkhya. See the use of अविशेषात् in BS. ii, 2.24, iii, 3.1; iv, 1.11 according to S. also.

On closer thought the interpretation of the second Sūtra as handled by S. and his commentators virtually threatens to undermine the causality of B. as established in Sūtra i, 1, 2. For, the purpose of the present Pāda as explained by the *Bhāmatī* is to remove the possible overpervasion of this definition of B. as Jagatkāraṇam elsewhere.[14] By showing that Ajā which appears as the cause of the world does not denote Pradhāna, this overpervasion of the definition of B. is of course prevented there. But by the same stroke it is perpetuated in another direction by identifying the Ajā with *Tejobanna* which is of material

14. Cf. नान्यत्रेत्यत्र साधितम् (*Bhāmatī* i.4.28).
'नान्यत्र' इति चतुर्थपादे । (*Kalpataru*).

essence and is certainly not-B. This dethrones B. and enthrones Tejobanna as Jagatkāraṇa.

There is much difficulty for S. in interpreting the *'One unborn'* (ajā ekā) as *'Tejo'banna'*. For the latter are themselves products and they are three in number and *not one*. They cannot be regarded as having become one by being made tripartite (*trivṛtkṛta*). For the Upaniṣad clearly shows that each several element becomes tripartite.[15]

S. tries to overcome these difficulties by explaining that *Tejo'banna* has been called Ajā or a she-goat by way of imagery (*Kalpanopadeśāt*). The benefit of such imagery can also be given to Sāṅkhya-Pradhāna in respect of investing the three guṇas with the three colors, without much difficulty and without bringing in a she-goat all the way into the picture with no schematic purpose.

As a matter of fact we *have* clear support in the *Cūlikopaniṣad* text:—

गौरनाद्यन्तवती सा जनित्री भूतभावनी ।
सितासिता च रक्ता च सर्वकामदुधा हि सा ॥

which refers to the Prakṛti as eternal and one and as a creative principle endowed with the three colors. This cannot be reduced to Tejo'banna as the former is stated to be both beginningless and endless.

In the last resort S. is inclined to equate the Ajā with his 'Avidyā' which is one and beginningless. But then Avidyā is amorphous. The explanation that Avidyā in its post-causal state can be conceived as having various forms and colors would be equally true of Prakṛti (Ajā).

In the final analysis, there seems to be virtually no need for this separate *adhi.* from S.'s point of view. For he himself has, in so many words, admitted the existence of a positive entity possessing the three qualities of *Sattva, rajas* and *tamas* and designated by various names like Prakṛti, Māyā, Akṣara and providing the stuff of the universe.[16] His only point of opposition to its Sāṅkhya counterpart is to its metaphysical independence. But then, this independence of Prakṛti is going to be repudiated in Adhy. ii, 2, 1-10 and has also been rejected already according to his own interpretation in Sūtra i.4.3. Where then is the necessity to repudiate the causality of Prakṛti here anyway?

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

While following S. in regard to the inclusion of the Camasa Sūtra in the present *adhi.* and interpreting it like S., R. varies his interpre-

15. R. also criticizes S.'s interpretation on these and other grounds.
16. See his C. on *BS* i, 4, 3.

tation of Sūtra 2. The issue raised by him is slightly different—whether the Ajā referred to in the passage of the *Śvet. Up.* (iv, 5) is the *independent Prakṛti* of the Sāṅkhyas or the *Prakṛti* (*of Vedānta*) *dependent on B.* The Pūrvapakṣa is that as this Ajā appears in the guise of an unborn (i.e. uncreated) substance and as it is further referred to as "creating" (*sṛjamānā*) offsprings, it must be the independent Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas. The Siddhānta is that this Ajā is originated by B. The reason for taking it so is that it has been so stated (*tathā hyadhīyate*) in the *Mah. N. Up.* (ix.2)—where after referring to B. as "*aṇor aṇīyan*" (*Mah. N. Up.* viii, 3) and describing the creation of the various Prāṇas etc. the text refers to the Ajā (Prakṛti) also as one of the many, created by B.

The most glaring defect here is that it does *not* appear from the *Mah. N. Up.* (ix, 2) cited by R. that Ajā (Prakṛti) is mentioned as having been *created by B.* (*Brahmakāraṇikā*). The *Śrutaprakāśa* tries to overcome this difficulty by arguing that the Brāhmaṇa text *Samidho yajati* does not expressly mention that Samidyāga is a subsidiary to Darśapūrṇamāsayāga. It is, however, taken to be so because of the expectancy of the *modus operandi* (*itikartavyatākāṅkṣā*). In the present case, also, as the context is one of creation of the world, Ajā mentioned therein must be presumed to fall within the category of things created by B. The analogy is inappropriate. For the Samidh and other *prayāja* rites have no other form of expectancy with their principal than of being subsidiaries to it; so their subsidiariness has to be accepted even tho' not actually mentioned. But in the present case, the Prakṛti (Ajā) being otherwise also necessary as the material cause of everything, its mention may as well be due to that requirement in creation. It need not, therefore, be put down as itself coming under the things created by B. It is indeed difficult to see how R. can seriously insist on regarding his Acit-Prakṛti as produced by B. (*Brahmakāraṇikā*). That would be quite against the clear statement of the Śruti—

"A cow *she* is *without beginning and end*" (*Cūlikopaniṣad*) cited by R. himself in his C. on Sūtra i.4.8; and the BG. The Prakṛti moreover has been described as "unborn" (*ajā*) in the *Śvet. Up.* text also.

R. tries to meet these objections in his C. on Sūtra 3 where he takes the term "*Kalpanā*" as formation or creation of the world.[17] His explanation is that tho' Prakṛti is in essence eternal and uncreated, it is so only in its causal form (*Kāraṇātmanā*) whereas in its evolved forms as Tejobanna it can be regarded as an effect and possessing the three colors. This is a very roundabout interpretation of a clearly

17. As in RV. x, 190, 3.

worded text: which speaks of the Prakṛti (ajā) as *one* and possessed of the *three colors* (qualities) *in its causal form itself* as is clear from the epithet *sṛjamānām* put in apposition with the words *ajām* and *ekām*. It is a unitary predication about Prakṛti and ought not to be split up into two predications made with reference to different states of it. Apart from this, there is really no point in pursuing the Prakṛti again in this *adhi*. For R. has also clearly accepted the category of Prakṛti in his own system. The independence of this Prakrti as contended by the Sāṅkhya has already been set at rest according to R.'s own interpretation in Sūtra i.4, 3. The status of Prakṛti *vis-a-vis* B. is thus established beyond reasonable doubt. Will it not be a futile exercise, therefore, to waste a few more sūtras of another adhi. for re-establishing the metaphysical dependence of Prakṛti on B. by making the Jyotis-Sūtra (i.4.9) represent Prakṛti as one of the things created by B. (and as such dependent on it). To support such an assumption a straight and single predication about Prakṛti has been subjected to a very circuitous explanation.

CHAPTER XLI

THE FIVE FORMS OF BRAHMAN

3. *Na Saṅkhyopasaṅgrahādhikaraṇam* (i. 4, 12-14).

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of "pañca" "jana" *ākāśa*- and such other words, which by reason of the mark of being contained in another associated with them, in the context of their occurrence, appear to be 'anyatraivaprasiddha'. The Viṣayavākya is from *Bṛh. Up.* (iv.4.17). "That in which the five people and space subsist, I regard as Ātman". The repetition of "five" draws attention to the presence of the five Forms (of B) in every living being.[1]

1. S.R. and others take Pañcajanāḥ as a compound word. However, as the Kāṇva and the Mādhyasdina recensions of the *Bṛh. Up.* are both unaccented, it is possible to treat "Pañca" and "Janāḥ" as two separate words. M. has not therefore committed himself to any particular view. But his commentator Trivikrama has held them to be separate words,—the repetition being intended to emphasize the presence of the controlling forms of B.in the five principles of Prāṇa. Cakṣus manas etc. *in every living being*. J. in his *TP* evidently concurs with this interpretation; tho' the author of the *Abhinava-candrikā* rejects the particular sentence in the TP as an interpolation (*op. cit.* p. 260-61). But this goes against the explanation found in Raghūttama's gloss on M.'s *Bṛh. Up. Bhāṣya*. पंचपंचेति द्विरुक्तेस्तात्पर्यं 'प्रतिपुरुषम्' इति (p. 307).

S.'s bhāṣya has taken its stand on the *antodatta* or Bhāṣikasvara which the term 'Pañcajanāḥ' bears in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa (xiv. 2, 7, 19) where the verse is to be met with, in support of his view that it should be treated as a cpd. As M. has not expressed any disagreement with this view, it is to be presumed that he is willing to concede S.'s point while reserving to himself the right of taking advantage of the use of Pañca and Janāḥ in the Upaniṣadic texts which have come down without accents and explain them as intended to lay special emphasis on the fact that these controlling forms of B. are to be understood with reference to the five principles functioning in every living being. It is presumably for this reason that the *TC* has not entered into any discussion if Pañca and Janāḥ are to be looked upon as two different words or as a cpd. word. The remarks of Rāghavendra's *TCP*. on this question (*op. cit.* p. 797) are also to be understood as suggesting that it is open

The Pūrvapakṣa is that these five persons (principles) are life, sight, hearing, mind and food. As "*Pañca*" and "*Janāḥ*" which are plural in form denote things which are many in number; and as B. is only *One*, it is *not* possible to apply them to B. It *is* true that it was shown in the *Guhādhi*. that duality is not incompatible with the oneness of B. It may, therefore, be argued that 'plurality' likewise may be accommodated in B. But this has to reckon with the general principle that 'manyness' is concomitant with 'difference'. This may be verified from the text : *Dvā* suparṇā *(Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.1.1.) It is only where the difference is set aside by contrary evidence, as in the interpretation of the Śruti: *Ṛtam pibantau* that the same subject can be accepted as having both the attributes of manyness and oneness, without inconsistency. But the position in the present case is utterly different. Here we find that after referring to the five principles subsisting in Ātman, the Upaniṣad in the very next verse speaks of B. as "the life of life, sight of sight......." (*Bṛh.Up.* iv.4, 18)[2]. This makes it clear that while the words in the accusative case (Prāṇam, manaḥ, etc.) may be referred to B., the others in the genitive case *(Prāṇasya, manasaḥ* etc.) cannot possibly be referred to B. They must be taken to refer only to the five principles which have earlier been spoken of as 'resting in' an other. *(Yasmin pañca pañca janāḥ ākaśaśca pratiṣṭhitaḥ)*. This "Other" is evidently B. It would make no sense to say that B. as equated with *Prāṇa, manas,* etc. stands in the relation of container and contained (*adhāra-ādheyabhāva*) to its own self. We have, therefore, to exclude the terms *pañca, janāḥ,*[3] etc. from the purview of Samanvaya in B.

The Siddhānta view is that the five persons referred to in the nominative case by the terms '*panca* and *janāḥ*' are the five forms of B. present in the (five) principles of life, mind, etc. and mentioned in the accusative case again in the complementary passage *(Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4.18). They confer on *prāṇa, manas,* etc. referred to in the genitive case, their respective powers of sustaining the body. This is supported by other Up. texts also. Tho' essentially one, there is nothing to forbid B.'s being referred to by terms like "Pañca" as it energizes the five principles. thro' corresponding indwelling forms. The relation of 'container and contained' *(ādhāra-ādheya)* is not inconceivable where the same B. is spoken

to us to take Pañca and Janāḥ as separate words—notwithstanding the occurrence of the same words as a cpd-form in an identical verse in the version of the *Śatapatha Br.*

M.'s point here that the 'Pañca Janas' are the five Forms of Brahman remains unaffected, irrespective of the two words being treated as a cpd. or as two separate words. In the former alternative, the fact of the Five Forms of B. being present in each living being will be left to be gathered from other Pramāṇas. In the latter, it will follow from the wording itself.

2. प्राणस्य प्राणमुत चक्षुषश्चक्षुः ।
श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं मनसो ये मनो विदुः ॥

of as containing the '*panca janāh*' which are no other than its own forms. present in the five principles of life, mind etc. Judgments like "Space is everywhere'; 'Time exists at all times', show that there is nothing inconceivable in B.'s possessing such a capacity.

In this way, B. comes to have as many controlling forms as there are things to be controlled. In the present case, the controlling forms are five corresponding to the five principles functioning in the body. That form of B. which controls the body as such is other than (but not absolutely different from) the forms which control the above-mentioned principles of Prāṇa etc. These two forms of B. are conceived as standing in the relation of *ādhāra* and *ādheya* to each other. The concept of Viśeṣas makes such a thing possible. The present Samanvaya highlights this aspect of B.'s glory.[4]

As the Samanvaya of words like *pañca* and *janāḥ* can be established in B. with the help of the reasons already given in some of the earlier sūtras, the opening sūtra here seeks only to remove the impediments to such samanvaya. Acordingly, the expression *virodhaḥ* is taken over (by ākarṣa) from the previous sūtra by M. and read with the negative standing at the beginning: Saṅkhyopasaṅgrahād api na (virodhaḥ).

The smooth samanvaya of words like *pañca* and *janāh* in B. is obstructed by two considerations (i) the plurality of number (sankhyopasàngraha) attaching to the words *pañca, jañah,* etc. and its incompatibility with the oneness of B., and (ii) the relation of being contained in another *(ādheyabhāva)*[5] in which the Upaniṣadic text places the '*pañca janāḥ*' with reference to that other Being in which they are said to be rooted,-which again would be equally unthinkable in the case of B. (if it were to be identified with the '*Pañca Jañaḥ*'.

The Sūtrakāra overcomes these obstacles by making it clear that (i) B. has numerous forms of its own present in the physical body as such; as well as in the five principles which are functioning in the body and (ii) that these forms enjoy a measure of distinction *vis-a-vis* one another, adequate for the purpose of treating them as standing in the relation of container and contained (ādhara-ādheyabhāva) with reference to one another, according to the exigencies of the situation.

Thus the translation of the opening Sūtra, following M.'s interpretation would be :—

3. Viewed as separate words or as a cpd.
4. Bahurūpatvād adhikaraṇa-ādheyatvādi tasyaiva yujyate *(M. NV.* i.4. adh. 3). Satyanātha points out that the idea of B. being its own support is not inconceivable: स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितः स्वे महिम्नि (*Chān. Up.* vii.24, 1) इति स्वाधारत्वस्य प्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । (*Abhinavacandrikā* (p. 263).
5. This is suggested by the term '*api*' in the Sūtra which is to be connected with both the obstacles.

"There is no obstacle[6] to the Samanvaya of words like *pañca janāḥ* in B. either on account of the statement of plurality[7] or on account of the relationship of container and contained mentioned in the Upaniṣadic text;[8] for B. manifests Itself in a diversity of forms[9]. The forms in the supported things are numerically *other than*[10] the forms present in the supporting form."

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. the Pūrvapakṣa here is that the five groups of five conveyed by the compound word *Pañcajanāḥ* qualified by the other word 'five' denote the aggregate of twentyfive principles recognized by Sāṅkhya philosophy. Because of this schematic reference to the twenty-five principles, the Pradhāna and other categories of the Sāṅkhya system are acceptable to and have recognition in the Śruti.

The Siddhānta view is that we cannot treat Pradhāna and other principles of Sāṁkhya philsophy as having any acceptance or recognition in the Śruti: *Pañca pañcajanāḥ*. For each one of these twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas is different from the others and cannot, therefore, be classified into groups of five principles as there is no common quality among the members of any group justifying such a classification. Besides, the second (word) *pañca* is not an independent word but forms part of a compound (*pañcajanāḥ*). So, the first *pañca* cannot be taken to qualify the second *pañca* which is also an adjective.

Secondly, if we accept the Pūrvapakṣin's contention, the number of principles enumerated in the text would exceed twentyfive; for Ātman is mentioned as the support of the *pañcajanas* and of *Ākāśa*. The Pañcajanas in question have, therefore, to be accepted as the life principle (Prāṇa) the eye, the ear, mind and food mentioned in the following verse of *Bṛh. Up.* (iv.4.18).

Criticism

The Siddhānta is not sustainable *in principle*. The twentyfive *tattvas* have been accepted and found referred to in Śruti and Smṛti texts. They are also recognized more or less by the same names in all the schools of Vedānta. It is not possible, therefore, to deny the authenticity of these principles. We have the clearest reference to the twenty-six principles in the *Subālopaniṣad*[11] which speaks of the *tanmātrās, mahat, avyakta* etc. The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (iii, 27, 10-11) refers to the twenty-four *tattvas*[12] comprising five *mahābhūtas*, five *tanmātrās*, five

6. न (विरोधः) ।   7. संख्योपसंग्रहात् ।   8. (आधाराधेयभावाद्) अपि ।
9. नानाभावात् ।   10. अतिरेकात् ।
11. Quoted by R. (*BSB.* i, 4, 11; 27).
12. पंचभिः पंचभिर्ब्रह्म चतुर्भिर्दशभिस्तथा ।
एतच्चतुर्विंशतिकं गणं प्राधानिकं विदुः । (iii, 27, 10-11).

jnānendriyas, five *karmendriyas* and (the four): *manas, buddhi, ahankāra.* and *Cittam.*

S.'s (and R.'s) criticism that the twentyfive principles cannot be classified into five groups as the members of each group do not have anything in common is not insurmountable. It is possible to classify these twentyfive principles under five distinctive groups the first four comprising *bhūtas*, tanmātrās, jnānendriyas and karmendriyas respectively and the remaining five viz. mahat, ahaṅkāra, manas, Prakṛti and Puruṣa—as having the common attribute of 'being other than the twenty'. The very reference to "the two fives, the ten and the four" evolutes of Prakti in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* bears witness to the possibility and provenness of such a classification. If there can be no grouping without a common quality among the members, how will S. himself justify the Sūtrakāra's bringing together under one group of five the breath, the eye, ear, mind and food? The mention of Ākāśa in the given text would not cause any increase in the number of principles as twentyfive, if we constitute the groups of five as follows:—

(i) Five karmendriyas.
(ii) Five jñānendriyas.
(iii) Five viṣayas.
(iv) Sattva, rajas tamas, mahat and ahaṅkāra (common attribute: being above '*manas*'-*tattva*).
(v) Pṛthvī, ap, tejas, vāyu and manas (common attribute: being other than the twenty already named).

In the above scheme, there are only twenty-three tattvas in as much as Sattva rajas and tamas are constituent parts of Prakrti. With the addition of Purūṣa[13] and ākāśa mentioned in the text the total would not exceed twenty-five.

S.'s interpretation of the second Sūtra, identifying the *Pañcajanas* with breath, eye, ear, mind and food does not do justice to the theme of Samanvaya *in B.* as it fails to establish the identity of Pañcajanas with *B.* The position taken by S. in interpreting the second Sūtra, that the Pañcajanas are only breath, ear, eye etc. deserves no higher consideration than as a Pūrvapakṣa. The Siddhānta will have to be in terms of B. if Samanvaya is to be in B. as established in i.1.4.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. accepts the twenty-four *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas in his own system with the necessary addition if Puruṣa as the twenty-fifth principle and

13. He is the twentyfifth tattva according to the Sāṅkhyas.

the Supreme B. as the twenty-sixth principle,[14] controlling all the rest. It is, therefore, pointless for him to deny the authenticity of the twenty-five principles or refuse to accept them *in principle*. These tattvas do not and cannot become "*aśabdam*" simply because the Sānkhyas look upon them as *independent of B.* The dependence of Prakṛti on B. (tadadhīnatva) has already been established by R. under Sūtra i.4.3. There is no need to flog a dead horse over and again. This makes it all the more necessary to explore the possibility of a fresh interpretation of the adhi. mire consistent with the principle of direct Samanvaya of given texts in B.

14. Cf. अन्यश्च राजन् स परः तथान्यः पंचविंशकः ।
तत्स्थत्वादनु पश्यन्ति ह्येक एवेति साधव :
Mbh. XII. 323. 56, q. by Vedānta Deśika *Satadūṣaṇī* S. Muktavali Ser: 36. p. 131.

CHAPTER XLII

BRAHMAN IS BOTH THE PROXIMATE AND THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF COSMIC EVOLUTION

4. *Kāraṇatvenety* (*Ākāśa*)-*adhikaraṇam* (i, 4, 15)

This *adhi.* undertakes the Samanvaya in B. of words like Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, etc. occurring in the cosmological accounts of the Upaniṣads such as *Taitt. Up.* ii, 1. *Chān. Up.* vi, 1, 3. It is clear from such descriptions[1] that the Up. speaks of material principles like ether, air fire and water originating from one another in the order of their enumeration, from Ātman (B) standing as the first cause of all. That being so, any attempt to make these words denote B. in their primary sense, in the interests of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B. would lead to certain awkward results. In the first place, it would reduce B. to the position of becoming an effect or a product of Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc. That would deprive it of its proud position as the cause of all and as never being the effect of anything else. Secondly, even the terms Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, etc., are in this theory proposed to be interpreted in the sense of B., in cosmological predications: From ether air is produced; from air fire is produced. This would be tantamount to saying that B. is produced from Itself. It is possible that "A" may be regarded as the cause of "B" without prejudice to its being an effect of "C" at the same time. But it would be impossible to conceive of "A" as being the cause and the effect of its own self. The cause invariably precedes the effect in time. How can we think of B. as preceding Itself? These are the objections which the present *adhi.* seeks to overcome, while pressing undauntedly for the Samanvaya of the words in question, in their primary sense, in B.

1. "From this Ātman ether arose; from ether air; from air fire; from fire water; from water the earth; from the earth herbs...."

It is true eno' that in the earlier *adhi.* it was shown that B. could be looked upon as being both the *ādhāra* (support or container) and the *ādheya* (contained) with reference to its own being and its various manifestations (in Prāṇa, manas, etc.)-even as time and space are inherent in themselves. But the analogy cannot be extended to the sphere of causation. A thing cannot be its own cause and its own effect. The direct Samanvaya of such predications as 'Ākāśād vāyuḥ'; 'Vāyor agniḥ' in B-as envisaged by the Sūtrakāra thus appears to be impracticable. By such *ākṣepasaṅgati* the present *adhi.* is connected with its preceding one.

The advantage accruing to Brahmavāda thro' a Samanvaya of such terms as the above (which stand for various proximate causes and effects in the cosmic evolution) is that it illuminates a fresh aspect of Divine majesty by showing how B. is not only the first cause of all, in the ultimate sense, *but also their proximate and intermediate cause as well,—at each and every stage and of every link in the causal chain.* This special advantage can be secured only by resorting to a Vākyasamanvaya with the help of the connected terms. A Padasamanvaya of bare terms like Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc. in B. without predicative associations of characteristics, on the lines of words considered in the Jyotiradhi. earlier, would not confer this advantage, as it would not be taking into account the colorful details of cosmic evolution thro' different stages and the unfoldment of each stage by Divine immanence and impulsion.

We have seen the nature and drift of the Pūrvapakṣa. The Siddhānta view is: Whatever may be the difficulties in the empirical sphere in conceiving of one and the same thing as 'cause' and 'effect' with reference to its own self, they melt away in the transcendental logic of B.[2] (*Brahmatarka*). The direct Samanvaya of words Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc. in B. would follow as a matter of course from the principles of interpretation already indicated in *Tadadhīnatvvāt* (i, 4, 3) *Camasavat* (i, 4, 9) *Jñeyatvāvacanāt* (i, 4.4). All that remains to be done in the present case is to show how to dispel the objections to such Samanvaya. This is what the Sūtrakāra sets himself to do in the present sūtra:

Kāraṇatvena ca ākāśādiṣu yathāvyapadiṣṭoketeḥ

Accordingly, it is suggested that the words *'na virodhaḥ'* be read by *anuvṛtti*[3] here, from Sūtra i.4.12. M. holds that the conjunctive *'ca'* in the Sūtra after 'Kāraṇatvena' stands for taking into account the counterpart of *Kāraṇatva* (causeness) i.e. to say *'Kāryatva'* (being an effect.)[4] These two ideas taken together would suggest that B. is to be viewed

2. *TCP.* p. 810.
3. Rāgh. *TDP.*
4. *TC.* p. 810 b; *TDP.*
5. J. defines *'Avāntarakāraṇa'* as *'Kāryatve sati kāraṇam'* (*TP.* i.4.15).

as being both the cause and the effect—which is exactly what constitutes the nature of a proximate or intermediate cause (*avāntarakāraṇam*)[5]—to use M.'s paraphrase[6] of the Sūtrakāra's 'Sautranirdeśa' as "Kāraṇatvena ca." In the Viṣayavākya of the *Taitt. Up.* Ākāśa, Vāyu and others have been introduced as such *'avāntarakāraṇas'*. The Sūtrakāra wants to carry out the Samanvaya in B. of these words which refer to particular *avāntarakāraṇas,* without denying that these principles also operate as intermediate causes *vis-a-vis* their own effects.

The Pūrvapakṣin's objection that B. could never be viewed as an effect in the causal process is not pertinent to what precisely the Siddhāntin has in mind when he claims by virtue of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B. that the latter is capable of being denoted by every one of the terms which refer to the various material principles like Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc. standing in the relation of cause and effect with reference to one another in succession. In his interpretation of Sūtra i.4.15, M. has made his meaning clear that when cosmic evolution takes place, the Supreme B. manifests Its (corresponding) form in every intermediate cause and its effect—as without such operative manifestation of B. no intermediate cause or effect can come into being or carry forward the evolutionary series. It is in recognition of this fact that the names of the intermediary causes are applied to (corresponding forms of) B. It is the different manifestations of B. in the various intermediary causes that are conceived as standing in the relation of 'cause and effect' to one another—in an esoteric sense, as manifesting one another.[7]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. and R. treat Sūtras i, 4, 14-15, as one *adhi.* According to S. the *adhi.* deals with certain apparently contradictory statements in the Śrutis about (i) the order in which things created by B. have been mentioned in them and (ii) the causality of B. The *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 1) *Chān. Up.* (vi, 2, 3) and *Praśna Up.* (vi, 4) mention created principles in different orders. There is no uniformity in their enumeration. There are again texts which ascribe creation of the world to non-being as well as others which discredit such a view. Some other texts make out that the world came into being on its own initiative without a creator. Such utter confusion and contradictions in respect of the Kāraṇavakyas and the Kāryavākyas would undermine the foundations of Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. Hence they are to be set at rest.

6. Avāntarakāraṇatvenāpi sa evocyata iti vakti (M.BSB. i.4.15).
7. आकाशवाय्वादिगतत्वेनाभिव्यक्तभगवद्रूपात् वाय्वग्न्यादिगतरूपान्तराभिव्यक्त्या व्यंग्यव्यंजकभावरूपस्य कार्यकारणभावस्य बहुरूपत्वेनोपपत्तेः । (*TC.* p. 809).
Cf. यः कारणं च कार्यं च कारणस्यापि कारणम् ।
कार्यस्यापि च यः कार्यं प्रसीदतु स नो हरिः ॥ (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* i, 9, 47).

According to S. the conflict of texts in respect of the order of enumeration of created things is resolved in i, 4, 14 with the simple explanation that altho' there may be such contradictions here and there, in respect of the order of created things, there is no such contradiction as to the nature and identity of the source or creator who has been described everywhere as the omniscient Lord of all,—the inner Soul of all and as the one and only cause of all, without a second.

Criticism.

To suit this explanation, the term 'Kāraṇatvena' in the opening Sūtra has been alternatively split up as (i) *Kāraṇatve* (locative) and *na* and (ii) *Kāraṇatvena* (instrumental). It is not so easy to accept the construing of the conjunctive particle *ca* in the sense of 'but' (*tu*). The splitting up of 'Kāraṇatvena' into two parts as a locative followed by a negative involves the importation of another word 'Vigānam' (discrepancy, inconsistency) after the word *'ākāśadiṣu'* in the Sūtra, to secure the desired import of the Sūtra as a whole—that there may be *discrepancies* in the order of enumeration of created things; but there is none whatsoever in regard to the nature of the cause as B.[8]

The subject of the *adhi.* as contemplated by S. is out of place in the present Adhyāya and Pāda. Removal of contradictions and opposition (Avirodha) is the special theme of Adhy. II. This question should, therefore, be taken up there. As a matter of fact, the Sūtrakāra himself has discussed more than one case of such discrepancies and internal contradictions in the Śrutis pertaining to some of these created principles, in *Adhy*. II. *pādas* 3 and 4.

There is not much force in the contention that Adhy. II is concerned only with the Virodha (opposition) to Brahmavāda from other Pramāṇas such as independent reasonings and the doctrines of other schools of philosophy; and that as the subject of the present *adhi.* is merely one of internal contradictions between the statements of Śrutis themselves, it could not be discussed *there.* Such distinctions in the nature of Avirodha would of course justify their discussion in separate Pādas of the same (Avirodha)—Adhyāya but not altogether outside the Adhyāya!

This is also clear from what the Sūtrakāra himself has done in respect of similar topics of internal contradictions of Śrutis—by discussing them in the 3rd and 4th pādas of the II (Avirodha) Adhyāya. We have therefore to conclude from the presence of this *adhi.* here, in the Samanvaya-Adhyāya, that its subject must be one of *direct* Sa-

8. Cf. सत्यापि प्रतिवेदान्तं सृज्यमानेष्वाकाशादिषु क्रमादिद्वारके विगाने, न स्रष्टरि किंचित् विगानमस्ति । (S.*BSB* i.4.14).

manvaya of some terms or characteristics in B., rather than an attempt at disarming opposition to such Samanvaya apprehended from some quarter.

The *Bhāmatī* and the *Kalpataru* have overshot their mark by saying that the discussion of cases of internal contradictions in the Śruti, in the 3rd and 4th pādas of Adhy. II is not an organic part of the subject-matter of that Adhyāya but only a side-issue (*prāsaṅgika*). This overlooks the fact that such discussions are part of the theme of Avirodha[9] and have been pursued in *two Pādas* of the Avirodha-Adhyāya. This should make it clear that they are there in their own right of direct Adhyāya and Pādasaṅgati and not as side-issues.

The *Taitt. Up.* (iii. 1) text and the other from *Chān. Up.* (vi.2.3) cited by S. in the Pūrvapakṣa show no mutual contradiction to justify a valid Pūrvapakṣa. The former has it that from Ātman Ākāśa is produced. The latter merely says B. created fire. It does not say that B. created this fire (tejas) *before creating Ākāśa.* These two statements are not, therefore, directly contradictory. The non-mention of the creation of Ākāśa before the creation of tejas cannot be construed as a contradiction. Silence is not contradiction. There is, however, a contradiction between the other two statements: 'It created fire (*Chān. Up.*) and '*From Vāyu* fire was produced' (*Taitt. Up.*). But then the removal of *this* contradiction, according to S., is undertaken *not* in the present *adhi.* but elsewhere in II, 3, 10. The Pūrvapakṣa of the Sūtra thus stands on very shaky foundations.

The Siddhānta which S. is eager to put forward here that it is B. which is one without a second, celebrated as *Satyam jñānam anantam* and which has been uniformly proclaimed in all the Kāraṇavākyas as the source of the Universe is, as usual with him, mixed up with the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa phraseology. If the Nirguṇa is the final and true source of all phenomenal creation, it would *not* be correct to speak of it (Nirguṇa B.) as seeing and desiring (*aikṣata; akāmayata*). S. blows hot and cold when he says that "there is no such contradiction regarding the Creator" in i.1.14 and yet introduces Sūtra 15 with the words "it remains to dispose of conflicting statements (cited by the Pūrvapakṣin) about the nature of the Cause".

His overall interpretation of Sūtra i.4.14 leaves the alleged contradictions in Śruti about the order of created things unresolved. If these contradictions do not matter because the Śrutis have no real interest in the problem of creation (as S. puts it), one would expect the Sūtrakāra not to have bothered himself about similar discrepancies over again in respect of Ākāśa, etc., in II, 3, 1-7; II, 3, 8; 10; and II, 4, 1; 5.

9. Cf. समं हि मानान्तरविरोधपरस्परविरोधयोरप्रामाण्यादिपर्यवसानत्वम् । (*TC.* p. 812 *b*).

We cannot help feeling that S.'s interpretation of this *Adhi.* has gone off the track into a blind alley.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. who carries the polemics against the Sānkhya Prakṛti into this *adhi.* also, considers that it rejects the contention that Prakṛti is the cause of the world. His Pūrvapakṣa is based on the texts: "All this was then undeveloped (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 4, 7)" "Non-being indeed was in the beginning" (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 7, 1). The Siddhānta is that it is B., as described in Sūtra i.1.2, and as endowed with omniscience and other qualities that should be accepted as the originator of Ākāśa, Tejas, etc.

It is difficult to make out a plausible case for R.'s Pūrvapakṣa. There is no evidence of any established usage (*rūḍhi*) of the terms Avyākṛta and Asat in favor of Prakṛti. In their root-meaning and in the figurative sense (*gauṇārtha*), they would be equally applicable to B. This will counterbalance the Pūrvapakṣa. The Viṣayavākyas cited do not exhibit any decisive characteristics which can *only* be applicable to Prakṛti and could *not* be applied to B. On the contrary, in the light of the considerations urged by R. himself in the Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa (i, 1.5-11), it should be possible to establish that these passages also ought to be understood in terms of the ultimate source of all creation being a sentient Being and not insentient Matter (Prakṛti). This will bar the Pūrvapakṣa.

It has been argued by R.'s commentator that the fourth Pāda here discusses texts in which the reasons urged in support of the Pūrvapakṣas (in favor of Jīvātman or Prakṛti) are more self-evident than those in favor of the Siddhānta. From this point of view, it would be seen that at least in the case of a text, like *"Mahataḥ param avyaktam"* (*Kaṭha. Up.* i, 3, 11) introduced in the Sūtra i, 4, 1, there is some semblance of support for looking upon Avyakta referred to therein as the Sānkhya Prakṛti. But in the texts referred to for the Pūrvapakṣa in *this* adhi., there is not even this semblance of plausibility of support to the Pūrvapakṣa over the claims of B. A sound *adhi.* cannot be built on such weak foundations.

The position taken by M. that we have in this *adhi.* the establishment of B.'s unique title to be viewed as both the proximate and the ultimate cause, at every stage of creation, in and thro' all the other principles implicated in the causal process[10] and which for that reason is entitled to be designated by the names of one and all of those principles[11]—is thus in full accord with the role and purpose of the Samanvayādhyāya in the Sūtrakāra's work of 'Brahmamīmāmsā'.

10. S. concedes this in principle tho' he does not spell out its implications or work them out in his system, as M. has done. See S. *BSB.* ii, 2, 3.
11. This in itself is a highly elevated conception of the Upanisadic B. as a *Svatantra-Kartṛ.*

CHAPTER XLIII

THE GRAMMAR OF SAMANVAYA

5. *Samākarṣa-adhikaraṇam* (i, 4.16-23)

This adhi. is in the nature of a *resume.* It incorporates the twin principles which are the basis of the whole theory of Samanvaya in B. It also explains the different points of view from which the claims of established worldly conventions in the use of language are to be justified and made consistent with the higher attunement of Scripture with B. It may thus appear that the proper place of this *adhi.* would be at the end of this Pāda. But the last *adhi.* itself draws upon the grounds presupposed here thro' an *atideśa* or analogical extension of argument, to establish the Samanvaya in B. of *anyatraivaprasiddha* terms like Śūnya, Asat, Abhāva, etc. It could not also have been placed *after* the the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (i.4, 24-28) because its presence is equally necessary *immediately after* the Sūtra: *'Kāraṇatvena. . .* (i.4.15)' if we are to give a convincing answer to the question which is bound to arise with reference to that Sūtra itself as to how we could at all speak of the production of Ākāśa from B. (as stated in the Śruti: *Ātmana ākāśas sambhūtaḥ*) if every word like Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc., in the cosmological texts, is to be referred to B. The explanation contained in the Sūtra *Kalpanopadeśācca* (i, 4, 11) would not be sufficient to meet the further objection that the two modes of application of words (to B. and to objects of the world) would thus be on a par with each other as primary denotations. The higher status that *has to be given*[1] to the Samanvaya of all words in B. can only be maintained by investing it with an intrinsically higher significance and richness of content based on *Mahāyoga*

1. *Cf.* नामानि विश्वा अभि न सन्ति लोके (Q. M. *BSB.* i, 1.1). वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम् । (*Pravṛtta Saṁhitā*).

and *Vidvadrūḍhi* as representing the 'Paramamukhyavrtti' (highest primary denotation) and treating the other as a 'Kevalamukhyavrtti' or ordinary primary denotation based on worldly convention. It is only in this *adhi.* that this acceptance of the two 'Vṛttis' is formally incorporated in the Sūtra. For this reason, also, it is absolutely necessary to have the present *adhi.* immediately after the Sūtra: Kāraṇatvena.... (i.4.15). It cannot, therefore, be disturbed from its existing position.

The opening Sūtra: *Samākarṣāt* (i.4.16) gives a thoughtful answer to the inevitable difficulty which is bound to arise—as to how the practical requirements of our life are to be satisfied if all the words found in scripture are to be appropriated to B.[2] The answer to this question is that tho' all the words are strictly speaking applicable only to B. in their highest primary sense, they are, nevertheless, 'drawn upon' (*Samākṛṣya*)—i.e. borrowed with due acknowledgements to the Divine by the wise (Jñānins) and without such acknowledgement by the unwise (ajnāninaḥ) and utilized for all purposes of practical life provided for by the Śrutis themselves.

This may, however, lead to the presumption that the operation of words in these two spheres is on an absolutely equal and *independent footing* of primary conno-denotation, unrelated to each other, as in the case of a homonymous word like *akṣa* which denotes many things like an axis, a die, seed of which rosaries are made, sense organ, etc. This presumption is set aside by the Sūtra: *Samākarṣāt* which is to be read with *Jagadvācitvāt*[3] (i.4.17) so as to give the meaning—"Words which are in themselves and in their highest primary sense applicable only to B. are "drawn upon" and freely diverted towards worldly usage on the basis of B.'s intimate relationship with the world of objects.

By reason of such diversion, the words come to acquire the sanction of established usage (*rūḍhi*) and root-meaning (*yoga*) within the limits of worldly convention. This is, however, *different from and less than* the highest conno-denotative relationship which the words bear to the Supreme B. and is entirely subject to its jurisdiction. The *Paramamukhya-vṛtti* which is the basis of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B. rests on *Vidvadrūḍhi* and *Mahārūḍhiyoga* as has been explained in earlier contexts.[4] The Mukhyavṛtti of worldly usage rests on simple *(ajña)-rūḍhi* and *yoga*. The latter is not, however, to be looked upon as *amukhyavṛtti*, or *Lakṣaṇāvṛtti*.[5]

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2. सर्वशब्दानां परमात्मवाचकत्वे, कथमन्यत्र व्यवहार इति ? अतो ब्रवीति – "समाकर्षात्" इति । (M. *BSB.* 1.4.16).
3. जगद्वाचित्वाय समाकर्षात् जगद्वाचित्वात् । (*BD*).
4. See Pages 275; 276.
5. अत्र तु, मुख्यवृत्तितारतम्यमस्तीत्युक्तमिति ध्येयम् ।

This upholds the value and sanctity of worldly usage and makes for a perfect rapprochement between the empirical and the transcendental values of life so harmoniously set forth in the Mund. Up. i, 1.3-4): *Dve vidye veditavye parā caiva aparā ca.*

The second Sūtra '*Jagadvācitvāt*' explains also how then words have come to acquire an almost exclusive reputation as belonging to the world.[6] Like children using words such as 'lion' to denote their representations in figures and pictures, the uninitiated world carries on its activities using the words in their limited sense without awareness of their higher connotation.[7]

Sutras 19-23 explain the rational bases of such 'Samākarṣa' or drawing of words from B.—'world-wards', from a number of philosophical standpoints and purposes and ascribe the explanations to different teachers like Jaimini, Āśmarathya and so on. Since the Śrutis prescribe sacrifices, and contemplate their performance, as a means to the acquisition of knowledge of B. by all seekers, the wise and the unwise alike,[8] it becomes necessary—according to Jaimini, that words should have a well-defined connection with reference to Karma and other Sādhanas, apart from their higher connotation of B. Sūtra 20 (*Vākyānvayāt*) says that it is only when such circumscribed connotations are accepted with reference to propositions in the Karmakāṇḍa and other spheres that their position in the general scheme of spiritual advancement can be properly explained and understood and become fully coordinated with the Supreme goal of complete knowledge of B. open to the most highly advanced Sādhakas.[9]

Sūtras 21-23 indicate the different ways in which prescriptions of the Karmakāṇḍa etc. contribute to the progressive attainment of B.[10] by bringing home to us the impermanence of the fruits of Karma (according to Jaimini); or because Karmas contribute to Jñāna by bringing about purity of mind (Auḍulomi); or because B. is to be known by all as the support of all and the knowledge of the supported (*ādheya*) is necessary to the understanding of the supporter (*ādhāra*) fully (Kāśakṛtsna).[11]

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6. तर्हि कथं तेषां शब्दानां जगति प्रसिद्धिः ? जगद्वाचित्वात् । (M. *BSB* i.4.17).
7. जगति व्यवहारो लोकस्य (M. *op.cit*). लोकस्य लोकानामनवगतमुख्यार्थानाम् । (*BD*).
8. कर्मकाण्डस्यापि भगवज्ज्ञानमेवोद्देश्यम् । (*Vādirāja TPG* p. 62). See *Brh. Up.* iv, 4.22.
9. तथाच तत्समन्वयाधीनं ब्रह्मणो जगद्धेतुत्वसर्वशब्दवाच्यत्वादिकं, तथा श्रवणादिविधिः कर्मदेवतादिपरवेदभागस्य कर्मदेवतादाववान्तरप्रामाण्याभावेन कर्मदेवतादिकं न सिद्ध्येत् । तथा च उत्तमाधिकारिस्वरूपस्याप्यसिद्ध्यापातेन .... (*TC* p. 816).
10. उत्तरसूत्रचतुष्टये च पूर्वसूत्रानुकृष्टस्य जगद्वाचित्वस्य जगद्वाचित्वमन्यार्थमित्यादिरूपेणान्वयः । (*TC*. 816b).
11. अवस्थितेरित्यत्र कथं ब्रह्म ज्ञेयमिति जिज्ञासायां, स्वेतरसर्वाधारत्वेन इति साक्षाज्ज्ञानापेक्षितप्रकारसमर्पणायेतरोक्तिरित्युक्तम् । (*TC*. p. 817 b).

Thus Sūtras 21-23 explain how the goal of Brahma-jñāna is attained thro' the discharge of worldly responsibilities and practice of Sādhanas prescribed in the Śrutis, including the various karmas and how, towards this end, it becomes necessary and meaningful to accept Vākyānvaya and Jagadvācitva of words in their ordinary primary senses of connotation without prejudice to the higher understanding of B. by the same words in their highest form of reference with the help of Paramamukhyavṛtti, when one is able to rise to such a height.

The views ascribed to the various teachers mentioned above are, according to M., partial aspects of Bādarāyaṇa's own all-comprehensive view, propounded to suit different orders of Adhikārins in different stages of spiritual advancement. The Sūtrakāra has referred to them under the names of his own disciples Jaimini, Āśmarathya and so on, to give them publicity in the world.[12] The view ascribed to Jaimini is for purposes of Vākyānvaya as explained. Āśmarathya's view has its place with reference to Adhikārins who are aspirants of Svarga and other goals prior to the ripening of their Vairāgya. The view of Auḍulomi refers to those who are still on the road of Jijnāsā and whose knowledge of B. has not blossomed to its fullest extent. The view of Kāśakṛtsna refers to Adhikāris who have reached the stage of ripe wisdom.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja.

S. and R. divide the seven sūtras beginning with *Jagadvācitvāt* (i.4.16) into two separate *adhi.-s*. This does not accord with the references to Jaimini, Āśmarathya and others found distributed in these sūtras in terms expressive of their holding alternative views on a given topic. We should expect a single adhikaraṇa in such cases (as for example in the Vaiśvānara *adhi.* i.2, 24-32).

The Viṣayavākya of the *Jagadvācitvādhi.*, according to S. and R. is from the *Kauṣītakī Up.* (iv.19) beginning with the words: Verily Bālāki, He is fit to be known who is the maker of these Puruṣas and whose work is this." The Pūrvapakṣa is that this must be the Jīvātman or Prāṇa.[13] The words "whose work this is" is to be taken as referring to the deeds of merit and demerit of the individual or to the activity of motion pertaining to Prāṇa. The Siddhānta is that the person in question is B. as the words "this work" (*etat karma*) refers to the world of perception (*pratyakṣasannihitam jagat*) which is the outcome of B.'s creative activity (*kriyata iti karma*).

12. स्वशिष्याणां प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं मतमात्मीयमंशतः ।
विज्ञातं तैर्जगादात्र तारतम्यं नृणां वदन् ॥ (M.*AV.* i, 4, Ver. 28).
See also *Introduction* P. 1 and P. 193 *ante*.

13. R. excludes Prāṇa from his Pūrvapakṣa. But this is inconsistent with Sūtra 17 which mentions Prāṇa.

This reverts to the Samanvaya of terms and contexts in B. once more after S.'s having taken up the position that such Samanvaya is restricted to the first three Pādas and interpreting the first three *adhi.* of this Pāda as a refutation of the '*Śābdatva*' of Prakṛti and then turning to a "side-issue" of removing an internal contradiction in Śruti regarding creation.

S. and R. import the words '*etat-śabdasya*' (of the word this) before 'Jagadvācitvāt' (ablative) to give a connected sense. It may, however, be seen that the choice of the term "because of denoting" (*vācitvāt*) would readily suggest the desirability of looking for the instrument of such denotation i.e.—'words' in general. That would enable us to recognize the theory of (Sarva)—śabdasamanvaya as such to be the issue discussed in this *adhi.* That would avoid splitting the Sūtras (beginning with Samākarṣāt) into different *adhi.* and the importation of the words "*etat-śabdasya*" before Jagadvācitvāt.

Vākyānvayādhikaraṇam

Sutras 19-22 form part of the *Vākyanvayādhikaraṇa* according to S,. R. and others. It is taken to discuss the question whether the famous passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* (iv, 5, 6) beginning with *Na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*[14] and concluding with '*Ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaś śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ Ātmano vā darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānena idam sarvam viditam*[15] contained in Yājñavalkya's discourse to his wife has for its subject-matter the Jīvātman or B. But there is no mention of nor any clue to the nature of the topic to be discussed in the body of these Sūtras. This is most extraordinary—especially for so "important" an adhikaraṇa as it is claimed to be by S. and others, as it is supposed to go into the crucial question of how it is that while the passage 'For the sake of the Self everything becomes dear' is referred to the Jīvātman, the concluding passage 'By knowing the Self everything is known' is to be maintained as referring to B.; and about which it is further believed that the Sūtras have taken the opportunity of taking into account three main positions about the great problem of the true relationship of the Jīva to B.,—held respectively by the teachers Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakrtsna, the last of which is accepted as the Siddhānta. With so momentous an issue before him, it is strange that the Sūtrakāra should *not* have thought it fit and necessary to pinpoint *this* as the topic of his *adhi.* instead of leaving it vague and uncertain with a mere "*Vākyānvayāt*".

14. Not for the sake of the husband does the husband become dear but for the sake of the Ātman (Self)—Tr. according to S.'s view.

15. "Verily the Ātman is to be seen, heard, perceived and meditated upon. When the Ātman is seen heard perceived and known all this is known".

There is no need to assume that the Jīvātman has been made the subject of discourse at the beginning. Hence there is no need to try to reconcile the supposed incompatibility between the Upakrama and the later statement regarding B. that everything becomes known by knowing the "Ātman". It is all a misconception of Yājñavalkya's teaching that he was thinking of the individual soul while making his famous statement '*Na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati...... Ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati*'. The term 'Ātman' stands for the Supreme B. in its primary sense. This has been established by the Sūtrakāra in *Dyubhvādyadhi.* (i, 3, 1) and has been accepted by S. himself.[16] There should thus be no difficulty in recognising that Y. was discoursing only on the importance of the Supreme B. His words '*Na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya......Ātmanstu kāmāya*' would breathe the spirit of a nobler social ethics and deep philosophical humility of understanding if it is seen in the light of conveying that everything in God's world must be loved and cherished only for the sake of God and as His gifts. Nothing happens except as He wishes it. The love of husband and wife or parents and children are governed no less by Divine pleasure. It is within our experience that things do not always happen as we like them to. This realization comes of philosophical insight.

If this inwardness of Y.'s teaching is perceived, there will be no difficulty in properly construing the somewhat irregularly worded phrases '*Jāyāyai kāmāya; patyuḥ kāmāya; Ātmanaḥ kāmāya* as equivalent to *Jayayāḥ kāmena; patyuḥ kāmena; Ātmanaḥ kāmena*, etc.

When that is done and the term 'Ātman' is properly understood in the highest primary sense of B. as accepted by the Sūtrakāra, Y.'s pronouncement would at once be free from the inconsistency imagined by the commentators and stand out as a uniformly consistent teaching about Divine majesty from the beginning to the end. Y. is only emphasizing the dependence of human life and its transactions on Divine will and pleasure when he speaks of the individual's relations with others as husband, wife, child, etc. and as the owner of worldly goods. The Jīvātman thus comes into the Upakrama merely as a creature who carries on his life at the pleasure of the Divine Will. The theme of Y.'s discourse is Divine majesty and nothing else.[17] There is thus no reason to suppose that the Jīvātman has been made to figure in the

16. Ātmaśabdaśca Paramātmaparigrahe samyag avakalpate na arthāntaraparigrahe (S. *BSB*. i, 3, 1).—the '*arthāntara*' includes '*Śārīra*' (Jivātman) according to S.
17. An implicit concurrence with this approach to our understanding of Y.'s words. *Na vā are patyaḥ kāmāya....*' is to be found in R. D. Ranade's exposition of how human relations are determined thro' their relationship to God:

"God-love must be regarded as the only bond of union between any two relatives and friends. This reminds us of the famous doctrine of Leibnitz

Upakrama *as the central figure*. That being *not the case*, the presumption of non-difference between Jīva and B. is entirely uncalled for to explain a supposed inconsistency between the Upakrama and the Upasamhāra.

S. does not admit that the *Vidhi*. 'Ātman is to be seen......' refers to Jīvātman. It refers to B. Granted this, the earlier passages (Na vā are patyuḥ kāmāya......) embodying the *arthavādas*, ought to be interpreted in tune with the *Vidhi* as referring to B. No talk of discord between *upakrama* and *upasamhāra* can possibly be entertained in such circumstances. From this point of view also S.'s interpretation of Sūtras 19-22 remains unwarranted.

The term '*avasthiteḥ*' in Sūtra 22, presents a serious difficulty to S.'s interpretation that the Supreme B. itself exists "in the condition" of the individual soul. This puts more into the Sūtra than what is actually warranted by its wording and its syntactic requirement. '*Avastithi*' means remaining or existing. As there is nothing to be gained by merely asserting that B. remains or exists, the first and the most natural question to arise by way of syntactic expectancy of the word would be as to the place or locus *where* it is predicated to exist or abide. The expectancy as to "*how*" or *in what manner* it exists there, would arise, if at all, only *after* the first expectancy (*ākankṣā*) has been fully met. The expectancy of the locus of abiding has to be fulfilled by supplying the appropriate word "*in the Jīvātman*"—in this case.[18] With that the syntactic expectancy would become fully satisfied and the proposition that B. abides in the Jīvātman would be self-sufficient. The question of how it abides in the Jīva—even if it should

in his Monodology that monads which are all-important have no direct relationship with one another except thro' the central monad and that the only relationship that can subsist between any two monads is the indirect relation *thro'* God. God, thus, becomes the *viniculum substantiale*. God according to Leibnitz is the *monas monadum* and all the monads are bound to this central monad by the bond of substantiality. Similarly according to Tulsi Dās, God is the bond of subsistence between two relatives or friends:

नातो नेह रामके मानियत सुहृद सुसेव्य तहां लौ ।

अञ्जन कहां आंखि जेहि फुटइ बहुतक कहउ कहां लौ ॥

This is also otherwise expressed in an Upaniṣad which tells us that spokes of a wheel are connected with each other not directly but only thro, the central hub which is God. Also we can easily recall the famous Upaniṣadic utterance *Na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvam pripam bhavati Ātmanstu kāmāya sarvam priyam.* The mother should be dear to us not for her own sake but thro' God. Everything not for its own sake but only thro' God."

R. D. Ranade, *Pathway to God in Hindi Literature* (1954) pp. 62-63. Ranade's thoughts on this question reflect the Mystic attitude and there surely are many points of intersection between philosophy and Mysticism. See also M.'s comment on *Yatra nānyat paśyati*....under *Bhumādhikaraṇa* P. 224... ante. Also *Bhāg.* x, 21, 27 quoted on P. 174, f.n. 8.

18. Cf. *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam antaro yamayati* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.7.22).

arise subsequently, cannot be answered by saying that it exists *in the Jivātman* "as identical with him"; for the relation of *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva* would be the negation of their identity—which S. is so eager to establish by this Sūtra. The inadequacy of the views attributed to Auḍulomi and Āśmarathya has been admitted by S. and his commentators themselves.[19] R. has also criticized S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 22 for its philosophical inadequacy.

19. Will this not strike a discordant note in a '*Samanvayādhyāya*'?

CHAPTER XLIV

BRAHMAN IS BOTH THE MALE AND THE FEMALE PRINCIPLE IN WORLD-CREATION

6. *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇam* (i, 4, 24-28)

The *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of terms like *Strī*, Yoni, Sūti, and Prakṛti.[1] Besides being feminine nouns, by virtue of grammatical gender, these words present a special difficulty to Samanvaya in B. For the sense of their crude or uninflected forms (*prātipadikārtha*) itself includes 'femininity'. Hence in scriptural texts like '*Eṣa Prakṛtir avikṛtiḥ*', this femininity cannot be ignored as being only an attribute of the subject of the proposition (uddeśyaviśeṣaṇa). It has to be admitted as an attribute of the predicate (*vidheya-viśeṣaṇa*). As there is no femininity as such in B., such words as *Strī*, *Prakrti*, etc. occurring in the Śrutis have to be excluded from the scope of Samanvaya in B. They are to be referred to the Cit-Prakrti (or *Śrītattva*) which is the female principle presiding over the evolution of Jaḍa-Prakṛti.[3]

Thus the Pūrvapakṣa objects to the application of such purely feminine terms to B. on the basis of *Tadgatatva* or the presence of the property in question, in B.,—tho' it may be justified on the other ground of *Tadadhīnatva* or dependence on B. of the reason for the use of such words with the particular significance attached to

1. स्त्रीशब्दा अपि तस्मिन्नेवेत्याह । M.*BSB*. i.4.24).
2. एषा ह्येव प्रकृतिरविकृतिः (*Vatsa Śruti*). अदितिर्देवतामयी (*Kaṭha Up.* ii, 1.7). स्त्रियः सतीस्ता उ मे पुंस आहुः । (*RV*. i, 164, 16a).
3. The concept of *two Prakṛts* finds its *locus classicus* in the *Gītā* vii, 4-6. See M.'s C. on *Gītā* The Cit-Prakṛti figures prominently in some parts of M.'s interpretation of the philosophy of the *Gītā*, *Upaniṣads* and *Sūtras*.

them.[4] In this way, the Pūrvapakṣa is not barred by the *Tadadhīnatvanyāya.*

The Siddhānta is that application of such terms to B. is fully admissible from the point of view of the actual presence (*tadagatatva*) of the attribute of the female principle (along with that of the male) in B. The characteristic of the female is to bring forth directly unlike the male. As B. brings forth the world in both the senses, it is entitled to be referred to by terms expressive of both the functions.

In the opening Sūtra, the term "Prakrti" includes by *upalakṣaṇa* others of similar nature, such as Strī, Sūti, Māyā, etc. which are also to be brought under Samanvaya.[5] As "Prakrti" is the well-known name of "*Śrītattva*" (presiding-deity of Jaḍa-Prakrti) preference has been given to it in the Sūtra, for purpose of Samanvaya.

According to M. the first Sūtra means: Besides being called Puruṣa, the Supreme B. is called "Prakṛti" which is a term expressive of the exclusive sense of the female principle in creation. This is in keeping with the authoritative statement and the illustrative instance given to elucidate it, in the Śruti- "Verily all the names principally denote this Person, just as all the rivers destined to reach the Sea flow towards it and enter it. Likewise, all the names (fulfilling various needs of men by the way) find their fulfilment in B.[6]

The next Sūtra: *Abhidhyopadeśāt* gives the rationale of denoting B. by the term Prakṛti. The Śrutis and Smṛtis refer to God's will (*icchā*) as "Prakṛti", 'Māyā', Mahāmāyā, Avidyā, Niyati and Vāsanā.[7] They also tell us that God and His Will, concealing power, decree, impulsion, wisdom, bliss, etc., are all one and the same.[8] There is, therefore, no difficulty in denoting Him by the term Prakṛtī, in this sense.

The next Sutra: *Sākṣācca ubhayāmnānāt* shows how, apart from the *general approval* in the Śrutis for the application of all names to B. and the sanction obtained indirectly thro' the fact of the Will of

4. नपुंसकमित्यादिशब्दानां * * * तद्गतत्वं निमित्तीकृत्येह पूर्वपक्षे न्यायसाम्येनाक्षिप्यते । (*TC.* p. 827).
5. स्त्रीशब्दा इति सामान्योक्त्या सौत्रप्रकृतिशब्दो ऽन्यस्याप्युपलक्षक इति सूचितम् । (*BD*).
6. "एतमेव पुरुषं सर्वाणि नामान्यभिवदन्ति यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रायणाः समुद्रमभिविशन्ति, एवमेवैतानि नामानि सर्वाणि पुरुषमभिविशन्ति, (Sruti) इति प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् प्रकृतिशब्दवाच्योऽपि स एव । (*M.BSB.* i, 4, 24).
7. *Śvet. Up.* iv, 10. Also:

महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येवं तवेच्छानन्त कथ्यते ॥

इतिवचनात् तदभिध्यैव प्रकृतिशब्देनोच्यते । (M.)
8. "सोऽभिध्या स जूतिः स प्रज्ञा स आनन्दः" इति श्रुतेरभिध्यापि स्वरूपमेव । (*M.BSB.* i.4.25).

God being known as Prakrti etc., there is evidence of B. being expressly referred to by such terms as "Prakṛti" "Strī", Puruṣa etc.—i.e. by terms expressive of the female and the male principle.

It may, however, be felt that, at the most, the application of such words to B. would come to rest on mere Scriptural convention,—however, authentic. Such a purely conventional application of names would not be competent to achieve the true purpose of Sarvaśabdasamanvaya in B.—which is the establishment of innumerable perfections in B. That can be done only when the words applied are charged with deep meanings. For this purpose, it must be shown that B. contains in an abundant measure the denotative basis and significance of the terms applied to it. This is done by the Sūtrakāra with reference to the words under discussion expressive of the notion of the female principle denoted by terms like Prakṛti, Strī, etc.—in the Sūtra: *Ātmakrteḥ pariṇāmāt.*[9] By doing so, he brings out the depth of thought that lies behind the Samanvaya of such terms in B.

The Sūtra is rendered by M. as follows: "B. is called Prakṛti because It *enters into* Prakṛti so as to enable it to evolve from the subtle to the grosser states of Mahat, Ahamkāra etc. It then abides in them as their ruling principle,—assuming many forms of its own for that purpose thro' self-manifestation."[10]

M. explains that B. is called "Pra-kṛti" in the sense that Its creative activity (*kṛti*) is indeed stupendous (*pra*)[11] as has been indicated above. To explain the point further: Jaḍa-Prakrti (Matter) cannot evolve of its own accord,[12] because of its dependent position. It is very necessary that B. should educe the development of Prakṛti from within, by inner impulsion.[13] This presupposes the entry of B. into Prakṛti *ab initio.* The subsequent stages of Prākṛtic evolution are equally dependent on the impulsion given by B. at every stage. The *Śvet. Up.* (v. 5) refers to this point in clear terms.[14] We have a similar reference in *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 6).[15] Only, M. would clarify that B. assumes as many manifestations of Its own form as It deems necessary, according to the evolutionary states of matter, to sustain them from

9. चतुर्थे, उपलक्षके प्रकृतिशब्दे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताभावरूपबाधकोद्धारः । (*TC.* p. 828).
10. प्रकृतावप्रविश्य, तां **परिणाम्य**, तत्परिणाम**नियामकतया** तत्र स्थित्वा, आत्मनो बहुधाकरणात् । (*M.BSB.* i.4.27).
11. प्रकर्षेण करोतीति प्रकृतिः इति योगाच्च । (*ibid*).
12. Cf. *Gita* ix.10.
13. See *Bhāg.* i, 10, 23; iii, 6, 28.
14. *Pācyāmaśca sarvān pariṇāmayed yaḥ.*
15. Having created it, into it indeed He entered. Entering it, He acquired various names *Sat, tyat, niruktam, aniruktam* etc. (in the primary sense of their root-meaning).

within.[16] It is not open to us to determine or question the need or the wisdom of B.'s assuming many manifestations of this kind.

It should be noted that in Sūtra 27, the expression *Pariṇāmāt*, according to M. is to be explained as an *elliptical ablative* equivalent to "after bringing about the transformation (in Prakṛti)": *pariṇāmam vidhāyā*.[17] For purposes of appropriate syntactic connection, and cogent interpretation, the term *pariṇamāt* in the Sūtra has to be read in the reverse order with *ātmakṛteḥ*: making Itself many thro' self-manifestation (*ātmakṛteḥ*) *after* bringing about the transformation of Prakṛti (*pariṇāmāt=pariṇāmya*).[18] In this way, it stands clarified that the stupendousness of B.'s activity (*prakṛṣṭakaraṇam* or *prakṛṣṭakṛtimatvam*) embraces the two aspects of (i) *ātmakṛti* or self-multiplication into numerous forms and (ii) educing Prākṛtic evolution. It is in these twin-senses that the excellence or stupendousness (*prakarṣa*) of God's *ātmakṛti* manifests itself in creation.

The fifth Sūtra meets the objection to the application to B. of feminine nouns like Strī, Yoni, Sūti and such others whose Prātipadikārtha itself carries the sense of the female principle. The Sūtra points out that there is no difficulty whatever about this because the concepts of the female and the male principles are to be understood in their esoteric and fundamental sense of bringing forth directly and bringing forth indirectly:—

व्यवधानेन सूतिस्तु पुंस्त्वं विद्वद्भिरुच्यते ।
सूतिरव्यवधानेन प्रकृतित्वमिति स्थितिः ॥

"The Supreme Being—the Perfect Puruṣa being both the means of directly bringing forth and indirectly bringing forth (thro' Jaḍa-Prakṛti) is spoken of as both Woman and Man—the female and the male principle and, therefore, denoted by words of both the genders in language"[19] as Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

Instead of interpreting the *Prakṛtyadhi.* strictly in terms of a direct Samanvaya of certain terms like Prakṛti in B. in conformity with the theme of the Adhyāya, as M. has done,[20] S. R. and other commentators have all chosen to treat it as discussing the question whether B. is to be regarded only as the operative cause (*nimittakāraṇam*)

16. Cf. M. on रसोऽहमप्सु * * * (*Gītā* vii.8-12).
17. परिणामात् इति ल्यब्लोपे पंचमी । (Rāgh. *TDP*).
18. प्रकृतिरपरिणामादनन्तरं आत्मानं च महदादिप्रेरणाय बहुधा करोति (*TP*).
19. उभयात्मकसूतित्वात् वासुदेवः परः पुमान् ।
प्रकृतिः पुरुषश्चेति शब्दैरेकोऽभिधीयते । (*Brahmāṇḍa Pur.* Q.M.*BSB.* i.4.28).
20. Dasgupta has shown that the *Vāyu Purāṇa* and the *Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā* apply epithets like Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Prasūti, Yoni, Kṣetra, Akṣara and Avyakta to B. (*His. of I. Phil.* iii, pp.34 and 502). See also my *His. of Dvaita school of Vedanta*... vol. i, p. 143).

of the world or as being the material cause (*upādānakāraṇam*) *also*. The view that B. is the *Upādānakāraṇa* of the world is supposed to be shared by all of them. But this is true in the full and literal sense of that term only of some commentators like Bhāskara, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmadatta and Yādavaprakāśa and perhaps also of the Vṛttikāra. The position becomes complicated when we come to S. and R. Both have their own mental reservations about accepting Brahmopādānatva actually, and unquestioningly without some modification. S.'s commitment to Māyāvāda obliges him to use the language of Brahmapariṇāma for all outward purposes, as a convenient disguise for his (Brahma) Vivartavāda, which comes perilously near the Ajātivāda of his predecessor Gauḍapāda. R. with his acceptance of Prakṛti as a distinct metaphysical category and an ontological principle of his system along with Jīva and B. is placed in a difficult position when it comes to define the exact sense in which B. and Prakṛti are to be accepted as Upādāna in his Siddhānta. R. cannot say that Brahmacaitanya directly transforms itself as Jaḍa Prakṛti or as the world.[21] The acceptance of Prakṛti as a distinct principle would be superfluous if R. has no use for Prakṛti as the transforming cause (*upādāna*). If both B. and Prakṛti are to be accepted as Upādānakāraṇa, there would be two Upādānakāraṇas of the world, *in essence*. If B.'s Upādānatva is to be understood in the sense of its being the energizing principle present in Prakṛti enabling it to get transformed from the subtle to the grosser states and thus act as Jagadupādāna, the position would, in principle, be the same as M.'s—the only difference being in the phraseology of Brahmopādānavāda.

There is no doubt that B. plays the most decisive role in causation. But the question before us, here, is whether it is open to us to interpret this particular *adhi.* as one that is intended to define the precise nature of B.'s *kāraṇatva* in regard to the world in terms of *Upādānatva* combined with Nimittatva; and whether such an interpretation can be maintained in the light of the wording of the Sūtras and of the Viṣayavākyas and the drift of their arguments,—apart from the other question of the philosophical tenability of the view that B. is the material cause of the world.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. interprets the opening Sūtra as follows: B. cannot be merely the creator or Nimittakāraṇa of the world. It must also be accepted as its material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*). Only then can the promissory statement of the Śruti about the many becoming known by knowing the

21. This renders his interpretation of the expression *Ātmakṛteh* (i, 4, 26) rather weak.

One and the illustrative instances given there (*Chān. Up.* vi, 1, 4-6): Just as by knowing one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known ....etc.' be free from conflict.

We have to point out that this question is outside the terms of reference of Samanvaya, which is the theme of the Adhyāya. As there is no attempt at setting aside the Śābdatva of Prakṛti directly in this Pāda in this interpretation, as set out in S.'s (and R.'s) statement of the Pādopādhi,[22] the topic of the precise nature of B.'s causality—whether it includes Upādānatva or not—is equally outside the scope of the Pāda.

It may perhaps be argued on S.'s behalf that the necessity of settling the nature and identity of the material cause of the world would arise in this Pāda this way: As the first three *adhi.* here have shown that there is no Śāśtric place or validity for the acceptance of the Sānkhya Prakṛti, the contingency would arise that in the absence of Prakṛti (as material cause) the world will have to be treated as an effect without a material cause. That would be an absurd position. To avert such a contingency it has to be shown that B. takes the place of Prakṛti as the material cause of the world. That is what is being done in this *adhi.*

This would be a very far-fetched way of justifying the discussion of B.'s Jagadupādānatva here. In the first place, it will have to be clarified if the first three *adhikaraṇas* deny (i) the existence of the principle of Prakṛti *as such* or (ii) simply that terms like Avyakta and Ajā, used in the Śruti refer to it. The Samanvayādhyāya is not directly concerned with the denial of principles other than B. referred to in the Upaniṣads. Its concern is with the higher attunement of all such terms and contexts with B., on certain primary considerations—leaving their individual existence and functioning in their own respective spheres and their right to be designated by their own names in a lesser sense, intact. The non-existence of Prakṛti *as a principle* would not, therefore, be a valid inference from the Samanvaya of terms descriptive of Prakṛti in the Samanvayādhyāya. The question *could not, therefore, arise* as to which is to be accepted as the material cause of the world in the absence of Prakṛti. For, there is no absence of Prakṛti at all. The second alternative too would be to no purpose, unless and until it is also shown in the same breath that such terms as are supposed to be descriptions of Prakṛti and other principles and, therefore, discussed in this Pāda refer to B., instead. But *that has not been done* by S. (R. or the others).

22. *Nānyatretyatra sādhitam* (*Bhāmatī* i.4, 28).

Moreover, the non-existence of a principle like "Ākāśa" would *not* follow from the fact of the Samanvaya of a term such as "Ākāśa" in B. in i, 1.22. We cannot as a consequence of the Ākāśādhikaraṇa (i.1.22) ask—where should the world exist in the absence of *ākāśa* (space)? No such question has been raised by the Sūtrakāra or answered by him, following the Samanvaya of the term *ākāśa* in B. Why should the case be other with the Samanvaya of terms descriptive of Prakṛti in B.?

It is thus pointless to plead that B. is sought to be established as the material cause of the world in i.4.23-27 because of the annulment of Prakṛti as a consequence of the Samanvaya of terms like Avyakta. It should be clear from the procedure adopted by the Sūtrakāra with regard to terms like Ākāśa and their Samanvaya in B. where, in spite of such Samanvaya, the existence of Ākāśa etc., as distinctive principles and their normal functions in their own spheres have been freely recognized. The Sūtrakāra's discussion in ii, 3, 1-7, about the creation of Ākāśa by B. and other discussions over the order of creation of various principles (ii, 3 adh. 7) should be sufficient to establish this.

Even conceding such a farfetched plea in S.'s behalf, we should expect the present *adhi.* purporting to establish B. as the material cause of the world in place of Prakṛti to appear immediately after the first three *adhi.* here: in which the *aśabdatvam* of Prakṛti has been proved (according to S.) *once for all.* There is no reason why so important an issue should have been kept waiting till *adh.* 7.

S. and his commentators have raised the Pūrvapakṣa here from the point of view of empirical logic that B. can only be looked upon as the operative cause and not as the material cause also, because of the non-intelligent and impure nature of the world and other impediments. In the nature and fitness of things such logical objections ought to be refuted in the Yuktipāda (ii, 1) as has been done in the *Navilakṣaṇatvādhi* (ii, 1.4-11). So far as we can see, the Sūtras of this *adhi.* (even as is appears from S.'s c.) rely on Scriptural grounds and analogies[23] rather than on independent logical proofs to establish the material causality of B. That would not be the proper way to dispose of logical objections to Upādānatva.

The argument for Brahmopādānatva based on "Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānapratijñā", that unless B. is accepted as the material cause of the world, the thesis of the Upaniṣad that by knowing one all else is known would not be realized, is not so conclusive from S.'s point of view, as it appears to be. For, the Advaita admits *Prāgabhāva* and

23. Cf. the terms *Pratijñā, upadeśāt, āmnānāt*, and *gīyate* used in these Sūtras.

Avidyā as beginningless and, therefore, uncreated by B. These are not identical with B. They are conceived as different from B. Still, the thesis of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* is deemed to be maintainable. Similarly, the thesis of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* may stand unaffected even if we admit the operative and the material causes of the world to be different.

The Advaitin may argue the matter in a different way: If B. is not accepted as the operative cause also, we may have to accept some one else other than B. to be the operative cause of the world. As such an author of the world would not be comprehended by knowing B. the promissory statement *Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam* would be stultified.[24] To make it good, the nimitta and upādānakāraṇas of the world must be combined in one.

This is not also a conclusive argument. The examples given in the Śruti in connection with "*Ekavijñānena....*" pertain to material effects. This shows the promissory statement is with reference to material effects and their *material cause.* In so far then as one aspect of the cause is known by knowing B. as material cause, the world of effects becomes known. The promissory statement is thus made good even when the operative cause has *not* been made known in the process.

S.'s interpretation of the Sūtras here is worded ostensibly in favor of Pariṇāmavāda.[25] The *Bhāmatī* gives it a decidedly Vivarta turn.[26] If that be so, *Upādānatva* would consist in B.'s being the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world. In that case, the use of the term "Prakṛti" in the sense of a transforming cause would be improper—as the rope is not said to be the material cause of the (illusory) serpent. From the Vivarta standpoint, the correct knowledge of the substratum sublates the superimposed object. But then all that is made of clay is not superimposed on clay. Even when clay and clayness come to be known, they do not bring about the disappearance of the products of clay.

The wording of the second sūtra is not consistent with the requirements of Vivartavāda. The Śruti to which *abhidhyopadeśa* is taken to refer is "He wished may I become many and grow forth" (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6). It is *His Wish* that has been referred to as *abhidhyā* and *not* the wish *to become the substratum of illusory appearances.*

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24. *Bhāmatī,* i.4, 23.
25. एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः – उपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च (S.*BSB.* i.4.23).
26. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेण; अपि तु, यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् । (*Bhāmatī* i.4.27).

Dr. Radhakrishnan (The *Brahmasutra* p. 332) deplores that "the illustrations used are *unfortunate* in that they suggest that the world is also an illusion even as the appearance of the snake is".

The natural drift of Sūtra 25 consistent with the question raised in Sūtra 23 would require the term "ubhaya" (both) to be connected with the ideas of operative and material causes and *not* with the origination and dissolution of the world as S. has explained it.[27] The interpretation of the remaining Sūtras is also open to objections from the Vivarta point of view. The terms *prakrti, pariṇāma* and *yoni* used in the Sūtras do not readily fit in with the Vivarta interpretation. The presumption that the text of the *Chān. Up.* (vi.1.4-6) favors a material-cause and effect relationship between the pairs named in the illustrative passages is open to question. The presence of the words *eka, maṇi* and *piṇḍa* there makes it very difficult to establish such a relation for the simple reason that all that is made of clay in the world cannot possibly be accepted as the effect of "one" clod of clay. It would be presumptuous for us to put in that the author of the Up. has been rather loose and careless in wording his propositions. It may very well be that he intends to suggest some other explanation of the illustrations of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* on the basis of similarity and of the preeminence of B. as the source of all dependent realities. How inconsistent the thesis of Pariṇāmavāda is with the context may be seen from the example of the nail-cutter (*nakhanikṛntana*) which is in itself an effect *and cannot be the cause of anything else.* This example very nearly threatens to establish the converse of the proposition: that by knowing the effect, the cause is known; for the nailcutter is itself an effect (an article) made of *kārṣṇāyasa* (black-iron).

Thus, the advocates of Bariṇāma and Vivartavāda find themselves badly let down by the context of Samanvaya in the Sūtras and by the precise requirements of the illustrations used and their wording in the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.* The harnessing of the present *adhi.* for the purposes of establishing B. as the material cause of the world from the standpoints of the Pariṇāma and Vivartavādas cannot, therefore, be regarded as a successful venture.

Such interpretations may have originated with some very early commentators on the Sūtras and have gained wider currency thro' the prestige of influential successors. Still, the absence of a concensus of tradition on this point is shown by the conflicting pronouncements which have been made about the interpretation of the term "Pariṇāma" in the Sūtra, by early writers like Vākyakāra Brahmanandin, Bhāskara and Vācaspati.[28] S. was evidently the first to read Vivartavāda between the lines of the Sūtra here and elsewhere. It was his commentator Vācaspati Miśra who gave it a more forthright expression. R.

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27. इतश्च प्रकृति र्ब्रह्म, यत्कारणं साक्षात् ब्रह्मैव कारणमुपादाय उभौ प्रभवप्रलयावाम्नायेते । (Ś.*BSB.* i, 4, 25).
28. See *Kalpataru* on i, 4, 27.

with his roots in the Vṛttikāra's siddhānta could neither do away with Prakṛti altogether[29] nor reject Brahmanandin's view of Brahmapariṇāma completely. He found *a via media* by retaining the *language of Brahmapariṇāma* while fully utilizing the services of Prakṛti for physical transformation (of the world) and taking care to insist on the Brahmātmakatva of Prakṛti on account of its inseparable relation (*apṛthaksiddhi*) to B. as its 'body'. Some other commentators have toyed with the idea of the Pariṇāma of B.'s *Sacchakti* while treating its *Cicchakti* as the operative cause.[30] The inadequacy of these interpretations requires a fresh approach to be made to interpret the *adhi.* in strict conformity with the context of Samanvaya. And that is what M. has done.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. puts forward a special type of "Abhinnanimittopādāna" interpretation of the adhi. According to it B. is regarded as the Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) in so far as Prakṛti which is the changing (transforming) material cause is grounded in B. (*Brahmātmaka*) and has no separate existence apart or isolated from B. at any stage before, during or after the evolution.

It is clear from R.'s exposition that he does not regard Brahmacaitanya as transforming itself into the world of matter. It is Prakṛti that undergoes the actual physical development and change from the subtle to the grosser states, with B. being present equally in the unevolved state of Prakṛti and its evolved state. Thus the cause is unevolved Prakṛti *plus* B. and the effect is likewise evolved Prakṛti *plus*[31] B. Thus B. intersects both the points of the cause and the effect.

M. has made it clear that in his view also all change in the womb of matter is, in the final analysis, due to Divine impulsion. The stand taken by R. in so far as it seeks to assign the crucial position in causation to God or B. is unexceptionable and readily acceptable to M.[32] The only point that M. would urge is that the term "upādāna" be com-

29. See R. on B.S. i, 4, 3.
30. For a review of this theory See *NS.* p. 200 and my Philosophy of Madhvācārya, p. 172.
31. सर्वंचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया सर्वदा सर्वात्मकं परंब्रह्म कदाचित् विभक्तनामरूपं कदाचिच्चाविभक्चतनामरूपम् । यदा विभाक्तनामरूपं तदा तदेव बहुत्वेन कार्यत्वेन चोच्यते । यदा चाविभक्तनारूपं तदा एकमद्वितीयं कारणमिति च (R.*BSB.* i.4.23).
32. अपादानत्वमेवास्य यद्युपादानता भवेत् ।
अंगीकृतं तत् पितृवच्चैव विश्वात्मना भव: ॥ (*AV.* i.4.24-28).
एवंभूतं चोपादानत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽस्माभिरप्यंगीकृतमेवेति नात्रास्माकं प्रद्वेष: । (*J. NS*).

pletely eschewed in our references to B.'s role in causation, as this term, in its widely accepted currency in Śāstra literature stands for a 'transforming cause'. Its projection and intrusion into the Theistic Vedānta of R. creates an unnecessary misconception which it is better to avoid[32] in the interests of clarity of thought by using plain language without ambiguity and circumlocution. M.'s commentator has also pointed out that the Samanvayādhyāya is not the appropriate place for R. or anybody else to make any particular *adhi.* therein discuss the question whether B. is to be accepted as Abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇa of the world or not.

33. विकारिवस्त्वधिष्ठातृत्वमेव मुख्यमुपादानत्वमिति चेन्न; लोकविरोधात् । लोकव्यवहारानुसारेणैव हि परीक्षकलक्षणं कार्यम्; न स्वाभिप्रायेण लोकव्यवहारो नियन्तव्य: । (*NS.* i, 4.24-28).

CHAPTER XLV

BRAHMAN DENOTED BY NEGATIVES AND NEGATIONS AS WELL

7. *Etena sarve vyākhyātādhikaraṇam* (i, 4, 29)

This *adhi.* establishes the Samanvaya in B. of expressions like Asat, Śūnya, Abhāva, Tuccha etc. which have the sense of total negation. The application of terms like Strī, Prakṛti, Sūti etc. to B. in the sense of "directly bringing forth" may be accepted as it would not in any way affect the entity of B. But terms like Asat, Śūnya, etc. if applied to B., would cut at the very root of B.'s entity and bring about loss of its authentic being (*rūpahāni*) and make it a nullity. For, these terms convey the idea of pure non-being without essence. (*nis-svarūpa*). We cannot think of B. in this way. We cannot get over this difficulty with the help of the *Tadadhīnatvanyāya* and explain the application of such terms to B. in the sense that the void or non-being is subject to the power and control of B. and derives its characteristics from B. Non-being has no essence of its own. The possibility of its dependence on B. does not, therefore, arise.[1] We have, therefore, to exclude such terms from the scope of Samanvaya.

Quoting from *Mahākaurma*[2] M. explains the esoteric senses of the terms Śūnya, Tuccha, Abhāva, etc. which the *Mahopaniṣad*[3] applies to

1. स्वरूपशून्यस्य नियाम्यताभावेन पराधीनत्वायोगात् । (*TP.* i, 4.29).
2. शमूनं कुरुते विष्णुरदृश्य : सन् परः स्वयम् ।
तस्माच्छून्य इति प्रोक्तः तोदनात् तुच्छ उच्यते ॥
नैव भावयितुं योग्यः केनचित्पुरुषोत्तमः ।
अतोऽभावं वदन्त्येनं नाश्यत्वान्नाश इत्यपि ।
सर्वस्य तदधीनत्वात् तत्तच्छब्दाभिधेयता ।
अन्येषां व्यवहारार्थमिष्यते व्यवहर्तृभिः ॥ (*M.BSB* i.4.29).
3. एष ह्येव शून्य एष ह्येव तुच्छ एष ह्येवाभाव एष ह्येवाव्यक्तोऽदृश्योऽचिन्त्यो निर्गुणश्च ।
(*M.BSB.* i, 4.29).

B. The Supreme is called Śūnya, as it reduces the happiness of the wicked; Tuccha in the sense of bringing misery to the unrighteous[4] and remaining hidden from their view. It is Abhāva in that It is not fully comprehended by any one else. It is "Nāśa" in that it cannot be consumed (*na-aś*) by others.[5]

Non-being or the Void is *as much* under Divine dispensation as 'being' in its various aspects. This has been elucidated in earlier contexts as well.[6] It touches a crucial point of Theistic doctrine upon which M. has laid great emphasis in his writings. The Void or non-being owes its nature of being what it is—viz. Void or non-being to the will of God, even as 'being' owes its being to His Will.[7] This is the rationale of (Mystics) applying terms like Asat, Śūnya, Abhāva, etc. to B.—not that B. is in itself a void or non-being.

The Pūrvapakṣa thus brings up a fresh objection to Sarvaśabdasamanvaya by citing such counter-examples.

The Siddhānta is that tho' these words cannot be applied to B. in their generally accepted conventional senses of non-being, utter void etc., there is no difficulty in applying them to B. in their esoteric senses, which will not make any inroads on the positive nature and authentic being of B. as a being endowed with countless perfections.

This being the concluding adhikarana of this Adhyāya, the Sūtrakāra naturally takes *a bird's eye view* of all that has been said in the previous adhikaraṇas by way of Samanvaya and perorates—"Hereby all the terms so far discussed and various others (like Asat, Śūnya, Abhāva, Tuccha etc.) which remain to be attuned to B. should be understood to have been explained as applicable to B. in their primary senses—on the basis of the various principles of interpretation which have been embodied in terms of Tadadhīnatva, Mahadvacca, Camasavad, Pratijñā-dṛṣṭāntānuparodha etc.[8]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. interprets the Sūtra *Etena sarve vyākhyātaḥ* (i, 4, 28) as follows: Hereby all other doctrines concerning the origin of the world, such as the

4. *Gita* XVI. 19-20.
6. See Ākāśādhikaraṇa (*BS.* i.2.22).
5. न तद् अश्नाति किंचन । (*Brh. Up.* iii, 8, 8).
7. निषेधमुखवेद्यत्वादीनामपि भगवत्प्रेरणामन्तरेणानुपपत्तेः । न हि कारणमन्तरेण तन्नैव तदुपपद्यते ।
(*TP.* i, 4.29). Vyāsarāja puts its arrestingly:
उत्पिपादयिषेदेष यदि शृङ्गं शशादिके ।
गवादाविव जायेत तदभावादभूदसत् ।
[If God wills to endow hares with horns, as in the case of cows and bulls, they would surely grow on their heads. They are non-existent in hares because the Divine will has not chosen to realize them in hares].
8. एतेन (तदधीनत्वाद्युक्तिसमुदायेन) सर्वे शून्यादिशब्दा अपि व्याख्याताः । (*M.BSB.* i.4.29).

atomic theory, stand refuted by arguments analogous to those refuting Prakṛti's causality of the world. This does not seem to be the correct interpretation of this Sūtra. (Pradhānakāraṇavāda), Paramāṇu-kāraṇavāda, Śūnyavāda, etc. are going to be refuted in Adhy. II. pāda 2, even according to S. There is no need to think of censuring the atomic theory, Śuñyavāda and others here, again, by resorting to an *atideśa* which itself would seem to rest on very insecure foundations and take the trouble of discovering germs of the atomic theory and Śūnya-vāda in such harmless expressions of the *Chān. Up.* text (vi, 12, 1) as *aṇvyaḥ* and *na kincana*[9] "अण्व्य इवेमा धाना:; किमत्र पश्यसि, न किंचन भगव इति "

On the contrary, this being the concluding Śutra of the entire Samanvaya-Adhyāya, would it not be more natural to take it that the significant perorative *"etena"* (by this) has been used by the Sūtrakāra to recall in a flash the various principles of Samanvaya of Śrutis in B. which have been set forth by him in the course of the Adhyāya *till now* and provide for similar Samanvaya of such other terms, texts and contexts coming within the scope of this Pāda as have been left out or remain to be considered. Such an interpretation would not only be a fitting conclusion to the thesis of Samanvaya but also obviate the necessity of interpreting the term "vyākhyātāḥ" in the Sūtra in an unusual sense of "have been refuted".

Conclusion

Commentators of the Advaita school do not consider it necessary to recognize that Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. is intended to establish the position that B. is directly denoted and expressed by terms such as Ākāśa, Prāṇa, etc. chosen for Samanvaya in the various adhikaraṇas of this Adhyāya. Their view is that such words and the contexts in which they are used are merely shown to have their purport in B. without going further to establish any denotative relationship of the words with B. For, the probability of overpervasion of the definition of B. as Jagatkāraṇa (with reference to the various characteristics of B. embodied in the Viṣayavākyas of the adhikaraṇas of the Samanvayādhyāya) can be overcome by merely establishing B. to be the purport (*tātparyaviṣaya*) of the passages in question. As nothing more is to be gained by Samanvaya, there is no need to go beyond this and insist upon B. being directly denoted and expressed by the words chosen for Samanvaya and others brought in by Upalakṣaṇa. It serves no useful purpose and it is also without authenticity.

Many may be inclined to agree with this 'simple' view little realizing the philosophical implication of the position that B. is not directly

9. See *Kalpataru* i.4.28.

denoted or denotable by any of the terms whose Samanvaya is attempted in the Sūtras. They may consider the position taken by M., who is most particular about establishing a direct conno-denotative link between the words and B. (besides the tātparya)[10] to be unnecessarily complicated and carried to extreme limits.

It is, therefore, necessary to make clear the authenticity and purposiveness of the distinctive approach which M. has found it necessary to make to the concept of Śāstrasamanvaya in B. We have already seen something of the ultimate purpose which Samanvaya is intended to serve in the philosophy of B. according to M.'s way of thinking. We have also seen why M. insists on the conno-denotation of B. by all the terms selected for Samanvaya and how Samanvaya helps demonstrate the Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva of B. which cannot be done meaningfully without acceptance of Vācyavācakabhāva relation between B. and Scripture, in the highest senses of the terms employed. We have also seen that Samanvaya in M.'s interpretation of the Sūtras is not restricted to Kāraṇa-vākyas alone.

These two significant points should suffice to make clear the rationale of M.'s approach to Samanvaya—irrespective of our agreeing with his stand. M., however, feels that no student of the Śrutis and Smṛtis who is open to conviction can fail to be convinced by the justness and the justice of his point of view in regard to B.'s Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva. If we need a B. and must have one, It must necessarily be Sarvaguṇapūrṇa and not Nirguṇa and it must be within the province and the competence of the Brahmasūtras to convince us of B.'s Sarvaguṇapūrṇatva thro' Śāstrasamanvaya—because such a B. is *Śāstrayoni* (knowable only by the Śāstra).

As for the authenticity of the position taken by M., there are evidences galore from Śrutis and Smṛtis and Sūtras to convince the open-minded that they do presuppose the concept of B. being *actually denoted* by the terms employed in the Śāstras, *in addition to its being their purport.* Attention has already been drawn to many of these passages in relevant contexts of Samanvaya.[11] We have also seen how under the Sūtra i, 2, 28 S. himself has accepted that terms like Agni and Viśavānara connote B. thro' the root-sense of the words. Terms like Antaryāmi and Bhūmā referred to in the Sūtras are such as cannot be referred to any other being and they have to be accepted as directly referring to B.

10. M. holds that the Majesty of God or B. is the *Mahātātparya* of all Śāstras.

11. नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति (*Bhāllaveya Śruti*). तस्मादन्नं तदुच्यत इति (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 2). त्वं प्राणोऽभवः, यद्देवान् प्राणयो नव (*TĀ.* iii, 14). महान् भोगः, भुजःकरिष्यमाणः (*TĀ.* iii, 14). तं शतर्चिन इत्याचक्षते (*AĀ.* ii. 2, 1-2). ता वा एताः सर्वा ऋचः सर्वे वेदाः सर्वे घोषाः प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात् (*AĀ.* ii. 2, 1-2). एकं सत् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति (*RV.* 1, 164, 46) वचसां वाच्यमुत्तमम् (*Pravṛtta-Saṁhitā*).

R. has taken the position that as the world of matter and souls constitutes the 'body' of B. all the terms applied to them *'run up' to B.* This does not satisfy M. as it does not expressly admit that these words are also actually capable of directly denoting B. in their primary senses. For R.'s position that words refer to B. thro' the medium of what constitutes Its 'body' implies an element of Lakṣaṇā in their application to B.—just as in the Bhātta school of Mīmāmsā the meaning of the word is the universal,—the particulars being understood by the word thro' Lakṣaṇā. This would go against the spirit of the Śrutis and Smṛtis which make it clear that B. is the highest 'Vācya' (denoted) of words: *Vacasām vācyam uttamam.* Curiously enough, this text has been cited in his works by R. too.

According to R. words like *deva, manuṣya,* etc. refer to individuals as qualified by their respective bodies. Similarly, words like Ākāśa whose Samanvaya has been made the subject in the Sūtras would refer to B. as qualified by Ākāśa and other principles which are taken to constitute its body—as we have it in the Śruti text: *Yasya prithivi śarīram, Yasyākāśaḥ śarīram.* But this does not seem to be necessarily true. For in the predications Yasya pṛthvi śarīram, etc. we find the words Pṛthvī, Ākāśa, Agni, Ātmā, etc. standing only for the respective qualifying elements or principles (*kevalaviśeṣaṇa*) excluding the B. from their connotation. In some other passages as in *Sarvāṇi bhūtāni ākāśād eva samutpadyante* (*Chān. Up.* i, 9, 1) we find the term *ākāśa* used solely in the sense of the substantive (*kevalaviśeṣya*)—i.e. B. without reference to its body. In texts like *Ātmana ākāśas sambhūtaḥ* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1.) the application of the term ākāśā has to be restricted to the thing qualified (viśeṣya) as such and not to B. qualified by the element of Ākāśa (constituting its body). Otherwise, as only the qualified B. (viśiṣṭabrahman) can be the cause or the effect in R.'s philosophy, pure B. without the adjuncts of subtle or gross matter can neither be regarded as a Cause nor an effect. That being so it would be difficult to explain the anxiety of the Śrutis to uphold the view that B. is only the cause and is never born or produced,—a position which shows that in Ākāsas sambhūtaḥ" the word ākāśa refers only to pure *ākāśa*. In any case, in cosmological texts like *Ākāśād vāyuh* there would be no point in making B. enter into Ākāśa etc. as the Śruti does[13] as from R.'s point of view Ākāśa is already impregnated with B.—as it constitutes its body. To avoid such difficulties it must be conceded that at least in such cases, the terms *ākāśa, vāyu* etc. do not refer to Ākāśa, etc. as qualified by B. but simply *ākāśa, vāyu* as such.

12. संभूतिवाक्ये न विशिष्टपरत्वम्। तथात्वे हि विशिष्टे उपादानकारणत्ववत् कार्यत्वस्यापि सत्वेन, विशेष्ये कार्यत्ववत् कारणत्वस्याप्यभावेन, श्रुतिषु ब्रह्मणि कार्यत्वं निषिद्धय कारणत्वं न विधीयेत (*TC.* p. 840).
13. *Tat sṛṣṭvā tadeva anuprāviśat* (*Taitt Up.* ii, 6).

It would be difficult and too much to consider everything as the body of B. in the literal and physical sense of the term. It can only be so in a figurative and metaphorical sense that things depend on B. as the body depends on the soul. The Śrutis clearly assert that B. has no body in the physical sense of that term: *Aśarīram śarīreṣu* (*Katha* ii, 22) *Sa yaścāyam aśarīraḥ prajñātmā* ( ). If such texts mean that B. has no body which serves as the receptacle of its personal enjoyment and means thereof, like the ordinary human body, it would follow that Prthvi and others cannot be said to be the body of B. in the sense of serving as receptacles of its personal enjoyment. As a matter of fact, even the texts *Yasya pṛthvī śarīram* cannot be taken to make out that insentient Prthvī etc. are bodies of B. It should be clear from the further statements there: *Yam Pṛthvī na veda, yam ākāśo na veda,* etc. that it is the Abhimānidevatās of Pṛthvī etc. which have been spoken of there. This should suffice to show that it does not follow from the texts *Yasya pṛthvī śarīram* that these insentient principles are to be taken as the body of B. in the primary sense. R. himself has defined "body" as that which is in a position to be controlled and regulated by a sentient person for his own ends and whose essential nature it is to serve the interests of that person.[14] This makes R.'s concept of Śarīra as applied to Cit and Jaḍa akin to the concept of *Tadadhīnatva* accepted by M. It would also be difficult for R. to explain the text: *Anena Jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi* (Chān. Up. vi.3.2) as applied to B. For here the term Jīva according to him would have to denote B. which has the Jiva for its body. Now, as the text speaks of B. entering into the presiding deities of Tejas, ap and anna, here, it would come to mean that B. which has entered into the bodies of Jīvas enters (again) into these deities who are also Jīvas. It would not be possible for the Jīva to enter into deities as this interpretation would entail. All this shows how cumbersome it would be to explain the Samanvaya of various terms in the Sūtras in B. on the basis of R.'s criterion of *Śarīravācinām śabdānām śarīriparyantatā.*

The inadequacy of this criterion and the complications it creates have led M. to abandon it and take his stand on the criterion of B. being connoted and denoted by all such terms by *Paramamukhyavṛtti* based on Mahāyoga and *Mahārūḍhiyoga.* which takes into account various factors like *Tadadhīnatva, Kalpanopadeśa* etc. to establish such Samanvaya.

14. अयमेवात्मशरीरभावः पृथक्सिद्ध्यनर्हाधाराधेयभावः नियन्तृनियाम्यभावः शेषशेषिभावश्च । (*Vedārthasaṅgraha*).

द्वितीयाध्यायप्रथमपादीयसूत्रपाठः

* **स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात्**
  इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेः
  एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः
* **न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्**
  दृश्यते तु
* **अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम्**
  दृश्यते च
* **असदिति चेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात्**
  अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम्
  न तु दृष्टान्तभावात्
  स्वपक्षदोषाच्च
  तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः
  एतेन शिष्टा अपरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः
* **भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत्**
* **तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः**
  भावे चोपलब्धेः
  सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य
  असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात्
  युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च
  पटवच्च
  यथा प्राणादिः
* **इतरव्यपदेशात् हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः**
  अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्
  अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः
  उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेत् क्षीरवद्धि
  देवादिवदपि लोके
  कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा
* **श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्**
  आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि
  स्वपक्षदोषाच्च
  सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्
  विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम्
* **न प्रयोजनवत्वात्**
  लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम्
* **वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति**
  न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात
  उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च
* **सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च**

II AVIRODHA-ADHYĀYA

CHAPTER XLVI

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. THE FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITION

The purpose of this Adhy. is removal of opposition (*virodha*) to the main thesis established in the course of the various adhikaraṇas of the previous Adhy. It shows how B. is the source of all the eight-fold dispensations pertaining to the history of Matter and Souls and is as such the only Independent Reality endowed with infinite perfections and free from all the limitations of matter and souls. The two Adhyāyās are thus logically connected. The first paves the way for the second as it is only after the nature and attributes of B. have been fully established that the possibility of objections and opposition to such a conception of B. can arise and steps can be taken to counter them. The relationship between them can also be made out in another way. The conception of B. as set forth in Adhy. I has itself to depend for its stabilization on the effective removal of obstacles to its acceptance, if there are any. And they are many. As such a stabilization would owe its full-flegded being to the work done by this Adhy., it can also be looked upon as the outcome of the Avirodha-Adhyāya. This way of looking at the two Adhyāyas would reverse the relation of cause and effect between them[1].

It should be noted in this connection that in Adhy. I only such points of opposition as were pertinent to the actual Samanvaya of parti-

1. अतो विपरीतकार्यकारणभावलक्षणा अनयोः संगतिः । (*NS.* p. 230b).

cular texts and contexts in B. had been dealt with[2]. The opposition which the present Adhy. is intended to overcome is of a wider range. It is the opposition to the security of the foundations of belief in B. laid in Sūtra i, 1.2 as the One Supreme Reality conceived as the source of all the eightfold dispensations of matter and souls—a Reality which stands completely above and remains distinguished from all of them, in its essence and is the abode of infinite perfections and free from all their limitations—which is in short: *Sarvasattāpratītipravṛttiniyāmakam.* The dissenting voice of pure reason, the doctrines of various schools of philosophy not conforming to the traditions of Vedic thought, fully or in part, and even some of the apparent contradictions in the scriptural passages themselves, pertaining to doctrine or detail, pose a serious challenge to the said foundations of the philosophy of B. It is these powerful challenges that have to be met, if any finality is to be claimed for the Sūtrakāra's Siddhānta as established in the Samanvayādhyāya. It is precisely this task that the Avirodha-Adhyāya is intended to accomplish[3]. It is easy enough to see that unless all possible sources of opposition to the conclusions of the Vedānta, as established in Adhy. I are disarmed, there can be no lasting security to the foundations of belief in B. and no surety about the nature of the highest truth. Without such certainty, there can be no embarking on the next voyage of Dhyāna. And no truth which has not been processed by Dhyāna can be realized in Aparokṣajñāna. And without Aparokṣajñāna there is no possibility of Mokṣa. In this way, Avirodha-adhyāya has a vital part to play in the fulfilment of the Adhikārin's highest aspirations.

2. PĀDA-VYAVASTHĀ ACCORDING TO MADHVA

According to M. the four Pādas of this Adhy. deal with four kinds of opposition, presented respectively by (i) Yukti (pure reasoning); (ii) Samaya (schools of philosophy); (iii) Śruti texts as such and (iv) Śrutis supported by reasonings.[4] Tho' there are a few instances in Pāda iii of removal of opposition from Śruti texts supported by reason, there is no overlapping of Pādas as the supporting reasons in Pāda iv are derived by the texts in question from other Śrutis, while in Pāda iii such reasonings are independent of Śrutis.

The order of Pādas rests on the merits of the grounds of opposition—viewed in their ascending or in their descending order as the case may be. Opposition from reasonings comes first because pure reasonings are open to vagaries and are therefore of inferior mettle to systems of philosophy which deal with supersensuous data perceived by wise men and command wide acceptance. Śrutis by reason of their Apauruṣeyatva are still more authoritative than systems of philosophy spun by the cogitations of men. A bare Śruti text in its turn, is less powerful than one supported by reasons found in the Śrutis themselves.

Or, the opposition may be distinguished as internal and external. Opposition from external sources comes to be more quickly realised than internal rifts. It is, therefore, the first that has to be countered. Reasonings as such fall outside the range of verbal testimony on which much of Vedānta philosophy rests. The evidence of Śruti is thus nearer to Vedānta than reasonings which are thus external. Systems of philosophy propounded by individuals are also external to Śruti. Hence, they are taken up immediately after the disposal of *Yuktivirodha.* The *TC* explains the arrangement of Pādas in the ascending order of merit with a colorful analogy drawn from ancient military tactics:

पदात्यादिषु भग्नेषु गजाश्वादिप्रवृत्तिवत्[5] ।
युक्त्यादिषु निरस्तेषु समयादिप्रवृत्तित: ॥ (p. 844 b).

Opposition from pure reasonings is thus the first casualty of the Sūtrakāra's attack. Then comes the turn of philosophical schools and the opposition from the two kinds of Śrutis.

M. and J. prefer to explain the arrangement in the descending order of the importance of the oppositions confronted. The Sūtrakāra has given the place of honor and priority of attention to the refutation of opposition to his Siddhānta from pure reasonings. This is as it should be. For, all the four forms of opposition have ultimately to draw their strength from reason, in their own different ways. Reason, therefore, leads the opposition attack (and its refutation) in the Science of Inquiry into B. The second place is given to the various schools of philosophy established by individual thinkers and their followers. Even these systems have ultimately to establish their claims before the bar of reason. Even systems which repudiate Vedic authority base their arguments on reason to repudiate such authority. The followers of a particular school are indifferent to the claims of veracity put forward by the founder of another school. But no philosopher who values his reputation would care or dare to repudiate the authority of reason as such. For all these reasons, *Yuktivirodha* is given the first place.

As between Śrutivirodha and opposition from the schools of philosophy, the latter is more powerful because tho' sharing with the Śruti

2. एवं च द्वये विरोधा: परिहरणीया भवन्ति । द्वितीयसूत्रसिद्धसर्ववैशिष्ट्यविषया: शास्त्रसमन्वयविषयाश्च । तत्र द्वितीया " विकारशब्दात् . . .' इत्यादिना तत्र तत्रैव परिहृता: । (*Op. cit.* p. 306-07).

3. इति परिशेषात् सर्ववैशिष्ट्यविरोधपरिहार एव द्वितीयार्थ इति ज्ञायते । (*Op. cit.* p. 30-7).

4. यद्यपि युक्तय: पूर्वपादेऽपि सन्ति, तथाप्यागमगृहीतव्याप्त्यादिमत्त्वेनात्र प्रबला इति विशेष: । (*Op. cit.* p. 456b).

5. In mediaeval warfare, the infantry led the attack, the cavalry and other divisions bringing up the rear and going into action when the others were overpowered.

the claim to considerable antiquity and following, they derive their authority definitely from one person—their founder, unlike the Śrutis which cannot point to any such source for its authoritativeness. The opposition from Śrutis is thus considered after disposing of opposition from systems of philosophy. Thus, the arrangement of the first three Pādas is based on the principle of knocking down the top-wrestler (*mahāmallabhaṅganyāya*)—the disposal of the other adversaries being an easy job thereafter. The fourth Pāda is placed at the end as it deals with the conflict of Śruti and reason combined.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF PĀDAS ACCORDING TO ŚAMKARA

S. gives the division of Pādas on the following basis. Pāda i removes opposition to the Sūtrakāra's own Siddhānta from Sāṁkhya and other Smṛtis and their reasonings. Pāda ii shows how the Sāṅkhya and other systems of philosophy are founded on fallacious reasonings. Pāda iii resolves apparent conflicts among Śrutis in their accounts of the production of the five elements in the first part and conflicts touching the nature of the individual souls, their production, the question of their size, agency etc., in the second part. The last Pāda resolves conflicts of Śrutis regarding the nature of Prāṇas, their number, size, etc.

This classification shows many discrepancies. We do not have here *one single governing idea for* each of the Pādas i and iii. Sutras 10, 12 and 29 of Pāda i interpreted by S. as impugning certain corresponding doctrines of rival schools infringe on the province of Pāda ii. The explanation that the object of drawing attention to these defects in the doctrines of rival systems is to show how the Sūtrakāra's own position is not open to such defects would be equally true of the refutation of the doctrines of other systems in Pāda ii. Otherwise, Pāda ii would have no place in the Avirodhādhyāya. The overlapping created by the interpretation of the above Sūtras with the theme of Pāda ii cannot be overlooked as a casual affair as the doctrines of other systems have been impugned in them more than once or twice. The Siddhānta Sūtra ii, 1, 6 has been interpreted by S. as silencing an objection to B.'s causality of the world on the ground of disparity of natures between them, by establishing that disparity of natures is no bar to the relationship of cause and effect between two things, as we see in the birth of scorpions from cowdung and of hairs and nails from the human being. Curiously enough, Sūtra ii, 2, 11 has been used by S. *for the same purpose* of silencing the objection to the production of the unintelligent world from intelligent B. by quoting a parallel from the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the production from "spherical" atoms of binary compounds which are "minute and short" and of tertiary compounds which are "big and long"—but not anything "spherical". This gives us

another instance of resort to the removal of opposition to the Sūtrakāra's own position in both the Pādas.

Pāda iii cannot be restricted to the removal of conflicts pertaining to the elements alone. This is so only in three or four adhikaraṇas (ii, 3, 1-2; 4; 5). In the rest, we have according to S. himself discussions showing that B. is not a product, that the individual soul is eternal, that its nature is pure intelligence, that it is *Vibhu* in size and is an agent but only when connected with Upādhis and is further an *amśa* of B. This diversity of topics makes it difficult for him to bring them all under a single governing principle.[6] Apart from this, the discourse in ii, 3, 15 is about Prāṇa and the mind which are *indriyas* and not *bhūtas* (elements). If they are to be considered as elements because Śruti texts like *Chān. Up.*[7] vi. 5, 4, it may be pointed out that by the same token, the discussions regarding the production, number and size of the Prāṇas carried on in several *adhi-s* of Pāda iv (such as 1-4, 5-6; 7 and 8) should also have been taken over to Pāda iii.

According to S., Sūtras ii, 4, 20-22 discuss the question whether the act of bringing about the evolution of names and forms is the work of the individual soul or of God. This shows that the theme of Pāda iv cannot be restricted to the discussion of Liṅgaśarīra, as his scheme has it. As Pādas 3 and 4 also according to S. remove opposition to Sūtrakāra's own Siddhānta, as does Pāda i, it would seem more proper from S.'s point of view to place them both immediately after the first Pāda and take up Pāda ii which is an avowed refutation of other systems in the end. On the whole, the scheme of Pādas adopted by S. is wanting in cogency.

4. RĀMĀNUJA'S SCHEME OF PĀDAS

According to R. Pāda i, repulses possible objections against the Sūtrakāra's own view of B. as the world-cause. Pāda ii lays bare the defects to be found in the conception of the originating cause of the world as entertained by various systems of philosophy which are hostile

6. This difficulty does not exist for M. For even tho' the topics of Pāda iii, according to M. include discussions on Adhibhūta, adhidaiva, Paramātma and Jīva, they are all capable of being brought under one single governing idea of removal of conflicts in the statements of Śrutis regarding their nature, origination, attributes, relationship etc. Such an explanation cannot be availed of by S. For, if in spite of this difference in their subject matter, the several *adhi-s* of Pāda iii are to be treated as coming under one governnig idea of removal of conflict of Śrutis in respect of these topics, there will be nothing to distinguish this Pāda from Pāda iv which is *also* committed to removal of conflict of Śrutis regarding the nature of Liṅgaśārīra according to S. This is not the case with M. For him pādas iii and iv have distinctive criteria of removal of conflict of bare Śrutis and conflict of Śrutis augmented by reasonings contained in the Śrutis themselves.

7. *Annamayam hi somya manaḥ. Āpomayaḥ Prāṇaḥ etc.*

to Bādarāyaṇa's. Pādas iii and iv disarm objections which are likely to be raised in respect of the nature and modes of the Kārya or the world of Cit and Acid produced by B.[8] as described in the Śrutis.

There are discrepancies in this scheme also. For, as interpreted by R. Sūtras ii, 1, 10-11, refer to defects in a rival system. The Utpattyadhikaraṇa in ii, 2, 41-42, rebuts objections brought against the Sūtrakāra's own position. In several other places in Pāda ii such as Sūtras 12, 13, 21, 23, 24, 31-34, we come across objections raised against concepts other than the originating cause of the world, as such, in the rival systems. The discussion relating to Jīvātman in Pāda iii, Sūtras 10-20, shows that the scope of the Pāda cannot be limited to disarming objections raised against the world of effects; for the Jīvātman is essentially uncreated according to R. also. As in S.'s case, Pādas iii and iv purport according to R. to remove objections that may be brought against the Siddhānta. Their affinity with Pāda 1 in this respect requires them to be placed immediately after Pāda 1, so that they can all be read together without the intrusion of another Pāda with a different objective of refuting rival systems.

R. deems it necessary to devote one Pāda to the removal of objections in respect of the concept of the world-cause in the Siddhānta, another to urging objections against the conception of the originating cause in other systems and two to the removal of objections in respect of the nature and modes of Kārya or the world of effects produced by B. There is no reason why one of the last two Pādas could not have been utilized for a similar examination of the world of *effects,* its nature and modes as conceived *in the other systems* which would render the scheme as R. would have it much more balanced and symmetrical.

5. GENERAL OUTLINE OF ADHIKARAṆAS IN THE FIRST PĀDA

There are eleven *adhi*-s in this Pāda. The first three form one group. They raise certain objections against the validity of the Śrutis undermining the very proof of the existence of B. and refute them and stabilize the definition of B. as established in Sūtra i, 1.2. The first *adhi.* meets a challenge to Vedic authority on the ground of its alleged conflict with some of the Smṛtis. The second *adhi.* refutes objections to the validity of the Śruti on the ground of the invalidity of their prescriptive texts like those relating to the performance of the Kārīrī. The third refutes objections against the validity of the non-prescriptive texts like '*Mṛd abravīt*'.

8. इदानीं स्वप्रकाशस्य विप्रतिषेधदोषगन्धाभावख्यापनाय ब्रह्मकार्यतयाभिमतचिदचिदात्मकप्रपंचस्य कार्यताप्रकारो विशोध्यते । (R.BSB. ii. 3.1).

The next four *adhi*-s deal with different objections against the definition of B. raised while conceding the existence and the validity of the Śruti. The eighth *adhi.* refutes objections to B.'s causality of the world brought up on the ground that certain antinomies which make it impossible to regard the Jīvātman as a free and independent agent in his undertakings are equally applicable to B. and shows that B. is beyond the grasp of dry reasoning. The next two *adhi*-s bring out how B.'s nature remains untouched by any kind of imperfections by showing how the aim and purpose of B.'s eightfold dispensations of the cosmos are not open to adverse criticism, on grounds of absence of an acceptable purpose, or being open to partiality and cruelty. The concluding *adhi.* refutes objections to the concept of B. as both Sarvaguṇapūrṇa and Nirdoṣa which is implicit in the use of the term "Brahman" in i.1.1 and which has been shown to be elucidated by defining it as the author of the eightfold dispensations of the world.

CHAPTER XLVII

OPPOSITION OF NON-VEDĀNTIC SMṚTIS KNOCKED DOWN

1. *Smṛtyadhikaraṇam* (ii, 1, 1-3)

The first *adhi.* of the Yuktipāda quashes the opposition to the conclusions already established in the previous Adhy. from all the unacceptable Smṛtis which derive their authority from individuals who claim to have discovered the spiritual truths by their own Yogic powers or superior intelligence. While some among the Smṛtikāras accept Vedic authority, others do not. Among the former are those who do not subscribe to the belief in the Apauruṣeyatva of Śrutis. In the present *adhi.* all these Smṛtis, which for one reason or another, refuse to accept the conclusions established in the earlier *Adhy.* re. the nature and attributes of B. and its relation to the world of matter and souls are being refuted in a comprehensive manner.[1] The Smṛtis which come under the scope of the *adhi.* are the Śaiva, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Kāṇāda, Hairaṇyagarbha and others.

The *Pañcarātra Smṛti* is *not* included in this category. Dasgupta is thus wrong in saying that here according to M. "the Vedas lend no support to the traditional canonical writings (*Smṛti*) known as *Pañcarātra* or to those of the *Pāśupatas*..." (*Op. cit.* iv.p.139).

The Sāṅkhya, Śaiva (Pāśupata) and some other Smṛtis come under the class of non-Vedāntic schools of philosophy. They take their stand on what they consider to be irrefutable reasonings in support of their

1. Cf. Ata eva Sudhāyām Pāśupatārhatabaudhādīti Baudhādiśabdaḥ. (*TC.* p. 850b). The Pūrvapakṣas will, however, be of different complexion according to the attitude of these different Smṛtis to the question of Veda-apauruṣeyatva and the validity of the Smṛti. Cf. Atra eṣām pāśupatādīnām *** yad va kāṇādādi *** Baudhādimate tu *** ityeva Pūrvapakṣah (*TC* p. 849-50 b).

conclusions and they also draw upon Śrutis for support. Thus they present all the four kinds of opposition mentioned above.[2] For this reason they cannot be completely left out of the whole Adhy. They have to be accommodated somewhere within the Adhy.—either at its commencement or at its end. As there is no valid reason to defer their examination till the end,[3] they are taken up in their comprehensive aspect, at the very outset, in the opening *adhi.* of the first Pāda itself.

Pūrvapakṣa

The first half of the opening Sūtra[4] sums up the Pūrvapakṣa and the second[5] the Siddhānta. The Sūtra says: "If it be argued that in view of the Śaiva, Sāṅkhya and other Smṛtis having no room except for what they stand for, there is bound to be the adverse consequence of the defect of invalidity enveloping the Śrutis which teach B. as the highest source of all and that, therefore, it would be necessary to interpret the teachings of the Śruti in accordance with the teachings of the Pāśupata and other Smṛtis—we rejoin that because of the fact that certain other Smṛtis like the Pañcarātra have no room except as upholding the authorship of B. and its attributes as established in Adhy. I, the defect of invalidity would arise only in respect of the Śaiva, Sāṅkhya and other Smṛtis which are opposed to the Pañcarātra and other Smṛtis".

At the first reading, the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta appear to be equally matched and we seem to be heading towards a stalemate. Beyond the fact that the dispute is between two sets of Smṛtis, the picture presents no clear outlines. This baldness of the Pūrvapakṣa (and the Siddhānta) has to be rectified by breathing life into its roots[6] M. does it as follows:

The authors of the Smṛtis such as Sāṅkhya and Pāśupata are reputedly all-knowing. They are reliable persons. They have no *male fide* intentions of deceiving humanity. They have personally intuited the truths they have set forth in their writings for the benefit of humanity. For these reasons, their teachings cannot be set aside as unworthy of acceptance, simply because they conflict with the teachings of the Śrutis[7]. The Śrutis have no author to fall back upon.

2. *Op. Cit.* p. 850b line 9.
3. Cf. also वेदाप्रामाण्यवादिस्मृतेर्युक्तिसमर्यादिरूपाया अप्यत्र विरोधपरिहारेणान्ते निवेशनायोगात् । (Raghu. *TPB.* p. 190).
4. स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग: ।
5. इति चेन्न; अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसंगात् (ii, 1.1).
6. Sāmyāpādanamātre'pi parasyaiva jayo niścayapratibandhakatvād iti. Ato nirdalam pūrvapakṣam tāvad ujjīvayati *Āptair iti* (*NS.* p. 231).
7. Sarvajñā hi Rudrādayaḥ. Atas teṣām vacanavirodhe aprāmāṇyam eva syād iti cet. (M.*BSB.* ii, 1.1).

If their utterances come true sometimes, it is only a matter of chance—like the lines traced on the ground by the haphazard movements of ants presenting the appearance of a row of letters of the alphabet.[8] They cannot hope to command the completeness of thought or the fixity of meanings associated with the spoken and the written words of Āptas or responsible and trustworthy persons like the founders of the Smṛtis.[9] The Śrutis are too loosely worded and too unwieldy to be mastered by anyone. Without the advantage of a known and reliable author and a settled interpretative tradition, they are virtually incapable of establishing anything definitely in their own right. Their statements, such as they are, have, therefore, to be construed in accordance with the pronouncements of trustworthy persons of established reputation like the authors of the Smṛtis who have actually "visioned" the truths they have taught, by the power of Yogasiddhi or by their own natural gifts. The ruling of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā that Smṛtis conflicting with Śrutis lose their validity has reference only to Smṛtis which generally derive their authority from Śrutis in respect of the sacrificial ceremonial and Dharma. The Pāśupata and other Smṛtis do not derive their authority from the Śrutis but from the trustworthiness (*āptatva*) of their own authors. Hence, they stand their own ground. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in as much as the authoritativeness of the Pāśupata and other Smṛtis will be nullified by accepting the conclusions established by the Śrutis and their Mīmāmsā in respect of the nature of B. and its attributes, in Adhy. I, the latter are somehow to be interpreted so as not to conflict with the Pāśupata and other Smṛtis.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that it is only when the validity of the Pāśupata and other non-Vedāntic Smṛtis is conclusively established that we can presume on their authority to set aside the conclusions established in Adhy. I regarding the nature and attributes of B. But that is impossible; for, the Pāśupata and other Smṛtis are themselves confronted by another set of Smṛtis like the Samhitās of the Pañcarātra and of Manu which happen to be in perfect agreement with the teachings of the Śruti as established in Adhy. I. This is not just a case of one set of Smṛtis being confronted by another. The Pañcarātra Smṛti happens to be based on Vedic doctrines while the Pāśupata and others are not. This gives the former an advantage over the latter. There is no independent evidence of the trustworthiness of the authors of Smṛtis like the Pāśupata. The followers of different teachers readily believe in

8. Aspaṣṭatvamātre'yam dṛṣṭāntaḥ (Satyanātha, *AC*).
9. आप्तैः प्रत्यक्षतो दृष्ट्वा प्रोक्तमर्थं कथं श्रुतिः ।
पिपीलिकालिपिनिभा वारयेत् सर्वगा हि ते ।

(M.*AV*. ii, 1.Ver.5).

those to whom they owe allegiance and disbelieve in the wisdom and *bona fides* of the other teachers.

The Pāśupatas claim that the validity of their Āgama is capable of being tested in respect of its prescriptions within the empirical field. This surety of results following the performance of the rites as directed in them enables us to infer the validity of the other parts of the teachings of the Āgama relating to the purely supersensuous data. We are thus in a position to satisfy ourselves about the trustworthiness of the entire range of the Āgama.[10]

This contention is repudiated by the second Sutra: *Itareṣām cānupalabdheḥ* (ii, 1.2). It points out the limitations of the argument by showing how even within the realm of matters open to our own experience here and now there are miscarriages of results ascribed to the performance of particular rites enjoined by the Āgamas.[11] This discrepancy may be conceivably greater in respect of the transempirical objectives and their realization. It is only when the validity of a particular Āgama has been established on independent grounds that cases of discrepancy of results may be otherwise explained as being due to deficiencies in the performance or inadequacy of qualifications of the performer.[12] But where, as in the case of the Śaiva Āgamas, the validity of the transempirical parts of the Āgama has itself to be inferred from the correspondence between performance of the prescribed rites and the achievement of their promised results to be ascertained at the empirical level, there is no way of getting away from the fallacy of interdependence between the ascertainment of such correspondence and the validity of the prescriptions in question, in the face of miscarriages.[13] It is possible to look upon rare cases of such correspondence as purely coincidental[14] without any obligation to accept the validity of the Āgamas touching their prescriptions relating to supersensuous matters or

10. *Śaivādyāgamasamprāptadṛṣṭagena phalena tu*
Tadvākyopamayāncca pramāṇatve'numīyate. (M.*AV*. i, 1.3). This is fully endorsed by the account given in Srikumāra's C. on Bhoja's *Tattvaprakāśa:*
द्विविधो ह्यागमः दृष्टार्थोऽदृष्टार्थश्चेति । तत्र दृष्टार्थानां चित्रयागविधायकवाक्यसदृशानां तदुक्तकर्मानुष्ठानेन तदुक्तफलसंभवदर्शनात्, प्रामाण्यमनुमाय, तत्कर्तुरतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शित्वेन परमाप्तत्वनिश्चये, अन्येषामदृष्टार्थानामपि तत्कर्तृकतया दृष्टार्थवाक्यवत् प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते ।
(Trivandrum Skt. Ser. LXVIII. 1920. p. 27). This shows how well and correctly informed M. is about the traditions of other schools of his times.
11. प्रत्यक्षयोग्यत्वमितरेषामित्यनेनोच्यते । तासु स्मृतिषूक्तानामदृष्टादितरेषां फलानर्थानामुक्तानुष्ठानपरित्यागयोः कृतयोरपि प्रत्यक्षतोऽनुपलब्धेराप्तोक्तत्वानिश्चयादिति भावः (TP) न विद्यते उपलब्धिर्यस्यासावनुपलब्धिः उपलब्ध्ययोग्यः । तस्मादितरेषामुपलब्धियोग्यानां फलानामनुपलब्धेरनुपलम्भात् इत्येवं सौत्रानुपलब्धिशब्दः काकाक्षिवदुभयत्रान्वेति इति भावः । (*TC*. p. 851).
12. प्रामाण्यस्य हेत्वन्तरेण सिद्धत्वे च, वैगुण्यनिमित्तकता विसंवादस्य । (*TC*. p. 851).
13. न तु संवादेनैव सिद्धौ । अन्योन्याश्रयात् । (*TC*. p. 85).
14. क्वचित् संवादस्तु काकतालीयः । (*Op.cit.* 851).

pronouncements on the nature of ultimate truths. The Āgamas are not, therefore, on a par with the approved Smṛtis which derive their authority from Śrutis which are Apauruṣeya and are not, therefore, open to the foibles of authorship.

The concluding Sūtra meets a fresh argument in defence of the Smṛtis impugned that there is no such discrepancy to be seen in the fruits mentioned in the Yoga Smṛti following the practice of prescribed disciplines. The Sūtra points out that this assumption is not altogether correct; for even when the Yogic practices are carried out scrupulously according to instructions, the effects are not realized at exactly the same time or in the same order of succession as mentioned.[15] J. elucidates this point saying that 'Sweating is not followed by malleability of limbs as the practice gains in intensity—as mentioned in the works on Yoga.[16] Commentator Vādirāja is the only one to throw light on the precise meaning of the term '*Gātrabhañjanam*' used by J. He says it refers to the placing of the upper part of the feet etc. below the lower (anal?) region in what is called the *Kāmadahana-āsana.*[17] This should be a very interesting and valuable piece of information to students of Yogaśāstra.

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S.. and R. raise the Pūrvapakṣa on the following lines: The Vedāntic texts are multifaced. Their purport cannot be easily ascertained by the dull-witted who generally depend on others' judgment. The Smṛtis which are the writings of eminent persons help us in getting at the heart of the Śrutis. But Smṛtis such as those of Manu are concerned with things to be done (*anusṭheyaviśeṣapara*) and find their fulfilment in giving information about religious duties of Varṇas and Āśramas and their obligations. The Smṛtis of Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha and others, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with true philosophical knowledge and the means of release. They fathom the nature of established reality (*Siddhārtha*). They would, therefore, lose their right to exist if their competence to help us in ascertaining the nature of philosophical truth is denied or not taken advantage of, in finding out what the Śrutis teach. Hence, the Vedāntic texts should be interpreted in conformity with the findings of the Smṛti of Kapila that only non-intelligent Prakṛti is the cause and the source of the world.

The Siddhānta is: There are many passages in the Smṛti of Manu, and in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas which support the origination of the

15. उक्ताभ्यासे तत्काल एव फलादृष्टेः । (*M.BSB.* ii, 1.3).
16. तदुक्तफलानां स्वेदनगात्रभंजनादीनां प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धावपि, "प्रथमं स्वेदनं द्वितीयं गात्रभञ्जनम्" इत्याद्युक्ताभ्यासावस्थोत्कर्षसंपत्तिकाल एव स्वेदनादीनामदृष्टेः; आप्तोक्तत्वानिश्चयात् इति भावः । (*TP.* ii, 2.3).
17. कामदहनाद्यासनेषु पादोर्ध्वभागादेरधोभागादौ प्रापणं गात्रभञ्जनमित्युच्यते ।

world from a sentient cause like B. To avoid making them forfeit their right to exist, we have to interpret the Vedānta texts in conformity with *their* stand.

Criticism

There is not sufficient reason to entertain any misgiving at this stage about the Vedāntic texts being multifaced,—after all that has been said about the uniformity of their teaching about B. in i, 1, 10 and its demonstration in the entire Samanvāyadhyāya. The fear of Śrutis becoming weakened by the opposition from Smṛti has already been eliminated in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā—which is acknowledged to be the prior treatise (Pūrvatantra) by showing that the injunction of the Smṛti about the whole stump of the Udumbara (tree)[18a] having to be covered up with a piece of cloth is to be disregarded (wholly or in part) in the face of the Śrauta injunction "He sings after *touching* the Udumbara".

It is not also proper to restrict the scope of this *adhi.* to the Smṛti of Kapila *alone* as S. and R. have done,[18b] when the area of discourse can very well be extended to all non-Vedāntic Smṛtis, such as those of Kanāda, Bauddha Jaina, Pāśupata, etc. S. has put in that tho' there are many other Smṛtis such as Bauddha and Jaina dealing with philosophical problems, the Sānkhya and Yoga have been singled out for refutation here (ii, 1, 1-2; 3) because they are widely known as offering the means of accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favor with many competent persons and are also strengthened by scriptural references to them. This is not convincing argument. For the other Smṛtis are also reputed to be the works of very wise and trustworthy persons and possess great inherent weight; and enjoy wider popularity among competent persons. The plea that these other Smṛtis are going to be refuted in the next Pāda would apply to the Sānkhya also. There is, therefore, much to be said in favor of interpreting the opening *adhi.* as focussing attention in a comprehensive way on the opposition to the conclusions established in the first Adhy. from all non-Vedāntic Smṛtis without exception, each in its own way and disarming it.

According to S. and R. the second Sūtra shows that some of the principles accepted by the Sānkhya Smṛti such as "Mahat" are not to

18a. The stump of an Udumbara, measuring to the height of the Yajamāna, is required to be set up in the south west of the Sadas. According to the Sruti this is required to be touched by the Udgātṛ before he begins his chant.
18b. तत्र प्रथमं तावत् स्मृत्यविरोधमुपन्यस्य परिहरति। स्मृतिश्च तन्त्राख्या परमर्षिप्रणीता अन्याश्च तदनुसारिण्यः। तासु च, अचेतनं प्रधानं स्वतन्त्रं जगत्कारणमुपनिबध्यते (S) प्रथमं तावत् कपिलस्मृतिविरोधात् वेदान्तानामतत्परत्वमाशङ्क्य तन्निराक्रियते (R)

be perceived either in the Vedas or in ordinary experience. We have seen under B.S. i, 4, 12, how most of the principles of the Sānkhya cosmology have been recognized in the Śrutis, Smṛtis and Purāṇas.

S. and R. put up Sūtra ii, 1.3, as a separate *adhi.* in refutation of *Yoga-Smṛti* on the ground of a further objection (*adhikāśaṁkā*) that the latter finds recognition in the Śrutis such as *Kaṭha Up.* ii, 3, 8. This overlooks the fact that the Sānkhya too has been recognized along with the Yoga in *Śvet Up.* vi, 13. If the term "Sāmkhya" there stands for knowledge conforming to Vedic tradition (and not to that of the Smṛti of Kapila) the term Yoga there, can also be similarly understood as the means of acquiring such knowledge and not to the type of means hostile to Vedic teaching associated with the Yoga Smṛti.

CHAPTER XLVIII

ŚRUTIS AND VEDĀNTIC-SMṚTIS HAVE A HIGHER STATUS

2. *Na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇam* (ii, 1.4-5)

This *adhi.* establishes that the Śrutis and the Vedāntic-Smṛtis which derive their authority from them have a status quite different from the Smṛtis impugned in the prevous *adhi.* and are not to be compared with them in point of validity.[1] In the case of the Śrutis, such higher status (*tathātva*) consists in their being eternal and without an author and, therefore, enjoying an intrinsic validity of their own. In the case of the Vedāntic Smṛtis, this superior status lies in their being based completely on the teachings of the Śruti (*Śrutimūla*).

This higher status of the Śrutis (and of Vedāntic Smṛtis) is sure to be challenged by powerful reasonings. The very basis of the doctrine of intrinsic validity of Śruti and the concept of a verbal testimony being without an author and being eternal are open to question. The opposition may also point its finger at the numerous instances of miscarriages of promised results observed in the performance of particular rites prescribed in the Śrutis. If the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. and the nature and attributes of B. as established in Adh. I should be irrefragable, these powerful objections from reasoning must be met. This is what the present *adhi.* does.

The first objection is met by showing how the Śrutis are intrinsically valid like Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa and do not depend for their validity on extrinsic factors (*guṇas*) such as being the utterances of a trust-

1. नैवं श्रुतेस्तदनुसारिस्मृतेश्च तदुक्तानुपलब्धेरप्रामाण्यं वाच्यम् । विलक्षणत्वात् नित्यत्वात्, तदनुसारित्वाच्च । (*M.BSB.* ii, 1.4)

worthy person (*āptoktatva*). The capacity of a Pramāṇa to produce correct knowledge may be obstructed by certain flaws in other cases; but not in what is *ex hypothesi* 'Apauruṣeya' and eternal. This is the distinctiveness (*vilakṣaṇatva*) of the Śruti to which reference has been made in the Sūtra. The Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. has been made on the basis of such a Pramāṇa. It cannot, therefore, be set aside or modified to any extent by the opposition of reasonings however clever or imaginative. The miscarriage of results of particular rites, where met with, has, therefore, to be ascribed to some defect in the performer (*kartṛvaiguṇya*) or to some insufficiency of the means employed (*sahakārivaiguṇya*) or the presence of powerful obstacles (*pratibandha*). When these are remedied, the results are bound to be realized as promised.

The other objection that Śruti cannot lay claim to any validity at all is too sweeping to be entertained. As a body of words, the Śrutis are perfectly capable of acting as a means of proof. Means of proof are accepted as valid if they are capable of discharging their function efficiently. The Śrutis obviously have such a power. Otherwise it would be impossible to conceive of any possibility of miscarriage of results in any particular instance as such.

The only things that can deprive a statement of its validity are defects such as inability to convey a cogent sense or conveying a contrary sense. All such defects ultimately reduce themselves to defects of persons who make such statements. As the Vedic statements are by hypothesis eternal and have no author they are *ipso facto* free from the flaws to which mortals are liable. Once the validity of a Vedic statement is thus established as *sui generis* cases of miscarriage of results can be satisfactorily accounted for as indicated above. The eternality of the Śruti (*tathātvam*) is known from statements such as *Vācā Virūpa nityayā* (R.V. viii, 64, 6). References in the Śruti ascribing Vedic utterances to individuals are to be understood in the sense of their having been propagated by them. Once the validity of Śruti is established, it can be shown that Vedāntic Smṛtis like the Pañcarātra and the Purāṇas are also valid as they are faithful to Vedic teaching.

Thus the first part of the opening Sūtra establishes that the Śrutis and Vedāntic Smṛtis are not exposed to invalidity like the impugned Smṛtis because the Śruti has the characteristics of eternality (*nityatva*) and, therefore, of being authorless (*apauruṣeyatva*) and of its intrinsic validity not being dependent for its genesis or ascertainment on considerations of its coherence or agreement with some other knowledge or the realization of fruits. This distinguishes it (*vilakṣaṇatvāt*) from

the impugned Smṛtis. The latter part of the Sūtra conveys that the above characteristics of the Śruti (*tathātvam ca*) are borne out by Śabdapramāṇa (*śabdāt*[2]). The validity of Smṛtis faithful to the Śrutis follows as a matter of course.

The second Sūtra *Dṛśyate tu* repudiates the objection that sometimes there are miscarriages of results in the performance of rites prescribed by the Śruti and emphasises that the fruits promised by Śruti *are realized*[3] by competent persons—i.e. proper Adhikāris who fulfil all the conditions laid down.[4] Such persons are known to exist tho' they may be very few nowadays.

2. अस्य श्रुत्यादेस्तथात्वं शैवादिस्मृतिवदप्रामाण्यं न। श्रुतावपौरुषेयत्वादिरूपस्य श्रौतस्मृतौ च तदनुसारित्वरूपस्य वैलक्षण्यस्य सत्वात्। तथात्वं वैलक्षण्यं चापौरुषेयत्वरूपं संवादानपेक्षत्वरूपं च (*TC*. p. 854)
3. Dṛśyate tu adhikāriṇām phalam. (M.*BSB*. ii, 1, 5).
4. Tur adhikāriviśeṣadyotakaḥ. (Rāgh. *TDP*).

CHAPTER IL

CONCEPT OF PRESIDING DEITIES OVER INANIMATE PRINCIPLES

3. *Abhimānyadhikaraṇam* (ii, 1, 6-7)

This *adhi.* repulses another rationalistic objection to the validity of the Śrutis on whose Samanvaya the doctrine of B. had been built in the first *Adhy.* The preceding *adhi.* had defended the validity of Śrutis against the specific objection of the failure of rewards promised in the Śrutis' prescriptions like that of the Kārīrī sacrifice.[1] It was shown there that such failures are really due to the non-fulfilment of the prescribed conditions and are not a reflection on the Śrutis.

The present *adhi.* refutes what is to be deemed as the most formidable objection of rationalism that the Śruti abounds in absurd statements ascribing to inanimate things like the earth, the waters, fire, herbs and stones intelligent activities like speaking,[2] perceiving,[3] hearing,[4] desiring and so on. One text actually refers to a quarrel among Prāṇas[5] which are themselves sense-organs which cannot have other sense organs of their own. All this vitiates the case for the higher status of validity which the Vedānta has so loftily claimed for the Śrutis in building its edifice of Samanvaya upon them.

The present *adhi.* is thus called forth by a fresh objection to the thesis of Vedaprāmāṇya and it rests on a well-founded concomitance

1. A sacrifice prescribed for the production of rain.
2. मृदब्रवीत् । आपोऽब्रुवन् ।
3. ता आप ऐक्षन्त ।
4. श्रृणोत ग्रावाण: ।
5. *Brh. Up.* vi, 1, 7.

(*vyāpti*) of the reason with the predicate of the proposition and its presence in the proposition to be proved by the syllogism (*pakṣadharmatā*[6]) while the earlier objection was on purely negative considerations. There is also another powerful consideration here that even tho' the Śruti has been accepted as eternal and flawless, sound reasoning resting on irrefutable *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* is equally to be reckoned with as '*niravakāśa*'. The conflict then of the Śruti with such strong reason (*dṛdhayukti*) cannot be brushed aside without a satisfactory solution.[7]

The solution is offered by the Sutra: *Abhimānivyapadeśastu viśeṣānugatibhyām*, by formulating the principle of 'Abhimāni devatās' or presiding deities. There is no need to reject the validity of the Śrutis on the ground that they ascribe intelligent functions like speaking, hearing, etc. to inanimate things like the earth and waters. The fact is that only some sentient beings are primarily referred to by those terms, 'earth', 'waters', etc., by reason of such beings exercising a measure of control and superintendence over them.

The concept of 'Abhimānidevatās' is bound to raise some further questions. Do these deities pervade the principles fully wherever they are or pervade only a part of them? If they pervade fully, have they their own bodies; or are they to be regarded as bodiless? If they have bodies of their own those should be visible to us. If they are bodiless beings and *ergo* without sense organs there would be difficulty in explaining statements ascribing the acts of seeing, speaking, etc., to them. If the deities pervade only some parts of the elements they can as well be dispensed with; for, if the other parts of the elements which they do not pervade can exist without their pervasion, the parts they pervade can also afford to exist without their pervasion.

Thus, without the help of this concept, it would be impossible to establish any rapprochement between the elements and a particular sentient being who will act as the *dues ex machina* in making intelligible propositions out of such statements of Śruti as *Mṛd abravīt*. The concept is forced upon us if we want a rational reconciliation between Śruti and Yukti. Otherwise, we have to dismiss such statements of the Śruti as babblings of child humanity. Even the Pūrvapakṣin here is not

6. *NS.* p. 279 b.
7. We are concerned here with the elements in primordial creation. Hence it cannot be ascertained by our present Pratyakṣa that these elements were incapable of speech etc. As the *TC* points out (p. 856-57 b), the inanimate character of the primordial elements is inferred from the earthiness, etc. characteristic of the earth open to present perception. The incompatibility of inanimateness with the power of speech etc. is much more patent than that between earthiness and the power of speech. Hence insentiency had been made the ground of the objection in disputing the validity of the statements of the Śrutis quoted. In this way, these instances come under the scope of '*Yuktivirodha*'.

an iconoclast bent upon denying the validity of Śruti for the mere pleasure of it or out of spite. As there are always two sides to a question, it is a fair question to him as to why he should not pay attention to finding some constructive way of making such statements intelligible to us without prejudice to the validity of the Śruti? As Samanvayācārya of the Śruti-siddhānta, the Sūtrakāra has shown the way how to do it.

The second Sūtra of the *adhi*: *Dṛśyate ca* (ii, 1.7) shows that these Abhimānidevatās are open to the perception of the great Yogins and their exalted powers are also experienced by them. This is also endorsed by the statements recorded in the Purāṇas.[8]

M. has made it clear in his *AV* that the terms like *Mṛt, Āpah,* etc. in these contexts are to be understood as having been applied to the Abhimānidevatās *directly* and *primarily* and not by secondary signification (*lakṣaṇāvṛtti*). The latter is resorted to only when there is any serious obstacle or incompatibility in accepting the primary sense. In the present case, the Śrautaprayoga itself bears testimony to the fact that the terms are used in the sense of the *Abhimānis.* We have also seen how by Arthāpatti-pramāṇa, it is established that these terms refer to the deities and not to the elements *as such.* It is a case of *Vidvadrūḍhi* while the meanings commonly associated with those terms are based on the usage of the uninitiated (*bālarūḍhi*). J. points out here that the very fact that the Sūtrakāra has taken the trouble to introduce the concept of Abhimāni-devatās here, instead of being satisfied with the simple explanation of the difficulty that it is a reference to some Cetana or sentient being, speaking thro' the earth etc. is significant. A reference to some Cetana would meet the difficulty only partially. The implication of the concept of Abhimāna is that the powers and characteristics of the Abhimanyamāna are dependent on the Abhimāni. This brings it within the ambit of the principle of *Tadadhīnatvāt arthavat* (B.S. i.4.3) already explained and confers the right of application of words referring commonly to the controlled, to the controlling principle, in the primary sense. As such controlling agencies, the Abhimānidevatās are here primarily referred to by the Śruti statement such as *Mṛd abravīt.* The validity of the Śruti thus stands vindicated.

8. M. has cited a relevant passage from the *Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa:*

पृथिव्याद्यभिमानिन्यो देवता: प्रथितौजस: ।
अचिन्त्या: शक्तयस्तासां दृश्यन्ते मुनिभिश्च ता: ।
ताश्च सर्वगता नित्यं वासुदेवैकसंश्रया: ।।

CHAPTER L

PRIMORDIAL ANTECEDENT NEGATION IS NOT THE AUTHOR OF THE WORLD

4. *Asad-adhikaraṇam* (ii, 1, 8-13)

The *adhi.* refutes the rationalistic position deriving support from certain statements in the Śrutis which apparently favor the view that antecedent negation of the world (*Viśvaprāgabhāva*), existing in the state of Mahāpralaya or the great dissolution, is the sole cause, author and creator of the Universe[1] and not B. The Śrutis in question are:

1. This is different from the refutation of '*Asatkāraṇavāda*' or *Śūnyavāda* of Buddhistic philosophy refuted in ii, 2, 26-29. According, however, to Raghūttama's *TP.B.*, M.'S. *BSB* and *NV.* and J''s cc. on them refute the causality of Asat in the sense of Śūnya apparently derived from the Śruti in this *adhi.* and not the causality of *Viśvaprāgabhāva.* He thinks that it is only in *AV* and *NS* that the latter view is refuted. Following the *TC.* Rāghavendra's *TCP* (p. 859) is for adopting a uniform interpretation in the *Bhāṣya* and *AV* etc. in terms of the causality of Prāgabhāva. He is not convinced by Raghūttama's arguments. His objections are that if in the pūrvapakṣa of the present *adhi.* we are to make *Asat* stand for absolute nothingness (*tuccha*) it would (i) not fulfil the definition of a cause as an invariably and unconditionally existing antecedent (*niyataprāksattvavat*) and (ii) the predication of existence with reference to this Asat in the Śruti (*Asad evedam agra āsīt*) would be incongruous. Even if *Asat* is understood in the sense of *Śūnya,* the objection will hold that being *nissvarūpa,* it cannot be a *pre-existent* 'cause'. On the other hand, if Śūnya is to be conceived as having some *svarūpa* of its own, the objection raised in the reading of the text of *TP: Nahi śaśaviṣāṇādīnām yatkiṃcit prati kāraṇatvam sambhavati iti bhāvah* quoted by Raghūttama (in his support) will be out of place. The *TCP* therefore argues that the Bhāṣya text; *Samayasya upari niṣedhāt* is best explained as disposing of a doubt as to why it cannot be presumed that the causality of Śūnya itself, accepted in the Buddhist school is being refuted here. In this view, the passage: *Nahi ṣaśviṣāṇādīnām**** of the *TP* (even granting its authenticity) can be explained as embodying an analogical argument against accepting the agency of Prāgabhāva (*Yatha śaśavisāṇāder na kāraṇatvam tathā prāgabhāvasyāpi na kartṛtvam iti dṛṣṭāntaparatayā*). The incompatibility of this passage could not be got rid of in the

"In the beginning of the world there was Asat (*Chān. Up.* vi, 2.1)". "At the time of primordial creation, being was produced from non-being (*R.V.* x, 72, 2cd)".

As the objection raised in the Pūrvapakṣa of the previous Sūtra was based on a well-founded reasoning (*dṛḍhayukti*), the present *adhi.* proceeds to examine another presuming to derive support from the Śrutis themselves which would make its reasoning stronger still (*sudṛḍha*). Hence the inclusion of this *adhi.* in the present Yuktipāda is justified. J. has fully explained in his *NS* (p. 282) how the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhāntanyāyas of the present *adhi.* are quite different from those of the preceding one and how, therefore, it is not rendered superfluous.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa contends that the authorship of the Universe ascribed to B. in Adhy. I is unsustainable for want of proof. The texts *Sad eva somya idam agra āsīt; Tat tejo'sṛjata* etc. cannot be deemed to be adequate to establish B.'s causality. These texts are opposed to powerful reasonings aided by the Śrutis themselves. It must be admitted by all that in the state of Mahāpralaya, there exists only the antecedent non-existence of all the things to be brought into being later. Otherwise, the production of effects at the beginning of creation would be impossible.[2] As this universal antecedent negation has not worked itself out in any other direction, it will have to be accepted as the sole originating cause of all the effects to be produced such as Mahat, Ahamkāra, etc. in as much as it is the unconditional and invariable antecedent.[3]

This reasoning carries with it two important implications: (i) That except the antecedent negation, no positive entity or being exists or can be supposed to exist in the state of Mahāpralaya. This completely eliminates God or B. and many other principles such as

other view which makes Śūnya figure in the Pūrvapakṣa; for Śūnya is regarded as a "tattvam" by the Buddhist and not as something *nissvarūpa* which could be compared with the hare's horn.

Until these objections of the *TCP* are met, it would be difficult to agree to the suggestion of the *Abhinavacandrikā* that the two interpretations may be regarded as alternative explanations (*varṇakāntara*) of the same Sūtra one following the Bhāṣya tradition and the other that given in the AV. The TC. as the earliest c. on the *TP* that we now have, seems to have had the reading supporting the agency of Prāgabāva before it, as it is actually quoted in the *TC*. The *TPGD* of Vādirāja also follows the position taken by the *TC*: अतोऽसदेव जगत्कारणम्' इति वदन् पूर्वपक्षी सावधारणत्वात् , प्रागभावकारणतायाः सर्वैरङ्गीकृतत्वात् च, अस्मद्वाक्यमेव प्रबलमित्यभिप्रैति (*op. cit.* p. 67).

2. प्रागभावप्रतियोगि कार्यम् ।

3. महाप्रलयवर्ती कार्यप्रागभावो महदादिकार्यकारणं भवितुमर्हति । अन्यत्रानुपक्षीणत्वे सति नियमेन तत्पूर्वभावित्वात् । (*NS.* p. 283 b)..

Time and Jivas which the Theist believes to be existing in Mahāpralaya. This can be demonstrated by a simple reasoning that all positive substances and entities cease to exist in Mahāpralaya,—like Mahat and other Tattvas. (ii) With God or B. and all other entities having been thus ruled out of existence in Mahāpralaya and given that Universal antecedent negation alone survives in that state and given also that it is the necessary and invariable antecedent of all that is to be produced, it follows that it must be accepted as the sole and only cause and author of all that is to be.

It cannot be argued by the Theist that an effect requires or presupposes not only a cause but a creator also; and that God or B. will have still to be admitted as the Creator. The non-existence of God or of any other entity during Mahāpralaya has been established by reasoning.[4] We have, therefore, to rest content with looking upon antecedent negation alone as the Author of all. Such a conclusion cannot be upset by certain Śrutis making B. the cause of the world. For there are indeed Śrutis at the disposal of the Pūrvapakṣin stating that at the beginning of the world there was only antecedent non-existence; that 'this non-existence' took it into its 'mind' (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2.1) and 'from Asat Sat came into being' (   ) and so on.

As Prāgabhāva has a nature and essence of its own, 'antecedent negation existed in the beginning' is not a self-contradictory proposition. There is no substance in the objection that antecedent negation is never known to be both the material cause and the creative principle (*kartṛ*). For, it can be easily returned by the Pūrvapakṣin that in matters beyond the empirical, we have to abide by the pronouncements of the Śruti.

The further objection that if Prāgabhāva were admitted to be both the material cause and the creator, there will be an interminable creation since both the *nimitta* and the *upādāna* are combined in one and the same principle, will have to be met by the Siddhāntin also. If the Brahmavādin seeks to overcome this difficulty by appealing to Divine Will, the Pūrvapakṣin can also appeal to the text which ascribes a similar will to antecedent negation. (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2.1).

Siddhānta

This is refuted by the opening Sūtra: *Asad iti cenna pratiṣedhamātravāt.* It is to be construed as follows: "If it is contended that Universal antecedent negation (existing in Mahāpralaya)[5] is the

4. ईश्वरादिकं प्रलये असद्भवितुमर्हति । भावत्वात्, महदादिकार्यवत् । (*NS.* p. 283*b*),

5. The term '*apītau*' (meaning in Mahāpralaya) is taken over from the next Sūtra and construed with the opening word *asat* so as to give the intended sense (Rāgh. *TDP*).

sole cause and author of the world (and not B) we point out that it cannot be; for antecedent negation is negation pure and simple.[6]

This cryptic statement of the reason has to be fully elucidated. The elucidation has been given by M. in his *AV* and by J. in his *NS* and *TP*. A pure negation falling under the category of Abhāva can have neither volition nor conation and without these it can never be the creator of anything, let alone a stupendous Universe such as ours. The text *Tan mano 'kuruta* (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 2.1) admits of a satisfactory explanation as referring to B. to whom the term Asat has been applied under BS. i, 4.29.

The second Sūtra: *Apītau tadvatprasaṅgād asamañjasam' refutes* the Pūrvapakṣa by drawing attention to the undesirable consequence of everything being reduced to complete non-existence in Pralaya.[7] This again is a cryptic statement requiring elucidation. The point is this. As the Pūrvapakṣin holds that antecedent negation is the cause of all things that exist, all these existents shall have to be merged in their cause during Mahāpralaya and be reduced to complete non-existence. This would do away with God, Time Jīvas, Adṛṣṭa, etc. Leaving aside the question of God, the existence of Time *in Mahāpralaya* cannot be disputed; for the conception of Mahāpralaya itself presupposes the conception of Time. This has been deftly pointed out by the Sūtrakāra by using the term '*apītau*' (in the locative).

At least one witness to the utter destruction of all in Mahāpralaya must be there to give respectability and credence to the inference that in Mahāpralaya everything is reduced to non-existence. If such an original witness is there, the inference that none survives in Mahāpralaya would be falsified; and for aught we know that surviving witness to Mahāpralaya may very well be the God of the Theist who will originate the fresh creation from the antecedent negation by His Will

6. *Pratiṣedhamātravāt*. According to M. the term *mātra* is necessary here to pinpoint the essential nature of antecedent negation *as negation pure and simple*, as given in the first act of its perception, as distinguished from its perception with its other aspects of existence or knowability, which are also part of its essence but which can be kept isolated in thought thro' the play of Viśeṣas. The term *mātra* excludes also negativeness of character in which a positive substance may come to be perceived as when the reciprocal negation (*anyonyābhāva*) of a given thing from another is conceived as being identical with its essence. The negation intended to be emphasized here in the Sūtra is not such negation but *negation in its own right and essence as given in the first act of perception* and not one brought about thro' an identity-relation with a negative attribute. For fuller discussion of the topic see *AV* and *NS* pp. 284-85. Vādirāja puts the matter succinctly:

धर्मिमादायाभावात्मकता अन्योन्याभावात्मके घटादावप्यस्ति । प्रागभावस्तु न तथा । धर्मिस्वरूपपर्यालोचनयैव अभावः । एवं च, सौत्रमात्रपदव्यवच्छेद्यो धर्मरूपेणैव प्रतिषेधः । सौत्रहेतोस्तु धर्मिस्वरूपेणैव प्रतिषेधत्वं विवक्षितम् । (*TPGD*. p. 67).

7. असत उत्पत्तौ प्रलये सर्वासत्त्वमेव स्यात् (*M.BSB.* ii, 1, 9). "तद्वत्" इत्यत्र तच्छब्दः प्रकृतासत्त्वपरोऽवधारणमात्रशब्दशिरस्कश्च । "वत्" इति मतुप्प्रत्ययः । न तु, परमत इव वतिः । (*BD*).

and with the help of a few other things such as Time, Jīvas, Adṛṣṭa and Mūlaprakṛti.

The survival of Jīvas and adṛṣṭa in Mahāpralaya is equally necessary to rationalize the inequalities in the distribution of merit and demerit in the lives of created beings.

The next Sūtra: *Na tu dṛṣṭāntabhāvāt* shows that the supposition that nothing positive survives in Pralaya cannot hold water. There is ample reason to infer to the contrary.[8] The counter-inferences have been indicated by M. as explained already.[9] The next Sūtra (ii, 1.11) emphasizes that it is the Pūrvapakṣa contention that nothing positive survives in Pralaya that is faulty as neither perception nor Āgama can be cited in support of it.

The only recourse left to the Pūrvapakṣin is to try to save himself from these onslaughts of the Siddhāntin's argument that only a positive principle can act as a true cause and never a purely negative one, by taking shelter as a last resort under the lofty plea that as there is no delimiting authority restraining that a counter-inference can go only thus far and no further, it will be still open to him to resort to a different mode of reasoning[10] and establish thereby that *no positive principle can be accepted as cause or need be accepted as such and that only a purely negative principle can be a cause and need be accepted as such.*[11]

This raises a very crucial question whether one should renounce faith in reasoning as an instrument of knowledge because of the possibility of counter-reasoning everywhere or whether there is some criterion on which the soundness of reasoning can be tested. M. in his *AV*. enters a most sober and spirited plea under this Sūtra (ii.1.12) in defence of the claims of reasoning as a sound instrument of knowledge, And J.'s comments on this discussed in his *NS*. (pp. 290-91) are worth pondering by all students of Logic.

It is idle to contend that because inference sometimes goes astray there is possibility of a counter-inference *in every case and at all times.* Such a contention would be highly irresponsible. Reasoning may be

8. According to M. (as explained by J) '*dṛṣṭānta*' here stands for a sound inference based on vyāpti ascertained with the help of clear instances:

दृष्टान्तावधारितव्याप्तिमूलमनुमानमुच्यते । दृष्टान्तमात्रस्य साधनबाधनानङ्गत्वात् । (*NS*. p. 287 b).

9. The whole question has been exhaustively dealt with by M. in his *AV:*

नाशोऽयं विमतोऽपि स्यान्नाशत्वात्कर्तृशेषवान् ।

(See *NS*. pp. 287b-90).

10. 'Etāvān eva tarkaḥ' iti pratiṣṭhāpakapramāṇābhāvād uktād anyathāpyanumeyam iti ced (M..*BSB*. ii, 1.12).

11. 'Anyathā' pūrvasūtradvayoktād vaiparityena Abhāvakāraṇatva-bhāvākāraṇatva-rūpeṇāpyanumātum śakyam tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt iti cenna (Rāgh. *TDP*).

unsettled only when it is not supported by sound evidence of Pratyakṣa or Āgama. If the counter-inference is not based on proper evidence it cannot be of any avail. If it rests on good grounds, it will prevail against any counter-inference. How then can all inferences be condemned? Where there may be some doubt as to whether both the inferences are supported by evidence, there may be a temporary opposition between them. But this cannot be everywhere or last for ever. Where the truth of the one is ascertained the other would naturally become unsettled. If one is not prepared to abide by this ruling and insists upon maintaining rather irresponsibly that all inferences are obstructed by counter-inferences and are, therefore, invalid, his own thesis that all inferences are invalidated would also be countered and invalidated. It must, therefore, be admitted that inferences would be inconclusive only in the absence of supporting evidences of perception or Āgama. If supported by such evidence they would be conclusive. It is not, therefore, the possibility of counter-inference that can render an inference invalid but only want of support of Pramāṇa. In the present case, the proposition that only a positive entity can be a cause of anything else and that a pure negation cannot be the sole cause of anything else is supported by sound Pratyakṣa and Āgama[12] and is, therefore, irrefragable. An unbridled skepticism would make the existence of Mokṣa itself an uncertainty. M., therefore, concludes in his Bhāṣya—Things are to be admitted only so far as they are known to be facts from proper evidences. Nothing in conflict with facts should be surmised.[13]

The last Sūtra of this *adhi.* is *Etena śiṣṭā aparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ*: Hereby all the remaining views not countenanced by the Śruti are refuted. It refutes certain other theories such as the creation of the world by Jīvas alone; or by the insentient Matter alone; or by Kāla, Svabhāva,[14] etc. Tho' the Jīvas, Time, Svabhāva, etc., are not pure negations, their claims based on reasoning of some kind find some support from certain Śruti texts also.[15] Some of these Śrutis have been cited by M.:—

जीवात् भवन्ति भूतानि जीवे तिष्ठन्त्यचञ्चलाः ।
जीवे तु लयमृच्छन्ति न जीवात् कारणं परम् ॥

This discussion is called for by reason of the fact that a further objection that tho' Prāgabhāva cannot be regarded as the sole cause of

12. Sata utpattiḥ saśeṣanāśca hi loke dṛṣṭaḥ (M.*BSB*. ii, 1.10).
13. Ato yāvatpramāṇasiddham tāvad eva angīkartavyam. Nāto anyat śaṅkyam. (M.*BSB*. ii, 1.12).
14. यद्यपि जीवस्य निमित्तत्वेन प्रधानस्योपादानत्वेन च जगत्कारणत्वमङ्गीकृतमेव, तथापि स्वातन्त्र्याभावाभिप्रायेणेदं वचनमिति न विरोधः । (NS. p. 293 b).
15. Cf. कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यदृच्छा । (*Śvet. Up.* i, 2).

the world because of its nature of being pure negation, Jīvas, Prakṛti, Time, Svabhāva, etc., may any one of them, be so accepted as they do not suffer from this disability and there are texts apparently supporting their claims. These views are, therefore, refuted here by extension (*atideśa*) of the ground of refutation (viz. of yuktiviruddhatva and *aprāmāṇikatva*) to the extent applicable to their cases. In the Siddhānta interpretation these Śrutis are to be construed as primarily referring to B. under the several names of Jīva, Prakṛti, Yadṛcchā, etc.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

(*Na vilakṣanatvādhikaraṇam* ii, 1.4-12)

S. and R. interpret the eight Sūtras beginning with "*Na vilakṣaṇatvāt*" as a single *adhi.* They omit the Sūtra *Dṛśyate tu* after "*Na vilakṣaṇatvāt*". Their Pūrvapakṣa here is from the Sāṁkhya point of view against the material causality of B.

Pūrvapakṣa

The world is constituted of insentient matter. It is limited, impure, gross and constituted of parts while B. is unlimited, pure, subtle, conscious and partless. They are thus different in their natures. This diversity of their nature is also borne out by the Śruti text which speaks of B. as manifesting itself in two distinct forms of the intelligent and the unintelligent.[16] This fundamental distinction cannot be repudiated on the strength of certain Śrutis texts such as 'The Earth spoke, the waters spoke'— attributing intelligence to some of the elements and bodily organs. For these refer to the activities carried on by the presiding deities of the elements and the organs in question. They are not to be taken as attributing sentiency and other qualities of intelligent beings to the purely material principles. Thus, the Vedāntic theory of B.'s being the material-cum-intelligent cause of the world is opposed to reason.

Siddhānta

This contention of the Sāṅkhya is refuted by the Sūtra: *Dṛśyate tu*. It strikes at the root of the Sāṅkhya objection by declaring that disparity of essential natures is no bar to the existence of a material cause-and-effect relation between two given things. This may be seen from the production of nonintelligent substances like hairs and nails from intelligent beings like men and of scorpions and other sentient creatures from cowdung etc.

Sūtra 4 anticipates a further objection from the Sāṅkhya side and repulses it. The objection is that the acceptance of the unintelligent

16. विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च (*Taitt.Up.* ii, 6).

world's emanating as an effect from the intelligent B. would strike at the root of the Satkāryavāda accepted by the Vedāntin. According to this theory, the effect pre-exists in its cause. But the Vedāntin also holds that prior to the origination of the world, the intelligent B. alone existed—one without a second and there was no world of effects as such. This will contradict the Satkāryavāda of the Vedānta.

The second half of the Sūtra '*Pratiṣedhamātratvāt*' silences this objection by pointing out that no such contingency of the world of effects ceasing to exist in the cause' would arise if the position of (Advaita)—Vedāntin is properly understood. The position is that effect is non-different from the cause and as such it does exist in the form of the cause prior to its coming into being. Even when it has come into being it has no existence apart from the cause. So, at all times, the effect by itself is non-existent without the cause. As it is always the one or the other form of the cause, how could it be negated at all? The Pūrvapakṣin's argument is thus incompetent to disturb the Satkāryavāda of the Siddhāntin.

According to R. the fourth Sūtra raises the objection in a different way and answers it differently. The objector contends here that if the cause and effect should have different natures, they would turn out to be different substances. That would mean that the effect does not exist in the cause before production. That would compel us to accept the proposition that the world arises from such prior non-existence only and not from B. That would be a blow to Brahmakāraṇavāda.

The objection is refuted here by pointing out that rejection of affinity of natures between the cause and the effect in the previous Sūtra is merely intended to emphasize that there is no hard and fast rule that cause and effect should always be of the same nature. It was not asserted that the effect is altogether a different substance from its cause. Hence there is no need to give up the view that B. as cause modifies itself in the form of the world which differs from it in its nature.

The fifth Sūtra according to S. and R. brings up another objection to Brahmakāraṇavāda. If the world is a transformation of B. (and not of Prakṛti) then, at the time of dissolution (*apīti*) when the effects become one with the cause B. will be in danger of being polluted by the impurities of the world and of losing its authentic being.

This is refuted by pointing out that there are many instances of effects which do not affect the purity of the cause into which they are refunded, with their limitations. When articles of clay, magical shows,

dreams and such others are reabsorbed in their originating sources, the latter remain uncontaminated.

The first part of the concluding Sūtra (*Tarkāpratiṣṭānāt*) has been explained by S. as emphasing the Siddhānta view that the material causality of B. established by Śrutis cannot be set aside merely on account of its being opposed to reason; for reasoning itself is ill-founded.[17] He raises a further objection against this position in the second part of the Sūtra[18], by making the Pūrvapakṣa contend that reasoning by may be so perfected as to be free from the flaw of ill-foundedness and employed to uphold the position that B. *cannot* be the material cause of the world. To this the reply is given in the third part of the Sūtra[19] that granting that such a perfected reasoning may be considered well-founded for all empirical transactions, it can never be free from ill-foundedness when it encroaches or trespasses on the realm of ultimate reality which is the cause of world-phenomena and whose nature is comprehensible only thro' Śabdapramāṇa.

Criticism

Judging from the manner in which the Sūtrakāra has entered upon his task of establishing Avirodha by taking pains to refute the validity "other Smṛtis" opposed to Śruti in the earlier *adhi.* it would be natural to expect him to turn in this *adhi.* to the task of *dispelling similar objections against the validity of the sources of his own system.* Looked at from this point of view of natural sequence of ideas, the interpretation of this *adhi.* proposed by M. seems to be much more to the point than those of S. and R. It seems called for then to treat the Sūtra '*Abhimānivyapadeśastu....*' (ii, 1.5) as an *adhi.* by itself showing how there is no violation of reason whatsoever in some Śruti texts ascribing powers of speech and other intelligent functions to supposedly inanimate principles like the earth and the waters. If this had been done, the awkwardness of having to look upon the *first, second* and *fifth* Sūtras of the *Na vilakṣaṇatvādhi.* as Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtras and the *third, fourth and the rest* as Siddhānta-Sūtras could have been avoided. It would have saved S. and R. from the insincerity of representing the world as a modification of B.—in which they *do not actually believe in any straight sense of the term.* The presence of *tu* in *Dṛśyate tu* is not a conclusive proof that the two preceding Sūtras should be put down as Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtras. In that case, the Sūtra *Abhimānivyapadeśastu....*which S. has treated as a Pūrvapakṣa-

17. न ह्यागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम्; यस्मात् पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति । (S.*BSB.* ii, 1.11).
18. अथोच्येत – अन्यथा वयमनुमास्यामहे (S)
19. यद्यपि क्वचिद्विषये तर्कस्य प्रतिष्ठितत्वमुपलक्ष्यते, तथापि (S)

Sūtra may well expect to be treated as a Siddhānta-Sūtra. As a matter of fact, S. is hardly consistent in his attitude to this Sūtra. He has elsewhere willingly accepted the principle of Abhimānidevatās as part of Vaidika Siddhānta.[20]

It is worthwhile considering seriously if we should continue to go by the beaten track of putting down some Sūtras in each *adhi.* as Pūrvapakṣa Sūtras and singling out some others as Siddhāntasūtras. What is the harm if we dispense with the luxury of relegating a large number of Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa as Pūrvapakṣa ones and treat all of them as Siddhānta-sūtras throughout? S. himself has recognized that *there are no Pūrvapakṣa Sūtras as such in the Samanvayādhyāya.* Why should we not adhere to the same principle in all the Adhyāyas? Why could it not be that suitable Pūrvapakṣas are presupposed outside or implied in the appropriate wordings of the opening Sūtras of the adhikaraṇas themselves—except where the Pūrvapakṣas have been expressly and unmistakably incorporated in the Sūtras themselves as in i, 1.13; 25; 29; 31; 2, 7; 26; 4, 1; ii, 1, 1. or otherwise indicated by referring to their sponsors by name or other indications. The *Kalpasūtras* and the Sūtras of Pāṇini have no separate Pūrvapakṣa Sūtras. The same style of composition could be assumed to be the case here also. That would release more Sūtras for Siddhāntanirūpaṇa and enable us to find better meanings and purposes for those so released from the necessity of having to be relegated as Pūrvapakṣa Sūtras and thus enrich the thought-content of the Sūtras by raising fresh problems for solution.

In any event, the case for interpreting the *Na vilakṣaṇādhikaraṇa* as refuting the objection that B. cannot be the material cause of the world because of the disparity of their natures stands considerably weakened as the same objection has already been raised and refuted according to S. and his commentator in the Adṛśyatvādhikaraṇa[21] (i, 2, 21-23). Moreover, according to S.'s own metaphysics, it is either Avidyā or B. qualified by Avidyā that is the actual Upādānakāraṇa (material cause) of world-appearance. Between Avidyā and the world (its effect) and between the Avidyā-tinted B. and the world there is affinity of nature and not disparity. How could the Pūrvapakṣa resting on diversity of natures arise in this circumstance?

Sūtrākṣarārtha-Vicāra.

The interpretation of the wording of Sūtras of this *adhi.* by S. and R. leaves much to be desired by way of natural connections with what has gone before and is often weak and far-fetched. For e.g. in M.'s interpretation, the predicate of the proposition in the opening Sūtra is

20. See his C. on *BS.* i, 3, 33.
21. See Pp. 186-87.

na tathātvam which refers to the denial of parity of status for the Śrutis of the Siddhāntin with the non-Vedāntic Smṛtis of the Pūrvapakṣin, referred to earlier, in the first *adhi.* But in S.'s and R.'s interpretation, the predicate of the Sautra-proposition is the denial of B.'s being the material cause of the world. But this theme of the material causality of the world is *"not given"* to us in the preceding adhikaraṇa and has, therefore, to be imported by *adhyāhāra.* Similarly, in M.'s interpretation *'asya'* in this Sūtra refers to the sources of the Sūtrakāra's own views. This is covered by the reference to *"anya-Smṛtis"* in Sūtra ii, 1.1. But in S.'s and R.'s interpretation *'asya'* has to refer to "the world" which has *not been given* in the earlier adhikaraṇas of the Pāda which are concerned only with the position of certain Smṛtis.

The Śruti *Vijñānam cāvijñānam ca'* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6) put into the mouth of the Sānkhya Pūrvapakṣin is taken to express the idea that the Supreme B. manifests itself in two forms *Vijñāna* and *avijñāna.* If this Śruti is evidence of their mutual difference of nature, does it not also unambiguously *assert* that B. *becomes transformed* into both the intelligent and the unintelligent world—i.e. to say, acts as the material cause of the whole world? The sentence preceding *Vijñānam cāvijñānam ca* in the *Taitt. Up.* is: "Having entered it, He *became* both the actual and the beyond—the defined and the undefined, the founded and the unfounded"[22] (ii, 6). How could the Pūrvapakṣa banking on the diversity of nature between cause and effect arise with the help of such a text? Whatever may be the mutual difference between *Vijñāna* and *Avijñāna,* each one of them as a transformation of Brahman-stuff must be identical in nature with B. The Avijñāna in this way would be identical in nature with B. How then could S. argue on the Pūrvapakṣin's behalf—*Śabda eva 'Vijñānam cāvijñānam ca' iti **** cetanād Brahmaṇo vilakṣaṇam acetanam jagat śrāvayati"* (ii, 1.4)?

The illustrations of the production of scorpions from cowdung and hairs and nails from the human being are *incompetent* to establish the relation of material cause and effect between B. and the world. Cowdung is or can be the material cause of only the insentient body of the scorpion. Similar is the case of hairs and nails produced from the physical body. The Sūtra *Dṛśyate tu* thus becomes irrlevant, incompetent and inadmissible in this connection.

The fourth Sūtra: *Asad iti cemna pratiṣedhamātravāt* gives a straight and simple proposition with the minimum addition of a simple predicate which along with its reason is capable of being directly connected with the subject of the inferential proposition: *Asat na* (*Kāraṇam*) *pratiṣedhamātravāt* in M.'s interpretation. The aim of the Pūrvapakṣa there is

22. Tr. as in Radhakrishnan: *The Principal Upaniṣads.*

to directly oppose the causality (Jagatkāraṇatva) of B. In S.'s (and R.'s) interpretation, the predicate that is imported has to be supplied with an extension-clause and the connection between the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is remote and indirect.[23] The Pūrvapakṣa does not directly challenge the causality of B.—but the Satkāryavāda. These are obviously circuitous interpretations.

S. and R. interpret the fifth Sūtra : *Apītau tadvatprasaṅgād asamañjasam* as raising the adverse consequence of B. becoming of the same nature as the effects in dissolution and thereby becoming polluted by their imperfections. We may, however, ask if this consequence will be because of the destruction of the effects or because of the identity of effect with the cause. It cannot be due to the former reason because when the effects as such are destroyed in dissolution, their distinctive features and imperfections are also destroyed and there cannot arise the contingency of B. becoming polluted by them. If it be due to their identity of natures, the contingency will arise as much during the state of subsistence of the effects as after their dissolution. S. himself admits that this will be so in his C. on ii, 1.9. But he fails to see that it makes the pointed reference going all the way to the distant state of dissolution (*apītau*), in the Sūtra, pointless.

The sixth Sūtra would be superfluous from S.'s point of view. Admitting as he does identify of cause and effect at all times and admitting also that the characteristics of the effect do not visit their imperfections on the cause, the examples of the production of scorpions from cowdung and the others cited under the earlier Sūtra can as well carry with them the implication that the characteristics of the scorpion are not to be found in the cowdung. Consequently Sūtra ii, 1.9 purporting to give *further illustrations on the same point* would be unnecessary.

Unlike R., S. treats the entire Sūtra beginning with the words '*Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt*' and ending with '*prasaṅgaḥ* as a single Sūtra. *Nevertheless, he separates the first part of it: 'Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt' from the rest and interprets it as embodying a fresh reason in support of his own Siddhānta.* For doing so he is obliged to *import* thro' *adhyāhāra* a necessary predicate to the effect that "there is no threat to the acceptance of the relation of cause and effect between B. and the world

23. असत् [कार्यं प्रसज्येत] इति चेन्न [सत्कार्यप्रतिबेधस्य] प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् (S)
[कारणे कार्यं न विद्यत इति] असत [एव जगत उत्पत्तिः प्रसज्येत] इति चेन्न । [कार्यकारणयोः सालक्षण्यनियम] प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् [पूर्वाभिहितस्य] (R).
The importations and extension—clauses are largest in R.

as taught in the Śrutis",[24]—which is connected with the Siddhānta-reason "because reasoning is ill-founded" (tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt[25]).

This breaking up of what he himself concedes to be a single sūtra by S. at the point indicated by him to justify its being interpreted as lending further weight to the Siddhānta-(yukti) cannot be accepted as there is no conjunctive particle "ca" in the Sūtra after the words *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* sanctioning such an interpretational break-up.

It would be more natural to expect the thesis established in the previous Sūtra *Svapakṣadoṣācca* to supply the proper counter-correlative to '*anyathā*' in ii.1.11, and connect *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* as its supporting reason. That would give us a cogent proposition embodying a *continuous and connected Pūrvapakṣa embracing Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt as part of* the *Pūrvapakṣa-yukti* to be overthrown by the succeeding part of the Sūtra *"Iti ced evam apyavimokṣaprasaṅgaḥ.*

The way in which S. has broken up the Sūtra and interpreted *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* as part of the argument in reinforcement of the Siddhānta renders the use of the term *prasaṅgaḥ* (contingency) after *anirmokṣa* (or avimokṣa) unnecessary.[26]

S.'s condemnation of Tarka as "unsettled" smacks more of controversial zeal than regard for strict facts. It would be impossible to seriously maintain that all reasoning is unsettled. The reasoning by which such a contention is to be proved has at least to be accepted as quite settled. That means some reasoning is settled. Otherwise, there will be no scope for any kind of scientific inquiry into the nature of anything in the secular or in the philosophical world. And the Śrutis themselves recognize the competence of reasoning in Brahmajijñāsā. If it is only the kind of reasoning which is repugnant to the spirit of the Śrutis that is unsettled, the reasoning which opposes B.'s material causality of the world on the ground of their disparity of natures as sentient and insentient is certainly not repugnant to the teaching of the

24. Thibaut, Radhakrishnan, Date and others have missed this important point in his interpretation of this Sūtra and have wrongly assumed that the phrase *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* embodies and forms part of the Pūrvapakṣa itself according to S. *It does not*. And such an interpretation would be highly inconsistent with the trend of S.'s own remarks in the opening paragraph of his C. on this Sūtra. S.'s purvapaksa here begins only with the words *Anyathānumeyam*....This should be clear from the significant comment of the *Bhāmati—Sūtre śaṁkate* in introducing the *pratika* "Anyathānumeyam iti cet".

25. R. also interprets *Tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt* as reinforcing his siddhānta. But he reads it as a separate Sūtra (*Tarkāpratisthānād* api). In his case also, following *Svapakṣadoṣāt* (ii, 1.10) we should expect the Sūtrakāra to have observed stricter economy of expression and given the Sūtras as *Svapakṣadoṣāt, tarkāpratiṣṭhānacca* and dropped the superfluous '*api*'.

26. This applies to R. also for more or less similar reasons.

Śruti which is particular in maintaining B.'s Nirvikāratva (not being subject to transformaton or modification of nature).

S.'s Śiṣṭāparigrahādhikaraṇam (ii, 1, 12)

S. and R. treat the Sūtra: *Etena śiṣṭāparigrahā api vyākhyātāḥ* as constituting a separate *adhi.* Ś. explains it as follows: "By this refutation of the theory of the Sāṅkhyas which has been accepted in some respects as being near to Vedic philosophy by competent authorities like Manu and Vyāsa the other (remaining) theories such as the atomic theory of causation (of the Vaiśeṣikas) which have *not* been accepted in any aspect by those authorities, stand refuted".

More or less the same interpretation has been given by Śamkara to *the closing Sūtra of Adhy. I* (*Etena sarve vyākhyātāḥ*). Where is the need then, to repeat it? Apart from this, it is open to question how far an avowedly Godless theory such as the Sāṅkhya could be regarded with equanimity by Śiṣṭas like Manu and Vyāsa as being nearer to the heart of the Vedas than the frankly Theistic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. The first and foremost criterion of a "Vaidika Darśana" within the connotation of the term that would be acceptable to the author of the *Brahmasūtras* is the acceptance of B. as the Supreme Author of the Universe. For not only has the Sūtrakāra started with an inquiry into B. but has made it a point to define his B. as the Supreme Author of the Universe. Judged in the light of this cornerstone (*pradhānaprameya*) of the Sūtrakāra's own Siddhānta, it is the Sāṅkhya theory that should be pronounced to be out of court with Vaidika Darśana!

The purpose of the present Pāda in the Sūtras is to dislodge all theories which dispute B.'s authorship of the Universe. Among such theories the Sāṅkhya *refuses to accept the very concept of a B. along with its authorship of the Universe.* How then can such a theory be "acceptable to Śiṣṭas? The Vaiśeṣika theory, on the other hand, accepts a Supreme Being corresponding to B. of the Vedānta and also recognizes it as the efficient and intelligent cause of the world. It withholds assent only to the position that B. is the material cause also of the Universe. The opposition of the Vaiśeṣika theory to Vaidika Darśana, if any, is thus but slight and over a matter of detail but not to the very *being* of B.

The basic issue is whether genuine Vaidika Darśana can be content to be Godless. The acceptance of Satkāryavāda by the Sāṅkhya is irrelevant to this fundamental problem. If such irrelevant criteria are to be applied, the Sāṅkhya too shall have to be dismissed as Avaidika in the opinion of Śiṣṭas on account of its pronounced hostility to Vedic sacrifices.

CHAPTER LI

SUPPOSED ONENESS IN MOKṢA DOES NOT IMPERIL BRAHMAN'S CAUSALITY.

5. *Bhoktrāpattyadhikaraṇam* (ii, 1.14)

The previous *adhi.* disposed of an objection to B.'s causality of the Universe which (objection) was supposed to derive support from certain Śruti texts. The present *adhi.* dispels another objection which claims support from a logical premise which is supposed to have the backing of the Śruti and which is highly detrimental to B.'s causality of the Universe. The premise is the identity of Jīvātman with B. in the released state which is apparently conveyed by the Śruti text:

Karmāṇi Vijñānamayaśca ātmā

Pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti[1] (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii, 2, 7)

The Pūrvapakṣa here tries to make dexterous use of the premise of identity between the released soul and B. in Mokṣa to the detriment of the latter's causality of the world. The argument of the Pūrvapakṣa is as follows: B. cannot be accepted as the author of the world. For, we read in the Śruti that the soul becomes one with B. in release. This identity would automatically deprive B. of its authorship of the world. The point is that B. cannot be identical with the released soul without being identical with the soul in the state of Samsāra as well, in reality. For it does not stand to reason that one who is essentially different from another could ever become identical with him at any time[2]. The iden-

1. 'One's deeds and the self consisting of understanding all become one in the Supreme Immutable Being' (Tr. Radhakrishnan. *Principal Upanisads* p. 691).
2. मुक्तस्य परापत्तिरुच्यते अतस्तयोरविभागः । अतः पूर्वमपि स एव । न ह्यन्यस्यान्यत्वं युज्यते ।

tity of the Jiva and B. in the released state must, therefore, hold true in the state of Samsāra too—despite appearances to the contrary. The appearances may have to be liquidated by the denudation of contradictory attributes from both the subjects of the identity—proposition thro' 'Cinmātralakṣaṇā' or by explaining away the apparent differences at the Samsāra level as the outcome of Upādhis to be liquidated in release. The law of identity would thus compel us to admit that if A. and B. are identical one of them could not possess any essential characteristic that is opposed to the other's. The conclusion is thus inevitable that as B. is essentially one with the Jīva in release, it must also be one with him in Samsāra also. As the transmigrating self is not the author of the world, B. which is identical with it cannot also be the author of the world. It would be difficult to maintain the released soul may somehow possess the power of creating the world tho' such a power is not manifested in the soul in the state of Samsāra; and in view of the identity in the released state B. may also be accepted as author of the Universe. Release is only the dropping out of certain features which have accrued to the soul during the transmigratory career. It is not an acquisition of any new characteristics which do not being to it intrinsically. Else, the released state may turn out to be impermanent by the birth of some more fresh attributes and the loss of some existing ones. It cannot be that like the innate bliss of the self which is dormant in Samsāra, the Soul's power to create the Universe comes to be manifested in release when it becomes one with B. There is no independent proof as there is in the case of innate bliss (which is partially intuited in the state of Samsāra, in Suṣupti) that the soul has such a power as to create the Universe.[3] Thus it follows as a corollary of the released soul's identity with B. that the latter too cannot be the real author of the world.[4] The identity of the released soul with B. is thus utilized by the Pūrvapakṣa as a further proof of the the identity of Jīva and B. in the state of Samsāra as well on the basis of the law of identity and this is finally used as a leverage to strike down B.'s authorship of the Universe.[5]

The first part of the Sūtra: *Bhoktrāpatter avibāgaścet* embodies the Pūrvapakṣa on the above lines. The term '*avibhāga*' (identity) by the sheer force of its logical impact carries the argument to the upshot of the Pūvapakṣa that in virtue of such identity reaching back to the

3. *NS* p. 293.

4. Ato Jivābhinnatvāt Īśvarasyaiva paramārthato Jagatkāraṇatvādi anupapannam iti lakṣaṇasūtram na yuktam iti bhāvaḥ. (*TP*. ii, 1.14).

5. Tasmād asarvakartrtvena pratyakṣasiddhasamsāryabhedāt Brahmaṇopi tathātvam iti vaktum Muktāvabhedena samsārepyabhedas sādhyaḥ. (*TC*. p. 869b).

soul's transmigratory state, as well, B. forfeits its right to be accepted as the author of the world.[6]

Apropos the above Pūrvapakṣa, the term *bhoktṛ* in the Sūtra stands appropriately enough for the transmigrating self. *Āpatti* signifies 'attainment of (oneness with) B. or 'Brahmanhood' (*brahmatva*) in the released state as referred to in the Śruti: *Karmāṇi vijñānamayaśca ātmā pare'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti.*[7] The last term in the Pūrvapakṣa '*avibhāgaścet*' points out the repercussion implicit in the Jīva's (attainment of such) identity with B. (in the released state) on B.'s authorship of the world.[8]

Such an objection based on the natural consequence of the law of identity between Jīva and B. cannot be dismissed as trivial or farfetched *in what is indeed a Yuktipāda.* The Pūrvapakṣin cannot be expected to have any soft corner for the Theist's faith in B.'s causality of the Universe, and he is sure to attack it at any vulnerable point he can find. The identity supposed to be attained by the individual soul with B. in release offers one and the Pūrvapakṣin is quick to seize it. This is a sufficient explanation of the propriety of this *adhi.* in this Pāda. And it should be sufficient to dispose of Ghate's objection against M.'s interpretation of the *adhi.* that he is not justified in "explaining the Sūtra so as to establish his doctrine of absolute difference between Jiva and B. and that his reference to the released condition of the soul makes the *adhi.* more appropriate to the Phalādhyāya and that M. himself conscious of this tries to show the propriety of the *adhi.* in the present Pāda which deals with Avirodha or removal of contradiction[9]: *Phalatvepi yuktivirodhe antarbhāvād atroktam:* Ghate's criticism suffers from certain misconceptions about the purpose of this *adhi.* in the present Pāda. It is *not the establishment of* the doctrine of absolute difference between Jīva and B. There are other sūtras in the first *Adhy.* itself and in Pāda iii of his Adhy. which do so. What the Sūtrakāra has to do here and has done in this Pāda is to refute logical objections that might be raised against the conception of B. as established in Adhy. I. One of the most important points connected with the conception of B. is its authorship of the Universe and its eightfold dispensation. Any objection which is likely to adversely affect this conception on purely logical grounds is to be set at rest here. An argument based on the

6. Ato asarvakartṛsamsārijīvābhinnatvāt na Brahmaṇo jagatkartṛtvam yuktam. (*BD*).

7. It will thus be seen that according to M.'s interpretation we have to import (*adhyāhāra*) the words *mokṣe* (in release) and *brahmatva* (brahmanhood) between the terms *bhoktṛ* and *āpatteḥ* and understand *āpatti* in its radical sense of full measure (*ā*) of attainment (*patti*) from √*pad* to attain; or the entering into a state or condition.

8. Tataśca na Brahmaṇo jagatkāraṇatvam vāstavam yuktam iti (*NS*. p. 294b).

9. V.S. Ghate. *Vedanta*. p. 72.

future identity of Jīva with B. is *potentially dangerous to B.'s causality of the world*. What matters is the objection itself and not the question of how or where it originates. S. has made it clear that the law of identity of cause and effect applies with the same force to the state of dissolution and the state of subsistence of effects. In the same way, identity of essence between Jīva and B. if true must hold good equally in the state of Samsāra and release. In this sense, the Pūrvapakṣa raised by M. objecting to B.'s Jagatkāraṇatva from the point of view of their future identity is quite within its rights here. That the objection at one end touches the Phalādhyāya does not minimize its relevance to the theme of the Yuktipāda. As it touches both the ends of Yuktivirodha and some detail falling within the range of Phalādhyāya. and as Yuktivirodha *precedes* Phalādhāya. in the schematic arrangement of the subject matter, there is no reason to put it off till we reach the Phalādhyāya. This is what M. means when he says: *Phalatvepi yuktivirodhe antarbhāvād atroktam*. It is not a confession of the weakness of his position, as Ghate imagines, but an affirmation of its soundness and strength. Nor is the present Pūrvapakṣa precluded from arising by the Siddhānta established in Jagadvyāpāravarjam (iv.4.17) as the Pūrvapakṣa there is based on a different ground. (See *TC*. p. 869b).

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta brings down the whole edifice of the Pūrvapakṣa raised on the foundations of the premise of identity of essence between Jīva and B. by elucidating the true nature of the omeness (*ekībhāva*) with B. attained by the Jīvātman in Mokṣa. It is an *ekībhāva* very much like the oneness brought about by the confluence of rivers; or the mingling of the rivers with the ocean. In fact, the very next verse after the one which speaks of the Vijñānamaya-Ātmā becoming one with the Supreme Being follows it up with the illustration of the "rivers going to their abode in the sea" (*Muṇḍ. Up*. iii, 2, 8). It may also be likened to the unanimous decision reached by different persons on a given point. The Jīvas who have wandered from place to place during their transmigratory carrer finally reach their haven of rest in B. as cows which have strayed all day long return to their shed in the night or as birds come back to their nests. During the transmigratory career the Jīvas are given to seeing things in disharmony with the Divine will and purpose. They often behave in contravention of the Divine law. In the state of Mokṣa there is an end of such discord and disharmony between the human and the Divine will. There is complete harmony between them. The released act in unison with the Divine Will (*matyaikya*). This is the type of *ekībhāva* that the Śruti has in mind and not the one which the Pūrvapakṣin has assumed—viz., identity of being.

CAUSALITY UNIMPAIRED BY SUPPOSED EKĪBHĀVA IN MOKṢA

The Pūrvapakṣin will have to make clear the following points before he can be allowed to interpret *ekībhāva* in the literal and primary sense of the term—viz. "identity of being". Does this text proclaim identity of being with B. for the Jīvātman who is conceived as (i) being *already one in essence with B*., or (ii) as being different from B. before he attains release; or (iii) as being both different from and identical with B.? The use of the suffix "*cvi*" in *ekībhavanti* in the prescribed sense of *becoming that which one has not been before* (*abhūtatadbhāva*)[10] would come in the way of accepting the first position. There is no need to *establish* identity within the groove of the third alternative as identity is already admitted in *bhedābheda*. If it is deemed necessary to establish it in order to dispel the notion of difference, in release, the identity sought to be established would be in the figurative sense of *difference not being there*. This will not be the primary meaning of the term *ekībhāva;* but only a secondary sense. If a secondary sense is permissible, it can as well be the other one in terms of *sthānaikya, matyaikya*, etc. which will not conflict with B.'s causality of the world. If identity is on the basis of the second alternative, it would be impossible of fulfilment. If A and B are really and essentially different beings, they can never become identical with each other, at any time.

It cannot be contended that such arguments against identity of Jīva and B. are set aside by Śruti which proclaims their identity of being. Identity of being cannot be accepted as the primary sense of *ekībhāva* unless the reasoning which contests the possibility of such an interpretation is first disproved. The reasoning cannot be disproved without establishing identity of being as the primary sense intended. This involves an inter-dependence.

It has already been shown that there is internal evidence of the *Muṇḍ. Up*. itself tending to show that the *ekībhāva* intended by it is one of likeness, closeness of contact and so forth. This is confirmed by what the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (ii, 14, 27) says: "It is false to maintain that there is any real identity of being between the Paramātman and the Jīvātman. One substance cannot pass over into the nature of another."[11]

It is not at all possible to sustain the interpretation of the text *Gatāḥ kalāḥ pañcadaśa*.... (*Muṇḍ. Up*. iii, 2, 7) in support of released souls attaining oneness of being with B. The second half of the verse:

Karmāṇi vijñānamayaśca ātmā
Pare 'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti.

10. Pāṇ. v, 4, 50.
11. परमात्मात्मनोर्योगः परमार्थं इतीष्यते ।
मिथ्यैतत्; अन्यद् द्रव्यं हि नैति तद्द्रव्यतां यतः ।

presents a serious obstacle to any such interpretation. Grammatically speaking, Karmas and Vijñānamaya-ātmā are the subjects of the predicate of the sentence *ekībhavanti* in the plural. But then as the Karmas of the enlightened soul are liquidated by *jñāna*[12] and as furthermore Karmas are "Jaḍa" (non-sentient) it would be preposterous to speak of their *ekībhāva* or *oneness* of *being* with B. along with the Vijñānātman. If Karmas are excluded, the verb *ekībhavanti* in the plural would not "agree" with the remaining subject *"vijñānamaya ātmā"* which is in the singular. The use of the locative case in *"Pare-'vyaye"* is more in keeping with identity of location, etc. than identity of being, which would require the instrumental case *"Pareṇa"* (ekībhavanti).

The *TC* points out that the illustration given in the very next verse, of rivers mingling with the sea clinches the issue that the *ekībhāva* in question is not and cannot be one of identity of being (*svarūpaikya*) between Jīva and B. When a quantity of water is mixed with another, there is perceptible increase in volume. Where the waters with different tastes and temperatures are mixed, their differences are also felt for sometime. We may treat them as having "become one" in a loose and popular way of speaking. But that will not carry us far in a scientific interpretation of the facts. In fact, the *Kaṭha Up.* (ii, 1.15) text: "As pure water poured forth into pure becomes *like that* indeed, so also the self of the seer", gives a hint of correction to the popular view on this matter. A drop of water poured into wine may lose itself and make no perceptible difference to the color and savor of the wine. That is because it is just a drop and no more. Dilute it more, and the change is readily felt. The difference is clearly seen when a liberal quantity of water is added to milk. When sweet water and saltish water are mixed together or when cold and hot waters are mixed together, the difference in taste and temperatures at different places or levels can be felt. Between coins made of alloys and pure gold there is difference in worth of gold content. If water mixed with water can become absolutely one with it, without any latent differences, a large quantity of toddy mixed with milk should be acceptable as milk.

There is no case, therefore, for any loose talk of identity of being or essence in such cases. The popular notion of the "rivers becoming one with the sea" has been exploded by Vācaspati Miśra in his C. on

12. See *Muṇḍ.* ii, 2.8. If *ekībhāva* in respect of Karmas simply means that they are disintegrated, such a disintegration should have been conveyed by bracketing them with the other Kalās mentioned in the first quarter. Their separate mention along with Vijñānamayātmā has no justification. According to M.'s interpretation of the Śruti sufficient justification has been shown: अतो ज्ञानोत्तरकालीनकर्मभिः सह मुक्तजीवस्य परोपकण्ठे स्थितिः, तद्बुद्धिसारूप्यं चेह विवक्षितम् (*TD.* ii, 1.14).

B.S. i, 4, 22. The *TC*, therefore, says well: Like beans in a heap and Brahmins in an assembly there is only a mingling of the waters of rivers and of the sea. There is no identity of being. But their separate identities are not distinguishable because of their common attribute of liquidity and close adhesion of parts.[13] It is thus impossible for a premise of identity of being between Jīva and B. resting on such weak foundations to upset B.'s causality of the world.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. introduces the Sūtra as replying to another objection against B.'s material causality of the world from the side of reason supported by the well-established distinction between the enjoying selves and the objects enjoyed, borne out by our normal experience. The argument of the Pūrvapakṣa is: Acceptance of B.'s material causality of the world as established in the previous *adhi.* will lead to the disastrous consequence of annulling the well-established distinction between the enjoying self and the inanimate objects of enjoyment; because, on the Pantheistic view both are equally modifications of the same ultimate causal substance and are severally idenditical with it. The Sūtrakāra is then taken to dispose of this objection at the surface level with an illustration accepted by the world without going deeper into the matter.[14] The illustration given is that of the waves and foam and bubbles of the ocean which manage to keep their separateness of form for short periods of time in spite of their non-difference from the sea--water.

Criticism

There is no room in the strict Advaitic view of Vivartavāda for this objection of the enjoyer and the enjoyed passing into each other's nature—as the superimposed do not share in the essence of the substratum. If the objection is introduced from the unofficial Pariṇāmavāda standpoint, certain other points will have to be clarified. Does the Pūrvapakṣa raise the objection that there will be no *specific distinction* between the effects as *sentient and insentient* respectively; or merely that there will be no sort of distinction between them? The former cannot be, as in the Siddhānta view, the transmigrating self, who is

13. मानभेदात् स्पर्शरसपूर्वभेदाच्च नीरयोः ।
मेलनेऽप्यभिदा नास्ति यथैव क्षीरनीरयोः ।
माषादिवच्च राश्यादौ सभादौ ब्राह्मणादिवत्
जले जलान्तरस्यापि संश्लेषो न त्वभिन्नता ।।
द्रवद्रव्यत्वेनान्योन्यं व्यामिश्रणात्तु भेदाप्रतीतिरिति ।। (*TC.* p. 872b).

14. इमां शङ्कां आपाततोऽविचारितलोकसिद्धदृष्टान्तोपदर्शनमात्रेण निराकरोति सूत्रकारः। (*Bhāmatī* ii, 1.13). The deeper scrutiny made in the next *adhi.* shows according to S. that this practical distinction of enjoyer and enjoyed has no ultimate validity as causation is only a device to turn from the appearances to their ground viz. B.

the enjoyer, is accepted as having a beginningless existence. In the rest of the world of effects there is no division into sentients and insentients. How then could the contingency of the enjoyer and the enjoyed passing into each other's state arise? It cannot be argued that the transmigrating self tho' beginningless is still by virtue of its oneness with B. indistinguishable from the world of insentient objects of enjoyment which are also non-different from B. and that by reason of such common link of oneness with B. there is the possibility of the one passing into the nature of the other. This contingency has definitely been averted in the previous *adhi.* under the Sūtra: *Dṛśyate tu,* where it has been shown by S. that B. retains its essential nature of Caitanya in spite of the fact of its being the material cause of the insentient world and that the latter remains non-different from B. By the same token, the enjoying self also can manage, in its turn, to retain its own distinctiveness of sentient character from the insentient world of effects which are products of B. and are *as such* non-different from it and not pass into the nature of the insentients.

If the Pūrvapakṣin's contention is simply this that if B. is admitted as the world's material cause, there will be no distinctions of any sort or form among the effects, it would be clearly unsustainable. Various articles made of the same bar of gold like bracelets and crowns do exhibit their own differences of form. If this is made possible because of the fact that different parts of the bar of gold go to produce the different particles—whereas such a possibility is ruled out in the case of B. which is by hypothesis partless and that, as a consequence, things produced from the same partless B. such as enjoying selves and object of enjoyment cannot be prevented from passing into each other's nature,—then the right Pūrvapakṣa to be raised in this context would be that B. being partless cannot be accepted as producing from its own undivided being effects of diverse natures. It would be clearly *premature to raise the objection that there cannot be any distinction among the products of B.* without first establishing that B. the partless can go into any kind of transformation at all.

The Pūrvapakṣa is thus barred from arising in the present circumstance. The Siddhānta also is untenable. The examples of foam, billows and bubbles which are real modifications of the sea-water are out of place in Vivartavāda. The foam, bubbles and billows of the sea are in reality the creations of different particles of the sea-water. As such they are *not the modifications of the same particles* of water. But the case is other with the same (partless) B. serving as the material cause of all.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. interprets the Sūtra as repulsing the objection to the concept of B. as having the character of being the cause and the effect according as It has for its body the sentient beings and insentient matter, in either their subtle state or their gross one.. His Pūrvapakṣa contends that this will do away with the difference in nature between Jīva and B. and expose B. to the certain consequences of embodied existence viz. the tasting of the joys and sorrows of life like the individual self.[15]

The reply is that it is not the mere fact of embodiment in the sense of having a body that exposes one to the sufferings and the enjoyments of life; but the fact of being bound in the body by the power of Karma and being subject to its sway. This is not the case with B. Not being in any way connected with Karma or subject to its sway, B. is immune from the joys and sufferings of life tho' it has the world of Cit and Acit as its body.

Criticism

The Pūrvapakṣa here is not new. It has already been raised and answered earlier under *Sambhogaprāptir iti cenna* (i, 2, 8). R. has, however, tried to show that in i, 2.8 we have the explanation of how the presence of B. in the region of the heart as object of meditation does not necessarily expose it to the risks of being subject to joys and suffering of embodied life; whereas, here, the objection is raised from the point of view of B. being—like the Jīvātman, *the possessor of the body in question.* But this does not seem to be a convincing explanation. For in both the places R.'s solution of the difficulty is the same—viz., that it is not dwelling in a physical body (*śarīrāntarvartitva*) that is the cause of going thro' joys and sorrows but the subjection to Karma, good and evil. Such subjection is out of the question in the case of B. to whom evil is foreign. As the answer to the objection and the solution of the difficulty is the same in both the places,[16] one of the two Sūtras will have to be written off as superfluous. If the latter is by way of extension (*atideśa*) of the same principle to another difficulty, it should have found its place immediately after it and not *so far away here.*

It will not do to argue still on R.'s behalf that accepting the principle established *here* that experience of happiness and misery is

15. Saśarīratve Jīvasyeva Īśvarasyāpi saśarīratvaprayuktasukhaduḥkhabhoktṛtvasya avarjanīyatāt (R. *Śrībhāṣya* ii, i.14).

16. नहि शरिरान्तर्वर्तित्वमेव सुखदु:खोपभोगहेतु: । अपितु, पुण्यपापरूपकर्मपरवशत्वम् । तच्चापहातपाप्मन: परमात्मनो न संभवति । (R. i.2.8) and
नहि जीवस्य सुखदु:खयोर्भोक्तृत्वं सशरीरत्वकृतम् । अपि तु, पुण्यपापरूपकर्मकृतम् । अपहतपाप्मनस्तु परमात्मन: स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपकृत्स्नजगच्छरीरत्वेऽपि, कर्मसंबन्धगन्धो नास्तीति । (R. ii, 1.14).

the outcome of Karma, the earlier Sūtra disposes of a possible objection that tho' the Lord is free from the experience of the joys and sorrows of life, in *that sense*, He may still become liable to such experiences of Jīvātman because of His juxtaposition with the latter. In that case, it would be pertinent to ask what precisely is the nature of enjoyment of experiences of Jīva by Īśvara which the objector there has in mind? Is it a personal correlation of the joys and sorrows forming part of the Jīvātman's personal experience, as His own, in the sense of their abiding in His own self and affecting it? Or is it merely one of being able to see the joys and sorrows existing in the Jīvātman? Even an ordinary man of sound mind does not succumb to the delusion of mistaking another person's experiences as happening to himself. It would be highly improper to suspect God to be capable of such an error. There is nothing out of keeping with God's omniscience in His being able to witness and know at first hand the joys and sufferings of millions of His creatures, as they are.

It seems necessary, therefore, to go in for a different interpretation altogether of the Sūtra: *Bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaścet syāllokavat,* from what S. and R. have given to it. Their ways of construing the Sūtra are also strained. Taking S. first, we find that his construing requires us to import the words '*bhogyatva*' and again '*bhogyasya*' and (*bhoktṛ*) —'*tva*' to give us the desired sense: (*Brahmaṇa upādānatve*) *bhoktur bhogyatvāpātteḥ, bhogyasya ca bhoktṛtvāpatter avibhāgaścet*[17]...."

In the case of R. the importations are *more*. He has a hypothetical clause *Brahmaṇaḥ śarīritve* in the beginning[18] and its consequent: *sukha-duḥkhādi* to be added before *bhoktṛ* and the abstract suffix '*tva*' after it to give the desired sense: [*Brahmaṇas śarīritve tasya Jīvavat sukha-duḥkhādi*] *bhoktṛ* [*tv*] *āpatteḥ*...." If it was the Sūtrakāra's intention to convey such a meaning, he would not have omitted to give us the all-important abstract suffix '*tva*' after *bhoktṛ*. (i.e.) *bhoktṛtvāpatteḥ*. The omission, which holds good for S. also, coupled with the large-scale importations (*adhyāhāra*) and the logical and contextual deficiencies in their Pūrvapakṣas and Siddhānta arguments, make it worthwhile to explore the possibility of a more satisfactory interpretation which would not require the help of the abstract-suffix at all after *bhoktṛ* and could do with much *less importations* and give a better insight into the Sūtrakāra's mind. It is doubtless true that the abstract termination is often left out after certain words in the Sūtras and is readily supplied while

17. "(If B. were the material cause of the world) there will arise the adverse consequence (*āpatti*) of the enjoying self (passing into the state of the enjoyed objects and of the enjoyed objects passing into the state of the enjoying self and consequently their non-distinction...)"

18. Corresponding to S.'s hypothetical clause: ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वे at the beginning.

construing them. But that is only in contexts where its omission is quite obvious and where there is otherwise concensus about the interpretation of the Sūtra as a whole[19] (as in i, 3, 2).

Where, as in the present case, the great commentators S.R. and M. have each a different interpretation to offer, the presence or absence of the *tva-pratyaya* would matter a great deal in deciding the very line of interpretation to be adopted. It seems pertinent then to ask with M.

भोक्तृत्वापत्तित इति यन्मतं तत्कुतो हरि: ।
भोक्त्रापत्तेरिति प्राह ? ********* । (*AV*).

19. प्रतिपाद्ये व्यवस्थिते, तद्बलाच्छाब्दी गौणता कथंचिदनुसर्तव्या । न चास्य सूत्रस्येदं प्रतिपाद्यं व्यवस्थितम् । जगदुपादानत्वस्य प्रागनुक्तत्वेन, अनुक्तोपालंभप्रसङ्गात् । (*NS.* p. 295 b).

CHAPTER LII

BRAHMAN IS THE ONE INDEPENDENT WORLD-CAUSE

6. *Tadananyatvādhikaraṇam*. (ii, 1, 15-21).

This *adhi.* discusses one of the most important problems of Theism whether in the creation, sustenance dissolution and other dispensations of the Universe, B. needs to work and works with accessories which are independent of it in the sense of not owing their being, capacities and potentialities to It. The previous *adhi.* had indicated that the identity of Jīva and B. in Mukti should be understood in the light of illustrations of rivers mingling with the sea, birds going back to rest in their nests or an army marching like one man.[1] It would be natural to presume then that the creative and other activities of B. are also to be explained on the same principles as are applicable to similar activities of other persons in the world who have to make use of given accessories and work within their limitations.[2] Neither the accessories nor their powers and potencies owe their being to those who make use of them in the world. There is no reason why the case should be other with the creative and other activities of B. Taking a leaf from the Siddhāntanyāya of the previous *adhi.*, the Pūrvapakṣa here challenges the Vedāntic position as defined in the second Sūtra that B. is the world's Independent Author and creator in the full sense of the term owing nothing to any other principle outside its own being.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that like the creations of a potter, a weaver or a carpenter, the creation of Mahat and other cosmic principles by B.

1. Cf. *Ekībhūtā tu sā senā Pāṇḍavān abhyavartata* (*Mbh.*) Also. VI.87.4. Kumb. Ed.
2. Cf. नियतिशक्त्या नियतरूपा, परमाण्वाद्युपादानकर्मादिसहकारिकारणपरतन्त्रा * * * ब्रह्मणो निर्मितिः (*Kāvyaprakāśa*. i)

is determined by other causal accessories and factors whose existence, powers and potencies are absolutely independent of the creator as such.[3] The Pūrvapakṣa is not confined to the creative activity of B. in the narrow sense of the term. It applies with equal force and is intended to be applied to all the eightfold dispensations of the Universe as set out in B.S.i, 1.2. It is *in this sense* that M.'s commentator says that the *adhi*, dispels opposition of several reasonings to the independence of B.'s causality.[4]

The Pūrvapakṣa contends further that no exception to the dependence on accessories which are themselves independent of the creator can be made in the case of B. If it is suggested that being omnipotent, B. may dispense with accessories, the Pūrvapakṣin would rejoin that by the same token It may be expected to dispense with Its own will, intelligence and such other aids also as well as of Prakṛti, Jīvas, Kāla, Karma etc. which are external to itself, and create from nothing. It also argues that the Śruti text:

> '*Adbhyas sambhūtaḥ pṛthivyai rasācca*
> *Viśvakarmaṇas samavartata adhi*' (T.A.iii, 13).

which refers to the elements and tanmātrās as existing in the primordial creation shows that they are all independent of B. as nothing has been said to the contrary.

All creatorship is dependent on accessories which exist independently of the creator. Śrutis which speak of everything as dependent on God have, therefore, to be taken to refer to such accessories as have been actually created by God and not to those which He Himself had been obliged to make use of in His own case. Otherwise, these very accessories which, as we understand from the Śrutis, God makes use of, will have to be brought into existence by Him earlier with some *other* accessories and those again with earlier ones and so on *ad infinitum*. For all these reasons, it is best to agree that God's creative activities are all entirely governed and determined by accessories whose being, powers and potentialities are metaphysically independent of Him. God or B. cannot, therefore, be accepted as the One Independent Cause and Author of all.

Siddhānta

The Sūtra: *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ* repulses this formidable objection to the Theist's conception of God or B. as the all-

3. महदादिसृष्टिः कर्त्रनधीनसत्ताशक्त्यादिमत्कारणान्तरसव्यपेक्षम्; कार्यत्वात् घटवत् । (*NS*. p. 297).
4. अत्र, बहुयुक्तिविरोधः परिह्रियते तत्र च बहुत्वं प्रयोगभेदमात्रान्न भवति किंतु, प्रमेयभेदात् इति नातिप्रसङ्गः । (*TC*. p. 873-74 b).

independent Creator of all. The Sūtra denies the *otherness* of the Independent Cause (*Svatantrakāraṇam*) of the Universe from B. In other words it affirms thro' a double negation (*an-anyatva*) that B. is that Independent Cause and all the accessories such as Prakṛti, Jīvas, Time, Karma and so on are by hypothesis metaphysically dependent on B. The wording of the Sūtra has been most carefully chosen, to establish these truths. It does not say that there is no Independent cause in creation. That would mean B. also is not the Independent Cause. By describing the Independent Cause as non-different from B. (*tadananyat*) the Sūtrakāra makes it clear that the independent cause of all is B. and none else or nothing else. The reference to *the existence of what is 'inferior'* in the next Sūtra (Sattvācca *avarasya*) most naturally suggests the idea of the superior or the Independent (*svatantra*) as its counter-correlate in the opening Sūtra. This fully justifies the *adhyāhāra* (understanding) of the term: *"Svatantrakāraṇasya"* there: (Svatantrakāraṇasya) *tadananyatvam āraṁbhaṇasabdādibhyaḥ.*[5]

The Viṣayavākya of the Sūtra according to M. is from the famous verse of the Ṛgveda relating to primordial creation:

Kimsvid āsīd adhiṣṭhānam āraṁbhaṇam
Katamat svit kathā āsīt[6] (x.81, 2).

It is not a question that is asked here nor has any answer been given specifying the *adhiṣṭhāna, āraṁbhaṇa,* etc. as in the case of other queries like *Kimsvid himasya bheṣajam.* It is a statement containing an *akṣepa* or challenge as to the existence of means and materials such as the *adhiṣṭhāna* (ground) *ārambhaṇa* (material stuff) *nimitta* (auxiliaries) etc. *independently of B.* in primordial creation.[7] Thro' such *ākṣepa* it is suggested by implication that B. is the sole Independent source of all creation. This text has, therefore, been accepted by M. as the Viṣayavākya of this *adhi.* This is fully supported by what we read in the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* of the *Ṛg Veda* (X.129) where we hear "Neither 'Asat' nor 'Sat' existed then—neither death nor immortality, neither night nor day. Darkness there was shrowded in darkness. There, that One alone breathed without wind by its own power. Other than That there was nothing independent.[8]"

The term *āraṁbhaṇam* in the Sūtra refers to the stuff out of which something is made—viz. the material (*upādānam*[9]) which is one of the

5. See Vādirāja *TPGD* p. 69.
6. What could have been the base, the means what was it and how? (Tr).
7. Cf. विचारण्येनापि आक्षेपार्थत्वस्यैवोक्तेः । (Rāgh. *TDP*).
8. This is only a free rendering. For M.'s interpretation of the Sūkta and of important terms therein such as *Asat* and *Sat* See his *Tattvodyota.*
9. *Ārabhyate yena tad ārambhaṇam upādānam* (Rāgh. *TDP.*).

means of production and the principal one at that. By force of *Upalakṣaṇa* it stands for the other accessories like *'adhiṣṭhāna'*, nimitta, etc. By *Lakṣitalakṣaṇā* (double lakṣaṇā) the term *ārambhaṇaśabda* calls up the whole complex of thought conveyed by the sentence embodying the challenge as to the existence of independent accessories: *Kimsvid āsīd adhiṣṭhānam ārambhaṇam katamatsvit kathā āsīt.* In this way, the expression *'āraṁbhaṇaśabda'* in the Sūtra is elliptical for *ārambhaṇākṣepa-adhiṣṭhānākṣepaśabda.*[10]

Among the accessories, the stuff of which something is made (i.e. the *upādāna*) is entitled to first consideration over all other means of production as being the most intimately connected with production among the means.[11] Hence the Sūtrakāra has given preference to what is relatively more important among the Sādhanas and selected it for mention in the statement of the reason, leaving aside the *'adhiṣṭhāna'* tho' in the *Viṣayavākya* it is the *adhiṣṭhāna* that has been mentioned first. The term *ādi* (after *ārambhaṇaśabda*) refers to reasonings by which B. is shown to be in a position to rise above dependence on all Sādhanas, except at Its own will and pleasure.[12] The result of the *ākṣepa* is the conclusion that there is no *adhiṣṭhāna* or *ārambhaṇa* and that, therefore, the creative activity of B. is entirely on account of Its essential power.[13] In the light of the points made in the succeeding Sūtras such as *Satvāccāvarasya* and *Asadvyapadeśānneticenna dharmāntareṇa vākyaśeṣāt* the full implication of the *ākṣepa* would be that B. is the One and Only Independent Cause and that the accessories such as Prakṛti (*ārambhaṇam*), Jīvas, Kāla, Karma, Adṛṣṭa, etc. beginningless as they are, still owe their very being and powers and potentialities to B.[14] They exist because of B. and not in spite of B. These points will be made clear under the relevant Sūtras.

The Siddhānta maintains that tho' absolutely independent of all necessity to use any of the accessories in its creation, B. out of its own free will deigns to make such use of them as we learn from the Śrutis. This does not limit its sovereignty in any way. It rather enhances it, for the very being, eternality, power and potencies of all these accessories are determined by B.'s own will and do not, therefore, pose any challenge

10. *TD.* ii, 1, 15.
11. *NS.* p. 298 lines 3-4.
12. Cf. परतन्त्रो ह्यपेक्षेत स्वतन्त्रः किमपेक्षते ?
साधनानां साधनत्वं यतः किं तस्य साधनैः? ॥ (*M.BSB.* ii, 1.15).
13. स्वरूपसामर्थ्यादेव तस्य सृष्टिः (*M.BSB.* ii, 1.15). तथाचाक्षेपस्य नास्त्याधिष्ठानादिकं किमपि, अतः स्वरूपसामर्थ्यादेव तस्य सृष्टिरिति विपर्ययपर्यवसाने सति, वक्ष्यमाणपर्यालोचनयार्थात् ईश्वरस्य जगत्सृष्टौ स्वतंत्र-साधनान्तरानपेक्षा सिद्धयति (BD)
14. द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।
यदनुग्रहतः सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (*Bhāg.* ii, 10.12).

to Its metaphysical independence at any time.[15] These accessories are, however, duly recognized and assigned their proper roles in the Śrutis and we have to accept these facts as they have been vouched for. The question as to *why* there should at all be these dependent accessories or why they should at all be made use of by B. is answered by reference to the *Satyasaṅkalpatva* of God. His will is Supreme and is not answerable to our question as to its why. Elaborating this aspect M. writes in his *AV.*:

शक्तोऽपि भगवान्विष्णुरकर्तुं कर्तुमन्यथा ।
स्वभिन्नं कारणाभिन्नं, भिन्नं विश्वं करोत्यजः ॥

Tho' capable of doing without these accessories, or making such changes among them and their order as He pleases, God out of His own free will has made the world different from Himself and different from and also identical with its material cause (Prakṛti). Commentator J. gives it a brilliant exposition. Tho' God makes free use of these accessories, it does not mean that He cannot, like a potter or a weaver, do without them or has no power to alter their sequence. The manner and method of His creation and the why and the wherefore of the accessories, their being and becoming are for ever determined by His Will.[16]

Vedāntic Theism recognizes the eternality of various principles such as Souls, Matter, Time and Space, Svabhāva, adṛṣṭa etc. under the aegis of God. The sovereignty and independence of B. have to be made consistent within the limits of this pattern of thought. The problem of reconciling the existence of other eternal principles and accessories with God's metaphysical independence and omnipotence in creation is doubtless a difficult one for the Vedānta, which does not accept the theory of creation *ex nihilo* and which is committed to the acceptance of eternal souls, eternal matter, etc.[17] No Indian philosopher has been temerarious eno' to derive Matter directly from God. It exists on the Advaitic view also as a force latent in B.[18] The only sensible and straightforward course by which the sovereignty of God can be made consistent with the existence of *such* matter and *such* souls etc. would be to make them *ex hypothesi* dependent on God for their very being and becoming. M. has thus done the right thing in raising this vital issue for Theism in general and Vedantic Theism in particular, in the most appropriate context for it in the Yuktyavirodhapāda of the Sūtras under the *Tadananyatvādhi.* The onus is on the other commentators who do not adopt

15. साधनानां साधनत्वं यदात्माधीनमिष्यते ।
तदा साधनसम्पत्तिरैश्वर्यद्योतिका भवेत् (M.*BSB.* ii, i.1.19).
16. *NS.* p. 299.
17. *Nityo nityanam cetanas cetanānām* (*Kaṭha. Up.* ii, 2.13).
18. परमात्मनि ओतप्रोतभावेन समाश्रितं वटकणिकायामिव वटवृक्षशक्तिः
Śaṁkara on *Kaṭha. Up.* i. 3, 11).

his interpretation of this *adhi.* to show where else in this *Adhy.* and Pāda this issue has been tackled by the Sūtrakāra, if not here. We shall see in their own context if Sūtras ii, 1, 24-25 of S. can be utilized for this purpose.

The second Sūtra: *Bhāve copalabdheḥ* makes out that if accessories existed *independently* of B. in the primordial state, it would be borne out by Pramāṇas. But there is no evidence in the Śrutis that such accessories existed *independently* of B. The next Sūtra *Sattvācca avarasya* answers the query as to how we should reconcile this with the clear reference to the existence of several accessories like the waters, the earth and the faculties (T.A. iii, 1.3[19]). The answer is that these are not referred to as existing independently; but only in utter subservience to Its Will.[20] Enlarging on this, M.'s Bhāṣya on this Sūtra cites a Śruti in support: Time was, the soul was, the Lord was; whatever there was, was enveloped by Him—was under His power. Therefore, it is said the Supreme alone was. As His, they may even be treated as non-existent in their own right.[21]

The next Sutra *Asadvyapadeśān neti cenna....* raises the objection that in the Nāsadīya Sūkta of the *Ṛg Veda* it is said that nothing but B. existed before creation,—neither Sat nor Asat. This is answered by pointing out that these accessories are said to have been non-existent not in their very essence but only in the restricted sense of their having been unmanifested, dependent, inferior, modified and disintegrated in that state. The dependent, unmanifested and inferior are sometimes spoken of in worldly usage also *as if* they are of no account and, therefore, *non est.*

But this should not lead us to conclude that they were absolutely non-existent. For in the concluding part of the same Śruti (*vākyaśeṣa*), we find a clear reference to the existence of Tamas or Prakriti: *Tama āsīt.* The existence of Time is already presupposed in the reference to "then" (*tadānīm*) in the opening line. The terms Sat and Asat referred to here denote *pṛthvi, ap* and *tejaḥ* and Vāyu and ākāsa respectively.[21b] (See *Brh. Up.* ii, 3, 2.3).

The Sūtra *Yukteś śabdāntarācca* shows that it is quite in keeping with Divine Majesty to do with the help of accessories[22] which are

19. *Adbhyas sambhūtaḥ pṛthivyai rasācca.*
20. *Avarasya tadadhīnasya sādhanasya sattvāt.* (M).
21. *Kāla āsīt Puruṣa āsīt Parama āsīt. Tad yad āsīt tadāvṛatam āsīt tadadhīnam āsīt atha hyeka eva Parama āsīt. Yasyaitad asit. Nahyetad āsīt* Cf. *Qua comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt nec sunt* (St. Augustine Con. xi. 4).
21b. *San mūrtam, asad amūrtam* (S. on *Praśna. Dp.* ii.5).
22. Cf. सहकारिभिरारम्भे न स्वातंत्र्यं विहन्यते ।
तत्सद्भावप्रवृत्त्योश्च स्वाधीनत्वव्यवस्थितेः ॥
Vedānta Deśika, *Tattvamuktākalāpa* Banaras, 1900, p. 255).

themselves metaphysically dependent on God. The Sūtra *Paṭavacca* instances the production of a cloth or of a pot with the help of means other than the producer. There is no harm in applying the same principle of utilization of means in respect of God's creations also. But the last Sūtra *Yathā prāṇādiḥ* hastens to correct the impression that such means are self-effective. They become efficient only when energised by His presence and entry into them. This is borne out by the Śruti *Yaḥ prāṇe tiṣṭhan prāṇam antaro yamayati* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 7.16). This is true of Prakṛti, Puruṣas and others as well.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

Introducing the *adhi.* with the explanation that in the previous one the possibility of the *bhoktṛ* and *bhogya* passing into each other's nature has been prevented by accepting their distinction of natures at the empirical level, S. says the present *adhi.* expounds the correct standpoint of Monistic philosophy in regard to the position of the world of effects *vis-a-vis* B. The position is that the world of effects is non-different from B. the cause—(*tadananya*[23]). This non-difference is to be understood in the sense that all the socalled modifications of the cause are '*mithyā*' and, therefore, non-existent apart from the cause (*vyatirekeṇābhāvaḥ*). This is taught in the Śrutis: *Ātmani dṛṣṭe śrute, mate vijñāte idam sarvam viditam* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 5, 6) *Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam* (*Chān. Up.* vi, 1, 1). *Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā* (*Bṛh. Up.* ii, 4, 6).

Criticism

It is difficult to see how *Tadananyatvam* can be construed as non-difference of the world from B. from the point of view of S.'s own metaphysics. There B. alone is true (*satyam or ṛtam*) and the world untrue (*anṛtam*). The *anṛta* cannot be non-different from the *ṛta* in any straight sense of the term.

It cannot be explained from the standpoint of the Vivaraṇa school that as B. suffused by Ajñāna is the material cause of the world, the latter can be conceived as non-different from such B. The terms of the thesis: *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* makes it imperative that it is by the knowledge of the unconditioned B. that one can attain the knowledge of the many and secure Mokṣa by liquidating (*vilaya*) the many in the One—the substratum of the appearances of the many. For this purpose, non-difference will have to be established with the Śuddha-B. and *not* with the suffused one; for, it is the Śuddha that is the substratum of world-appearance. But the Śuddha-B. is true and the superimposed world untrue. Their non-difference would be a preposterous idea. If the subject matter of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* were to be B. qualified by Ajñāna, Ajñāna as an adjunct of B. would also come to be included within the province of what is to be known in order that the many may become known. That would make Avidyā also worthy of being known (*jñeya*) instead of being fit to be discarded (*heya*).

23. Tadananyatvam is one single cpd. word as viewed by all the leading commentators. Radhakrishnan is *incorrect* in separating *Tad* from *ananyatvam*. *Brahmasutras*, p. 346).

The *Bhāmatī* puts in an ingenious plea. "By non-difference we affirm no identity; we negate difference".[24] This will not help much. Difference cannot be negated without bringing in identity. If, as Vācaspati says, there is no difference between the world of phenomena and B., the distinction between the true and the untrue would cease to be meaningful. If that is to be averted by taking the precaution of not affirming any identity between them, the prospect of knowing the many by knowing the One would disappear. Vācaspati may, however, argue that in the interests of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* we have to affirm non-difference; while, at the same time, we have to deny their identity. Instead of this cumbersome procedure, it would be simple and more reasonable to straightway posit a dual relationship of Bhedābheda (identity and difference on an equal footing) between cause and effect. That would be more in accordance with the two sets of texts: *Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā* and *neti neti*, etc. and in line with the illustration of clay and its products etc. B.'s oneness of essence (*ekarasatva*) will not suffer on this view; for tho' B. may not be different from the world of many essences, there would at the same time be no identity with the world of many essences. That would suffice to keep its *aikarasya* undiminished.

'Ananyatva' defined as 'having no existence apart from' B. will not necessarily mean that the world has no existence *in fact*. Smoke does not exist apart from fire but it is not on that account void of a reality of its own. 'Ananyatva' cannot mean that the world is superimposed on B. It would be a misuse of language to describe silver superimposed on shell as being identical with it. The world according to the Advaitin is *anirvacanīya*. The concept of *anirvacanīya* has to recognize that the Prātibhāsika and the Vyāvahārika reals are, in their turn, different from the Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika reals. *As anirvacanīya, the world must, therefore, be different from B. the Pāramārthika.* How then can it be that the world is *not* different from B. (*bhedam vyāsedhāmaḥ*)?

The pulling down of the world's status in S.'s philosophy to an *āropa* (albeit due to beginningless Avidyā) reduces the possibility of knowing the many by knowledge of the One to a shadow. For there

24. न खल्वनन्यत्वमित्यभेदं ब्रूमः; कितु, भेदं व्यासेधामः ।

is no prospect of knowing the silver more vividly than before, after the shell has come to be recognized as the substratum of the illusory appearance of silver. The cognition of silver in shell is possible and has meaning only so long as the truth about the shell remains *not* known. In the same way, our knowing the many will hold good only so long as B. has *not* come to be known. The moment B. comes to be known, its knowledge will *sweep off the erstwhile knowledge of the world* of multiplicity as an illusion that has been. How can this be called "knowing the many" in any *straight sense* of the term?

But the *Bhāmatī* is ready with another ingenious defence. It observes: 'When the rope is known, the truth about the serpent which has been wrongly apprehended there comes to be vividly realized. For the rope is indeed the truth about the serpent.'[25] Similarly, by knowing B. the truth about the superimposed world comes to be known.

All this quibbling with words will not take us nearer to knowing the many. The position would simply be that *knowing B. makes B.* known. It would not give us knowledge of the 'unknown many' as promised by the Śruti—*Avijñātam vijñātam bhavati.* It is the distinctive essence or properties of things that constitute their true being and not (the possibility of) their being or becoming the substrata of illusory appearances of others. B.'s truth (*tattvam*) would have to consist in its own intrinsic nature and attributes and *not* in its being the substratum of the illusory world-appearance,, which is itself a figment of thought.[26]

The rope is not the intrinsic nature or characteristic of the snake which is to be sublated by the correct knowledge of the rope. It may be that the snake as superimposed is not true and the rope on which it is superimposed is itself unsuperimposed (*anāropitam*) and, therefore, the true. But that will not make one thing which is different from another, "its truth". The snake may not be in a position to appear apart from the rope and may not, therefore, be different from it. But the *rope* as such has an existence apart from the 'snake' and is different from it. If the rope is 'the truth' of the snake, one who knows the rope may be taken to know the truth about serpents. If it is not 'the truth' about real unsuperimposed snakes that we are talking but only of illusory snakes, let it first be proved by the Advaitin that the world he is seeking to identity with B. is not a real world but an illusory one.

The incongruity of the illustration of clay and pots with Vivartavāda is easy to see. That pots and pitchers are not surely superim-

25. रज्वां ज्ञातायां भुजङ्गतत्त्वं ज्ञातं भवति सा हि तस्य तत्त्वम् ।
26. अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते ।

posed on clay should be evident from the simple fact that they do not disappear even after we have come to understand the truth about clay being the stuff of which they are made. It may be true that in 'Vedānta' philosophy the effect is not considered to be a different substance altogether from clay, as in the Nyāya school. Nevertheless, the Advaita philosopher also has to concede that what is called a pot is something brought into being by *special effort,* that it is capable of being used to fetch water and resembles its original substance clay in certain qualities and represents a particular change of the original substance. If S. should rejoin that all the same the socalled pot has no real existence, he should be reminded of the fact that the case is not other with his 'clay'—which would make the illustration given pointless.[27]

Śaṁkara's Sūtrākṣarārtha Examined.

As the same sort of Vivartavāda interpretation has been given by S. to the *Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa*[28] (i, 4, 23-27) and the *Adṛśyatvādhikaraṇa*[29] (i, 2, 21-23) the present one becomes superfluous to establish the same position. It also seems odd that in an authoritative treatise like the Sūtras, their author should talk with a double voice and first stand up for the differences of *bhoktṛ* and *bhogya* from the Supreme and then go back upon it in the very next Sūtra, sweeping away all difference as *anṛta.*

In S.'s interpretation, the reason embodied by the term *ārambhaṇaśabda* is not in a position to *directly* establish the conclusion that the world is non-different from B. It does so only *indirectly* by drawing out the 'Vivarta-implications' of the illustrations of clay etc. as provided in the Śruti, which are then to be applied to the ultimate relation between B. and the world as cause and effect. An interpretation such as M.'s wherein the *'ārambhaṇaśabda'* functions as a direct reason to establish the relevant conclusion has better claims to be preferred.

The way in which S. has construed the wording of the Sūtras, here, is also open to objections. The expression *'Vācārambhaṇam'* in the Śruti is a compound word according to S. That being so and as the other term *ādi* after 'Vācārambhaṇaśabda' (in the Sūtra) stands according to S. for another Śruti text, regard for grammatical correctness of form, consistent with the interpretation of the Sūtra sponsored by him, would require the wording *Vācārambhaṇādiśabdebhyaḥ.*

27. Cf. *Laukikaparīkṣakāṇām yasmin arthe buddhisāmyam sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.*
28. See pp. 309-11.
29. See pp. 186-87.

It is doubtful if *'ārambhaṇa'* alone can carry all the overtones which S. introduces into the full form *Vācārambhaṇam* seasoning it with a further particle *mātram* (in effect).[30] This difficulty does not exist for R. who has preferred to take *Vācā* and *ārambhaṇam* as uncompounded words and for M. who traces *āraṁbhaṇam* as such to a different Viṣayavākya where it occurs as a single word—as evidently intended in the Sūtra.

The two simple words of the second Sūtra *Bhāve copalabdheḥ* have been expanded by S. with much importations—interpreting *'bhāva'* as the existence of the cause *and its perception*[31] and *'upalabdhi'* as the perception of the effect and *its existence*.[32] The overall meaning of the Sūtra according to S. is that the effect must be deemed to be non-different from its cause as it is found to exist only so long as the cause is there and is perceived only when the cause is perceived.[33] This interpretation necessitates the importation of the words "of the cause" (*kāraṇasya*) and "of the effect" (*kāryasya*); of an emphatic particle *'eva'*; of the iteration of *'bhāva'* and *'upalabdhi'* and changing the ablative *upalabdheḥ* once into *upalabdhau* (loc.) and the locative-*bhāve* as repeated, into the ablative *bhāvāt* to supply the consequent-clause: *Kāraṇasya bhāve bhāvāt;* (kāraṇasya) *upalabdhau upalabdheḥ*. These importations and repetitions are avoided in M.'s interpretation which merely gives a modal significance to *upalabdheḥ* in this connection.

The first part of S.'s premise of non-difference (*ananyatva*) that as the effect exists only when the cause is known to exist contains a commitment about the *existence* of the effect which is not readily reconcilable with the conclusion about its unreality (*anṛtatva*). The basis of S.'s contention that the effect has no existence apart from the cause and should, therefore, be deemed to be non-different from it is this that it exists and is perceived only when its cause is also there and is perceived (*bhāve copalabdheḥ*). But the irony of it is that at the empirical level the world of effects is apprehended *only when* both the Nirviśeṣa-B or Śuddha-Cinmātra and the omniscient Saguṇa-B. *remain uncomprehended*.'! This creates a partial breakdown of the argument built on this particular interpretation of the Sūtra *Bhāve copalabdheḥ*.

S. interprets the third Sūtra: *Sattvācca avarasya* as meaning: Because the effects such as Ākāśa which are temporally posterior to

30. Cf. वाचैव केवलं अस्तीत्यारभ्यते, न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति (S) यतो नामधेयमात्रमेतत् (*Bhāmatī*) नामधेयमात्रं ह्येतत् अनृतम् (S)
31. *Kāraṇasya bhāvas sattā copalambhaśca* (*Bhāmatī*).
32. *Tasmin* (sati) *Kāryasya upalabdheḥ* (*Op. cit*).
33. Kāraṇopalambhabhāvayor upādeyopalambhabhāvād iti sūtrarthas sampadyate (*Op. cit*).

the cause (*avarakālīna*) are reported in the Śruti *Sad eva somyedam agra āsīt* (Chān. Up. vi.2, 1) as existing in the cause, before production and for this reason they should be taken to be non-different from the cause. If the effect is thus admitted to be actually preexisting, it could not be dismissed an *anṛta*. If the *anṛtatva* (unreality) is only apart from the cause, it would be against the teaching of the *Neha nānāsti* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4.19) text which, according to Advaita, negates the world *absolutely*. In any case, if the world as an effect is admitted to be existing previous to its production (*utpatteh prāk*) in B. it cannot be dubbed as *anṛta* within the meaning of *Sadasadvilakṣaṇatvam*. The interpretation needs the *importation* of the words: *utpatteḥ prāgeva* to yield the sense which S. tries to put upon the Sūtra.

The last two Sūtras of the *adhi.* as explained by S. are out of tune with Vivartavāda, as it has been upheld in the opening Sūtra. B. which is partless will not admit of rolling up and spreading out as in the case of a piece of cloth (Sūtra 19); or of expansion and contraction as of the different vital airs (*prāṇādi*). As both these Sūtras expatiate on the same aspect, it seems needless to devote two Sūtras for the same purpose.[34] An interpretation such as M.'s which puts them to better use as presenting fresh points for discussion deserves to be preferred.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. this *adhi.* establishes the non-difference of *B. as cause* in its capacity of being qualified by primordial *Avyakta, Mahat,* etc. in their undeveloped forms with *B. as effect* in its capacity of being qualified by the same Avyakta, Mahat, etc. in their developed forms.

This doctrinal lay-out (Prakriyā) establishes non-differences only as between two qualified beings (*viśiṣṭābheda*)—viz. of Sūkṣma-acidviśiṣṭa-B. with Sthūla-acidviśiṣṭa-B. But it does not establish and cannot establish any such relation of non-difference of B. qualified by unmanifested-Avyakta with *Mahat* as a purely qualifying element (*Viśeṣaṇāṁsa*) in this causal process. Moreover this sort of a procedural layout will not be in a position to explain the non-difference taught according to R. in other sets of identity-texts such as *'Idam sarvam yad ayam ātmā; sarvam khalvidam Brahma*—where the terms Ātmā and Brahma do not carry a Viśiṣṭa-denotation. If these latter type of texts are to be explained from the point of view of "Antaryāmi-aikya" or of B. being the inner ruler of all and that they are, therefore, absolutely dependent on It and hence cannot exist independently of It,—the same

34. For similar repetition see the discussion on S.'s interpretation of ii, 2, 1-10.

uniform principle could be availed of in explaining other identity texts in the cosmological contexts.

It creates a needless complication to make Sthūla-acidviśiṣṭa-B. an effect of Sūkṣma-acidviśiṣṭa-B. For, in texts like 'Having created it, He entered into it (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 6) reference is made to the creation of certain principles by B. and Its entering into them, *afterwards.* This presupposes that these created principles are not conceived in the Upaniṣad, as being already "*viśiṣṭa*" in R.'s sense. If they are, there is no point in B.'s *entering again* into that which is already qualified by Its own presence therein.

For R. also the Viṣayavākya of the opening Sūtra is the famous text of the *Chān. Up.* But unlike S. R. treats the term '*ārambhaṇam*' in the Śruti as a separate word and not as the second member of a compound-form. His interpretation of the Śruti is also quite new and different.

Treating '*ārambhaṇa*' as a variant of '*ālambhana*' and giving it the meaning of "*being* touched", he says that all modifications of clay in the form of particular configurations such as a pot or a pitcher and their names are *touched by speech,* for bringing about appropriate transactions (such as fetching water) and that, therefore, it is only the substance "clay" that receives the new configuration and the new name of 'pot' for the sake of purposeful activity. This is the gist of the Vācārambhaṇa-Śruti.

But then, when R. says that "configurations like the pot are touched by the substance of clay", he has to admit a difference between the Spraṣṭṛ and the Spṛṣṭa.—in other words, difference is not altogether ruled out on this interpretation of *ananyatva.* It is doubtful, if on the analogy of clay and its configurations we can regard the world of matter as a *physical configuration* of B.

There is no smooth sailing for R. in construing the wording of the sūtras so as to convey his meaning. He has to take many liberties with the wording of the Śruti: "Vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam....". In the first place, the expression *vācā* (instrumental) has to be invested with a secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) viz. "*for the sake of* bringing about appropriate activities such as bringing water."[35] This necessitates the *instrumental* having to be construed in the *dative sense of purpose.* Thirdly, *ārambhaṇa* has to be construed by change of *r* into *l* and given the meaning of "being touched". Fourthly, the conjunctive particle "*ca*" has to be *added* after the two words in the Śruti: *Vikāro nāmadheyam,* and lastly, to suit the interpretation of '*ālambhanam*' as

35. *Udakāharaṇādivyavahāraviśeṣasiddhyartham* (*Śrībhāṣya*).

"being touched",[36] the term *mṛdā* (by clay) has to be *imported* in the Śruti.[37]

R.'s interpretation of the second and the third Sūtras do not stand apart from each other. These two have been introduced by him as explaining how notwithstanding the non-difference of the effect from the cause, the effect is called by a different name. Accordingly, the second sūtra shows that gold, which is the cause, is perceived in the existence of its effects like earrings. In other words, there is the recollective judgment: "The earring is gold". The next Sūtra says the effect which is posterior in time (*apara*) to the cause exists *in the* cause; for we find in ordinary language and in the Śrutis statements such as—"all these jars and platters were till this morning only clay"; "being only was this in the beginning". There is a recollective judgment of identity in this case also. This renders one of the two Sūtras redundant, for the same purpose. R.'s commentator has, however, tried to show that there is some distinction between them—in the *form* of the recollective judgment. In the second Sūtra the recollection takes the form "that is this" whereas in the third it takes the form "this is that" (as applied to the effect and the cause). Or else, in the second we have reference to the *perception of the identity* while in the third we have reference to the *usage* of identity (or non-difference).

We cannot permit additional Sūtras for the luxury of illustrating the transposition of subject-predicate relationships between Kārya and Kāraṇa in their identity-judgments. That apart, there is nothing *in the manner of wording of these two Sūtras* indicative of a recollective judgment being intended,[38] as proposed by R. An interpretation, therefore, which could directly connect these Sūtras with the subject of B.'s own causality will have to be preferred to the way in which they have been used for supplying a number of tame illustrations of the identity of cause and effect.

36. *Ārabhyate ālabhyate spṛśyata ityārambhaṇam. 'Kṛtyalyuṭo bhahulam' iti karmaṇi lyuṭ. (Op. cit).*
37. Vācā vākpūrveṇa vyavahāreṇa hetunetyarthaḥ. Tasya vyavahārasya siddhaye tenaiva *mṛddravyeṇa* pṛthubudhnodaratvādilakṣaṇo vikāras samsthānaviśeṣaḥ, tatprayuktam ca ghaṭa ityādināmadheyam *spṛśyate* (R).
38. An identity proposition is expressed in terms of "this is that" and not with the use of the locative, genitive or other oblique cases, as here.

CHAPTER LIII

JĪVAS CANNOT BE THE WORLD-CAUSE

7. *Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇam* (ii, 1.22-27)

This *adhi.* repulses an argument apparently corroborated by Śruti and worldly experience[1] that the Jīvātman himself may be accepted as the Author of the world, in lieu of B. Tho' this contention has been disposed of earlier in ii, 1, 13, along with some others of the same kind; and its counterpart sponsored by a school of thought (Samaya) is going to be refuted in the coming Pāda (ii, 2, 9), the present *adhi.* goes into the question at some length[2] in six Sūtras, on purely rational grounds. Its presence at this point is necessitated by an *adhikāśaṅkā* against the point made in the preceding Sūtra that sentient principles like Prāṇa are also energised in their activities by the Supreme B. The objector contends that this cannot be accepted because the Jīvātmans as sentient beings are competent to be creators in their own right, as is borne out by experience.[3] This is given a fitting reply in this *adhi.* along with the elucidation of certain important points pertaining to the Jīvātman's own intrinsic limitations even as a Kartā.[4]

The Pūrvapakṣa is presented from two slightly different angles. One places the claims of Jīvas as a class at the highest level as exclusive authors of the world in collaboration with *adṛṣṭa*. Another pitches it in a lower key, refusing to acknowledge the hand of God in any of

1. अत्र श्रुत्यनुभवसंवादियुक्त्यविरोध उच्यते (*TC*. p. 882b).
2. जीवकर्तृत्वपक्षः श्रुतिप्राप्तो विस्तरात् निराक्रियते ।
(M.*BSB*. ii, 1.22).
3. तथापीह " यथा प्राणादिः" इति पूर्वाधिकरणोक्तं प्राणादिजीवानामस्वातंत्र्यमयुक्तं, जीवकर्तृत्वस्यानुभवात् ।
4. इत्यनुभवसंवादेनाधिकहेतुना पुनर्जीवमात्रविषयायां शंकायां, अनुभवस्य गतिं हिताकरणादिदोषान्तरं च वक्तुमिदमिति न पुनरुक्तिः (*TC*. p. 882)

the normal creative and other activities of countless human beings and other sentient creatures all thro' their lives. This will naturally limit the scope of God's work to the creation, sustenance, etc. of the great cosmic principles like Mahat, Ahamkāra, etc. and the laws of nature and leave the rest to the jurisdiction of the Jīvas. If this is conceded, it would considerably weaken and modify the position established in Sūtra i, 1, 2 that B. is the sole Independent Author of everything that is created and sustained in the Universe—be it ever so large or small a thing. Thus either way, the Pūrvapakṣa would be unwelcome to the Siddhāntin who stands for B.'s sole independent authorship of the Universe, its maintenance, control and other dispensations in their widest range as well as in their most minute aspects.[5]

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the Jīvātman as a sentient being is in a position to accomplish what he undertakes to do (*upasamhāradarśanāt*). He may, therefore, be regarded as the creator of the world in collaboration with adṛṣṭa. This would simplify matters. The assumption of a God as creator involves further assumptions. God is invisible and for aught we know, He may not be existing at all. If He is not open to perception, He can never be seen by anyone. It will be just an assumption that He exists. If He is open to perception, He should be perceivable at all times and in all places and, therefore, here and now. But He is not. He cannot be said to be visible to some and invisible to others like the Abhimāni-Devatās referred to earlier; for God is said to be unmanifest in essence (*avyaktasvarūpa*) and quite unlike some other principles like fire which are sensible in one aspect and insensible (*sūkṣma*) in another aspect of *tanmātra*. After assuming the existence of God in spite of these difficulties, we have to assume further that He controls the creative activities of others like a potter or a weaver. It would be much simpler to eliminate God from the sphere of creative activities of such persons altogether. There is no harm in going a step further and crediting the Jīvātman himself with cosmic creation in collaboration with *adṛṣṭa*. It is not necessary that one should be an all-knower and have a foreknowledge of the material cause, the nimitta-kāraṇa and other details in order to be able to act as a creator. A man produces sounds without being in a position to perceive *ākāśa* of which sound is the distinguishing property.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta makes it clear that even tho' Jīvas have a certain measure of agency (*kartṛtva*) within the limited sphere of their lives, even that is in principle dependent on and derived from B. The opening

5. तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुः तत्तच्छक्तिप्रबोधकः ।
एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमञ्जसा ॥ (M.*BSB*. ii, 3, 11).

Sūtra: *Itarvyapadeśād-dhitākaraṇādidoṣaprasaktiḥ* points out that this should be clear from the very fact that man does not always succeed in doing what is best for himself and avoiding what is detrimental to his interests. He is not in a position always to have the happiness he wishes for and avoid the unpleasant which he dislikes. This is proof of his helplessness. Such a state of affairs is clearly incompatible with a free and independent agent. It is, therefore, out of the question to suppose that such a helpless creature could be vested with independent powers of creating anything—let alone a cosmos.[6a] The Sūtra thus exposes the weakness of the Pūrvapakṣin's argument by placing its finger on the most vulnerable point.

The other Sūtras similarly reply to other incidental objections. Sūtra 23, shows that being Antaryāmin and endowed with transcendent attributes, the Supreme Being is not subject to any kind of fatigue or worries in its creative activities like ordinary mortals. Sutra 24, shows that tho' sentient, the Jīva cannot claim such independence. The states of Suṣupti, birth and death thro' which the Jivātman has to pass are sufficient to establish his helplessness. Sūtra 25 shows the fact that the Jīvātman is able to successfully complete the tasks undertaken by him does not prove that he is not under the control of a superior power. The essence of food eaten by a cow is finally converted into milk by the agency of Prāṇa.[6b] Unable to perceive the hand of God everywhere, man falls into a pitiable delusion of his own independence of initiative and conduct. This is like missing the fact of the dependence of our own bodies on the soul. No wonder man falls into the greater delusion of thinking that his own soul which is but a Pratibimba of the Supreme is independent of the Bimba.

The most important Sūtra here is *Kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopo vā*. It poses a dilemma to the agency of Jīvātman as an intelligent being. The resolution of the dilemma demands the acceptance of Divine agency as the regulating principle in all human agency in order to secure the proper adjustment of effort and expenditure of creative energy according to the magnitude of the tasks performed. This solution of the dilemma is not, however, incorporated in the body of the adhikaraṇa in the Sūtra. It is, however, implicit in the inner dialectic and wording of the Sūtras of the succeeding adhikarana—especially of *Śrutestu śabdamūlatvāt* (ii, 1.28), and *Ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi* (ii, 1.29) which rebuts a similar objection based on the same grounds of *kṛtsnaprasakti* and *Niravayavatvaśabdakopa* being brought up against the independent agency and authorship of God Himself.

6. Note how aptly this interpretation of the Sūtra by M. echoes the criticism of the *Śvet. Up.* (i, 2 d.) on this precise point: आत्माप्यनीशः सुखदुःखहेतोः ।

6b. See also *Gītā* xv. 14.

What M. has done in his *AV*. is to examine the dilemma against the Kartṛtva of Jīvas in the light of the Sūtrakāra's own firm commitment to the position that the Jīvātman is a real agent tho' subordinate to the Supreme and derives it from the Supreme. (See Sūtras ii, 3, 33 and 41) and make clear on the basis of such a critical examination how the accepted agency of the Jīvātman is to be rationally accounted for and rescued completely from the horns of the dilemma of *Kṛtsnaprasakti* and *niravayavatvaśabdakopa*.

And in order to do this, M. has very naturally made an advance use of the clues to the solution of the dilemma provided in the Sūtras of the succeeding *adhi*. He has thereby put an end to the irresponsible attempts at making the Jīvātman the author of the world or even the *absolute and independent creator or author* of whatever he accomplishes *even within the limited sphere of his work*.

This part of M.'s exposition in his *AV* is, therefore, parenthetical and given in anticipation of the Siddhāntanyāyas of the succeeding *adhi*. to enlighten his readers and satisfy their curiosity as to how the dilemma is to be rebutted. This anticipatory approach does not, therefore, stand in the way of the Pūrvapakṣa of the succeeding *adhi*. arising. This point should be specially borne in mind to avoid any mistaken impression that in the light of the solution of the dilemma given here, the Pūrvapakṣa of the succeeding adhikaraṇa cannot arise.

The creative energy of an individual flows either from his whole being or from a part of it. When creative energy is expended in performing a small task we do not feel we are using up the maximum energy of our being.[7] There are times when we feel called upon to indent upon all our 'reserve' energies, to pull thro' a difficult task. This needs no elaboration. If we admit then that creative energy expended at any time is in proportion to the magnitude of the task undertaken, another difficulty would arise. The creative energy of an individual has to be treated as part of his own being and not something different from it. That being so, we will have to grant in the latter case, that individuality is divisible and is constituted of organic parts like a living cell. But the Śruti is clear that the Jīvātman is an indivisible whole.[8] Logic thus conflicts with Śruti. Activity is measured in terms of quantum of energy expended. The quantum is bound to vary according to the magnitude of the task and will not remain constant. The difficulty threatens to reduce Jīva's agency to a fiction. The only way of resolving

7. Ayam ca doṣo Jīvakartṛtvapakṣe Ekena angulimātreṇa pravartamānopi pūrṇapravṛttis syāt. Na ca tad yuyate. Sāmarthyaikadeśadarśanāt. (*M.BSB*. ii, 1.27). We are not talking of muscular or such other energy here.

8. *Na caikadeśena. Niravayavatvāt* (*Op. cit*).

the difficulty is to bring human agency under the regulating control of the Divine Being.

It may, however, be asked—how is the position improved by subjecting human agency to Divine impulsion? Even as dependent on Divine control, the Jīvātman will be in the same predicament so far as the difficulties connected with the adjustment of the quantum of energy to suit different exigencies is concerned. If we cut the Gordian knot by denying the reality of individual agency as a mere assumption, it will contradict the position taken up by the Sūtrakāra ascribing activities to the soul even in the released state. (ii, 3, 34).

The Sūtra does not leave the difficulty unresolved. The solution is implicit in the points made in the Sūtras of the succeeding *adhi*. M. has briefly indicated the solution in his Bhāṣya after dismissing the plea that the difficulties created by the Jīva's being partless can be circumvented by conceiving of parts engendered by conditioning factors (*upādhis*). The Upādhis are powerless to create parts in a partless whole. They can only signalize and serve to mark off naturally existing parts of a whole, from one another.[9] The question whether the Upādhi acts on the whole or part and how parts are to be conceived (as parts) before the advent of Upādhis are all too difficult to answer satisfactorily.[10] He, therefore, counsels that where such a stalemate is created by the stiff opposition between Śruti and reason, the solution must be found on the basis of pre-established harmony guaranteed by Divine Will and dispensation.[11]

As pointed out earlier, M. throws full light on these points in his C. on this *adhi*. in his *AV*. He points out there that Jīvas are accepted as "partless". This removes the supposed conflict with Śruti on the question. But tho' partless the Jīva is enabled by the incomprehensible power of God to put forth creative energy and effort commensurate with the tasks undertaken by him.[12] As the matter can thus be satisfactorily accounted for by reference to Divine intervention, there is no need to seek the help of Upādhis to introduce imaginary distinctions of parts in the individual's personality. The intrusion of Upādhis has its own difficulties to face. The recourse to Divine intervention is justified because the Jīva himself does not possess such wonderful power of accomplishing the unaccomplishable. (*aghaṭitaghaṭaka-acintyaśakti*). It is an attribute of the Deity which the Jīvātman does not possess. If

9. विद्यमानस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापको नैव कारकः । (M. *Upādhi. Kh.*).
10. न चोपाधिकृतांशः । स एवांश उपहित इति द्वित्वापेक्षत्वात् । (M.*BSB.* ii, 1.27).
11. 'यद्वि युक्त्या विरुद्धयेत तदीशकृतमेव हि' इति गत्यन्तरोक्तो: (*Op. cit.*).
12. यदि भागेन कार्येषु जीवशक्तिं न योजयेत् ।
हरिस्तदाहि सर्वत्र कृत्स्नयत्नोंऽशितापि वा । (AV.)

he should have it, he will not be the helpless creature exposed to the failings of *hitākaraṇa* and *ahitakaraṇa* as rightly pointed out in the opening Sūtra.

It is further explained by M. that Jīvas possess *svarūpāmśas* which are integrated with their personalities, thro' the help of Viśeṣas. The regulation of creative energy is made possible by such *aṁśas*. The existence of such *Svarūpāmśas* is presupposed elsewhere also in the Sūtras (ii, 3, 25) to account for other facts connected with the Jīva's personality.

It cannot be argued that as Jīvas possess *Svārūpāṃśas* and as Viśeṣas are there to regulate the adjustment of creative energy to suit the needs of each case, God's intervention can be dispensed with. M. shows in his *AV*. that it is not possible to do without Divine intervention in the last analysis. For, the acceptance of *amśas* would break up the Jīva's unity of being. If to avoid this difference between *amśas* and and *amśi* is not admitted, the adverse consequence of having to put forth maximum effort to accomplish even the most insignificant act of lifting a blade of grass with a finger would rear its head. It cannot be said that it is only in insentient things that the possession of *amśas* would disrupt unity of being. No satisfactory reason can be given to hold such a view. It is no answer that it is in the nature of sentients to be so constituted. This is not a question of evidence as to the nature of things but of what makes sentients have a characteristic that is not possessed by the insentients. The preservation of unity in the face of different *amśas* cannot be accounted for in this case by means of Viśeṣas *alone*. For Viśeṣas are there in insentients also—where they do not come in the way of the difference between part and whole. We have, therefore, to ascribe this special power with which the Viśeṣas in a Cetana are invested of preserving the unity of being in spite of the acceptance of *amśas* in its being, to the dispensation of God Himself.

M. thus concludes his exposition of the topic with the observation that making sentiency the determinant of such an arrangement and Viśeṣas its basis, the Supreme Being brings together under one and the same being ordinarily incompatible attributes of difference of amśas (aspects) and identity of being with His own incomprehensible powers. The identity of being prevents the *niravayavatva* of Jīvātman from being violated and the differentiation of *Svarūpāmśas* thro' Viśeṣas prevents *kṛtsnaprasakti*. Thus both the horns of the dilemma are rebutted and the Jīvātman is enabled to harness his effort and creative energy commensurate with the tasks he undertakes with the help and guidance of the Supreme.

CHAPTER LIV

DISABILITIES IN THE WAY OF BRAHMAN'S AUTHORSHIP *OVERTHROWN*

8. *Śrutestu Śabdamūlatvādhikaraṇam.* (ii, 1, 28-32)

This adhi. dispels the possibility of B.'s causality of the world being impugned on grounds similar to those brought up against the Jīvātman's title to be the creator of the world. The Pūrvapakṣa is that the disabilities which stand in the way of B.'s being accepted as the author of the world are by no means inconsiderable. In some respects they are even more serious. (i) As in the case of Jīva, if B. should have to exert its whole being and entire energies to create the world or only an insignificant part of it, it would not be a compliment to its intelligence. It would be foolish to say that this cannot be helped; for such a confession would be derogatory to Divine Majesty. On the other hand, if it is held that B. exerts only a part of its being and energies in creating the world and a smaller fraction of its being and energies in creating smaller things, there would be a violation of the Śruti text which says B. is an undifferenced whole (*neha nānāsti kiṁcana*) without parts.[1] (ii) B. has no physical body and sense organs. It would be difficult to imagine a creator without these. (iii) Where will this creator of the world be standing, where will He remain poised *before* He starts to make the first move in creation? There is no point

1. अत्रानंशस्यापीशस्यैकदेशेन व्यापारे, अणीयस्त्वादियुक्तस्य महीयस्त्वादौ व्याघात इति व्याघातपर्यवसायिप्रबल-युक्तिविरोध उच्यते । (*Rāgh. TDP*).

M.'s Pūrvapakṣa in this *adhi.* has thus nothing to do with the objection fancied by Dasgupta (Op. cit. iv.p.144) that "if B. worked without instruments, His whole being might be involved even in creating a single-straw". The question of instruments, as we have seen, has been set at rest by M. under II.1, **15-21.**

in objecting that as B. is not accessible to reasoning, the how of Its creation of the world is beyond the power of reason, to settle. Reason may not be able to prove the existence of B. But it can certainly raise objections to particular conceptions of B. which will have to be answered if Brahma-Mīmāmsā-Śāstra is to be taken seriously. If all logical difficulties are to be swept away by waving the magic wand of B.'s inscrutable powers (*acintyādbhutaśakti*) there will be no knowing where one should draw the line. One may as well claim that B. creates the world without a material cause and/or possessing the requisite foreknowledge of time, space and other accessories. Or, B. may even turn itself into the material cause of the world, or convert the void into a reality, revert released souls to bondage and so on.

Siddhānta

These and other objections are overruled by the Sūtra: *Śrutestu śabdamūlatvād* and the others. The Siddhānta points out B. is not open to any Pramāṇa other than Śruti. Its nature, attributes and powers are, therefore, to be gathered from the Śrutis and accepted on their authority. The case is other with the Jīvātman who is open to the jurisdiction of Pratyakṣa and inference. Seemingly contradictory attributes can, therefore, be reconciled in B. where and when borne out by the Śrutis—without any difficulty. The Purāṇas tell us how by the mysterious powers of Viśvakarmā, the Puṣpakavimāna could accommodate any number of persons according to needs. Powers which are not found in human beings are seen or are known to be possessed by the gods and the spirits. A power not found in one or most persons may well be found in some extraordinary person. We hear of Agastya drinking off at a draught the mighty ocean whose other shore is beyond our ken. Why should it surprise us if God should have powers which are incomprehensible to our understanding and by which He could accomplish what is unaccomplishable by human standards? This is not to say that God's ways are erratic or that He can do what is logically impossible such as making a square circle. The mysterious powers of God are invoked here only to explain what are observed or borne out by Pramāṇas which nevertheless seem to be incompatible or defy explanation.[2] The square circle is nowhere given in our experience. The wonderful power shown by Agastya in drinking the ocean, we would say, is itself God-given. For God is the one inexhaustible source of all powers and potencies:

परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च (*Śvet. Up.* vi, 8).

It is because the reasonings of the Pūrvapakṣin are quite strong in their own context that the Sūtrakāra has combated them with equally

2. यत्प्रमितं विरुद्धं च तस्यैवाचिन्त्यशक्त्या निर्वाह इति नातिप्रसङ्गः । (*TC.* p. 887 b).

powerful arguments. In the opening Sūtra: *Śrutestu śabdamūlatvād* (ii, 1, 28) the expression "Śruteḥ" is intended to justify the fact of B.'s possessing seemingly contradictory attributes on the evidence of Śruti and the additional phrase '*Śabdamūlatvād*' has been put in to emphasize the point that such a B. is essentially inaccessible to inference and should be accepted as defined and described in the Śruti. The two other Sūtras: '*Ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi*' and '*Sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt*' show that B. possesses the power of accomplishing the unaccomplishable. The Sūtra: *Svapakṣadoṣācca* (ii, 1.30) points out that such powers cannot be claimed for the Jīva and that, therefore, there is no basis for the contention that like the Jīvātman, B. also cannot be the creator of the Universe. The other objections that B. cannot be the creator of the world as it does not possess a body, sense-organs etc. is refuted in the concluding Sūtra (ii, 1.32). A creator, who cannot energize the causal complements directly by his will power, has to work with his physical body. When his knowledge has to come from outside his being, he has to make use of sense organs. He will need a standing ground to support his body. An omniscient, all-powerful creator needs no such assistance.[3] Since reason cannot come in the way of God who is knowable only thro' Śrutis, there is nothing to prevent His possessing powers which are trans-empirical and beyond our comprehension. He can, therefore, manage with ease to exert only as much of His being and creative energy as may be adequate to the magnitude of the work intended to be accomplished by Him, even tho' He Himself is an indivisible personality in the sense of not having any *amśas* or parts which are separable from His essence and being. His being a Saviśeṣa-personality makes such adjustment of the measure of energy to be brought into play possible. In the case of Jīvātmans these Viśeṣas, tho' present, are able to operate *only* under the controlling power of God. It is thus the independent position of God that makes it possible to rebut the dilemma of *Kṛtsnaprasakti* and *Niravayavatvaśabdakopa* in the case of both the Jīvātman and the Supreme B. In virtue of Its infinite powers, it is possible for B. to be a creator without having a *physical body* and senses like others or a standing ground; for B. is established in Its own glory and poised in its own majesty.[4] As for dispensing with a material cause (and such other objections) suffice it to say that the question does not arise as the Śruti makes it clear that B. does make use of a material cause viz. Prakṛti in the creation of the world. This question has already been gone into in the Prakṛtyadhi.

3. यो हि साक्षात्कारकाधिष्ठानस्य नेष्टे स शरीरव्यवधानमपेक्षते । यस्य चागन्तुकं ज्ञानं स तदर्थमिन्द्रियाणि । यश्च गुरुशरीरो नावस्थातुं शक्नोति स क्षित्यादिकमाधारम् । भगवांस्तु सर्वशक्तिः सर्वज्ञः किमर्थमपेक्षेतेति ।। (*NS.* p. 307).

4. स भगवः कस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठित इति – स्वे महिम्नि इति । (*Chān. Up.* vii.24.1).

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Others

S. and R. treat the three Sūtras beginning with *Itaravyapadeśāt* .... (ii, 1.21-23) as one adhi. The Pūrvapakṣa is presented in the first Sūtra as follows. Śrutis like *Tattvamasi* say that Jīvātman is the same as B. The consequence of this identity of essence is bound to be disastrous to B.'s causality of the world. For if B., as the creator of the world, subjects the Jīvas to the miseries of Saṁsāra, it would be exposing its own self to such misery; for the two are one in essence. This would entail the defect of one who is master of his own destiny not doing what is good for himself and digging his own grave instead; or putting shackles on his own self when he is free to shake them off. It cannot be that B. does not realize what it is about or that the world is a quagmire of misery.

The Siddhānta refutes the objection by pointing out that the "Creator is one other than the Jīvātman" (*adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt*—ii, 1.22) as borne out by Śruti texts such as *Bṛh. Up.* ii, 4.5; iv, 3, 35; *Chān. Up.* vi, 8, 1. S. clarifies his position here that while non-difference between Jīva and B. is the *real* truth, the difference alluded to in the Sūtra: *adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt* (ii, 1.22) is the one which is the outcome of Avidyā.

Retaining the same Pūrvapakṣa, R. has maintained that the difference between B. and Jīva is real and true in the absolute sense and that the other scriptural statement about their non-difference is to be understood in terms of their intimate and organic unity as body and soul.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation Reviewed

In S.'s interpretation we are obliged to take the phrase *Itaravyapadeśāt* to mean 'on account of the other's (*itarasya*)—i.e. Jīvātman's being mentioned as being identical with B. (*Brahmātmatva-vyapadeśāt*).[5] This involves a farfetched breaking up of the cpd. *itaravyapadeśa* as itarasya (*brahmātmatva*)—vyapadeśāt involving the importation of the words *brahmātmatva* between 'itara' and 'vyapadeśa'. Such an interpretation takes away the very *raison d'etre* of calling B. or Jīvātman as *itara* (the other), if the Jīva's otherness from B. is to be modified into identity with B. in the very next breath in order to give room for a Pūrvapakṣa. We have a natural right to expect the cpd. '*Itaravyadeśa*' to be construed in the same way as others of its kind—as in Itaraparāmarśāt sa.... (i, 3, 18).

Retaining S.'s perspective, Dr. R.D. Ranade has tried to offer a new interpretation of the three Sūtras here (ii, 1, 21-23) which he deems

5. S. takes *itara* alternatively to refer to B. This makes no difference to the Pūrvapakṣa either way.

to be an improvement in their argument, as these three sūtras "do not seem to have been accurately interpreted by any commentator".[6] He interprets the second Sūtra also as an objection (as against S.) and finds in the Siddhānta in Sūtra 23 a reconciliation of the opposites in such a way that "physical and moral evil will have a place in God tho' the responsibility for them rests principally on the autonomy conferred by God on nature and the selves" (*Op. cit.* p. 96). We are constrained to point out that Ranade's interpretation of the first Sūtra is open to the same objection of *adhyāhāra* as S.'s. Apart from that, it is much more difficult to accept his novel interpretation of *adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt* (ii, 1.22) viz.: "If we say that He is different (bheda) from the individual self, the objection will press against Him still closer (*adhikam*) because He cannot prevent the performance of bad actions" (p. 96). This makes it clear that on this interpretation *adhikam* would mean congency of the flaw of हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्ति: would be more intense in the second position. But then, as Ranade himself agrees, *adhikam* is in the neuter and it would be a gross violation of Samskrit grammar to construe it as a predicate of "*Doṣaprasakti*" which is a feminine noun. The second point made by Ranade is that the ablative *itaravyapadeśāt* is to be understood as in contrast with the ablative *bhedanirdeśāt* (p. 96). May we point out how unphilological and tortuous it would be to contrast "*bheda*" and "*itara*" when both have the same meaning in language?[7] Further if as Ranade says a contrast is intended to be conveyed would not the Sūtrakāra have been better advised to use the right terms *abheda* and *bheda?* The fact that form a quarry spring emeralds and pebbles of no value, or from food both nourishment and poison does not justify the conclusion that physical and moral evil *have a place within God.* For the diamonds and food and poison share the same nature of "*acaitanya*" while God is pure *Caitanyasāra*. The difference is obvious and significant.

In the next Sūtra, it seems enough for purposes of the Siddhānta position of S. to show that Jīva is different from B.[7] As this is done by the words *bhedanirdeśāt* (ii, 1.22) there is no compelling necessity to use the additional "*adhikam*" (=superior) in that Sūtra, when the notion of superiority is itself to be rejected as a distorted impression created by Avidyā!

Explaining how the faults of not doing what is beneficial to itself and indulging in self-stultification do not arise in S.'s position, of non-difference between Jīva and B., Vācaspati writes: "It is true that Para-

6. Vide his "*Vedanta The Culmination of Indian Thought*" posthumously published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 1970. (p. 96).
7. S. himself construes adhikam (in ii, 1.22) merely as "other than" (*anyat*) which is what *bhedanirdeśa* also conveys.

mātman *qua* all-knowing sees the Jīvātman as non-different from Himself. At the same time, He also sees that in point of fact the Jīvātman has no contact with the experiences of pain and misery etc. in reality and that it is purely on account of Avidyā that the Jīvas come to entertain the feeling that they are really in contact with pain and misery. B. feels, therefore, that "even tho' these Jīvas have an experience of misery and other imperfections due to Avidyā, I remain indifferent and untouched. Even when they are thrown into prison nothing can hurt me. In this way, there is no room for charging B. with not being in a position to do what is beneficial to it and avoid doing what is detrimental to its well-being."[8]

This defence of Vācaspati will have, however, to explain in what sense B. will *not* be liable to the miseries of the Jīvas in case it is non-different from them. Is it because (i) it is only the self conditioned by Avidyā which is, therefore, unreal that is connected with misery and that such a conditioned self is not identical with B.; or (ii) because tho' Jīvātman may be treated as a real being exposed to suffering, B. is not identical with such a being but only with pure consciousness; or (iii) because notwithstanding the presence of real identity, difference has been superimposed; or (iv) because B. knows the truth and is not, therefore, subject like the Jīvas to the feeling of undergoing any misery; or (v) because misery and unhappiness are purely imaginary conditions and that, therefore, in reality there is nothing to be lamented in the world.

The first view is untenable. As bondage and release should have reference to the same individual, the one who participates in Mokṣa —i.e. the true subject shall have to be accepted as being exposed to the sufferings of Samsāra. We cannot dispute the logic of this position. For Mokṣa is not the extinction of the person who has been bound but the extinction of his bondage leaving him unextinguished. Otherwise, Mokṣa would be the extinction of Ātman as such.

It cannot be contended that bondage in terms of association with Avidyā is for pure consciousness, while it is the reflection of the Cinmātra in Avidyā which is called Jīvātman, that is exposed to suffering because the conditioning factor of Avidyā corrupts only the reflection and not the original. If this explanation is accepted, then in the doctrine of many egoes *(Bahujīvavāda)* accepted by one school of Advaita, pure consciousness with which the realized soul becomes identical in

8. सत्यमयं परमात्मा सर्वज्ञत्वाद्यथा जीवान् वस्तुत आत्मनो भिन्नान् पश्यति पश्यत्येवं—न भावत एषां सुख-दुःखादिवेदनासंगोऽस्त्यविद्यावशात्त्वेषां तद्वदभिमान इति । तथाच, तेषां सुखदुःखादिवेदनायामप्यहमुदासीन इति न तेषां बन्धनागारनिवेशेऽपि अस्ति क्षतिः काचिन्ममेति, न हिताकरणादिदोषापत्तिरिति राद्धान्तः ।

Mokṣa would become the logical subject of bondage consistent with the principle of Bandhamokṣāmānādhikaraṇya. Apart from this, the plea that conditioning factors tend to cast their influence exclusively on the reflections is not invariably true. We see for e.g. that difference brought about by conditioning factors holds true bilaterally. The redness of hue thrown by the Japā flower, on the other hand, is perceived in the crystal and not in the reflection.

The second alternative would not help. For according to Advaita, the substantive viz. Śuddha-B. which is indicated by way of secondary signification as the meaning of 'Tat' (in *Tattvam asi*) is always identical with the substantive similarly indicated by Lakṣaṇā as the meaning of 'Tvam', in the interpretation of that identity—text. For this reason the imperfections of Samsāra would also affect the Śuddha-B.

In the third case, tho' the Jīvātman may be deluded into superimposing difference from B. on himself, B. being ever free from such delusion cannot possibly be committing the mistake of taking the transmigrating self to be different from itself. In the absence of difference, the sufferings of the Jīva would equally be the sufferings of B. If B. too is deluded to the extent of thinking that it is different from the suffering Jīva, then being open to delusion it may also commit the mistake of not doing what is good for it and doing what is detrimental to its interests; so that the Sūtrakāra's attempt at refuting such a possibility would itself be futile. Things like cutting off of one's own head in a dream hardly deserve serious attempts being made to disprove them as facts. In any case, a superimposed difference on the part of B. towards Jīvātman would still be ineffective against the former's being exposed to the sufferings of Jīva. It will be of no avail against the stern reality of its non-difference from Jīvātman. Fire mistaken for a shrub of Guñjā[9] will not oblige by ceasing to hurt and burn the fingers of one who touches it.

The fourth alternative cannot go very far to spare B. from liability to sufferings. Tho' B. may know the truth and have no attachment, it would still be subjected to embodiment like a Jīvanmukta. Lastly, unreal as it may be, the misery of Samsāra would still be as much an undesirable experience to B. as it is to the Jīvātman (in view of their non-difference). Why else should even the Jīvātman be so much concerned with its termination—instead of leaving it alone as not worth removing, as it has no real existence?

9. *Abrus precatorius* bearing a red and black berry (Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.

S. has taken the two Sūtras *Upasamhāradarśanān neti cenna kṣīravad dhi* (ii, 1.24) and *Devādivad api loke* (ii, 1.25) as one *adhi*. The first Sūtra is interpreted in support of the position that B. acts as the material and the instrumental cause of the world without the aid of accessories—just as milk and water turn into curds and ice without any extraneous help. The second Sūtra cites the example of the gods in support of B.'s capacity to act without depending on Sādhanas.

This overlooks the fact that milk has to be boiled and go thro' a process of coagulation before it can turn into curd. Under the Sūtra *Payo 'mbuvaccet....* (ii, 2.3) S. has himself admitted that B. is the real cause in transforming milk into curd and making the waters flow. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to by-pass the truth established in ii, 2.3 and make out that milk is capable of self-transformation without any external impulsion or help. This shows that his interpretation of the Sutra *Upasamhāradarśanāt...* (ii, 1.24) is open to question. The illustrations of milk and water are also inconsistent with Vivartavāda. The illustration of the gods producing things at will is also out of place in Vivartavāda. The illusory transformation of nacre into silver needs no supervising intelligence. If world-creation is to be likened to a magical act, the illustrations of milk and curds would be out of place. If B. creates worlds by will power like the gods and Ṛṣis creating palaces etc. as described in the Purāṇas, the worlds so created would not be the unrealities they are represented to be by the Vivartavādin. The self-transformation of milk into curds is, if anything, an illustration favorable to the godless Sāṅkhya philosophy and would ill accord with a robust Theism such as Bādarāyaṇa's.

S.'s rendering of the word *Upasamhāra* in the opening Sūtra as the bringing together of requisite materials and accessories by persons like potters and weavers to produce their wares is unusual. The meaning given to this term by M. in his interpretation of carrying the work taken up to a successful conclusion is the more widely accepted sense of the word. Both S. and R. allow that B. does make use of accessories like time, Prakṛti (Māyā), Karma, etc. in creation. The attempt made in interpreting sutras 24-25 ostensibly to do away with such accessories is, therefore, inconsistent with the Siddhānta position. If the idea is simply that these accessories have no right of independent existence, the Pūrvapakṣa ought to have been raised on the lines of M.'s Pūrvapakṣa in the Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa.

Śaṁkara and Ramanuja on *Kṛtsnaprasaktyadhi* (ii, 1.26-29)

S. and R. interpret the four Sūtras beginning with *Kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopo vā* (ii, 1.26) as constituting a separate *adhi*.

The Pūrvapakṣa here is that if B. is wholly transformed into the world, it would *exhaust* its being in the world of effects and there will be no B. left outside the realm of effects to seek, contemplate and realize. If it transforms only in part it would mean that B. is divisible into parts which would ruin its integrality. The objection is refuted in the remaining Sūtras of the *adhi.* It is pointed out in reply that B. being inaccessible to logic, the manner and mode of its transformation into the world of effects are to be accepted without question as taught in the Śrutis. The Śrutis clearly say that B. transforms itself into the world. Another text says the Supreme Deity has wonderful powers which enables it to transform itself into the world without losing its being wholly or in part.

Criticism

The purpose of the Avirodhādhyāya is to set at rest such objections as place difficulties in the way of accepting the nature of B. as established in Adhy. I in terms of its being completely distinguished from all other Cetana and Acetana realities and as transcending them all, and as being untouched by any of their infirmities. It would thus be inconsistent with this main perspective of the Avirodha-Adhyāya to enthrone any sort of Pantheistic doctrine by proposing to refute the objections against it—either here or elsewhere in the Sūtras. For, Pantheism is in essence the negation of all distinction between B. and the world of matter and souls and thereby of the transcendence of B. and its freedom from limitations.

It would be too naive to argue that the very greatness of B. lies in its being the material cause as well of the world—in as much as the world cannot be its own material cause. Such an argument will have to be committed to the position that the *cause and effect must be different substances.* But then such a position would constitute an open contradiction of the position taken up in the Tadananyatvādhikaraṇa that B. is non-different from the world. It will not do to plead that it is only the world as an effect that differs from B. and not B. from the world as its cause. This point has already been refuted in the discourse on Bhoktrāpatyadhikaraṇam. The proposition that X differs from Y must hold true either way. Moreover, as the Sūtrakāra has nowhere before taught the thesis of B.'s material causality in respect of the world, the objection to it on grounds of Kṛtsnaprasakti or Niravayavatva can hardly arise or be entertained. We have seen only too clearly that the alleged exposition of such a thesis in the Prakṛtyadhi., Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhi. and others is unsustainable on grounds of contextual incompatibility and interpretational misfits, apart from the inherent logical untenability of the thesis itself.

The doubt whether B. transforms itself wholly or only with a part of its being has absolutely no *locus standi* in Vivartavāda and could not be raised from the standpoint of Vivartavāda which has been established by S. with much fanfare as the official and scripturally authentic view of 'Vedānta', in the Tadananyatvādhi. If the doubt has somehow arisen owing to forgetfulness of what has been established, the Sūtrakāra and his commentator should advise the Pūrvapakṣin to look back and refer to what has been said already. If any further elucidation of Vivartavāda were called for, the Sūtrakāra should more lucidly expound how the world is a superimposition on B. and reinforce the position established in Tadananyatvādhi. There is no logical propriety in his talking about *Śrutestu śabdamūlatvād.* The fact that B.'s causality of the world is knowable only thro' Śruti and is beyond the grasp of reasoning will not *necessarily* lead to the conclusion that B. is the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world.

It may be contended on S.'s behalf that as B. in intimate association with Avidyā happens to be the cause of the world, the question of the nature and extent of B.'s transformation (along with Avidyā) becomes relevant here. This argument can hardly stand scrutiny. The material causality of Avidyā is itself a figment of the imagination, as Avidyā by its very nature is a tantalizing phantom and its behaviour can call for no serious-minded inquiry. In any case, the dilemma about Kṛtsnaprasakti and Niravayavatva can have no meaning with reference to Avidyā. Even if the whole of Avidyā should be transformed into the world, there will be no harm done to anybody. There surely is no text commending that Avidyā should be pursued and realized in the way in which the pursuit and realization of B. have been commended in the Śruti! As there is no Śruti which says Avidyā is partless and indivisible there is no harm even if it should have transformed itself only in part as the world before us.

Vācaspati Miśra has put up his own justification for raising and refuting the objections based on Kṛtsnaprasakti and Niravayavatva here. He thinks that the illustrations of milk and water in Sūtra ii, 1.24 create the impression that the Sūtrakāra has accepted Brahmapariṇāmavāda. As such Pariṇāma of B. is open to objections based on Kṛtsnaprasakti and Niravayavatva, the Sūtrakāra has thought it fit to silence such objections and at the same time highlight the correct Vedāntic position in regard to causation—viz. Vivartavāda, in the Sūtra *Ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi*[10] (ii, 1.28) relying on the illustration of

10. यद्यपि परिणामो वास्तवो निषिद्धः, तथापि क्षीरादिदेवतादृष्टान्तेन पुनस्तद्वास्तवत्वप्रसंगं पूर्वपक्षे आपाद्य, सर्वथाय पक्षो न घटयितुं शक्यत इत्यपबाध्य, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' 'आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि' इति सूत्राभ्यां विवर्त दृढीकरणेनैकान्तिकाद्वयलक्षणः श्रुत्यर्थः परिशोध्यत इत्यर्थः। **अनेन स्फुटितो मायावादः।** (ii, 1.26-27).

dream-phenomena where the dreaming self is able with his own mind and without the least break-up or effacement of its selfhood, to project the appearance of horses, chariots, roads and gardens in the dream state, as stated in the Śruti (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 3, 10).

All this is pure fancy and wishful thinking. The Vivartavāda has been categorically affirmed, according to Advaita commentators, in the *Adṛśyatva*, *Prakṛti* and *Tadananyatva-adhi.-s.* There is thus absolutely no possibility of any recrudescence of the doubt about Pariṇāmavada again after all that has been said and done. If a doubt as regards Pariṇāmavada should still rear its head, it should have been scotched then and there by displaying the illustration of dreams etc. thro' the Sūtra: *Ātmani caivam vicitrāśca hi* without making a futile attempt at reviving the dead horse of Pariṇāmavāda by citing a precarious illustration of milk and water turning into curds and ice.

Under Sūtra 28, S. has given the illustration of the individual self's wonderful creations in his dreams, to support the position that the world is a similar creation of B. thro' Avidyā, instead of being a physical transformation of B. But the illustration raises certain fresh difficulties. What precisely is the illustration intended to convey? Do the analogies of dreams and magic imply that the Jīvātman goes thro' the illusory experiences of dreams because B. has the illusory experience of the world; or (ii) that because B. is the substratum of world-illusion therefore, Jīvātman in his turn happens to be the substratum of the illusory projections of his own dreams; or (iii) because B. happens to delude others like a magician, the Jīvātman also deludes others by his dreams?

The first alternative would be inapplicable to B. as it is not a deluded being. The second would not fit the illustration; for the Jīvātman does not look upon himself, in his dreams, as "I am an elephant or a cat" but perceives various objects as other than himself. Anyway in the first two alternatives, the reference in the Sūtras to "the wonderful powers" of the Ātman would be inappropriate. For being deluded oneself or becoming the substratum of an illusion are hardly a sign of being possessed of wonderful powers. The citation of the Śruti: *Na tatra rathā na panthāno bhavanti* from Brh. Up. iv.3, 10, with reference to dream-creations is wide of the mark. The presumption that the author of the dream-creations is the individual self is clearly opposed to the concluding words of the same text: He is the maker of the dreams. 'In Him all the worlds are rooted' (*Katha. Up.* ii, 2, 8). If it is the Saguṇa-B. that causes the dreams to appear, they would be entitled to be recognized as Vyāvahārika-reals instead of being dismissed as *prātibhāsika* (appearances). These difficulties oblige us to discard the meaning of individual self given to the term

"Ātman" used in Sūtra ii, 1.28 and take it in the sense of the Supreme Brahman itself. The Sūtra would thus come to mean that the Supreme B. has the incomprehensible power of creating a real world. Thus rightly construed, it can hardly be used to suggest that the objective world is false on the analogy of the falsity of dream-creations.

Sarvopetā-adhikaraṇam

S. treats Sūtras 30-31 as another adhi. The first Sūtra here, according to him, reinforces the statement made in Sūtra 28 that B. has wonderful powers, as it is all-knowing,—whatever it desires comes true. The other Sūtra answers an objection that the gods tho' endowed with mysterious powers still act only with the help of their bodies and sense organs. But B. has neither a body nor senses. It will not, therefore, be in a position to act. This objection is refuted in Sūtra 31. The objection is refuted on the ground that B. can act without a body and organs as it is far superior to the gods.

This interpretation cannot be sustained. As S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 28 assigns to B. a status no higher than a deluded being or a being which is the substratum of an illusory appearance or else of a magician, he cannot in this Sūtra talk of the omniscience and all-mightiness of B. being proclaimed by so many Śrutis. It offends our sense of logic to be asked to think of the omniscient being as a deluded one or as being the substratum of a delusion. The magician is unable to perceive his own magical creations as others see them. No one competent to create a real world would rest satisfied with creating dream-worlds. Since B. in S.'s philosophy is only the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world, the objection to B.'s being the cause of the world on the ground of its having no body or senses and the reply to such an objection that B. has adequate Śaktis[11] are all misplaced.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation (ii, 1 26-31)

R. takes all the six Sūtras beginning with '*Kṛtsnaprasatir....*' as a single adhi. Raising the Pūrvapakṣa that B. cannot be the material cause of the world as it is devoid of parts and in view of the adverse consequence of the entire B. entering into the effect, he concludes that as B. is open only to Śrutipramāṇa and possesses the highest powers, its material causality in respect of the world cannot be disputed merely because of the difficulties interposed by empirical logic.

But the difficulty is that in R.'s philosophy B. pure and simple is never the material cause of the world. It is only B. qualified by

11. प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मण: सर्वशक्तियोग: संभवतीत्येतदप्यविद्याकल्पितरूपभेदोपन्यासेनोक्तमेव ।
(S.*BSB.* ii, 1.31).

Acit in its subtle state (*Sūkṣma-acid-viśiṣṭa*) that is the cause. That being so, no Pūrvapakṣa based on B. being partless can be raised with reference to this qualified B. It has already been established by R. in the Prakṛtyadhi. that this qualified B. is the material cause of the world. There is thus no justification whatever to reopen the issue here.

The Siddhānta position that B. can well be the material cause regardless of the difficulties of *Kṛtsnaprasakti* etc. because of It's being endowed with the highest powers is not very much to the point. If the possessor of the highest powers is B. in its substantival aspect (*Viśeṣya*) unqualified by Sūkṣma-acit, it is certainly *not* the material cause in R.'s theory. The true material cause is not thus identical with the one possessing the highest powers. If it is the qualified B. that possesses these highest powers, it is doubtful if such a B. which is virtually unable to prevent itself from becoming exposed to various imperfections in the course of such transformation into the world of objects can properly be said to possess the 'highest powers'.

CHAPTER LV

BRAHMAN'S COSMIC ACTIVITIES ONLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF JĪVAS

9. *Naprayojanādhikaraṇam* (ii, 1, 33-34)

Having resolved the opposition to B.'s causality of the world put up by the dilemma of partial *vs* complete expenditure of energy in the act of creation etc., the Sūtrakāra now turns to dispose of the objections to B.'s causality with special reference to the motive behind the cosmic activities of B. It must be noted that the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta in this adhi. in respect of the purposiveness of God's activity are not confined to the act of creation only—as S.R. and others have assumed. M. has rightly held that they are applicable to all the eight dispensations of the cosmos. This stand taken by M. has a very important bearing on teleology in the Vedānta doctrine. If S. had realized this significance of the question of Prayojana as covering all the dispensations of the world, he would have concluded his discourse on this *adhi.* in a different vein.

The adhi. seeks to determine whether the causality of the eightfold dispensations of the world attributed to B. in i.1.2 is sustainable or not in the light of reason. In order to do so, it is necessary to examine whether the fulness (*Pūrṇatva*) of B. will be affected in any way if the fruit to be gained by such activities is not available to It before entering upon the said activities. To decide this point, it will have to be settled if God engages Himself in these activities in order to gain something anew or just in mere sport. This raises the further question if the activities of responsible persons are undertaken to gain some personal benefit or may also be sometimes carried on without any such

intention. To decide this again, we shall have to consider if certain acts like the dancing and singing in which a person who is drunk with wine indulges or the movements of the hands and feet by a child which is happily drinking its mother's milk, or the assistance which a compassionate man renders spontaneously to one in trouble are all guided by the thought of gaining some personal benefit or may quite conceivably be the expression of buoyancy of spirit, goodness of nature, contentment of joy or natural propensity as the case may be.

S. and R. regard the first Sūtra as representing the Pūrvapakṣa and the second the Siddhānta. According to M. both are Siddhānta Sūtras.[1]

Pūrvapakṣa

Pūrvapakṣa is that the cosmic activities of God can neither be associated with the desire to get some personal benefit out of them nor be bereft of such intention. In the first case, God will cease to be the Perfect Being that He is claimed to be in all respects and none but the perfect Being can be the all-creator. As the creation, sustenance, etc. of the world are the acts of a sentient being, they cannot also be held to be undertaken without the intention to gain anything from them—like the upward movement of the flames of fire. They cannot also be likened to the dancing and singing of persons under the influence of drink; for God is a responsible person who must be presumed to act with deliberation and forethought.

Siddhānta

It can very will be that tho' acting with forethought, God acts only out of compassion for His creatures and without any desire to gain anything thereby.[2] This must be so; for He is by hypothesis Āptakāma—one who has attained all that He could possibly wish for, He does not, however, cease to be a person without forethought if His actions are not based on considerations of personal benefit. The principle that an intelligent person acts only if he has something to gain by it is not invariably true. A connoisseur of music nods his head or moves his fingers and hand in particular ways in the sheer ecstasy of his artistic appreciation and enjoyment of good music. The flowering of mangoes in spring, the upward movement of the flames are natural. The cosmic

1. Prof. R. D. Ranade recognizes the justice of this claim, tho' his interpretation of the first Sūtra is different from M.'s.—*Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought*. Bombay, 1970, p. 98.
2. This is a very important admission and pronouncement of M. that God's cosmic activities are undertaken purely for the benefit of others: अत: प्रयोजनवत्त्वादिति हेतुं ब्रुवाण: सूत्रकृदात्मप्रयोजनोद्देशमेव नेति निवारितवान्, न परप्रयोजनोद्देशमपि । श्रुतिरपि "आप्तकामस्य" इति हेतुगर्भविशेषणं प्रयुञ्जाना, आत्मप्रयोजनस्पृहामेवाक्षिपति, परप्रयोजनस्पृहामभ्युपैतीति ज्ञायत इत्यापि द्रष्टव्यम्: (*NS* p. 309 b). This sentiment finds no expression in the cc. of S. or R.

acts of B. are similarly intrinsic to its nature. This is emphasized by the Śruti— देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा[3] ? B. is Āptakāma—has foreover realized the fruits of all Its desires. Such a Being cannot be supposed to act in order to realize some unfulfilled desire.

It has been established in the Ānandamayādhikaraṇa that the activity of the Lord flows out of the essence of its pure joy of nature. It is true that when one does something for another out of compassion, there is some tangible benefit accruing to the beneficiary. But the point here is that the compassionate one is not making any calculations as to how his good turn will benefit himself.[4] There is nothing objectionable, therefore, in holding that God's activities are similarly undertaken for the benefit of His creatures and not for His own benefit as He is an Āptakāma and has no unfulfilled desires to satisfy by doing particular things in particular ways.

It is only in respect of difficult tasks that require special efforts that even intelligent persons think of what possible benefit they would be getting by carrying them out. No one bothers to ask why you shake your finger while making a speech. If pressed for an answer you would simply say O for nothing. It is child's play for God to create, preserve, control and dissolve the cosmos and carry out its eightfold dispensations. It is in this sense that the Śruti says: *Icchāmātram Prabhos sṛṣṭiḥ* that the creation of the world is accomplished by the Lord at His merest wish—i.e. with effortless ease.

The first Sūtra *Na prayojanavattvāt* establishes the Siddhānta position that unlike in the case of others, God's creation of the world and other activities are not undertaken for getting some personal benefit. This meaning is got by repeating the words *naprayojanavattvāt* and construing it as a '*nasamāsa*', embodying a reply to the objection raised outside the Sūtra.

Śaṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

S. and R., however, interpret the first Sūtra as a Pūrvapakṣa and the second as conveying the Siddhānta that tho' B. or God may not have any other aim or object to fulfil by its creation of the world, it may be taken to act like a King diverting himself with some kind of sport.

3. M. regards this verse as well the others from the Āgama Prakaraṇa of Gauḍapāda's Kārikās as part of the *Māṇḍūkya Up.* For evidence in support of M.'s position see my *History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 219-22 and my articles on the subject in several Oriental Journals referred to therein.
4. न च प्रयोजनोद्देशिता कृपालुता चेति संभवति (*NS*. p. 308).

It is, however, one thing to compare the cosmic act of God to a mere sport or play in the sense of its being an effortless act and quite another to take it that God engages in the creation of the world *for the sake of diversion or sport* (*līlārtha pravṛttiḥ*[5]).

S.'s Bhāṣya on the *adhi.* blows hot and cold over the decisive answer to the question whether the creation of the world is a real act undertaken by God or B. with a deliberate intent to create it irrespective of whether it is done as a mere sport and/or for the benefit of struggling souls. S. speaks warmly of the creation of the world by Parameśvara as a mere play—however, stupendous the created world may appear to us. He also speaks in solemn tones about the presence of the Sṛṣṭiśruti and Sarvajñaśruti,—texts which speak of the creation of the world and of God's omniscience as its Creator. But his C. ends with a discordant parenthetical note:

न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः । अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात्, ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्चेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मर्तव्यम् । (S. *BSB*. ii, 1.33).

which pulls down the whole edifice of creation so sincerely built up by the Śruti and the Sūtrakāra.

In doing so, S. is merely going back to his real position as a Vivartavādin that B.'s causality of the Universe is not to be understood in any sense other than that it is the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world. With reference to such a position, the Pūrvapakṣa in the Sūtra on the ground of incompatibility of purpose behind such a creation and the reply to such an objectjon that creation is to be regarded as a sport or pastime of B. are out of tune. The question of Prayojana is absolutely irrelevant to an illusory appearance. No sentient being or insentient entity ever becomes the substratum of an illusory appearance with some specific object or conscious purpose in view or becomes a victim of such illusory experience with such a purpose. As pure consciousness, B. cannot also be conceived as deluding the souls into thinking that a world is there, like a magician, deluding others with an unreal projection.[6] If it is Īśvara equipped with the power of Māyā, and Māyic intentions to delude, the question will arise as to how Īśvara

5. While S. does not explicitly commit himself to such a view, R. has done so; तथैव परस्यापि ब्रह्मणो लीलैव प्रयोजनम् । (*Śrībhāṣya*).
M. expresses his dissent from this view:
क्रीडां प्रयोजनं कृत्वा सृष्टिः श्रुतिविरोधिनी ।
इति केवललीलैव निर्णीता प्रभुणा स्वयम् ॥ (*AV*. ii. 1.33).
सूत्रेऽपि लीलार्थेत्यनुक्त्वा केवललीलेत्येवोक्तम् । (*TC*. p. 893).
Cf. also: भूत्यै निजाश्रितजनस्य हि सृज्यसृष्टा-
वीक्षा बभूव परनामनिमेषकान्ते । (*M.Mbh. TN*. i, 3).
6. मायाविवत् व्यामोहयितृत्वमपि न चिन्मात्रस्य । (*TC*. p. 894 b).

himself comes into the picture—i.e. who projects him? It cannot be the pure consciousness; for it is not a perceiver of anything nor susceptible to illusions and cannot project an Īśvara by its own misconception. The projector of Īśvara cannot be Īśvara Himself lest there should be the fallacy of self-dependence. If it is the Jīvas who are to be the victims of Īśvara's Māyā that project the deluding Īśvara, there will be the fallacy of interdependence.[7]

The *Kalpataru* explains the metaphor of sport as follows:

प्रतिबिम्बगताः पश्यन् ऋजुवक्रादिविक्रियाः ।
पुमान् क्रीडेद्यथा ब्रह्म तथा जीवस्थविक्रियाः ॥
एवं वाचस्पतेर्लीला लीलासूत्रीयसङ्गतिः ॥

"Just as a person may perceive the changing facial expressions and bodily contortions of his own reflected image in a mirror and play with such appearances, the Supreme B. also plays with the changing states of Jīvas who are its own reflections. This is the kind of creation that has been described as a sport of B. here, according to Vācaspati."

The explanation is inadmissible. Samsāra is an experience implicating the real pure-consciousness which is the common-ground of both the Bimba and Pratibimba and in this respect it differs from the changing appearances in the mirror. Granted that a person may play with the reflections of his own self in a mirror under the mistaken impression (according to S.) that the reflections are different from the original, the case is not the same with B. It is free from illusions. It knows that the suffering Jīvas who are its own reflections are really identical with its own being. With such awareness of its own identity with the suffering Jīvas, there can be no room for "playing" with the idea of the latters' misery. The *adhi.* is, therefore, hostile to the interests of Advaita metaphysics and has been sought to be explained away by S. and Vācsapati as a concession to the popular pattern of thinking on the subject of creation and its purpose.

Prof. Ranade refers to the difficulties which beset the view that God creates the world out of compassion for others. He has not, however, indicated what these difficulties are. They are evidently on a par with those referred to by Vācaspati in his Pūrvapakṣa on Sūtra ii. 1. 32:—*Pareṣām copakāryāṇām abhāvena tadupakārāyāpi pravṛtter abhāvāt*. It would, however, be enough to say that this difficulty would not arise in a strictly Vedāntic position such as the one set forth in ii, 1.35-37 wherein the souls as well as their Karmas are recognized

7. नापि कल्पितस्य मायासंकल्पादिविशिष्टस्य । तत्प्रति तस्यैव कल्पकत्वे आत्माश्रयात् – तद्व्यामोहनीयानां जीवानां कल्पकत्वे त्वन्योन्याश्रयात् – चिन्मात्रस्य चाद्रष्टृत्वेनाकल्पकत्वात् । कल्पकं च विना कल्पनायोगात् । (*TC*. p. 599 b).

to be *anādi* and the varying trends of their karma are also taken to be intrinsic to their distinctive Svabhāvas. It is, however, doubtful if the idiom of traditional Vedānta would agree to the use of the term "final cause" to the creator and the purpose of the creator.

Ranade writes: "On the whole, Bādarāyaṇa does seem to incline to the view of Līlā. But is sport an explanation of the creation of the world? Obviously the answer is No, as Līlā is too personal" (*Op. cit.* p. 99). The misconception here is due to the inability to appreciate the significance of the term *kaivalyam* added to līlā in the Sūtra. The difference in meaning between Līlā and Līlākaivalyam has been brought out by J. in his *NS.*

Ranade writes further: "Gauḍapāda seems to offer a better solution. His doctrine of non-creation (Ajāti) is original. We must, however, not lose sight of the fact that he once regards creation even as an emanation (*svabhāva*). It is the nature of God to send fulgurations: *Devasyaiṣa svabhāvo 'yam*" (*Op. cit* p. 99). This must be sufficient to show that the Ajātivādin Gauḍapāda cannot be the author of the Kārikās of the Āgama Prakaraṇa where verses like *Icchāmātram prabhos sṛṣṭih: Devasyaiṣa svabhāvoyam* occur. Moreover the *Āgama Prakaraṇa* refers to various theories on creation—both realistic and idealistic such as *Vibhūtivāda. Krīḍārthavāda, Bhogārthavāda* and *Svapna-māyāsarūpavāda—but not to Ajātivāda.* An Ajātivādin Gauḍapāda who regards the one reality of his acceptance as "Nirviśeṣa" can hardly afford to speak of "emanation" or "flow" of the created world from such a Being. Nor is emanation or flow the rightful meaning of the Sanskrit term "Svabhāva".[8]

In conclusion Ranade observes: "The problem of the creation of the world by God defies explanation and no solution appears to be final" (p. 99). It is no compliment to Vedānta as the culmination of Indian thought if such is to be its finding on the problem. His other statement that "after all none can boast of having given a rational explanation of God's ways" should go to support the Sūtrakāra's stand that B.'s causality of the Universe is a truth that has to be accepted on the final authority of Śāstra.

8. The Nirviśeṣavādin would have difficulty in accounting for the periodicity of the "flow" if it is to be viewed as '*Svabhāva*' of the Nirviśeṣa-B. (स्वभावस्यानपायात्.)

CHAPTER LVI

CHARGES OF PARTIALITY AND CRUELTY IN GOD'S CREATION ANSWERED

10. *Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhikaraṇam* (ii, 1, 35-37)

This is a very important *adhi.* from the point of view of the problem of Evil in religion and philosophy and its reconciliation with the goodness, mercifulness and omnipotence of the Deity. It refutes the principal objection to the theory elaborated in the previous *adhi.* that Creation, sustenance, etc. of the world by God is for the benefit of the creatures.

If God has created the world for the benefit of the souls, every one in the world should be happy and prosperous and there should be no suffering, disease, poverty and ignorance for any one. The inequalities in endowments and opportunities so glaringly noticeable in human life are a sufficient indictment of the theory that God acts for the well-being of His creatures in creating the world. This *adhi.*, therefore, vindicates the fundamental position of Theism that God is not to be charged with partiality and cruelty in ordering the world as we find it —with a wide range of inequalities at all levels and that there is a rational explanation of these facts of life.

The main point to be considered in this *adhi.* is whether God is liable to the charges mentioned, in making some persons happy and prosperous and creating others in misery and unhappiness. To answer this question satisfactorily, it has to be settled further whether God deals with his creatures without reference to their beginningless Karma and intrinsic fitness and other factors or with due reference to them. To decide this matter again, we have to go into the question whether

such beginningless Karma, intrinsic fitness, etc. of souls are independent of God or whether, like the souls, they are also by hypothesis dependent on God. To settle this question, we have to consider further whether in the event of their being metaphysically dependent on God, the kind of differential treatment meted out to souls by God in making some happy and others unhappy in accordance with their own nature and intrinsic fitness (which have no beginning in time) will have to be regarded as a blemish of Divine character *merely because it involves a differential treatment* of persons, *or because such a differential treatment would constitute a violation of the moral law and principles of natural justice* as accepted by the Śrutis.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is as follows. The position established in the previous *adhi.* that creation, sustenance, etc., of the world by God is for the benefit of the creatures is untenable. In that case, all the creatures should be happy and prosperous for all time. But in reality God has made some happy and others miserable. For these reasons He must be adjudged to be guilty of partiality and pitilessness. It cannot be contended that this is not the fault of God, as He acts according to the Karmas of their previous lives. For we read in the Śruti that God Himself makes some persons do good and some others do bad deeds.[1] This makes it clear that their previous good or bad Karmas also are caused by Him. He cannot, therefore, be acquitted of His responsibility for this state of affairs.

It is not a convincing reply to this objection that God makes the souls do good or bad Karmas not arbitrarily by a fiat of His will but by making each subsequent good or bad depend on the corresponding good or bad karma of the still earlier life and that as this chain of good and bad Karma has no identifiable beginning, the whole series of Karma is beginningless. It has already been established in the *Ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa* (ii, 1.15-21) that the very existence of beginningless Karma and the intrinsic nature of matter and souls are all dependent on God without exception. Hence, it is impossible to keep away the defects of partiality and pitilessness from God's treatment of the souls. On the other hand, if we accept the position that the beginningless Karma and nature of souls are *not* in any way dependent on God, and exist in their own right, the sovereignty, and independence of God as the One Supreme Being will cease to have any meaning. Such a B. would cease to be the Perfect Being that it is claimed to be and none but the perfect being can be the source of all.

1. एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति यं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति, एष ह्येवासाधुकर्म कारयति. . . .
(*Kauṣ. Up.* iii, 8).

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta points out that as God rewards and punishes persons according to their own good or bad deeds and in doing so He gives due regard to the moral law of the Śruti, He cannot be deemed to be guilty of any partiality or cruelty.

To the objection that the Karma of a previous life which is taken into account by God in ordering the present is equally due to God Himself and depends on Him and that, therefore, He would still be liable to partiality and cruelty, in rewarding some and punishing others on that basis, the answer is given in the second Sūtra (ii, 1.36) that the chain of Karma goes back indefinitely and enables God at each preceding stage to take into account the nature of the Karma of still earlier stage. This Sūtra also answers the further objection to this that where the last link terminates there the trouble of Vaiṣamya would start by pointing out that the series of Karma has no recognizable beginning. It is *anādi.*

It may still be argued that even this dependence on *anādikarma* may not save the Deity from the charges; for *anādikarma* and the respective natures of souls from which they have to flow, must also be admitted to be dependent on God, on the evidence of the Śrutis. We seem thus to be forced into a stalemate and find ourselves in a blind alley.

The next Sūtra *Upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca* (ii, 1.37) sends a new ray of light and helps to solve the riddle. In his interpretation of this Sūtra M. asks us to consider calmly whether this particular form of partiality and pitilessness would really amount to a defect of character in B. in the sense that He can no longer be regarded as being equitable to all in His dealings; or because such conduct on His part would be opposed to the desirable virtue of "equality" to all. It is no use being carried away by misplaced sentimentalism and loose thinking in such matters. We have to do some rigorous thinking and accept the position that in respect of the moral law: पुण्येन पुण्यं लोकं नयति पापेन पापम् । (*Praśna Up.* iii, 7) and its bearing on the Karma theory, the correct meaning of "equity" and "equality" should be understood as consisting in acting in strict accordance with the beginningless diversities of fitness of different persons and not flouting or interfering with them with impunity or upsetting them to suit one's whims and fancies. God is said to be equally disposed towards all in the sense that He does not confer rewards on His devotees in excess of their merits or deserts or punish offenders out of proportion to their offences. Treating every one according to his or her deserts, dealing with people as they ought to be treated, according to time, place, regulations and merits of each case, is true "Samatva" (equality of behavior or treat-

ment).[2] Yama the god of Death is called '*Samavartī* (*Amara Kośa*. i.115) —equal in his dealings—as he has no preferences and exclusions and spares none whose time is up. The Gita verse (v.18), which says Jñānins look upon the learned Brahmin, the dog and the elephant equally, should be understood as emphasizing the point that the Divine Being is present in equal measure in all persons and things high and low and the Jñānī sees this Supreme Being as equally present in the different persons unaffected by their difference of status.

The objection that God does not deal with all persons equally needs to be properly analysed. Is it intended to be suggested that He is not equal in his treatment because He has brought into being a diversity of natures—instead of reducing all to a stark uniformity; or because He overrides their beginningless and fundamental natures in some cases; or because tho' competent to do so, He does *not* do so; or because He exercises control over the smooth working of beginningless natures of beings from which their diverse propensities of Karma flow?

These may be answered thus. There is no question of God putting different natures into different souls when He creates them. For, there is no creation of souls as such in the Vedānta. They exist without having had a beginning. There is no question of not changing the nature of persons tho' God is competent to do so; for it is God's nature to reward persons according to their beginningless, intrinsic nature expressed thro' their Karmas. There is no question of being partial when God chooses to exercise proper control over the smooth working of the diversity of natures and sees that there is no miscarriage of justice. One who does not choose to change the intrinsic nature of things or persons tho' competent to do so cannot for that reason be dubbed as being partial in allowing the natures of things to develop as they are constituted. That God maintains and controls the smooth working out of the intrinsic nature and potentialities of things and persons is quite consistent with His unlimited freedom and sovereignty and it does not entail any diminution of His powers.[3] This does not mean that He is wanting in compassion. It would be misplaced compassion to aid the undeserving and God does not choose to do so. Otherwise, one may blame Him for not choosing to convert the wrong into the right.

2. उक्तं हि —

'सेवायोगातिरेकेण स्वानामपि न दास्यति ।
अपराधातिरेकेण नान्यस्यातः समो हरिः ।
यत्र यस्य यथावृत्तिर्विहिता वर्तनं तथा ।
ज्ञानं वापि समत्वं तत् विषमत्वं ततोऽन्यथा ।। इति च ।।

3. स्वभावनियामकत्वस्य निरतिशयस्वातंत्र्यरूपमहागुणानुगुणत्वेन नीचतानापादकत्वात् । (*TC*. p. 896-97 b).

It will thus be seen that in his interpretation of this *adhi.* M. has taken a definite step forward and gone beyond the usual explanation of *anādikarmavaicitrya* in finding an answer to the charge of Vaiṣamya and Nairghṛṇya levelled against God in Theism. He is the first Vedāntic thinker to ground *anādikarmavaicitrya* where it ought to be grounded—viz. on *anādisvarūpayogyatā* of individuals, if God in Theism is to be properly cleared of the charge of Vaiṣamya. The *TC* of Vyāsarāja pinpoints this truth with its inexorable logic:—

तस्मादनादियोग्यतानङ्गीकारे वैषम्यादि दुर्वारम् । (P. 898)

There is no getting away from this hard truth. We have to come to the same conclusion even if we call to aid the other doctrine of Anāditva of *Samsāra* as S. and others have sought to do. To the objection that Karma cannot be the cause of inequality as all beings must be equal at the first creation, S. has replied that the very conception of the first creation has no sense in it. "There is always the sprout of desires or Vāsanās in Jīvas. Which can be regarded as the first—the sprout or the seed?" If this means that even in the primordial state of undifferenced existence, Vāsanās lie embedded deep in the core of Jīvas, it should stand to reason that they should be "Vāsanās" intrinsic to the core of individuality and not external to its being. We may call this Svarūpavāsanā the 'Śraddhā' of the individual, in the expressive language of the *Gītā* (XVII.3):—

सत्त्वानुरूपा सर्वस्य श्रद्धा भवति भारत ।
श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुषो यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः ।।

M. has made a brilliant suggestion here by pointing out in his *Gītā-Tātparya* that Sattva here signifies Jīva: **सत्त्वानुरूपा जीवानुरूपा ।** The reason why *anādivāsanās* of different persons should differ from one another's can only be that the Jīvasvarūpas themselves are fundamentally different. There can be no other explanation. By his discovery and application of this truth M. has been able to make a distinctive contribution to the discussion of the problem of Evil in Theism.[4]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. (and R.) God is, like the rains to the crops, only the common cause (*Sādhāraṇam kāraṇam*[5]) of the diversities in the

4. For further discussion of this problem see my *Philosophy of Madhvacarya* Chap. VII. pp. 261-69. See also:

यद्यनादिर्विशेषो न सांप्रतं कथमिष्यते ।
अदृष्टादेव चादृष्टं स्वीकृतं सर्ववादिभिः ।
आकस्मिको विशेषश्चेददृष्टे क्वचिदिष्यते ।
सर्वत्राकस्मिकत्वं स्यान्नादृष्टापेक्षिता क्वचित् ।
अदृष्टाच्चेद्विशेषोऽयमनादित्वं कुतो न तत्? (*AV*. iii, 4, *adh*. 5-6).

5. एवमीश्वरो देवमनुष्यादिसृष्टौ साधारणं कारणं भवति । (S.*BSB*. ii, 1.34).

endowments of creatures and the disparities of their lot. It is the karmas of individuals which, like the various seeds, are specific causes of the diversity of nature and dispositions. It is, therefore, illegitimate to charge God with any kind of partiality or cruelty.

This is an oversimplification of the problem. It will not do to dispose of God as just a "common cause" in creation. The *Kauṣītakī Up.* (iii, 8) speaks of Him as making whomsoever He wishes to lead up from this world do good deeds and the one whom He wishes to pull down do bad deeds. This makes it difficult to save God from the clutches of the Pūrvapakṣa.

Even the acceptance of the familiar theory of beginningless karma as the basis of diversities will not solve the difficulty. For, in a Theism, even beginningless karma will have to be placed under the control of God to shape as He pleases. Such an objection will reopen the question of partiality. *And such an objection will have to be raised sooner or later by the Vedānta itself in self-criticism and a solution found by pursuing a fresh line of thinking going beyond the familiar one of anāditva of Samsāra.* The *anāditva* of Samsāra only means that Jīvas must be *anādi.* But it does not explain why anādi-Jīvas should differ to the extent of originating wide differences in their karmas—unless such differences are ingrained in them. And the God who takes such differences into account cannot be pronounced to be partial.

The Sūtras *Na Karmāvibhāgād iti enna anāditvāt* and *Upapadyate cāpyupalabhyate ca* have, therefore, to be understood as coming to grips with this moot problem by going beyond the theory of *anādi-karma.*[6] Instead of pressing forward in that direction S. and R. have tried to solve the difficulty by appealing to the beginninglessness of *Samsāra* and establish it with special arguments in the concluding Sūtra:

उपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यते च ।

But the *anāditva of Samsāra* is an accepted doctrine and has already been sufficiently established by the Sūtrakāra in i, 3, 30. The second sūtra could, therefore, have been used to better purpose as referring to the anāditva of the Karmic series itself and the third Sūtra could have been used with better purpose to meet the inevitable objection that *notwithstanding the acceptance of Anādikarma, the difficulty of Vaiṣamya is not solved as such Karma also must be caused by God.*[7] By grounding anādikarmavaicitrya in the Jīvasvarūpa or Svarūpa-

6. The term *avibhāga* in this exigency could admit of the sense of not existing independently of B. Cf. the usage of 'Vibhāga' in the sense of independent status of brothers after partition of paternal property: *Vibhaktā bhrātaraḥ.*
7. This objection has not been anticipated or dealt with by S. or R. It is, however, a crucial objection.

yogyatā and showing how God deals with the souls in accordance with their *anādiyogyatā*, as it expresses itself in different ways, the impartiality of God stands fully and finally vindicated without loss of His prestige or sovereignty in the manner already explained.

The Advaitic B. serves merely as the substratum of world-appearance. There is no room for any doubt or objection regarding partiality and cruelty arising in respect of such a B. If it is the Īśvara or Saguṇa B., acting as a Magician, that is the creator of the world-appearance—the Māyic Īśvara, like the magician, cannot see the Karmic and other ingredients created out of his Māyā. In the circumstances, He cannot reasonably be said to depend on or take into account such disparities of individual Karma in bringing about corresponding disparities in rewards and punishments.[8]

The question whether the author of the world has any motive or purpose in creating the world as well as the other one whether He can be accused of partiality and cruelty in causing inequalities and unhappiness to people are both irrelevant to a monistic and acosmic metaphysics like S.'s. A magician indulging in a magical show of maimed and deformed creatures side by side with happy and smiling people is hardly to be accused of partiality and cruelty to his creations. The *Bhāmatī* itself readily confesses to the futility of taking the problem seriously.[9]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. also holds that B. is only the operative cause in creation while the material cause is constituted by the potentialities (*Karmaśakti*) of the persons to be created. His commentator explains that the Jīvas perform good or bad deeds with the initiative power which is required for the performance of good or bad deeds conferred on them by God Himself. God holds Himself aloof when the Jīvas indulge in bad deeds but commends them when they do good. Hence there is no partiality or cruelty.

This explanation too does not go far enough. If God gives complete freedom to the souls and the latter act on such freedom they cannot very well be conceived to be the 'body' of B. as R.'s theory would require. With such complete independence of initiative it would

8. परेषां त्विदमधिकरणमसङ्गतम् । भ्रान्तत्वेन वा भ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वेन वा वैषम्यादिशंकानुदयात् । न हि स्वप्नेऽयं सुख्ययं दुःखीति भ्रान्तिमतः तद्विषयस्य वा वैषम्याद्यस्ति । मायावित्वे च, ईश्वरस्य स्वमायाकल्पितकर्मादिज्ञाना-योगेन, तत्सापेक्षत्वोक्त्ययोगात् ।
9. अभ्युपेत्य च सृष्टेस्तात्त्विकत्वमिदमुक्तम् । अनिर्वाच्यातु सृष्टिरिति न प्रस्मर्तव्यमत्रापि । तथाच, मायाकारस्ये-वाङ्गसाकल्यवैकल्यभेदेन विचित्रान् प्राणिनो दर्शयतो न वैषम्यदोषः, सहसा संहरतो वा न नैर्घृण्यम् ।
(*Bhāmatī.* ii, 1.34).

be difficult to explain how and why some Jīvas persist in choosing the wrong path and go the wrong way.

R.'s contention that God having conferred the initiative freedom on the Jīvas remains neutral when the latter indulge in bad deeds is open to the objection that if God remains indifferent or neutral in spite of his competence to intervene and restrain, He lays Himself open to the charge of cruelty. If the neutrality is due to incompetence to restrain, the claims made in the Śrutis and Sūtras regarding the wonderful powers of God (*Śvet. Up.* vi.8; *BS.* ii, 1.29; 31) would be inappropriate.

CHAPTER LVII

CONCEPT OF BRAHMAN AS NIRDOṢAGUṆAPŪRṆA UPHELD

11. *Sarvadharmopapattyadhikaraṇam* (ii, 1.38)

In the previous *adhi.s* the opposition from reasoning to B.'s causality of the world and other auspicious attributes and absence of defects had been considered with reference to one particular auspicious attribute or absence of defect in each case. This being the concluding *adhi.* of this Pāda, the Sūtrakāra takes the opportunity of establishing in a omprehensive manner how there is no Yuktivirodha in accepting the doctrine of B. as Sarvaguṇapūrṇa and Sarvadoṣavarjita *at the same time.*

The opposition from reasoning to this unitary concept of B. as *Nirdoṣaguṇapūrṇam* may be presented as follows. A person possessing desirable virtues is sometimes found to have certain defects and undesirable qualities. That being the normal experience of life, if B. is accepted as having certain desirable qualities, It may be expected to have certain imperfections also.[1] Conversely, if B. has no undesirable qualities or defects, It may be devoid of desirable qualities as well. We cannot, therefore, have a Being possessed wholly and solely of all good qualities and having no single defect or blemish.[2] The conception of such a Being is logically impossible.

The Siddhānta is that there is nothing illogical in conceiving of B. as the abode of all auspicious attributes together with being absolute-

1. सर्वे चेतना अपूर्णगुणा दोषिणश्च दृष्टाः । तद्दृष्टान्तेन चेतनत्वादीश्वरस्यापि समासव्यासाभ्यां अपूर्णगुणत्वं दोषित्वं च स्यादिति पूर्वः पक्षोऽत्राधिकरणे निरस्यते । (*NS.* p. 312 b).
2. न तु चेतनान्तरेष्वदृष्टा सर्वगुणपूर्तिः दोषमात्रराहित्यं चेति । (*TC.* p. 899).

ly devoid of any imperfection whatsoever. The presence of an imperfection in a person or thing is evidence merely of his or its inability to get rid of it and the absence of good qualities in a person or thing is similarly evidence of inability to acquire the good qualities. But B. is *Sarvadharmopapannam*—in the words of the Sūtrakāra. This can be construed in two different ways viz. (i) that B. is always the one that has attained all the good qualities or auspicious attributes, in so far as it is, while being desirous of possessing such auspicious attributes, capable of *realising its wish* (ii) In the same way, B. is always free from all the defects and undesirable qualities in so far as it is while being desirous of getting rid of all imperfections fully *competent to get rid of them.*[3]

The desire to possess desirable qualities and get rid of undesirable ones can be easily posited of B. in so far as it is Svatantra and has sound judgment (prekṣāvat).[4] The term Sarvadharma** in the Sūtra thus denotes the presence of all Guṇas and the absence of all defects in B. The wording of the Sūtra is obviously hostile to Nirguṇa (or Nirdharmaka)—Brahmavāda.[5]

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3. Read: द्वेधा हि वस्तु न प्राप्यते – तत्र स्वातंत्र्याभावाद्वा, प्रेप्साभावात् वा। द्वेधा च न हीयते, स्वातंत्र्याभावाद्वा जिहासाभावाद्वा । अस्ति तावदीश्वरस्य सर्वस्वातंत्र्यं, अस्ति च मया सर्वदा आनन्दादिगुणवता दुःखादिदोष-वर्जितेन च भाव्यमितीच्छा; प्रेक्षावत्वात् । अतः कथं तस्य आनन्दादिगुणपूर्णत्वं दुःखादिसर्वदोषदूरत्वं च न संभवति ? (*NS.* p. 312).
4. ब्रह्म सदा प्राप्तसर्वसद्गुणम्; तत्प्रेप्सुत्वे सति, तत्र शक्तत्वात्, सम्मतवत् । तथा, सदा त्यक्तसर्वदोषम्; तज्जिहासुत्वे सति तत्र शक्तत्वात्, सम्मतवत् । प्रेप्सादिकं च प्रेक्षावत्त्वेनेत्युपपत्त्यनुगृहीतया सौत्र-चशब्दोपात्तया श्रुत्या, गुणदोषाभावरूपसर्वधर्मसिद्धिरिति । (*TC.* p. 899-900*b*).
5. इदं सूत्रं सर्वधर्मविनिर्मुक्तब्रह्मवादिनां प्रतिकूलमिति स्फुटमेव । (*TC.* p. 900*b*).

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	Nyāyavivaraṇam	—do—
	Chāndogya Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. Bhāṣya	—do—
	Aitareya Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Taittirīya Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Kaṭha Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Muṇḍaka Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Māṇḍūkya Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Praśna Up.Bhāṣya	—do—
	Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya	—do—
	Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya	—do—
	Gītābhāṣya	—do—
	Gītātātparyanirṇaya	—do—
	Tattvasamkhyāna	—do—
	Tattvodyota	—do—
	Māyāvādakhaṇḍana	—do—
	Upādhikaṇḍana	—do—
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8	35	*kyac*	*kyap*
15	fn. 1	Bharatīvajaya	Bhāratīvijaya
19	33	own Aṇubhāṣya (ii, 7, 11)	*own Aṇu-Bhāṣya* (ii, 1, 11).
35	fn. 3 and 4		Change *only* the nos. 3 and 4 into 4 and 3
60	fn. 18	critism	criticism
81	fn. 5	(Raghu *TPB* i.1.40)	(Raghu *TPB*. i, 1, 4)
83	fn. 14	धूमधिवासनम्	धूमाधिवासनम्
99	8	desparate	desperate
105	8	son on	so on
122	fn. 1	अहितं	आहितं
	15	*Pādo asyā*	*Pādo asya*
125	fn. 3	(*TPC* i, 1, 28)	(*TCP* i, 1, 28)
128	8	(BS. i.1)	(BS. i, 1, 30)
130	4	deserving person	deserving person in support of the Pūrvapakṣa.
139	2	(Vaiśvānara)	Vaiśvānara
178	fn. 33	(*TC* 573 *ab*)	(*TC* 513 *ab*).
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283	8	the five people	the five five people